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Moving Beyond Colonialism: Africa's Postcolonial Capitals*

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Introduction

Figure 2:1 is a photograph of me, standing in Nyerere Square in downtown Dodoma, the capital city of Tanzania. Behind me to my left is a statue of Tanzania's first President, Julius Nyerere. In the background, there is a billboard promoting Nyerere's ideas with his smiling visage, sponsored by Vodacom, a multinational cell phone company. The public square was empty, as it nearly always is. A few blocks away, an open space that Dodoma's planners would have filled with a ministerial office teemed with people packed into row upon row of plastic-covered market

stalls, buying and selling cheap, imported basic goods, slipping and sliding through the mud-and-garbage strewn paths.

Among his many bold achievements, Nyerere is remembered for having led the government's decision to relocate the national capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma in the 1970s. The move had its own pragmatic geographical and administrative logic. Dodoma is in the middle of the vast country, where Dar es Salaam not only lies on the Indian Ocean coast, but toward the northern end of that coastline. Nyerere (1972) based his blueprint for governing the country on a plan of 'decentralization' that supposedly would work outwards from the new central seat of power. But the move was also meant as a powerful post-colonial symbol of Tanzania's new order. In 1967, in the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere's government had made *ujamaa* the philosophy which would guide national development. Often translated as 'socialism', *ujamaa* literally means family-hood. *Ujamaa* articulated a vision for 'the elimination of exploitation, the control of the major means of production by peasants and workers,' and other elements of an African democratic socialism (Hess 2006: 120). The Arusha Declaration more broadly stressed the related principle of self-reliance, wherein collectivization of agriculture was expected to produce a sufficient basis for inward-looking development (Nyerere 1967). Under this framework, the government deliberately de-emphasized urban areas to deconcentrate and ruralize industrial growth (Darkoh 1994). The main urban area of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, was for several long decades the main victim of this de-emphasis, largely because it 'remained for Nyerere a reminder of a colonial legacy,' and instead, Nyerere sought to 'construct his own personal vision of an African socialist state' in a new capital city nearer to the country's agricultural heartlands (Hess 2006: 123).

Dodoma's designed layout and plan were in keeping with the ideals of *ujamaa* philosophy. The 1976 Master Plan had 'proposed nothing less than the first nonmonumental capital city' (Vale 2008: 179). What the city now calls Nyerere Square was to have been *Ujamaa* Square. It would not have had a towering statue of Nyerere in it; the Master Plan envisioned a large sculpture of an acacia tree, to follow the traditional gathering place of Tanzanian villagers and townspeople in the shade of a tree (Vale 2008: 181). It probably would not have been his idea, either, to see his own face used to promote a cell phone company or, as it is on other billboards, a lottery – he virtually invented the KiSwahili invective for unjust economic usury, *ubepari*, a word that is typically translated as 'capitalism' – in a capital city whose very design stressed the 'avoidance of elitism' on every inch of the map (National Capital Master Plan 1976: 71).

Making a truly different post-colonial city, in the ongoing circumstances of donor dependency, neoliberal economic policies, and resource limitations, would inevitably elude the Tanzanian state. The curious mixtures and inconsistencies that Dodoma today encapsulates (such as the empty people's plaza not far from a crowded informal market) make it a worthwhile case for examining the widespread efforts in post-colonial Africa to make 'new towns' that attempted to find a 'new approach compared with classic descriptions of urban phenomena,' as Henri Lefebvre (in Burgel, et al 1987: 27-38) once put it, in an interview about 20th century European new towns. In this chapter, I examine contemporary Dodoma, along with Abuja, Nigeria and Lilongwe, Malawi. These are just 3 of the more notable examples of post-colonial Africa's created capitals. Gaborone, Nouakchott, and Yamoussoukro, the capitals of Botswana, Mauritania, and Cote d'Ivoire, respectively, were all also essentially post-colonial creations.

I choose to focus my attention on these cities in part because, in relation to postcolonial studies writing within African studies or the discipline of geography – my two disciplinary homes - abstract 'theoreticism' has limited the 'purchase of its intellectual products' (Robinson 2003: 275). Spatial imagery abounds in postcolonial studies, but often the tangible and material matters beyond the images are left out of the discussion (Blunt and McEwan 2004: 1-2; Loomba 1998). Such criticism can be leveled at Achille Mbembe's (2001) brilliant but difficult book, *On the Postcolony*, for example. Although the book is full of insights on postcolonial political geographies of power, some of which I put to use in this book, it is often obfuscating in its abstract theoreticism and more suggestive than understandable about space and spatiality.

Mbembe's (2001: 170) model of 'the colony' as a 'series of hollows' is at once intriguing for someone like me who grew up just uphill from a coal-mining hollow in Pennsylvania, and maddeningly unclear. Mbembe's first hollow is 'physical space… made up of monotonous vistas, vast horizons in a sort of silence, calm, deceptive peace: indolence, the dead time of life. These vastnesses, with the heat that beats down and stifles them, make the colonizer nervous' (Mbembe 2001: 179). This evokes the empty land myth of colonial discourse rather imaginatively, but the discussion which follows gets muddled. In Mbembe's hands, the elaborate and terrible beauty/disgust of colonial exploitation of Africa is rendered complete, extreme, seductive, orgasmic, phallic, outlandish and impossible to outrun in the 'postcolony.' It is hard to know where to start interpreting the book, but Mbembe (2001: 237) does meander around, in his conclusion, to what he claims is the 'object' of his book: 'to define the quantitative and qualitative difference, if any, between the colonial period and what followed: *have we really entered another period, or do we find the same theater, the same mimetic acting, with different actors and spectators, but with the same convulsions and the same insult? Can we really talk of*

moving beyond colonialism?' (Italics mine). At the very end of this passage, Mbembe arrives at questions that really matter and challenges that remain unanswered in African studies: can we really talk of moving beyond colonialism? To provide some paths to answers, though, in my mind requires more tangible assessment than what Mbembe provides.

Staying within the language of postcolonial cultural studies, it is still possible to see paths toward that more tangible assessment. Working to move beyond colonialism will involve revalorizing 'indigenous management strategies' and embracing the cultural heterogeneity of African cities as a strength (Ndi 2007: 23; Demissie 2007a). These concerns with indigenous African citiness and the heterogeneity of it are crucial to chapter 3's discussion of informality, for example. But in revalorizing that citiness it is important to move 'beyond tradition' if 'traditional' indigeneity is conceptualized as refracted through the colonial experience and consequent reshaping of its meaning (Bissell 2007: 37). Moving beyond colonialism definitely involves, quite literally, *moving*: coming to grips with diasporic understandings of African cities, as I discuss in chapter 6, even while recognizing the warping triggered by nostalgia in many such renderings (Kehinde 2007). Cinema, literature, and photography are among the representational tools for postcolonializing African cities, but there are also still more tangible tools deployed, in architecture and urban planning in particular (Samuelson 2007; Fu and Murray 2007; Demissie 2007b).

There are plenty of professional place-makers among African urban planners and architects seeking to develop and implement imaginative, alternative, postcolonial urban visions. A new generation of African architects and planners is busily engaged in re-envisioning the continent's cities. The first order of business for some of these practicing architects and planners is tracing – writing, and in some cases rewriting – the varied and deep histories of architecture

and urban planning on the continent, particularly to retrace colonialism's legacies (Elleh 1997 and 2002). Others have experimented with possibilities for developing an Afrocentric architecture out of that history (Hughes 1994). Still more are engaged in re-envisioning the training processes in architecture and planning schools on the continent to think through African processes of planning and socio-cultural influences on building and urban design. This has in turn led to collective and collaborative research that enables African architects and planners to both compare what is happening in one another's cities and to work toward non-Eurocentric visions of cities.

The African Centre for Cities at the University of Cape Town, along with Cape Town's Isandla Institute, are engaged in fostering a rethinking of African urban development outside the box of western mindsets, beyond colonialism (in the manner of postcolonial studies). The ACC and planners at UCT, along with planners at Dar es Salaam's Ardhi University, have been generous and generative forces behind the creation and maintenance since 2002 of the Association of African Planning Schools (AAPS), which has made impressive efforts aimed at 'revitalizing planning education' in its 31 member schools on the continent (http://www.africanplanningschools.org.za/). Nine of the schools are in South Africa, but the other 22 are spread across Africa's cities from Cairo to Harare, Kumasi to Nairobi. Fred Lerise and Tumsifu Nnkya from Tanzania, who are among AAPS's most active and collaborative planning scholars, have, for one example, merged scholarly endeavors to link up key planning issues across the continent with activist, engaged collaborative efforts to rethink planning in Dar es Salaam, sometimes behind the scenes, as in their assistance to community groups in the informal settlement just beyond their university campus.

The ArchiAfrika network is another such example of applied re-visions that one might conceive of as postcolonial. ArchiAfrika's fascinating collaborative projects build bridges between architects in private practice, popular sector or civil society institutions in African cities, international donors, and governments, fostering research and then feeding research outcomes into actual plans and buildings. ArchiAfrika's newsletter publicizes and promotes projects across the continent, publishing both technical reports and interviews. One recent example of ArchiAfrika's interviews, conducted by Rachel Jenkins (2009) with Libyan artist and planner Hadia Gana, brought attention to urban planning processes for Tripoli that are extremely difficult to research even in the current ongoing, if slight opening to outside scholarship. In Libya, it is an eclectic mix of trained and untrained planners (engineers, architects, and artists) who have produced a vision for the primate city, *Tripoli 2025*. Associated with the blandly labeled Engineering Consulting Office for Utilities (ECOU), Gana is actually a ceramicist; her engagement with ECOU is central to efforts to revitalize indigenous Libyan building crafts, but she has been a part of the Tripoli 2025 collective and a group seeking to create urban villages within Tripoli. All of these loosely affiliated, fluid organizations emerged with the interest of making the new urban development projects that have come with Libya's petro-dollars more 'compatible with the way Libyans live… a human-centred approach' (Gana, in Jenkins 2009).

Yet Gana evaded Jenkins' question of whether the Tripoli 2025 plans were 'spearheaded by strong political and socially idealist leadership,' giving a funny but totally evasive answer about Dutch waffles and the architect Zaha Hadid. This evasion suggests that networks like ArchiAfrika can only do so much alone to effect changes toward a postcolonial city. Similar hints of political limitations appear in ArchiAfrika reports on architectural preservation planning in Dar es Salaam (Moon 2009), or on the impressive architectural accomplishments of Nairobi's

Maranga Njoroge (2009). Njoroge himself summed up the strengths and challenges of new networks like ArchiAfrica very well:

> Organizations like ArchiAfrika… facilitate discussions and forums and idea generation of like-minded architects. These forums fire up ideas that when translated into action will leave an impact. The major hindrance in the way to progress is majorly political both from the macro to micro level. Governance and policy are parameters that architects have to work within. When unfavorable, then there is a high degree of conformity and compromise among architects.

Njoroge diplomatically suggests here the 'conformity and compromise' architects must accede to within the largely 'unfavorable' governance 'parameters of post-colonial African cities. The ArchiAfrika network has done much to promote respect for vernacular or popular African architectural styles, innovative sustainable or green building techniques from indigenous origins, creative collaborative community rehabilitation, and fine alternative building designs. Yet it still operates within contexts that vary dramatically in their capacity to allow for meaningful socio-political changes. The AAPS's projects and the prospective future continental programs of the African Centre for Cities likewise face a similar contextual variation that makes their ambitions difficult to actualize.

There are other forms of postcolonial urban practice, to be sure, but for me Africa's new capital cities still embody the grandest and most tangibly postcolonial geographical theories put into practice, and we can use them as a lens on Mbembe's question of whether we can 'really talk of moving beyond colonialism.' I share with Cheryl McEwan (2003: 341) the sense that we

ought to approach postcolonialism with our eyes on 'material problems that demand urgent and clear solutions,' and those material problems clearly include the gross inequalities, social and spatial, which African cities inherited from European colonialism, problems these cities were ostensibly created to mitigate against.

'Postcolonialism and geography are intimately linked,' Blunt and McEwan (2002: 1) wrote. This is first and foremost because *colonialism* and geography were so intimately linked, nowhere more clearly than in Africa. Most urban studies or human geography research that identifies itself as postcolonial studies in Africa in fact concentrates on excavating histories and legacies of colonialism, in part simply because these were and are so extensive (Demissie 2007a; Ndi 2007). This meant that after independence, African countries had to come 'after' colonialism - in the sense of attacking or contesting its legacies – geographically (Loomba 1998: 12; Blunt and McEwan 2002). Across the continental map, African countries took different approaches in attempts to remake their urban areas to mark them as having moved beyond colonialism. As in Dodoma, but in diverse forms, we find in these other cities odd juxtapositions of something unique and different beyond colonialism with legacies and continuities from the colonial era. Egypt sought to create an 'implausible' array of new towns and satellite towns in the desert to deconcentrate urban development away from Cairo and Alexandria (Florin 2005). In Botswana's case, the colonial power, Britain, had ruled what was then termed the Bechuanaland Protectorate from an office building in Mafeking, South Africa, so the new government obviously had to build itself some domestic place from which to rule the country (Best 1970). It was less obvious that Cote d'Ivoire needed a new capital city, or that this capital should be the home village of its then-President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny (Yamoussoukro), or that the capital city of a country that was at best 15% Catholic would need a Catholic Cathedral modeled on, but larger than, St.

Peter's Basilica in Vatican City (Vale 2008: 152). Before we can analyze any of the oddities or normalities of such post-colonial urbanism, though, it is worth reviewing what it was about colonialism and urban space that seemed so in need of remaking to the new rulers and many citizens of independent Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.

Colonialism and African Cities

Perhaps the largest research area of African urban studies is concerned with the impacts and legacies of colonialism on the continent's cities. From this vast literature, certain key themes emerge. The first is the diversity of African experiences of European colonialism. Most of the continent experienced formal European rule, but the particular colonial power, its length of impact and its capacity or desire to develop urban areas or transform pre-existing ones varied. The British and French empires eventually dominated the continent, but Spain, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal also held colonies in some fashion for periods ranging from 8 years (the Italian occupation of Ethiopia) to nearly 5 centuries (the Portuguese in Cape Verde or Sao Tome and Principe, as well as parts of Angola and Mozambique). Some colonies were merely zones for the extraction of agricultural goods, with a limited European urban impress, while others witnessed European construction of large cities for white settlers and industrial investors.

Of course, cities existed in many areas of Africa prior to the 1500s, and a few (Cairo, Tunis, Ibadan, Jenne, or Kano for example) were comparable to many European cities in size prior to the rise of European power, while other areas were essentially devoid of larger-scale

urbanism (Myers and Owusu 2008). Liberia was technically never colonized (although it certainly was an American colony economically, its elites were African-American settlers, and its 2 largest urban areas, Monrovia and Buchanan, are named for US Presidents). Italy's brief occupation of Ethiopia led to only a small transformation in Addis Ababa's CBD. The Dutch settled in Cape Town in 1652, the French began their settlement colony in Algeria in the 1830s, trading hubs with attendant hinterland spheres of influence existed all along the continental rim from the early 1500s, some of which were declared colonies, and so on. The story is a little different anywhere we start it.

The prevailing trend, though, is that formal colonial rule began to stretch firmly across the map and into the interior after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 that officially established European spheres of influence, and the most significant urbanizing for our contemporary interests came with that expansion. The conference also coincided with the explosion of industrial capitalism in Europe, with its demand for African raw materials, and competition between the colonial powers over markets and materials. We can thus tease out patterns that are at least comparable across most colonies. The first of these patterns, and the second theme of the colonial cities literature, is what the historian Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch (2005a: 4) has termed a 'shared… historical rhythm:' the most significant investments in the creation of urbanism on African soil coincided with the era of formal colonial rule, roughly from the 1880s to the 1960s.

Consequently, the biggest urban spatial impact of European colonialism lies in the location of so many of Africa's eventually major cities along the coast or in close proximity to sites of resource extraction, and the functional retardation of African cities into roles as either entrepot/warehouse towns, bureaucratic capitals, or both at once, rather than as organically

grown industrial manufacturing engines of value added. Cities where colonial rule facilitated the growth of industry and manufacturing as the basis for urbanization were the exception, rather than the norm. Some cities that pre-dated the rise of Europe were able to capitalize on colonialism to grow larger (e.g. Mombasa, Kenya, or many North African cities), but others were bypassed and replaced, ultimately superseded and occasionally fallen into ruin. In several cases, the colonizers followed some administrative-geographical logic in locating a capital, rather than a strictly economic one (Lusaka, from chapter 1, is one such example), but this made the urbanism an even odder imposition in the space economy than, say, a terminal port-as-capital (Freund 2007).

This latter form is still an enormous legacy. Even in 2010, for 46 of the continent's 53 independent states, the primate city in the urban hierarchy is the colonial capital, primary port, or port-capital. Fully 28 of the 50 largest cities on the continent were cities of those historical types in 2010. As Table 2.1 shows, the dominance of the largest of these urban types has actually increased on the continent since 1980, rather than decreased (UN-Habitat 2008).

Thirteen of the other 22 largest cities are in Nigeria and South Africa, pointing to another, related element of the colonial legacy: most African countries other than Nigeria and South Africa have what mainstream Western geographers would consider to be poorly developed urban hierarchies, so that very high rates of primacy and the absence of significant secondary cities are still rather common. In much of the continent, colonial regimes attempted to restrict migration to cities from the countryside or even to exclude Africans from the legal right to live in cities. This was certainly a factor in many of these poorly developed urban hierarchies. So were the dislocation, disjuncture, and enclave status of leading cities; capitals and ports sometimes grew functionally more connected with the metropole than with the cities in that colony. Movement

controls were lifted at the end of colonialism, leading to huge upswings in urban populations in the first decades after independence. Yet it is only in the last 10 years or so that higher rates of urban population growth are occurring farther down the hierarchy and growth is slowing in the primate cities (Potts 2009 and 2011). Infrastructure connectivity between cities within countries still lags far behind what the sizes of the cities might suggest, to say nothing of the still weak connectivity between cities in different countries even when they are near to one another (e. g. despite some fanciful current planning dreams, there is still no bridge across the Congo River between Brazzaville and Kinshasa, twin capital cities of the 2 Congos, ruled separately by France and Belgium until 1960; de Boeck 2010).

In the abstract, high primacy ratios are not immediately disastrous for a country's development, but what makes the twin challenges of primacy and a thin urban hierarchy more daunting in many African countries is that the causes for rapid growth are commonly seen to be not directly attributable to economic growth and industrialization, with exceptions here and there (Becker, Hamer and Morrison 1994; Bryceson 2006). Under colonialism, rural-to-urban migration seems to have been fueled as much by the pull factor of perception as by actual opportunity, and by the push factors of rural landlessness, herdlessness, involution, poverty, and lack of employment. The end result in many countries was large numbers of the rural poor becoming the urban poor. This conundrum only became more extreme in the independence era in many countries.

Colonialism's other urban legacies concern internal form and spatial structure. These legacies in African cites are well known and widely studied (Celik 1997; Home 1997; Myers 2003; Nast 1994; Rakodi 1986; Western 1985; Winters 1982; Wright 1991). One is the segregation and segmentation of the urban landscape, and another is the related high degree of

inequality. Often, the most obvious dimension of the segmentation was racial segregation, with separate areas for business or residence restricted to Europeans, Asians, and Africans, respectively, in many colonial cities, justified by rhetorical concerns with health (Swanson 1977). Where white settlement or investments were more limited, such as in many parts of Western or Equatorial Africa, then this segmentation existed in modified form. In Maiduguri, in northeastern Nigeria where so few whites settled even as administrators, the colonial plan of the city still excluded all Africans except servants from the small 'European Residential Area' and the small Syrian trader population was confined to its own zone of shops in a special business area (Kawka 2002: 42-44). In any case, this is a legacy one often sees in the dramatically 'distorted' divisions between 'high status centers… and a spreading, sometimes immense, dirt-poor habitat that is poorly served and under-integrated' (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2005a: 5).

Since the largest colonial cities were such due to their political (and often to a lesser degree, economic) significance, they became laboratories, incubation sites and potent physical symbols of mechanisms of colonial power (Demissie 2007a). In attempting to 'replicate a quasi-metropolitan culture in every physical respect,' colonial regimes took on the task of a normative re-ordering of African spatiality (Lloyd 2003: 107). As centers of power, with growing African populations living in conditions of deprivation, these cities were crucial arenas for the administrations' drive for order and control to be expressed in architecture and spatial planning. Urban form thus reflected at least 4 ideological concerns. These were: (1) separating out who could and could not be in the city; (2) devising a map for who belonged where amongst those allowed to be urban; (3) providing for and reinforcing spatial expressions of the hierarchy of colonial rule; and (4) enabling the accumulation of resources by the colonial regime, the metropolitan power, and elites associated with both (Mitchell 1988; Berman 1984; Myers 2003;

Robinson 1990). That set of intertwined strategies seldom worked as it was meant to in any colonial city, but it established patterns and processes that left independent African countries interested in overcoming colonial legacies or decolonizing urban space with an apparently daunting task (Hamdan 1964).

South Africa presents perhaps the most extreme example of this on the continent. Apartheid South Africa built upon the urban geographies of Dutch and British colonialism before it. Robinson (1996: 2 and 1990) has shown how what she referred to as the 'location strategy' deployed by apartheid grew out of colonial tactics. Yet both the colonial and apartheid systems of spatial control were far from 'perfect.' They were rooted in a state that was deeply conflicted, inefficient, fragmented, and easily distracted, resulting in inconsistent and ineffective attempts to impose urban order, for instance in her case study of Port Elizabeth (Robinson, 1990, 1996). Grahamstown presents another example of this sort of ambivalent, half-undone and imperfect system of control. Although segregation dated at least to the 1840s, the ferocity of its imposition waxed and waned with the whims of different colonial or national regimes in relation to local governments. Apartheid's Group Areas Act of 1950 was not proclaimed over the city until twenty years after its passage, in 1970, thirteen years after the government had announced its intention to do so. 'Life for black Grahamstonians was tough,' to be sure, amidst 'appalling slum conditions' (Davenport 1980: 9). But lackadaisical and chaotic implementation and enforcement of apartheid legislation meshed with 'government incompetence,' political disputes between central and local authorities, and of course widespread community opposition to dilute the absoluteness of apartheid's geographies there (Davenport 1980: 47).

It is important, then, not to overplay the draconian authoritarianism embedded in the urban strategies of either the apartheid state or its European colonial antecedents across the

continent. Colonial regimes established much of the playing field for urban policy, in terms of building rules, land administration, housing strategy, spatial organization, and the like; there are no doubts on that (Njoh 2003). Colonialism's legacies still fester in other dimensions of Africa's urban stories: the dominant role of central governments at the expense of urban or municipal councils; the strong orientation toward blueprint master planning for modernist visions; or the co-optation of 'traditional' rulers into urban local government. Yet quite often, the enforcement of laws or codes, or the implementation of plans and schemes, lagged far behind the intended order. The trouble was, though, that ordinary African residents were not empowered to remake or overturn the un-enforced and un-implemented ideas; they simply endured in the interstices between what the Europeans wanted from the urban order and what the cities might have been without colonialism.

Postcolonialism and African Cities

Most African countries obtained independence from Europe between 1956 and 1977, with a few earning it ahead of the first date (Egypt or Morocco), and a few after that (Namibia, Zimbabwe, or Eritrea). The most difficult state to place on this timeline is, of course, South Africa, since the country earned independence from Britain in 1910 but some 85 percent of its

population only earned liberation with the complete and formal end of the apartheid regime in 1994. For some, it is only with that last date that we can truly say that mainland Africa was free of formal colonial rule, but even a rejection of that logic only pushes the formal end of colonialism back a year (if we consider Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia, the occupying power after the end of Italian colonialism, in 1993) or 4 (to Namibia's independence from South Africa in 1990). Supporters of the Polisario Front in Western Sahara (the former Spanish Sahara, occupied since the mid-1970s by Morocco) might even make a plausible case that colonialism is not yet formally over, at least in their corner of Africa. Regardless, all of this means that colonialism, while a fading memory in places like Sudan (independent in 1956) or Ghana (independent in 1957), remains a relatively recent story, pertinent to and within the lifetimes of citizens over age fifty in virtually every African city.

The fact that independence is a bit more than a half-century old at most and that the urban legacies of colonialism are profound are important starting points for any critique of the post-colonial trajectories of African cities. Add to these the poverty of most African cities relative to their counterparts in Europe or North America, and it is not so surprising to learn that cities have not come very far in attempting to overcome the colonial past. Changing the colonial inheritance of planning laws, building rules, the economic structures of the world economy and the national urban hierarchy, political processes at the urban and national levels, spatial divides, and the character of racism – if these are even possibilities, they are not going to occur overnight.

Be that as it may, if African cities have indeed been attempting to subvert or eliminate the colonial legacies they inherited over these post-colonial decades, then fairly often it must be said that one is hard-pressed to see the result. In city after city, formerly white or elite areas are increasingly full of exclusive and infrastructure-rich gated communities and fortress compounds,

and the ‘dirt-poor habitats’ at the other end of the segmented plan of the colonial order are even more overcrowded and destitute. Post-colonial regimes have often improved upon the strategies of colonial administrations, becoming even more exclusivist, authoritarian, and segmented (Bissell 2007). Thirty years of structural adjustment programs and poverty reduction strategy papers imposed on African cities essentially by the former colonial powers have meant that ‘high unemployment, escalating poverty and widening inequality have actually worsened’ (Demissie 2007a: 7). If postcolonialism is in this sense ‘something fairly tangible,’ then it is just as tangibly lacking in the sense of being identifiable as something new, different, or better than colonialism for African cities (Yeoh 2001: 456).

Just as apartheid South Africa represented an extension of colonialism’s geographies, the post-apartheid era in many ways parallels the post-colonial era for other cities across the continent. Apartheid was famously geographical, and therefore the post-apartheid New South Africa’s efforts likewise are inherently so. As Deborah James (2007: 1) puts it, in a discussion of post-apartheid land reform that nonetheless fits well with urban policy reforms: ‘what was at stake in the public imagination was nothing less than the complete redrawing of the map of South Africa.’ This redrawing has ended up being highly problematic on many levels. The most obvious shortcoming is that the stark racial segregation of the country’s cities remains just as stark, or even more so. But even in less tangible ways, the efforts to undo apartheid’s legacies fall short. One example is in attempts to democratize grassroots planning, where one might have expected the post-apartheid regime to build upon progressive tactics of the liberation movement to remake the poorest areas of cities, but instead a more mixed picture emerges, particularly on questions of social justice beyond basic redistribution (Visser 2001). Janet Cherry’s (2000: ii) dissertation on the politics of transition in the Port Elizabeth township of Kwazekele, built on her

many years of radical activism as well as formal research, shows that 'representative democracy' was rather rapidly 'successfully consolidated' there, but at the cost of declining direct participation in civic action. This is a striking decline, when one considers the meaning of the place-name for this self-help housing scheme, Kwazekele, in *isiXhosa*: 'the place which we built by ourselves' (Cherry 2000: 66). She traces the sense of self-reliance inherent in this name to the settlement's beginnings, but finds the street and area committees that essentially ran the neighborhoods of Kwazekele during much of the 1980s to have been 'both empowering and intolerant' (Cherry 2000: 96). The decline of the civics movement does not bode well for residents' capacity for building on a grassroots vision of post-apartheid politics that would move past such local intolerance while holding onto the sense of empowerment. She cites an anonymous 45 year-old man in Kwazekele who remarked, 'there are lots of promises being made which have not been fulfilled, and the future is filled with uncertainty' (Cherry 2000: 186). One finds similar critiques of failures of participatory urban development in post-apartheid South Africa's Integrated Development Plan (Harrison 2006b) or the state's engagement with social movements (Ballard et al 2006).

Postcolonial studies, as a field, seeks to 'open up the notion of agency' (Power 2003: 126) to not simply include such social movements in, say, remaking built environments, but to attempt to create a 'conceptual frame which works to destabilize dominant discourses' (Yeoh 2001: 457) and 'decolonize the mind' (Ngugi 1986). Many engagements of postcolonial studies aimed at creating counter-discourses reside in the arts: in film, photography, sculpture and painting, for example (McEwan 2009: 156-61). My discussion of Nuruddin Farah's fiction on Mogadishu in chapter 5 relies on his very postcolonial discursive tactics, such as his unsettling of subjectivity. Artistic and discursive postcolonialism is far from a hopeless cause, and it remains

an important means for reconceptualizing the representation of colonial subjects or colonized cities (Robinson 2002b: 116-18). This reconceptualization effort still seems to have 'promised more than it has delivered' (Driver and Gilbert 1999: 7), at least in terms of reconceiving the state's relationships with the people in cities.

So if we are looking for post-colonial urban thought, in the sense of thinking that truly attempts to move past colonialism, the places to look are probably not necessarily in government planning offices or the posh campuses and gated compounds of expatriate donors. Instead, it may be found in the 'ingenuity with which African urban residents have developed novel strategies' for confronting the 'structural and social crisis confronting them' (Demissie 2007a: 8) in places like that crowded informal market in Dodoma. The problem, though, as the Port Elizabeth example suggests, is that we must be cautious of blindly championing some sort of post-colonizing the city from below given both the potential for non-democratic or repressive city-building to dominate the grassroots and the challenges for the capacity of those grassroots to take on re-colonizing or neo-colonizing states. The 3 case study cities of this chapter provide ideal examples of these dynamics, which also then tie into chapter 3's discussion of informality and chapter 4's analysis of governance.

In focusing below on the socio-spatial dimensions of these 3 planned capitals as attempts to move beyond colonialism, I move from the least postcolonial case, Lilongwe (in that it has most closely followed colonialism's tactics and strategies), to that which at least attempted to move the farthest away from colonial approaches to planning (Dodoma). In so doing, I attempt to follow what I think of as a postcolonial intellectual practice of learning from the scholarship of Malawian, Nigerian, and Tanzanian geographers and urbanists as much as possible.

Lilongwe

Rather than being a place of an alternative vision moving beyond colonialism, Hastings Kamuzu Banda's Malawi fits the imaginative model of a 'postcolony' provided by Mbembe (2001: 102), a place 'characterized by a distinctive style of political improvisation, by a tendency to excess and lack of proportion' that is 'also made up of a series of corporate institutions and a political machinery that, once in place, constitute a distinctive regime of violence.' Lilongwe, Banda's planned capital, is a physical manifestation of the improvisation, excess, and machinery of his regime of violence.

As in Dodoma, prior to the decision to move the post-colonial capital there, Lilongwe was a small district administrative center. It had been created in 1904 by the British administration of the colony then known as Nyasaland. Unlike the other 2 case studies in this chapter, in Malawi, the decision to relocate the capital to Lilongwe from the colonial capital in Zomba came in the first weeks of independence. As in Dodoma and Abuja, though, geographical centrality was fundamental to the relocation argument as the post-colonial regime articulated it (Kalipeni 1999; Englund 2001). Lilongwe also lay at some distance from the areas of white settlement in the colony. Like many settlement colonies on the continent, Malawi had a developed core, and infrastructure built to serve that core, close to white settlement and European interests in the southern end of its elongated shape (Myers 2003). To the extent that Malawi could be said to even have an urban hierarchy at independence (given that the country's population was less than 5% urban in 1964), that hierarchy was overwhelmingly dominated by Blantyre, some 40 kilometers west of Zomba in the south's Shire highlands. Developing Lilongwe would give Malawi a second larger city in the country's mid-section (Capital Cities

Development Corporation 1972). In these ways, on the surface, this capital shift was a move away from the colonial legacy.

In virtually every other way, though, the capital plan for Lilongwe was not a grand leap from colonialism. Lilongwe's planners were white South Africans from a private Johannesburg firm at the height of apartheid, supervised by a European (Connell 1972). Banda created the Capital Cities Development Corporation (CCDC) with a loan from the apartheid regime (Myers 2003: 139). The CCDC's plan of the city replicated most of the ideological goals of the colonial city discussed above, where zones of residential density, starkly set off from one another by physical and natural boundaries, separated who belonged where by class (Mjojo 1989). What the geographer Deborah Potts (1986: 26) referred to as a 'virtually clinical degree of orderliness' was meant to segregate functions in the city in a direct continuation of colonial policies. The tallest point in the city, Capital Hill, was used for the grand new ministerial offices, and Banda built a garish Presidential Palace outside the city on another hill.

The argument that Lilongwe fostered the enablement of elite accumulation in line with colonial capitals is less certain. The geographer J. Ngoleka Mlia (1975: 389) argued that national pride and the rise to political power of Central region outweighed any expectations for Lilongwe to become an economic growth pole. However, the political prominence of Central region and its Chewa peoples had its corollary in economics, with the 'Chewa-ization' of the elite, who came to control much of the land around Lilongwe while holding shares in its new, fledgling industries (Kaspin 1995: 605). Hence even colonialism's agenda for accumulation from its urban areas seems to reappear in Lilongwe in post-colonial garb.

I have written previously about the 'odd, unlived-in feeling' Lilongwe exuded in the late 1990s for me (Myers 2003: 144). Twenty-five years ago, Potts (1985: 51) wrote of the sense of

'artificiality' to the place. But this is the planned city that Potts and I critiqued. Lilongwe's majority population lives outside of the plan. Informal settlements emerged all around the edges of the original planning area of the capital, and together with the 'traditional housing areas' allowed within the planning boundary these house most of Lilongwe's urbanites (Potts 1994; Kaluwa 1994; Englund 2002). This is to a degree the 'dirt-poor habitat' side of the post-colonial version of colonial segmented space that Coquery-Vidrovitch has discussed. But it has also grown so large that this other city dominates the city built to model Banda's clinical orderliness; its ways have overwhelmed that order and reshaped it through the residents' 'tenacity… in the absence of official supervision,' such that *this* is really the post-colonial city (Englund 2002: 152 and 143; Englund 2001; Myers 2003; Kalipeni 1999). As the first capital buildings came on line in the early 1970s, Lilongwe had scarcely 20,000 people, and it has nearly a half-million now; a good deal of this growth followed the democratic ousting of the Banda regime in 1994 and in effect the abandonment of the plan he had for the city (Chamley 2006).

The capital plan and its implementation evidenced the 'inability' of the Malawian state or elite 'to capture the soul of popular consciousness' in its majority areas (Myers 2003: 158). Despite the veneer of democratization in Malawi, the 2 post-Banda presidents have each displayed authoritarian tendencies. The current one, Bingu wa Mutharika, even re-occupied Banda's presidential palace that his predecessor, Bakili Muluzi, had at least turned over to the parliament (Vale 2008: 152), and Bingu began to explicitly model himself on Banda, erecting an elaborate mausoleum at the dictator's gravesite in Lilongwe with 4 pillars to honor the cornerstones of the old regime: unity, loyalty, obedience and discipline (Chirambo 2008: 155). Yet where Banda had no problems evicting squatters and demolishing informal settlements that contravened his master plan, the subsequent quasi-democratic regimes have had less leeway or

less compulsion to enforce such order. A recent wave of eviction orders in 2005, for example, never reached implementation due to vocal, organized opposition from the grassroots that would have been unthinkable in the Banda era (Chamley 2006: 49). Lilongwe's Centre for Community Organization and Development (CCODE), the Malawi Homeless People's Federation, and other local activist organizations, poets, musicians, and artists, challenge the state and elite visions, and as a consequence of Malawi's increasingly vibrant, often intensely contested public sphere, they reshape the city in the process (Lwanda 2008). Unfortunately, the social capital that inheres to the mushrooming settlements that now house most of Lilongwe is 'highly dynamic… volatile… and fragile, constrained' by the severe poverty that defines them, meaning their capacity to give birth to a genuinely workable or reproducible post-colonial alternative to the model capital is extremely limited (Rohregger 2006: 1154; Roe 1992). I explore this conundrum facing many African cities, beyond the postcolonial capitals, in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4.

Abuja

If Lilongwe represents an example of a postcolonial state attempting to expand upon colonialism's regimented order and repression in favor of a new elite, then Abuja can at least be taken as a moderate attempt at a *post*-colonial urban vision. The decision to create a centrally located federal capital came in 1976, scarcely 5 years after the formal end of Nigeria's civil war, at a time of increasing oil revenues and optimism about the country's possibilities (Mabogunje 2001; Ikejiofor 1997). Abuja seemed to be at that time a potent symbol of national unity which had the capacity to rise above ethnic and political differences (Vale 2008). By the time of the official capital relocation in 1991, optimism had faded from the scene and political conflict was on the rise. Yet by 2010, Abuja, with more than 1.8 million people, had become a city of

'paradoxes and disparities' (Adama 2007: 13): not a total failure, not a city completely compromised by its authoritarian aura, but also, like Lilongwe, not really the city envisioned by its planners, and for some similar reasons.

This planned city was envisioned in an ambitious, grand design. An American planning firm headed the team that produced the Abuja Master Plan, working in conjunction with Doxiadis Associates and the planners of the UK new town of Milton Keynes (Vale 2008: 157). The layout actually had more in common with Washington, DC, or Brasilia, rather than Milton Keynes, in keeping with the 2 different moments when Nigeria's leaders explicitly sought to model its political system after that of the US (Vale 2008: 165-68).

Even with these American elements and purported attempts to build on what were claimed as Nigerian indigenous urban traditions, the new city replicated several spatial-ideological features of colonialism. It did not take long for the segmented map of a colonial city to emerge, along class lines rather than racial ones (Elleh 2001: 75). It also upheld the monumental ideological tactics associated with colonial urbanism. Its National Assembly sits on the highest hillside available (the top of the highest point, Aso Rock, being too rocky for construction), and eventually its Presidential Palace took to higher ground as well. Since it was created to be a federal capital, its central 'business' district was a central government district, reproducing the colonial pattern by which urban growth was disconnected from organic economic development processes. Capital accumulation by Nigeria's elites and political leaders clearly expanded to fit the new capital city, though, particularly in the contracting for its construction, where these elites gained significant economic advantages (Elleh 2001). Even the supposed idea that Abuja was 'virgin land' when it had a pre-existing town and several thousand

years of smaller village settlements, adding up to tens of thousands of residents already in its midst, replicated colonialism's spatial myths about Africa's interior (Vale 2008: 162).

It was several years after the government of Nigeria made the capital relocation decision before construction began. Of the 3 phases of building planned in 1979, geographer Onyanta Adama (2007: 46) shows that by the mid-2000s essentially only phase one had been undertaken. Even Nigeria's then Vice President acknowledged the relocation to have been 'dogged by serious flaws, anomalies and distortions' (Kalgo and Ayileka, in Adama 2007: 51). Perhaps the largest flaw was that of the failure to develop housing to keep pace with the growth of the city as the capital relocation intensified, as this led to the extensive development of unauthorized housing areas outside of the parameters of the plan (Mabogunje 2001; Morah 1992). Even for the public housing that was constructed, researchers found widespread dissatisfaction among residents (Ukoha and Beamish 1997). The staggering speed of the city's growth, from under 100,000 in 1986 to more than 370,000 just 5 years later, practically made these problems inevitable (Ikejiofor 1998). Abuja then quintupled in size in the next decade, and it continues to grow at a pace far above what any of its planners anticipated or any of its managers can handle (Imam et al. 2008).

Actually-existing-Abuja is a city ruled by 'disorganized order' (Onyekakeyah, in Adama 2007: 15). Some of that disorganization occurs because of the inconsistency by which the government has dealt with the 845 pre-existing indigenous settlements in the Federal Capital Territory, whereby some villages have been wholly resettled, others partially so, and still others left intact in the heart of the city (Adama 2007: 52). Adama (2007: 54-58) studied one village, Nyanya, that is now home to all 3 settlement types – the indigenous settlement, the government's 'New Layout', and a labor camp that is something of a mix of planned and unplanned. The

evident contempt of Nigerian officials for the idea of low-cost self-help housing (over 40% of the officials surveyed by Morah (1993: 252) considered a plan for this sort of solution to Abuja's housing crisis to be a Western plot to keep Nigeria 'backward') fed further disorganization. The contempt of many of these same officials for the places like Nyanya, too, has led to ruthless attempts to enforce Abuja's Master Plan to the detriment of its poor majority, whose houses get demolished and whose rights to the city get restricted. Lawrence Vale (2008: 174) cited the then-Minister for the Federal Capital Territory, Hamza Abdullahi, for example, proclaiming in an interview that it was 'impossible for slums to develop here in Abuja' because 'there is what is called our land-use plan and this is our bible….There is absolutely no room for anybody to just start building substandard structures.' It is no surprise to see the response from the city's majority: 'to shut Nigerians out of their own capital, like the "natives" were kept out of the old African colonial capitals, is unacceptable,' as novelist Ike Oguine (2007: 29) put it.

Yet there are some possibilities for re-envisioning Abuja, and one might see this city as one that has moved beyond colonialism in ways that are more tangible than those in Lilongwe. Nigeria remains a country confronting ethnic and regional conflict in numerous areas at once, and Abuja does provide a genuine opportunity to build a unitary pluralist vision, however much its centrality might mark it as 'the eye of the hurricane' (Vale 2008: 161) or the dominance of northerners in Nigerian politics compromises the vision (Ikejiofor 1997). Lagos remains a choking megacity that is difficult to govern, to say nothing of the capacity to govern Nigeria from it, and Abuja still presents itself as a somewhat less choking, viable alternative (Oguine 2007). However deep the flaws of Nigeria's democratic political system, it is consolidating, and the bursts of constructive investment in Abuja have coincided with civilian rule (1979-83 and 1999- in particular) rather than with military rule (Adama 2007: 89). There is certainly vibrant

scholarly debate on Abuja within Nigeria's own considerable urban studies universe (Abumere 1998). The growth of the democratic regimes' interests in developing Abuja make the idea of using the new capital to spur development in the previously underdeveloped Middle Belt of Nigeria at least possible. Adama (2007: 90) makes the case that 'relocation was welcomed by the majority of Nigerians,' and it continues to be, contending that Abuja moves beyond its authoritarian shadows as swiftly as it makes a post-colonial statement, in effect one in which a designed capital becomes an informal 'Afropolis' (Mbembe and Nuttall 2008: 1). Here again, there is more to contemplate in chapter 3 on informality, however, in terms of re-envisioning African cities: can the creeping informalization of Abuja remake the city as an Africanized and postcolonial urbanism?

Dodoma

If Lilongwe and Abuja are visions made problematic from their very start, by virtue of their emergence out of obviously authoritarian regimes, perhaps Dodoma deserves some deeper consideration. The city is one of the greatest physical symbols of *ujamaa*, and since *ujamaa* is one of the most significant 'alternative visions' of urbanism and human settlement that has emerged from postcolonial Africa, it needs to be taken more seriously than the other 2 as a post-colonial urbanism. The philosopher Valentin Mudimbe (1988: 94) called *ujamaa* 'probably the most pragmatic of all African socialisms.' The literary theorist Robert Young, in his *Postcolonialism: an Historical Introduction*, argues that Nyerere's emphasis on 'self-reliance and the preferability of small-scale projects' as opposed to 'grandiose plans' has shaped the character of debates over development in Africa ever since. The irony here for Nyerere's

deserved prominence in the political pantheon of postcolonialism is that Dodoma itself was something of a grandiose plan, despite its modesty by comparison with Lilongwe or Abuja.

Although the German-built railway that passed through Dodoma gave rise to the development of a settlement there in the 1890s, Dodoma was a rather small regional center until the 1970s (Kombe and Kreibich 2000). Tanzania's decision to relocate its capital there came in a vote by the Biennial Conference of the ruling party, Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union in 1973 (the party subsequently became *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) 4 years later, after uniting with the ruling party of Zanzibar). The Master Plan was commissioned the next year and published in 1976. As had been the case in Dar es Salaam in 1968, the professional planners who produced the Master Plan were Canadian, and certain idealized European (or actually North American) notions of what African socialist planning should be found their way into the plans (Armstrong 1987; Alexander 1983). Still, had it been fully implemented in its planned 10-year process, Dodoma's Master Plan would have created a model of African socialist urbanism (Kombe and Kreibich 2000; Hoyle 1979). The strongest African influence on it came through Nyerere, as the 'father of the nation.'

Dodoma's spatial plan was designed to 'enable the open space of the landscape to flow through it' (National Capital Master Plan 1976: 69). In practical terms, this meant the design attempted to mimic an idealized notion of Tanzanian rural communal life (Nyerere 1967, 1968, 1970). The residential form of the plan involved building on the then one-party political system's 10-house cell social organization, in effect creating pod after pod of communalism, much like a dense collection of the rural settlement structures at the heart of the governing philosophy, *ujamaa* villages (Omari and Lukwaro 1978). As Hess (2006: 124) as written, 'the architecture of Dodoma was intended to embody Nyerere's belief in the equalization of urban and rural

development,' emphasizing 'the village as the means to "the brotherhood and equality of man"'. In between the pods, since planners avoided placing the communal areas on higher quality farm and pasture land, the idea was to foster agricultural development for food self-sufficiency, along with afforestation and recreational green spaces (Lupala and Lupala 2003).

The original idea was to transfer the capital gradually from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma over the course of 10 years (Hayuma 1981). Almost 35 years after the publication of the Master Plan, the transfer is yet to be realized in most respects. To be sure, Dodoma has grown from a dilapidated, dusty settlement with less than 50,000 people at the time of the Master Plan to a city of more than 300,000. Unlike Lilongwe or Abuja, it has grown at a slower pace than the plan envisioned, although as with the other created capitals, most of the growth areas have been out of character with the vision. Again most have been informal settlements, expanding in the opposite direction from the plan (Kombe and Kreibich 2000). Many observers have noted the common trend of parliamentarians to stay in Dodoma only as long as necessary to attend sessions of the Parliament – 'no sooner has the session ended than everybody picks up the files and moves back to Dar es Salaam' (Ng'maryo, cited in Hess 2006: 125).

As a consequence, it could be easy to dismiss Dodoma as a failed post-colonial urban vision along with Lilongwe or Abuja. It is certainly not the green city of urban communal foresters, farmers, and herders Nyerere might have idealized (Lupala and Lupala 2003). It has some vestiges of the segmentation by income that dominates Lilongwe or Abuja, even if it lacks the monumentalism (save for the Nyerere sculpture) or obvious elitist capital accumulation (Hayuma 1981). The Tanzanian-German planning research team of Wilbard Kombe and Volker Kreibich (2000: 186) charted out the expectations and achievements of the Capital City Transfer Program, and their chart documents notable gaps. Most significantly, the government itself did

not really move its seat of operations – parliament meets there most of the time, but essentially none of the ministerial headquarters are there, and neither are the main offices of the President or Prime Minister. Despite the slower than expected growth, government housing construction fell far short of what had been planned. Amenities, infrastructure and services that the Master Plan expected – a new hospital, 6 new dispensaries, 20 primary schools, new hotels, and so forth – either had not materialized nearly a quarter-century after the plan or were far more limited in number or scope. Moreover, the planning practices of the Capital Development Authority (CDA) were often repressive toward residents and building control, hardly in step with ideas of 'negotiation, dialogue and consensus building' which one might think could form the basis of a city built to symbolize 'family-hood' and 'self-reliance' (Kombe and Kreibich 2000: 135).

Yet perhaps we should not be so quick here. Kombe and Kreibich (2000: 126) are critical of the CDA's pace of plot allocation between 1982 and 1998 for self-built but surveyed and serviced residential developments, since only 29,967 of 42,816 applications for plots were honored, or 70%. Yet that is a much higher planned land allocation pace than one encounters in that same era in Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar, for example – cases where the percentage of applicants successfully allocated land in many years lies below 10%. Kombe and Kreibich's (2000: 132) fascinating study of the Chang'ombe informal settlement in Dodoma also reveals the ways in which community leaders, including ruling party activists and 10-house cell leaders 'worked tirelessly as a pressure group to mobilize [informal] settlers against' attempts by the CDA to evict them. The active collaboration and collusion of the majority of settlers with local party and government leaders created 'spatial orderliness' in the 'informally regularized' settlement during the first ten years of its development (1976-86). Kombe and Kreibich (2000: 147) argued that there had been a steady decline in community cohesion, and a corresponding

rise in ‘apathy’ toward socialist goals among residents, both of which followed a 1986 central-government directive that limited the CDA’s capacity for demolition and enforcement of strict building controls. The orderly and regularized dimension of Chang’ombe’s subsequent expansion decreased, but Kombe and Kreibich (2000: 147) nonetheless saw great potential at the grassroots for ‘collaborative initiatives’ in future planning.

In the years since their study was published, the formal capital relocation re-emerged as a serious idea, particularly under the leadership of Nyerere’s protégé, Benjamin Mkapa, during his second term as President (2000-2005), and then continuing with the election of Jakaya Kikwete as Tanzania’s President in 2005. Despite predictions that multi-party politics, which emerged in Tanzania after 1992, would lead to the capital relocation being ‘scrapped altogether’ (Kironde 1993: 435), in fact since opposition politicians first came to parliament in 1995 they often have joined with ruling party activists to push the government to speed up the process of relocating the capital, particularly in the last decade, with an emphasis on nationalist and nation-building rhetoric. As a result the government’s budget and aid moneys have gone toward, for example, substantial upgrading of Dodoma’s trunk road connection to Dar es Salaam to the east. Increased road traffic and improved bus service ensued, along with major trucking. The quality of other roads lagged behind, but upgrading and improvement had at least begun for roads to Arusha, Iringa, and Mwanza by the end of the first decade of the 21st century. In 2008, Dodoma finally had plans to receive commercial air service from Dar es Salaam. The University of Dodoma took over the CCM’s large conference center on the outskirts of town in that same year, with plans to expand to upwards of 40,000 students by 2018. A new parliament building was completed and pressed into service. Local hotels, guest houses, and restaurants increased in number and quality, along with other service industries and small factories. It seems that Dodoma is becoming more

than a ‘singular precedent for the amalgamation of moral vision and architectural planning’ (Hess 2006: 126): it is becoming its own city. The way in which that city’s residents live their lives is hardly in tune with the socio-spatial ideals of *ujamaa,* but one might argue that the residents often work toward their own *ujamaa* (as in its literal translation: family-hood) framework of development. Dodoma may be heading for an era of more participatory, decentralized and democratic planning, whatever the government plans, but even there, one senses a much greater degree of popular ownership of the idea of the capital transfer and active efforts to push the agenda (Kitilla 2008). Although the Dodoma capital project was, like those of Lilongwe or Abuja, a state-led vision from the outset, the less authoritarian governing ideology and the strength of community action make it the most likely of the three settings for something much closer to a genuinely postcolonial African urbanism.

Conclusion

Africa had many cities prior to the rise of European power on the continent, but formal colonial rule unquestionably reoriented urbanization, urban forms, and urban functions to meet its needs. Even if we are now more than a half-century past the date of independence in many African countries, contemporary cities on the continent still cope with colonial legacies in socio-cultural and political-economic terms.

If we consequently conceive of African cities as being post-colonial, in that they are amidst both the temporal and conceptual aftermath of colonialism trying to find ways to deal with or subvert those legacies, in most cases the evidence is fairly weak for claiming successes in

doing so. The urban hierarchies of most former colonies remain highly imbalanced, and the political and economic dependence that characterizes many larger cities does not seem to be withering away all that dramatically. Postcolonial regimes have struggled to subvert the internal urban form, segmentation and inequality inherited from colonialism, as post-apartheid South African cities have struggled in attempts to overcome apartheid's urban spatial legacies.

Even in the cases of cities that independent governments built to speak back to colonialism, such as Lilongwe, Abuja, or Dodoma, we can see colonial tactics and strategies replicated or adapted by states and elites. As with the circumstances of all cities on this most diverse and vast continent, these cases vary, so that Dodoma suggests more of a state-led alternative to colonial visions of urban order than the other 2. But truly post-colonial citiness seems to have more potential to emerge in the informal settlements that increasingly dominate all 3 of these planned capitals. A 'relational' and 'pluralist' understanding of African cities, a la Pieterse (2008a: 106) suggests that we need to know much more about the inter-relationships of informal settlements with formal visions of urban order if we are to develop an agenda for 'practical usefulness in changing the world for the better' in African cities (Soja 2000). Thus I next take my search for alternative visions for urban theory and practice to these informal areas in the next chapter, before moving to the realm of governance in chapter 4.

Table 2.1: Africa's Largest Cities

Population (in millions) for the Twenty Largest Cities on the Continent in…

1980	2010
Cairo 7.349	**Cairo** 12.503
Lagos 2.572	**Lagos** 10.572
Alexandria 2.519	**Kinshasa** 9.052
Casablanca 2.109	**Khartoum** 5.185
Kinshasa 2.053	**Luanda** 4.775
Cape Town 1.900	Alexandria 4.421
Johannesburg 1.656	**Abidjan** 4.175
Algiers 1.621	Johannesburg 3.618
Abidjan 1.384	**Algiers** 3.574
Kano 1.350	Addis Ababa 3.453
Durban 1.214	Kano 3.393
Ibadan 1.186	**Nairobi** 3.363
Addis Ababa 1.175	**Dar es Salaam** 3.319
Khartoum 1.164	**Cape Town** 3.269
Ekurhuleni (East Rand) 1.107	Casablanca 3.267
Luanda 0.962	Ekurhuleni 3.157
Dakar 0.957	**Dakar** 2.856
Accra 0.863	Durban 2.839
Nairobi 0.862	Ibadan 2.835
Dar es Salaam 0.836	**Accra** 2.332

Source: UN Habitat (2008), *The State of African Cities 2008: A Framework for Addressing Urban Challenges in Africa*, UN Habitat Nairobi, pp. 174-177. Note: Data for Johannesburg's consolidated metropolitan area in 2010 would yield a much larger population, of more than 8 million. Cities in **bold** are those that served as colonial capitals, primary colonial ports, or both.

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