Confronting Urban Displacement: Social Movement Participation and Post-Eviction Resettlement Success in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates whether urban social movement participation influences post-eviction resettlement success. Social movement are increasingly seen as a means through which marginalized groups can confront international development challenges, among which forced evictions represent a large and growing problem. Pre- and post-eviction interviews were conducted with sixty-four slum dwellers from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, including members of the Tanzania Federation of the Urban Poor (TFUP). The majority of interviewees reported improved post-eviction housing, but adverse employment impacts. TFUP membership was negatively associated with employment outcomes, particularly for property owners. Expecting TFUP to secure housing for them, members delayed finding accommodation. This led to resettlement further from their former homes and negatively impacted employment. Women's post-eviction pay fell due to the nature and location of their pre-eviction work.

INTRODUCTION

This paper investigates whether participation in an urban social movement – specifically the Tanzania Federation of the Urban Poor (TFUP) – influences post-eviction resettlement success. It draws on detailed pre- and post-eviction interviews with a sample of 64 slum dwellers from Kurasini, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The paper first describes evictees' resettlement outcomes with respect to housing, employment, income and resettlement distance. Drawing on qualitative and quantitative evaluations of interviewees' resettlement accounts, it then evaluates whether social movement participation influenced post-eviction resettlement success.

This study is relevant to urban planners and policymakers because, especially in the

developing world, there is a hope that grassroots mobilization can serve as a means for marginalized groups to effectively address international development challenges in the face of limited state resources or willingness to provide for their needs (Zaidi 1999). The paper investigates the influence of urban social movement participation around an episode of involuntary post-eviction resettlement, an increasingly frequent event in the developing world (Olds, Bunnel and Leckie 2002) and a growing locus for grassroots mobilization. Forced evictions and involuntary resettlement of individuals, families and communities rank among the most widespread human rights violations in the world: in 2007-8, 1.59 million people were affected by forced evictions (COHRE 2009).

Despite the large number of urban evictions taking place worldwide, there has been limited research on involuntary urban resettlement, especially in the developing world (Scudder 2005; Olds, Bunnel and Leckie 2002). By following a group of extremely poor evictees (with an average household income of 2.93 US dollars per day[i]) through the eviction process – from before eviction to after resettlement – this paper contributes to literatures on both the dynamics of social movement participation and the consequences of evictions. While centered on a single case study in Tanzania, the findings are applicable in a wide variety of similar contexts. The economic and political forces currently shaping Dar es Salaam and around which TFUP mobilizes – including increasing demand for the marginal land on which the poor live – also influence other cities in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world (Smets 2002). The form of social movement mobilization adopted by slum dwellers in this case study is increasingly employed by slum dweller groups around the world (Weru 2004), and this enhances the potential applicability of the results to other cities. Given that over 70 percent of the urban population in most Sub-Saharan African countries reside in slums

(Izutsu and Tsutsumi 2009), many of which face the threat of eviction, the study's findings are widely relevant.

This paper centers on a case study of mobilization around evictions in Dar es Salaam's Kurasini ward, which lies adjacent to the city's port and is home to over 34,500 people (Figure 1). Plans to "reorganise the land use pattern [of Kurasini] to provide more land for storage of transit goods" have circulated since 2001, when the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development published the Kurasini Area Redevelopment Plan (Government of Tanzania 2001). In October 2007, the first wave of evictees from Kurasini were ordered to leave their homes. Following Tanzanian practice, property owners received some compensation upon eviction for lost property while renters received none.[ii] Rather than simply representing an example of eminent domain, the eviction in Kurasini falls under the rubric of a forced eviction because the process by which the eviction was carried out lacked transparency and was enforced under threat of physical force by government officials. A number of additional factors highlight the forced nature of the eviction: compensation values were not disclosed until the moments immediately prior to eviction, residents were made to confirm acceptance of their compensation packages before viewing the values on their individual checks, compensation values varied widely between households, compensation was paid in the presence of bulldozers, armed police and police dogs, and physical altercations took place between the police and individuals who questioned the eviction process (Kisembo, 2008).

Figure 1. Map showing the location of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (top right) and Kurasini ward (bottom). Sources: googlemaps.

TFUP, Tanzania's national slum dweller movement, is built on a nation-wide network of community savings groups and has 1700 members in 30 savings groups across the country (Ndezi 2009). Prior to eviction, Kurasini ward was home to seven of these groups, accounting for approximately 300 members between them.[iii] While ostensibly organized around the issue of daily savings and the granting of small loans to members, TFUP also has strong movement dimensions, with the savings groups serving as the basis for more political and risky forms of mobilization around local land, housing and sanitation issues (Hooper 2010). TFUP is associated with Slum Dwellers International (SDI), a global network of slum dweller movements.

The principal pre-eviction mobilization effort undertaken by TFUP members in Kurasini was an enumeration of to-be-evicted neighborhoods. Enumerations consist of a population census and comprehensive mapping of plots and households (Weru, 2004). Enumerations have several goals: they demonstrate that marginalized communities have the capacity for self organization, generate data that give a tangible identity to slum residents and serve as the basis for lobbying. Accepting the Kurasini eviction would go ahead, TFUP used the data generated through the enumeration to lobby government for a grant of land for community resettlement.[iv] Movement organizers attempted to convince authorities in municipal and national agencies responsible for land administration that they should provide a grant of land to which evictees could move before they were forced to leave their homes in Kurasini.[v] While no direct promises were made to members by movement organizers concerning resettlement, the idea that evicted TFUP members would receive a grant of land became well established in evictees' everyday discussions and planning, not least as a result of brainstorming exercises in which members worked with local architects to visualize their post-eviction homes.

The TFUP movement focused their lobbying exclusively on the housing-related consequences of the eviction. Movement organizers expected that it would be very difficult for evictees to secure satisfactory post-eviction housing and believed a grant of land for resettlement would help offset these adverse housing impacts.[vi] Six months after eviction, at the time post-eviction interviews were conducted, these efforts had still been unsuccessful and residents had received no grant of land or group resettlement assistance. As a result, residents were responsible for individually identifying post-eviction housing options on their own and carrying out their own resettlement.

Tarrow (1998, 4) defines a social movement as "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities." By engaging in a sustained, public mobilization effort around the Kurasini eviction and by consistently demanding government authorities provide land for resettlement, TFUP members made a strong collective claim on the Tanzanian state. In this way, TFUP satisfies the definitional requirements of being a social movement. While TFUP may be smaller in scale and scope than the kinds of movements that have dominated social movement scholarship in Europe and the US, it is nonetheless representative of the increasingly wide range of relatively small, yet transnationally connected movements taking root across the developing world (Batliwala 2002).

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Pre- and post-eviction interviews were conducted with a sample of 64 slum dwellers in Kurasini between July 2007 and July 2008. All individuals were interviewed before and six months after eviction. Interviews were conducted in English and Swahili by the first author and a research assistant. Interviewees were selected by virtue of being in the first cohort of evictees and were evicted between October and December 2007. All TFUP members from this first evictee cohort known to movement organizers were interviewed. Non-members were identified through a call for interviewees circulated in Kurasini and respondents who lived closest to a randomly chosen interview site were selected as interviewees. Post-eviction interviews with all individuals in the sample were conducted six months after eviction. Only one evictee per household was interviewed. Interviewees were not paid for their participation, but were compensated for travel to the interview venue. Pre- and post-eviction interviews lasted approximately two hours and, although structured around a common set of questions, were open-ended.

Table 1 and Figure 2 provide a breakdown of the evictee sample. The group of 64 interviewees consisted of 43 TFUP members and 21 non-members. The sample was weighted towards TFUP members because the wider research project, of which this paper is one part, was focused on the dynamics of movement membership and more time was allocated to interviewing members than non-members. The evictee sample consisted of 64.1 percent owners and 35.9 percent renters. With respect to gender, the sample included 60.9 percent women and 39.1 percent men. The dominance of females in the sample in part reflects the predominance of women in the TFUP movement, which like many African social movement organizations began as a women's movement. The relatively small sample size means that care must be taken in interpreting the results of the interviews.

Table 1. Composition of the study sample (n = 64)

Interviewee Attributes	(%)	(%)
TFUP Membership	Members (67.2)	Non-Members (32.8)
Pre-Eviction Property Ownership Status	Owners (64.1)	Renters (35.9)
Gender	Female (60.9)	Male (39.1)

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                        Total Evictee Sample
                               (64)
                  /                         \
        TFUP Members                          Non-Members
           (43)                                  (21)
        /        \                            /         \
   Owners        Renters               Owners          Renters
    (24)          (19)                  (17)             (4)
   /    \        /    \                /    \           /    \
Women    Men  Women    Men         Women    Men     Women    Men
 (13)   (11)  (12)     (7)          (12)    (5)      (2)      (2)
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
Figure 2. Evictee sample breakdown in terms of TFUP membership, owner/renter status and gender (n = 64)

The paper's analysis proceeds in two parts. The first draws on evictees' interview transcripts to identify key patterns in post-eviction resettlement success. Resettlement success was assessed in terms of housing, employment, household income and resettlement distance. Post- versus pre-eviction housing was evaluated by interviewees on a scale of worse/same/improved in terms of physical setting [vii], security of tenure[viii] and cost. Post-versus pre-eviction employment (also evaluated according to worse/same/improved) was assessed in terms of travel time to work, hours worked, status[ix], security[x] and pay. Post-versus pre-eviction household income was gauged in terms of percent change in income. Resettlement distance was evaluated in terms of kilometers between the evictees' post- and pre-eviction places of residence. The second stage of the analysis undertakes a more detailed qualitative and quantitative examination of evictees' resettlement accounts. These accounts were evaluated qualitatively by identifying key themes and issues across interview transcripts. They were also evaluated quantitatively by tabulating and coding responses to determine whether patterns identified in evictees' accounts were statistically significant.

PATTERNS OF RESETTLEMENT SUCCESS

Interviewees' post-eviction resettlement outcomes are described below in terms of housing, employment, household income and resettlement distance.

Post-Eviction Housing

For all measures of post-eviction housing, a majority of interviewed evictees reported their housing situation as improved (ranging from 54.7 percent, for housing cost, to 87.5 percent for housing location) (Table 2). This is striking since TFUP's mobilization efforts focused on the adverse housing related impacts of the eviction. Contrary to TFUP movement organizers' expectations, and despite not gaining a grant of land for resettlement at the time post-eviction interviews were conducted, post-eviction housing conditions worsened for only a small minority of evictees.

Table 2. Evictee assessments of post- versus pre-eviction housing, in percent of interviewees answering in each category (n=64).

	Housing *Physical Setting*	Housing *Tenure Security*	Housing *Cost*
Worse	3.1	4.7	12.5
Same	9.4	39.1	32.8
Improved	87.5	56.2	54.7

Post-Eviction Employment

For all measures of post-eviction employment, a minority of evictees reported improved conditions, ranging from a low of 1.8 percent for travel time to work to a high of 22.8 percent for hours of work (Table 3). The number of interviewees who provided responses concerning employment was less than the full sample, since evictees who were unemployed prior to and after eviction did not answer some employment-related questions. For three of the five measures a majority of evictees reported their post-eviction employment situation as

the same as that before eviction, while for the remaining two – travel time and pay – a majority reported their post-eviction status as worse. The most negative change concerned travel time to work, with 78.9 percent of evictees reporting worsened conditions after resettlement. Individual pay also suffered, with nearly half (49.1 percent) reporting worsened post-eviction pay.

Table 3. Evictee assessments of post- versus pre-eviction employment conditions, in percent of interviewees answering in each category (n=57).

	Employment *Travel Time*	Employment *Hours of Work*	Employment *Status*	Employment *Security*	Employment *Pay*
Worse	78.9	17.5	7.0	10.5	49.1
Same	19.3	59.7	73.7	77.2	36.9
Improved	1.8	22.8	19.3	12.3	14.0

Post-Eviction Household Income

The majority of interviewed evictees (59.4 percent) reported their household income as improved following eviction, compared with their pre-eviction circumstances (Table 4). The average post-eviction household income of evictees was 169,000 TSh/month, compared with 118,000 TSh/month prior to eviction, a 43.2 percent increase. On first glance, these results appear to conflict with those from the previous section, which showed that only a small minority of evictees (14.0 percent) reported increased pay following eviction and that 49.1 percent reported a fall in pay. This seeming contradiction will be addressed in greater detail in the paper's analysis of resettlement narratives.

Table 4. Evictee assessments of post- versus pre-eviction household income, in percent of interviewees answering in each category (n=64).

	Post-Eviction Change in Household Income (%)
Worse	29.7
Same	10.9
Improved	59.4

Post-Eviction Resettlement Distances

Post-eviction owners resettled significantly further than post-eviction renters from their former homes (Student's T-Test, p = 0.000). On average, post-eviction owners resettled 4.5 kms from their former homes, compared with 1.3 kms for post-eviction renters. The resettlement locations of post-eviction owners also exhibited considerably more variation than those of renters. Post-eviction owners had a range of 17.0 kms in resettlement locations, while post-eviction renters had a range of only 3.7 kms. Finally, among post-eviction owners, but not renters, TFUP members resettled significantly further from their former homes than non-members (Student's T-Test, p = 0.006). Post-eviction owners who were TFUP members resettled an average of 6.0 kms from their former homes, compared with 2.3 kms for owners who were non-members. The reason for these different resettlement distances will be examined in more detail in later sections, drawing on evictees' accounts of resettlement.

ANALYSIS OF RESETTLEMENT ACCOUNTS

This section of the paper examines evictees' accounts of resettlement to better understand the ways in which social movement participation influenced post-eviction resettlement success. It also addresses an apparent contradiction identified in the description of resettlement outcomes, which showed that post-eviction individual pay fell while household incomes increased.

TFUP Membership and Resettlement Success

Member Expectations and Delayed Housing Search

Evictees' narratives indicate that TFUP membership influenced resettlement outcomes by conditioning evictees' resettlement expectations and adversely influencing their strategies for

securing post-eviction housing. Evictees' narratives show that TFUP members delayed securing their own post-eviction homes in the expectation that the TFUP-led effort to gain a grant of land for resettlement would be successful. In a comment representative of evictees' attitudes to securing post-eviction homes, an evicted TFUP member and post-eviction owner noted prior to eviction: "Through the federation I can get a house in the near future. The federation is trying to address this problem of housing." Other evicted TFUP members expressed similar expectations that the movement would provide housing. For example, one evicted member and post-eviction owner stated during the eviction: "The movement…will construct houses. These houses will be given to each member of the federation." This focus on the future, but as yet unrealized, provision of housing by the movement was also emphasized by an evicted TFUP member and post-eviction renter who said, "We haven't received help with housing yet, but I am still expecting to get a house and land from the federation."

TFUP members made an explicit connection between an expectation of housing from the movement, their own delayed housing search and ultimately having to resettle farther than expected from their former residence. While both post-eviction owners and renters who were TFUP members reported delaying their housing searches and having to relocate relatively further away from their former homes than expected, this strategy proved especially challenging for post-eviction owners. Given their resettlement at significantly greater distances from their former homes, a relatively distant home for a post-eviction owner was significantly further from Kurasini than that for a post-eviction renter who likewise delayed their housing search. As reported earlier, post-eviction owners who were TFUP members resettled an average of 6.0 kms from their former homes, compared with 2.3 kms for owners who were non-members.

Highlighting the connection between delayed housing search and resettlement distance, particularly for post-eviction owners who were TFUP members, an evicted member and owner stated: "We thought we would get housing from the movement. I have been waiting, but nothing has come. Now I've had a difficult time to find my own house and have moved far away [from Kurasini]." The direct connection between delayed search and greater resettlement distance was emphasized by other TFUP members, including a post-eviction owner, who said: "Because I waited, I now live very far away. I didn't want to spend my money if we would get good housing, but now I will have to live far from Kurasini." This sentiment was similar to that expressed by another evicted TFUP member and owner, "We were really expecting a house or land, but we couldn't wait so long. I already had to find a place that is very far because too many people are seeking plots due to the eviction."

These narrative sentiments concerning the expectations of TFUP members are substantiated by additional data drawn from evictee interviews. In post-eviction interviews, evictees were asked to retrospectively report the factors that they believed prior to and during the eviction would help them secure better post-eviction housing. Fifty-two percent of interviewees cited one of three TFUP-affiliated organizations – the TFUP movement as a whole, TFUP's savings groups and a local, TFUP-affiliated partner NGO[xi] – as the factor they thought would be most important in securing better post-eviction housing. This made the TFUP movement, broadly construed, the single most important perceived source of improved post-eviction housing. The perception that the TFUP movement could be an important source of potential housing assistance likely reflects the movement's strategic and rhetorical focus on the adverse housing impacts of the eviction.

A Chi-Squared Test shows that TFUP members were significantly more likely than non-members to consider TFUP an important factor in potentially securing better housing (p = 0.001). Of members, 77.5 percent mentioned they believed a TFUP organization could help them secure better housing, compared with 0.0 percent of non-members. While members were more likely to consider TFUP a source of better post-eviction housing, non-members were more likely to look to government for assistance. Results of a Fisher's Exact Test show that non-members were significantly more likely than TFUP members to cite "government" as a possible source of improved housing (p = 0.044), with 40.0 percent of non-members citing government as compared with 13.5 percent of members.

Despite over three-quarters of TFUP members stating they had considered the movement and its affiliated organizations important sources of improved post-eviction housing, evictees' *ex post* assessments of the movement's actual role in securing post-eviction housing were decidedly different. Six months after eviction, no evictees mentioned TFUP as a factor that helped them secure their actual post-eviction housing. When asked explicitly whether they had received "any help from the TFUP movement or its savings groups in finding [their] new home," 100 percent responded in the negative. The contrast between the levels of housing assistance expected and received by members accounts for their delayed efforts to secure housing and their relatively greater distance of resettlement.

Delayed Housing Search and Employment Impacts

Evictees' resettlement accounts show that TFUP members' delayed action on housing had spin-off effects on employment after eviction. The decision of TFUP members to defer their housing search was particularly problematic for evictees who resettled as owners, due to their resettlement further from Kurasini than renters. Evictees' resettlement accounts document

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that, even if post-eviction owners faced few negative impacts with respect to housing, relegation of owners who were TFUP members to sites that were relatively far away from Kurasini negatively affected post-eviction employment prospects. An evicted TFUP member and post-eviction owner stated: "by waiting so long, now I live very far away – 15 kms. It is very bad for my business." Another evicted member and post-eviction owner highlighted the connection between delayed action on housing and negative employment impacts, saying: "I expected housing and was waiting. I waited too long and found a poor site. Now my work suffers." And yet another evicted member and owner made the connection even more explicitly, stating: "Due to the eviction, people have had to move very far away and this has affected employment. They must travel to the city or find new work far away; both are not good options. They should have found a home closer to Kurasini, but we were too slow and all the good places were gone. I thought I would get a home from the federation, but I had to fight on my own."

The narrative accounts of evictees coincide with a quantitative analysis of interview data, which shows that post-eviction owners who reported unimproved post-improved employment hours, status and pay resettled significantly further from their former homes than those who reported improved conditions (Figure 3).

Post-Eviction Owners: Employment Hours

Owners: Improved Hours (1.5 kms)   Owners: Unimproved Hours (5.4 kms)

Distance from Pre-Eviction Home (kms)   0   5   10

Post-Eviction Owners: Employment Status

Owners: Improved Status (1.3 kms)   Owners: Unimproved Status (5.3 kms)

Distance from§ Pre-Eviction Home (kms)   0   5   10

Post-Eviction Owners: Employment Pay

Owners: Improved Pay (1.2 kms)   Owners: Unimproved Pay (5.0 kms)

Distance from Pre-Eviction Home (kms)   0   5   10

Figure 3. Differences in resettlement distances among post-eviction owners with respect to employment hours, status and pay (statistically significant at the 95% level, with $p < 0.05$). Numbers reported are the mean resettlement distances from former homes for each subgroup of post-eviction owners.

Changes in Individual Post-Eviction Pay versus Household Income

A close examination of data drawn from evictees' interview transcripts shows that men and women's individual pay responded differently after eviction and that this likely accounts for the complex relationship between post-eviction pay and household income. As described earlier, the majority of households (59.4 percent) reported improved post-eviction household income, but only 14.0 percent of evictees reported improved individual pay. Examination of the changes in male versus female pay following eviction and of the gender composition of the evictee sample shows that the decline in pay reported by the majority of interviewees reflects the negative impact of the eviction on women's individual pay. While the majority of both male and female interviewees reported improved post-eviction household incomes, a Chi-Squared Test shows a statistically significant difference in the post-eviction pay of men and women ($p = 0.004$). The majority of men (76.2 percent) reported similar or improved post-eviction pay while the majority of women reported worsened post-eviction pay (63.9

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percent). As mentioned, the majority of interviewees in this study (62.5 percent) were women. This strongly suggests that the stability, and in some cases growth, of men's post-eviction pay drove the increase in post-eviction household income, while the decline in individual pay for the majority of interviewees reflects the lower post-eviction pay reported by women (Figure 4). Since the majority of evictees (73.4 percent) were in marital relationships, this indicates a complex financial dynamic within households.


Figure 4. Changes in post-eviction household incomes and male versus female individual pay.

The data indicate that the nature and location of men and women's pre-eviction work exerted a strong influence on the direction of changes in their individual pay following eviction. A Fisher's Exact Test shows women were significantly more likely than men to work in the eviction zone (p = 0.005). Eighty-eight percent of women worked in the eviction zone, compared with 47.1 percent of men. As a result, women interviewees were more likely than men to have to relocate both their homes and jobs after eviction. While men working in the eviction zone also had to relocate their jobs following eviction, women working in the eviction zone were significantly more likely than men to be engaged in biashara, the Swahili

term for petty or street trading (Chi-Squared Test, p = 0.000). Employment in biashara posed special challenges for evictees due to the strong dependence of this form of informal employment on social networks. Of women working in the eviction zone prior to eviction, 96.4 percent were employed in biashara (27 of 28 evictees). None of the men working in the eviction zone were engaged in biashara.

As mentioned, biashara – as well as women's informal work more generally – is particularly dependent on social networks and close social relationships. Prior research suggests that disruption of these networks would have been particularly challenging for women's post-eviction work prospects (Parasuraman 1999). As evidence of this, women who reported worsened pay after resettlement relocated significantly further from their former homes in Kurasini than those that did not (Student's T-Test, p = 0.037). Women who reported worsened pay (n = 23) resettled an average of 3.17 kms from their former homes, while women who reported same or improved pay (n = 13) resettled an average of 1.3 kms from their former homes. This is the expected result given that women moving farther away would have to reconfigure the kinds of close social networks on which their work in the eviction zone depended.

Evictee assessments of the challenges faced due to eviction provide further evidence that women's social networks were disrupted by moves further from their former homes. Women who cited "finding new friends and acquaintances" as a major challenge of the eviction resettled significantly further from their former homes than those who did not mention this challenge (Student's T-Test, p = 0.000). The narrative accounts of female biashara pracitioners also support the argument that relocating further from Kurasini was particularly challenging for re-establishing their business networks. For example, an evicted woman who

was employed in biashara before eviction said: "To live in a new settlement is very difficult at first. I used to sell juices and fruits at my home place. But the business is not doing good at my new home because people need to know and understand me." A similar sentiment was expressed as follows by another female biashara practitioner, who stated: "To cope with the new environment was a great challenge because I had no people who knew me – this affects me economically."

DISCUSSION

Results presented here overlap with key findings from previous research on involuntary resettlement and extend them to an urban eviction in an African context. For example, Mejia (1999, 176) contends there is, "a prevailing belief that resettlement of the urban poor does not seriously disrupt economic activities" and this has led to a predominance of attention on post-eviction housing concerns, rather than on jobs and economic sustainability. Scudder (2005, 120) likewise notes that the, "lack of attention to economic development is…especially glaring." In his review of dam-induced resettlement, Scudder (2005) found that, in addition to the more expected challenges of landlessness, joblessness was a problem in 80 percent of cases. This supports a key finding of this study of Kurasini: economic challenges were a significant, and unappreciated, problem in the resettlement, and the attention and expectations of TFUP members in the eviction primarily centered on housing.

The results also overlap with key findings from prior research concerning the relationship between resettlement, employment and gender. Parasuraman (1999) notes that women are especially vulnerable because they are more dependent on kinship and other social ties. Similarly, the research reported herein shows that, in the face of increased household incomes, women's pay worsened following eviction as they were more likely to have been

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previously employed in the eviction zone and to be engaged in work that relied on close social networks. In arguing for further research on the relationship between resettlement location and informal employment, Mejia (1999, 177) contends the belief that economic factors are a secondary consideration in resettlement, "persists, in part, because of the scarcity of data on the correlation between economic activities and place of residence." The findings from this case provide a link in understanding the relationship between the pursuit of certain economic activities, particularly biashara, and the adverse impacts of resettlement.

To date, the literature has largely focused on the positive aspects of social capital and has neglected the downsides of participation (Portes and Landolt 1996). At the same time, it is clear that some social movements either do not achieve the results they intend or produce unanticipated results (Giugni 1998). Tilly (1999, 268) remarks that the unanticipated consequences of social movements, "far surpass the explicit demands made by activists in the course of social movements, and sometimes negates them." The lack of attention to negative and unanticipated impacts of movement mobilization may be due to a sentiment that, even where social movements fail to achieve explicit goals, they often succeed in producing other positive societal changes. As Tarrow (1998, 2) states, with reference to movements of the latter half of the 20th century, "they have often succeeded, but even when they failed, their actions set in motion important political, cultural and international changes." While this may be true at the societal level, what of the impact of unsuccessful mobilization efforts on participants themselves? While movements may have spin-offs that ultimately benefit, and even transform society, what happens to individual participants who do not achieve their goals in the short term? The results of this study point to the need for closer examination of unsuccessful mobilization efforts.

In examining unsuccessful mobilization efforts, close attention to the expectations of movement members is critical. As this study shows, where expectations are unrealistic, they may ultimately prevent more pragmatic action to protect members' self interests. Theory on "escalation of commitment" helps to explain why movement members may pin their hopes on a movement even when the odds appear stacked against success. In this case, escalation of commitment was observed in a persistent belief that evictees would receive housing from TFUP.

Escalation theory applies to situations "where losses have been suffered, where there is an opportunity to persist or withdraw, and where the consequences of these actions are uncertain" (Staw 1997, 192). The theory holds that individuals can become locked in losing courses of action and throw good money (or time or other resources) after bad.[xii] Prior research has shown that optimism, the illusion of control and self-justification can provide explanations for escalation behavior (Taylor 1989; Northcraft and Wolf 1984; Brockner 1992). Determining if these psychological factors play a role in influencing evictee decision making around resettlement should be a fruitful avenue for further research. Irrespective of the precise psychological drivers of escalation behavior, this research suggests that, in charged circumstances such as involuntary resettlement, where much is at risk and where much is promised by pursuit of a particular course of action, there is considerable risk for movement participants of entrapment in such escalation scenarios.

CONCLUSION

Across all measures of post-eviction housing – physical setting, tenure security and cost – a majority of evictees in this study reported improved conditions. In contrast, across all employment measures, a majority of evictees reported conditions worse than or similar to

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those before eviction. These results are surprising since TFUP's pre-eviction mobilization strategy focused on housing issues and not on employment and suggest that the movement may have been better served by focusing their resettlement strategy around employment-related consequences of eviction, rather than on adverse housing impacts.

Evictees' narratives indicate that TFUP membership negatively influenced resettlement outcomes by conditioning members' resettlement expectations and adversely influencing their strategies for securing post-eviction housing. Instead of finding new housing quickly, TFUP members delayed in anticipation of obtaining land as a result of TFUP's mobilization efforts. Since six months after the eviction 100 percent of evictees reported receiving no housing assistance from the movement, delayed action in securing post-eviction housing forced members to resettle relatively further from their former homes than non-members. This strategy was particularly problematic for members who were post-eviction owners, since – given their resettlement in a zone further from Kurasini than post-eviction renters – securing housing later was likely to leave them living especially far from their former homes. Delayed action on housing led TFUP members, particularly those who were post-eviction owners, to experience more negative outcomes with respect to post-eviction employment. These evictees either had to commute long-distances to jobs near their former homes or find new forms of employment at their new places of residence.

While the majority of evictees reported increased household incomes after resettlement, women's individual pay fell. Women were significantly more likely than men to work in the eviction zone and to work in biashara, a form of employment especially dependent on close social networks. As women moved further from their homes, they experienced more severe disruptions to their social networks and were more likely to report worsened post-eviction

pay. This suggests that women are particularly vulnerable in evictions, especially since the negative impacts they face may be disguised by aggregate improvements at the household level.

Findings from Kurasini coincide with some key results from the limited prior research on involuntary urban resettlement in the developing world. They reinforce the generally underappreciated impact of evictions on the employment prospects of evictees and for women in particular, and indicate that these prior findings may hold more widely, particularly in the rapidly growing cities of Sub-Saharan Africa. Theory on escalation of commitment may help to explain why TFUP members delayed their housing search in the expectation that the movement would help them secure new homes and may serve as a fruitful basis for further research.

From a practical perspective, the results of this research pose a considerable challenge to urban planners, policymakers and movement organizers. They show that the expectations of movement members can be strongly shaped by the rhetorical and strategic focus of a mobilization effort. When mobilization does not produce expected results, members can be left facing worse circumstances than they might otherwise have encountered. For urban planners, the results suggest that grassroots mobilization alone may be insufficient to provide marginalized groups with an effective means of confronting and coping with rapid urban change. Despite the growth in civil society groups in developing world cities, there remains a strong need for planners to ensure that the needs of marginalized groups are considered in formal planning procedures and that proactive efforts are made to support communities in their efforts to cope with highly disruptive events, such as evictions. Furthermore, the results highlight several distinct cleavages among evictees that must be carefully considered

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in resettlement efforts. The first involves post-eviction owners and renters, who here faced considerably different impacts, based on their different resettlement locations. The second involves male and female evictees. As this research shows, women are especially vulnerable due to the nature and location of their pre-eviction work.

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Notes:

[i] One US dollar is equivalent to 1,478.50 Tanzanian Shillings (TSh) and this conversion rate is employed throughout the paper. Universal Currency Converter, accessed on October 6, 2010, http://www.xe.com/

[ii] All compensation values reported by evictees in the course of interviews for this study, or in the mainstream Tanzanian media, were between 8-12 Million Tanzanian Shillings (TSh) (equivalent to 5,959 – 8,939 US dollars).

[iii] Tim Ndezi, Director of CCI - personal communication. Interviewed October 4, 2007 at CCI offices in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

[iv] Tim Ndezi, Director, CCI, personal communication. Interviewed October 4, 2007 at CCI offices in Dar es Salaam.

[v] Land tenure in Tanzania is governed by the Land Act 1999 and the Village Act 1999. These acts leave intact colonial-era principles of land allocation and occupation, the most important of which are that all land is in principle publicly owned and falls under the authority of the Office of the President (Kironde, 1995; Kironde and Rugaiganisa. 2002). Within Tanzanian central government, the primary regulatory agency with respect to urban land management and allocation is the Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development. This ministry is able to allocate lands to specific purposes and, for this reason, was the primary target of TFUP's lobbying efforts to secure a grant of land for resettlement.

vi Mwanakombo Mkanga, Deputy Director of CCI – personal communication. Interviewed August 7, 2007 at Mivinjeni, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

vii "Physical setting" refers to the physical characteristics of the site and was purposely left open to interpretation. Evictees were able to assess their circumstances with respect to setting in terms they considered most important – ranging from the provision of public services to access to schools – and expanded on these assessments in their narrative responses.

viii "Security of tenure" refers to the likelihood evictees will be arbitrarily removed from their homes.

ix "Status" refers to the respectability and social status of employment.

x "Security" refers to the likelihood an evictee will be arbitrarily dismissed or otherwise lose their job.

xi TFUP works with a local partner organization, the Centre for Community Initiatives (CCI), on a wide variety of capacity building and mobilization activities.

xii For more on escalation of commitment theory, see Staw (1981) and Staw (1997).