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Social movements and direct international rule:
Theoretical approaches

Abstract

Based on a case study from the Democratic Republic of Congo, the paper scrutinizes theoretical approaches to “direct internationalised rule” and the contestation thereof. Direct internationalised rule is understood as relationships of authority between international actors, such as international organisations, and individuals. Such relationships, it is argued, are increasingly widespread and significant. Yet how can they be approached analytically? Social movement studies, the global governance perspective, and the governmentality approach are scrutinised regarding their offerings towards an adequate analysis of forms of contestation to direct internationalised rule.

Internationalised rule and ex-combatants in the Congo

During fieldwork in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s district of Ituri in 2005 I encountered widespread complaints by former militia fighters about non-fulfilled pledges made by international intervention agencies. These pledges had been made in the context of a large-scale demobilisation programme. The programme aimed to defuse civil war and rebellion in the district, which had been on-going since 1999, by disarming armed groups’ fighters voluntarily. To lure combatants into giving away their main material and political resources, namely membership in a violent organisation and disposition of firearms, they had been promised cash and equipment to establish themselves as economic entrepreneurs. The programme was called “Disarmament and Community Reinsertion” (DCR), and initially ran from 2004 to 2006.¹

As usual in cases of international humanitarian military intervention such as in the DR Congo, an alphabet soup of organisations administered the DCR programme. Financed by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) cooperated with the national Congolese demobilization agency (CONADER) in the overall DCR management. The United Nations blue-helmet peace mission in the Congo (MONUC) provided security and transported combatants to disarmament sites, which had been constructed by the German national development agency (GTZ). Several local NGO were tasked with the “sensitization”

¹ See Veit (2010: 153-167 & 201-204) for a detailed analysis of the DCR programme.
of fighters and the on-the-ground implementation of reintegration projects. The success of DCR thus depended, besides the voluntarism of the programme’s objects (the ex-combatants and Ituri’s “communities”), on the managerial competences and cooperation between these at least ten different organisations. However, while demobilization, after initial shortcomings, proceeded successfully, community reinsertion remained in limbo for months. Neither cash nor equipment was provided. Ex-combatants I encountered and interviewed uniformly complained about the social and economic situation they found themselves in. What the “demobilisés” did not know, and had little means of knowing, was why pledges were not being fulfilled. As a researcher with a Western university background I had more possibilities in this regard. My enquiries and observations revealed inter-organisational conflicts between the most important “stakeholders” UNDP and CONADER, with the funding World Bank in the background. In October 2005 CONADER practically excluded UNDP, which it could under the given contracts emphasising national “ownership” of the programme. A sub-sub-contractor of the USA’s government agency USAID replaced UNDP. The newly incoming agency finally implemented the community reinsertion-projects, albeit on a much reduced budget and providing much fewer opportunities than originally pledged, which led to further annoyance among ‘beneficiaries’.

Ex-combatants reacted in various ways to the stalling and then downsizing of the programme. Probably most generalized was passive grumbling about the international programme. Many ex-combatants were pre-occupied with acquiring the most basic means of living, and abstained from open protest. However when they were asked to choose from a small selection of potential “micro-projects”, for which they would receive a “starter kit”, a majority of ex-combatants opted for shopkeeping. The respective “starter kits”, containing a variety of household items, meant to constitute their initial stock. Within days, however, the kits’ contents were available in Ituri’s long-established shops, as ex-combatants sold them wholesale. Hardly any small businesses developed.

The second reaction to unfulfilled pledges was an attempt to create a social movement. One group of ex-combatants organized a demonstration in the district capital Bunia, which drew some few thousand protesters, but was violently dispersed by the police. Encouraged by their successful mobilization, the group founded an organisation called “Association Solidaire des Ambassadeurs de la Paix en Ituri” (ASAPI). ASAPI, which was joined by several
dozen card-carrying members, gave itself a statute detailing internal hierarchies and procedures, and vaguely defined the association’s aims. But ASAPI encountered difficulties in being heard by local or international authorities and push for change. The district commissioner, on the other hand, reacted with reservation to their requests, as did other local institutions. Visiting representatives of the World Bank heard their complaints, but permanently installed organisations such as Monuc or UNDP were reluctant to even receive ASAPI representatives. When it came to ex-combatants’ affairs, these agencies relied on a limited range of local interlocutors, most importantly the district commissioner and the national demobilization commission CONADER. Furthermore, local NGO with better reputations, established connections, and experience in project proposal writing had already monopolized the narrow market of internationally financed activities such as information and sensitization campaigns. As their efforts seemed to be fruitless, ASAPI’s mobilization capacity waned. By 2008 ASAPI’s warehouse-office had been returned to its original uses by other tenants, and the organisation had become inactive.

The third choice made by ex-combatants after the disappointing DCR experience was to re-join armed groups. Some military staff of armed groups had never consented with the peace agreement on which DCR was based, and formed new rebel groups fighting the national army and MONUC’s blue-helmet troops. Recruits were offered financial rewards ranging, according to rumours, between 25 and 150 US Dollars. Based on the successful re-recruitment process, the rebels by 2006 successfully re-conquered large parts of Ituri. The Congolese agency CONADER, after new negotiations with rebel groups, set up a new demobilization programme. International organisations abstained from engaging in these Congolese-initiated efforts. At the time, MONUC refused negotiations with the rebels, arguing that the time for benefactions was over. The UN later reported that Congolese authorities had disarmed 4,700 fighters, but that “operational, managerial and financial difficulties of [...] CONADER have significantly hampered the demobilization process.” (UN Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR 2009) After a further year of warfare, UNDP and Monuc changed their minds and began negotiations with the rebels, which resulted in another demobilization exercise known as “DDR phase III”. In November 2007, another 1,800 combatants had gone through demobilization. Ituri then accounted for a quarter of all demobilised combatants in the Congo, but some few hundred or thousand rebels are still active in southern Ituri at the time of writing.
 Opposition and internationalized rule

A key assumption about processes of globalisation during the last decades is the nation state’s loss of competences. The weakening of state sovereignty is fostered by ever more, expanding international treaty regimes, intrusions of IO in various previously ‘domestic’ policy fields, and the takeover of governmental functions by commercial actors and NGO. Globalisation contributed to an internationalisation of political power and government “beyond the state” (Rose and Miller 1992; Zürn 1998). Some termed the result of this process “global governance” (Rosenau 1995), others “empire” (Hardt and Negri 2000). A third cluster of scholars, albeit with strongly differing conceptualisations, detects the emergence of a “world society” or a “world system” (Wallerstein 1974; Meyer et al. 1997; Stichweh 2000; Schlichte 2005).

Charles Tilly argues that the form of political regimes interact with, and often shape the form of, societal opposition (Tilly 2009: 14, 53). Tilly shows how social movements in centuries-long processes in Western Europe and North America redirected their claims away from local rulers and strongmen to the national state. Ever since the full development of the modern nation state, the arena and the addressee of popular claims has been the state. The central causes for these developments were, in a nutshell, the increasing density of social, political and economic interdependencies within national societies, and the ever-growing powers and competences of the central state at the expense of local rulers. If Tilly’s observation is apt, it can be expected that some key characteristics of oppositional politics are about to change due to globalisation. When the state loses competences to international actors and structures, and global interdependencies are increasingly dense, oppositional politics may be reshaped, redirected and reformulated.

In this contribution, I am interested in theoretical offerings that can be usefully employed to analyse the intersection of societal contestation and internationalised rule. On the one hand social movement studies may contribute to such an analysis. Indeed, in recent years a number of publications in this field have dealt with social movements’ answers to political globalisation. On the other hand, I scrutinize how societal contestation is understood in theories of international relations (IR), and what contribution IR theories can make to an analysis of societal contestation of internationalised rule. In the field of IR, I concentrate on two approaches that have been increasingly influential in recent years, namely global
governance and governmentality studies. The remainder of the article is thus divided into three parts, respectively devoted to (1) studies of societal contestation, (2) global governance studies, and (3) global governmentality studies. Each of these parts is subdivided into an interpretation of the DCR programme in Ituri from the respective theoretical perspective, and a more general discussion of theoretical desiderata.

Yet before taking a closer look at the theoretical offerings for analysing case studies like the DCR programme described above, the empirical field of study needs to be delineated more sharply. The Democratic Republic of Congo is neither the most powerful nor the most rogue, nor even the most resource-rich state in the world. Ituri, the district in which the above described peace building programme took place, is considered even by many Congolese politicians to be a peripheral area. What significance does the above-described DCR programme, and ex-combatants responses, actually hold?

My argument refers to an increasing number of direct authority relationships between international actors and individuals in the global South. The Congo is one example of an intervention space in which IO such as the UN and its sub-agencies, national development organisations such as USAID, and internationally operating development and humanitarian NGO together form a political authority network. East Timor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti and other countries are examples of extremely restricted national sovereignty. In such intervention cases, even the most basic domains of the state are taken over by international actors.2

Direct authority relationships between international actors and individuals may be opposed to ‘normal’ indirect relationships between these actors. An example for the latter are economic reform programmes fostered by the International Monetary Fund. These may greatly affect individuals, but are directed at and mediated by a state, which should assume responsibility for their consequences.3 In humanitarian military interventions, international actors directly communicate with individual human beings. While such direct relationships remain a temporary affair, that is until state sovereignty has been reinstalled, in empirical reality such interventions last for years and even decades. In intervention spaces power

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2 On international-national-local rule in East Timor see Chopra (2002); in Bosnia Knaus and Martin (2003) and Chandler (2006); in Afghanistan Suhrke (2007); in Liberia Andersen (2010); in Haiti Zanotti (2010); in a comparative perspective see Bliesemann de Guevara (2010).

3 Also indirect international rule challenges societal contenders. IMF programmes, for example, led to protests in a number of countries and even the fall of governments. In this article, I will however restrict my reflections to direct international rule.
relationships between the local and the international are generalized and direct. International organisations address without mediation individuals through their policies, by lecturing them, by offering material things, and sometimes by shooting at disobeying subjects (as with Ituri’s remobilised rebels). To contest international intervention policies is particularly difficult for those subjects, as the balance of power is extremely asymmetrical, and a legal framework for demanding accountability and making claims does not exist, or only in skeletal form.

Given the element of violent coercion, humanitarian military intervention is a particularly clear demonstration of how direct international rule affects particular political spaces, and which challenges arise for societal contestation of such rule. Yet instances of direct international rule are not confined to these forms of intervention. Other such forms take place on a daily basis and in locations from the smallest hamlet to the megacities of the global South. International development cooperation is clearly the most widespread of these (Schlichte 2005: 284-295). Given the size of the accompanying academic apparatus of specialized research units and journals dealing with development, a large amount of scholarly work analyses contestation to development practices. Often, however, these forms of contestation are not defined as opposition, but may rather be understood as responses to, for example, the sidetracking of resources (Bierschenk 1988; Olivier de Sardan 2005; Rottenburg 2009). Also the private corporate sector, especially in countries of the global South, sometimes takes over governmental functions in ways reminiscent of colonial concessionaire rule (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1972; Hönke 2009; cf. Ferguson 2005).

Another phenomenon involving internationalized rule which gives rise to societal contestation and social movements is flight. This field varies from those mentioned above, because refugees are subject to a specific international jurisdiction and an IO, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Occasional anti-UNHCR protest has been reported and analysed (Moulin and Nyers 2007). Yet like in development studies, refugee interaction with international actors is often described as tactical cunning rather than open protest. An analysis of societal contestation to internationalised rule would need to take into account and categorize the variety of such responses. A final example in this incomplete list may be the emerging field of international justice. From Ituri in the DR Congo, three leaders of armed groups now face trial at the International Criminal Court at The Hague; in many more

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4 See e.g. Malkki (1996) and Sommers (2001) on Burundian refugees inside and outside of camps in Tanzania.
especially African cases of political conflict, international courts play an increasing role. As in the case of refugees, an international juridical regime structures these processes.

The field of direct international rule, and contestation of it, is thus already considerable. Moreover, since the emergence of a liberal economic and political hegemony after the Cold War, direct international rule has continually expanded into new political fields, as well as extended further into societal structures. It is thus a field of study that affects an increasing number of persons, societal strata and states in “world society”. It employs a high number of IO, NGO and other, both public and private organisations. Taken together, the field calls for attention as it is not only significant for the conceptualisation of contemporary contestation, but also telling about the contemporary structure of international relations. Which theoretical approaches may be usefully employed to analyse direct international rule and its challengers?

**Social Movement Studies, Everyday Resistance**

*...and the DCR programme in Ituri*

What immediately springs to mind when examining contestation to internationalised rule are studies in social movements as well as the field of everyday resistance. Ex-combatants in Ituri reacted to the DCR programme in three ways familiar to this scholarly field. First, there was a kind of “everyday resistance” (Scott 1987; Scott 1992). Individualised attempts to grab what was on offer without investing many resources brings to mind the studies of peasant resistance by James Scott, or what Michel de Certeau calls “tactics” (de Certeau 1988). In a similar way to the peasants and authorities in South-East Asia, as narrated by Scott, a majority of ex-combatants was well aware of their very asymmetric power relationships with national and international organisations. They accordingly eschewed open revolt in favour of spontaneous attempts to seize opportunities in convenient moments, such as the wholesale of “starter-kits”. Yet, as de Certeau notes, such a tactic is “an art of the weak”, a means of constant improvisation. It is a method of isolated actions, grabbing opportunities, but without a proper place to stockpile “what it wins”. Such tactics are highly mobile, relying on “a clever utilization of time”, seizing the circumstances that allow a brief transformation of the given figuration into a favourable situation (de Certeau 1988: 36–38). The tactics of Ituri’s ex-combatants did turn the DCR programme at least partly into a farce, as they
undermined the idea of turning fighters into business entrepreneurs. But IOs still celebrated their programme as a success, while ex-fighters remained far from becoming business entrepreneurs.

ASAPI, the ex-combatant association, provided the second way of responding to unfulfilled pledges. The activists’ emphasised their orderly representation of interest. The resource-mobilization school in social movement studies may most profitably employed to analyse their actions (McAdam et al. 2001). ASAPI reacted to disappointing treatment with a mixture of adaptation and claim-making (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 1-26). The organisation tapped into bureaucratic and symbolic civil society repertoires, thus not only making use of “diffusion” and “brokerage”, but also “shifting scales” between local, national and international levels. Yet while the vocabulary of levels usually refers to different political arenas (such as a national capital or the international sphere), ASAPI tried unsuccessfully to jump scales in one arena, Ituri’s capital Bunia, where local, national and international institutions were present (cf. McAdam et al. 2001: 331-336).

Instead of wholesale rejection, ASAPI developed constructive criticism of the international social engineering effort. By ascribing to the notion of peace, the associations’ members discursively situated themselves on common ground with international agencies. They reconnected the role of ex-combatants to political life, whereas public and international views objectified them as a social problem. ASAPI tried to overcome the notion of ex-combatants as formerly wicked, now dangerous, men who should preferably vanish as a social group, by pointing out their orderliness. However, its members lacked the social and cultural capital, such as connections to international agencies or the ability to write project proposals, needed to gain access to the intervention figuration. The network of institutions rejected distrusted and powerless ex-combatants as partners. ASAPI’s failure to gain recognition demonstrated the problematic nature of meagre resources and opportunities for a social movement of ex-combatants. The context of international authority was not suitable for their kind of civil society organisation. In the language of the resource-mobilization school, the opportunity structure of direct international rule was not apt for an ex-combatant organisation lacking in resources.

Ex-combatants’ third response was most successful in terms of holding international actors to their promises. Re-mobilisation into non-state armed organisations and violent rebellion was the most successful response because combatants had viable power resources at hand,
namely: guns. While this was a very crude strategy, and for wider society the most detrimental, it forced authorities to react and re-install new rounds of the programme. The example thus shows that analyses of social movements should not erect artificial boundaries between violent and non-violent repertoires of action, as is usually done in social movement studies. Rather, there exists a continuum between these forms of action.\(^5\)

...and its desiderata

The vocabulary of studies of social movements in national frames of reference allows a good deal of description of the DCR programme. Yet what about the specificities linked to the international form of rule? Indeed, economic and institutional globalisation has tempted social scientists to look for parallel developments in the protest and resistance scenery. Many regarded the alter-globalisation movement\(^6\) as a sign of increasing transnationalisation of social movement activity. Charles Tilly summed up this argument in figure 1, with “claimants” being social movements and “objects of claims” being authorities.

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\(^5\) The resumption of warfare and the remobilisation of combatants in Ituri in 2006 had various complex causes, of which the failing DCR programme was only one part. For details see Veit (2010).

\(^6\) Or anti-globalisation movement or global justice movement, as it has been termed alternatively, which gained strength from around 1995.
Figure 1 (from Tilly and Wood 2009: 113)

It may however be doubted that a transnationalisation of social movement activity is the only, or even the most widespread and significant reaction to globalisation. At least this is indicated by the instances of direct international rule and its contestation pointed out above, which have hardly brought about transnational claim-making, but rather a wide array of localized reactions.

Moreover, the literature on transnational social movements suffers from two shortcomings, which prevent it from providing meaningful hints for the above described phenomena of international rule and contestation. First, while research on ‘national’ oppositions has for decades reflected the historicity of its object (Tilly 1986; Tilly and Wood 2009; Hanagan et al. 1998), this is not the case for transnational movements studies (cf. Brecher et al. 2000; Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Della Porta et al. 2006). Such presentism is at risk of overstating the newness of international connections between social movements, echoing the overexcited debates on the supposed novelty of globalisation in the 1990s. Statements like “Over the last quarter-century, we have witnessed a sea-change in the nature of leftist activism” (Reitan 2007: 1) do not adequately characterize change and continuity of transnational contention.

More prudently, Sidney Tarrow acknowledges that contemporary “transnational activism” may only differ rather than being an entire novelty compared to earlier periods, in that “it involves a broader spectrum of ordinary peoples and elites, and that it extends to a wider range of domestic and international concerns.” (Tarrow 2005: 4) Yet contestation across borders and involving authorities active across national borders has always been an important defining feature of globalisation. For example, the 19th century mobilisation against slave trade and slavery, the Socialist International, and the anti-colonial struggles in the 20th century all had strong, at periods defining international characteristics besides local and national elements. Crossing national borders has for centuries been a widespread phenomenon. Activists exchanged theoretical and practical ideas, mobilized internationally, and adapted successful forms of activism from other countries. At the same time, they often failed to maintain their organized solidarity, like the Second Socialist International in the face of nationalism during World War I. Tarrow further argues that “what is most striking about the new transnational activism is both its connection to the current wave of globalisation and its relation to the changing structure of international politics.” (Tarrow 2005: 4) Yet how the international political structure has changed since about 1990, and what role
contestation played in the process, needs to be analysed before being declared revolutionary with a broad brush.

The second shortcoming of this strand of literature is a restricted focus on Western democracies. Such geographical limits have a longer tradition in social movement studies, especially in theoretical works. Charles Tilly even insists that social movements in the modern sense are original products of European and North American democracy (Tilly and Wood 2009: 5). While such a view has its merits, allowing for a delineation of how social movements can be defined, it risks neglecting “popular politics in most of the world” (Chatterjee 2004). A focus on Western democracies is all the more surprising in a literature looking at activism in a globalisation context and on issues such as development or human rights that directly concern non-Western regions.

When non-Western actor groups are included into the analysis, the cases are very often drawn from Latin America, where the social movement scene is in many respects similar to Western democracies. Another tendency is to only look at cases in which Western activists denounce conflicts and interactions taking place between actors from the global South (such as female circumcision in Africa) (Keck and Sikkink 1998).7 The most prominent volumes on transnational activism feature no analysis or only briefly touch upon activism in Africa (and Asia, which is also outside the scope of this article) (Brecher et al. 2000; Smith and Johnston 2002; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005; della Porta et al. 2006). This circumstance mirrors the empirical problem of African social movements’ relative lack of resources, which results in difficulties in being heard in the international media, and an imbalance in power relations between Africans and non-Africans in transnational action networks.

Global governance studies

…and the DCR programme in Ituri

Traditional approaches to IR, i.e. (neo)realist and liberal theories, disqualify for the analysis of contestation to international rule because of their exclusive focus on the nation state. International organisations or societal forces are not taken into account as actors in their own right, while the DCR programme in Ituri as well as opposition to it was clearly driven by

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7 The volume by Khagram et al. (2002) balanced this bias.
such actors. A potentially more fruitful approach may be the concept of global governance, an approach that has become increasingly influential in sections of IR scholarship, e.g. in Germany (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2009: 458-460). The global governance perspective seems promising, as the concept allows the impact of globalisation on the landscape of political institutions to be described. One of its key assumptions is that authority is wielded also, but not exclusively, by the state. While states are regarded as important players, a multitude of other actors, institutions and phenomena “such as global social movements; civil society; the activities of international organisations; the changing regulative capacity of states; private organisations; public-private networks; transnational rule making; and forms of private authority” are also taken into account (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 189). Global governance is interested in systems of authority on every societal “level” (from the family to the international arena), provided “the exercise of control has transnational repercussions.” (Rosenau 1995: 13) Global governance “research is therefore particularly interested in the interlinkages between the different policy levels.” (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 192) The important “benefit of including these questions in the notion of global governance”, as summed up by Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg, “derives from the importance these linkages have in real life.” (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 192)

The global governance concept provides a clear definition of its object, which is its most important analytical asset. The structure of political authority in Ituri included a number of international organisations, foreign national development agencies, local and international NGO, and Congolese national state agencies as well as local governmental structures. This governance network, as has been described, failed to live up to the pledges given to ex-combatants, pledges that should not be regarded as a mere show of goodwill. After all, the DCR programme was meant to contribute to a transition from war to peace in a region ravaged by deadly conflict, and failure contributed to the resumption of fighting. Thus the question of accountability – of who was responsible for this deadly disappointment - obviously arises. During fieldwork, fingers were always pointed to the respective other organisation. It actually remained unclear who was indeed responsible for the management of the programme. Was it the Congolese government agency CONADER, which was largely dysfunctional and sidelined in the later stages of the described process? Was it the World
Bank as the funding organisation? Or UNDP, which initiated the exercise but found itself in conflict with other organisations?

Global governance structures obviously invite what may be called responsibility diffusion, which was indeed instrumentalised by the organisations involved. Yet how can we explain why organisations given a relatively simple task (providing some business opportunities to a limited number of people) fail to live up to that task? And why would these same organisations be so unresponsive to civic complaints, turning violence into the only language they were willing to hear? A number of recent works argue that when IO and NGO are understood as bureaucracies such seeming dysfunctions can be explained. Organisational self-interest, discursive framing and inter-organisational friction may all have played a role. Yet none of these works is obviously located in global governance studies, but rather employs a political economy approach (Cooley and Ron 2002), a constructivist approach (Barnett & Finnemore 2004), or refers to ideas from organisational sociology (Lipson 2007).

…and its desiderata

A global governance approach seems perfectly suited for shedding light on the confusing network of institutions in Ituri, as well as its nexus with Ituri’s society. Yet a closer look at a case study reveals that the perspective seems to offer very little either in theoretical or methodical terms. Part of the reason for this theoretical/methodical gap is perhaps the state-centred IR heritage, which has not been fully overcome. So far the lack of a social theory, or at least a vocabulary for naming social figurations beyond formal organisations, relegates the global governance approach to the status of a post-traditional international relations theory. Global governance studies tend to look at the world “from above”, whereas politics “from below” (Bayart 2008) are not on the map. While the comparatively disorderly, unorganized or informally organized has thus not yet become an object of analytical scrutiny, some global governance authors present the approach as being concerned with its antidote. The central themes of global governance, according to this strand of scholars, are order, control and the steering of the world (Mayntz 2008; Dose 2008). Even when contestation is explicitly under scrutiny, resistance to global governance actors is defined as a non-intended side-effect (Zürn et al. 2007) rather than understood as an integral part of the construction and deconstruction of (global) rule. Accordingly, resistance
can only be understood as the prevention of governance or the undermining of social order, rather than as a productive political force (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006). Also this perspective can be traced back to a certain heritage. In a seminal text, James Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel spelled out a paradigm of negotiation, cooperation and compromise that rested on the idea that single actors were forced to cooperate because of their inability to resolve global problems on their own (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Global governance is defined by some scholars, in tandem with policy-makers, as a political programme for the cooperative resolution (or at least management) of supra-national problems (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006: 189-196), turning global governance into a theory of post-political administration (Latham 1999). Conflict and asymmetrical power relations fall into analytical oblivion (Behrens 2004). While empirical-analytical approaches to global governance seek to overcome this normatively laden perspective, some “minimal normativity” in the sense that “governance-outputs are goods, not evil” (Teilprojekt A1 2009: 5, my translation) seems to remain in the global governance analytical mainstream.

Global governmentality studies

...and the DCR programme in Ituri

Another increasingly influential concept for the analysis of internationalised authority is posited by global governmentality studies. The term governmentality has been coined by Michel Foucault, and refers to the connection between government and mentality. The neologism is applied to governing actors, their reasoning, goals and means, and their ‘techniques of domination’, i.e. the institutions, practices, and procedures that regulate social conduct. This form of authority is centrally based on the consent of the governed. It is the encounter of techniques applied by others with techniques ‘of the self’ which results in a ‘governmentalized’ societal structure. The governed voluntarily consent and conduct themselves in ways demanded and expected of them by those governing. Government and population share a single governmentality, which is entrenched in corresponding subjectivities. Power in this model is foremost about structuring and shaping the field of possible action of subjects, who in reaction develop forms of self-government. Governmentality is, like global governance, a perspective that emphasizes consensus

Foucault developed the concept to analyse the European case in a particular historical context, rather than positing the concept as a universal theoretical device. He argues that the idea (or the problem) of government being primarily concerned with populations emerged in the late 17th century in Western Europe. The new form of governmental reasoning gradually amended older forms of sovereign power primarily concerned with discipline and controlling territory. European governments, including affiliated philosophers and the social sciences, developed laissez-faire policies for achieving prosperous political economies. Government limited itself as a way of rational domination (Foucault 1991). Ruling actors' self-limitation, which can also be understood as “governing at a distance” (Rose and Miller 1992), was possible because “multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts and so on are gradually, progressively, actually and materially constituted as subjects.” (Foucault 2004: 28) The matrix of rule expands into society, which becomes subject to and agent of its own assujettissement (subjectivation) (Reckwitz 2008: 23-39). Governmentality may thus be understood as a theory of liberal rule. Examples of how subjects consent to their own subjugation are easily to be found in contemporary Europe and North America, for example in the field of welfare politics. Nonetheless, the even in the Western context the governmentality paradigm is often applied in a generalised sense and with a disregard for the actual results of governmental discourse and policies (cf. Finzsch 2002). Regarding non-Western countries the application of the concept demands even greater analytical care. Nonetheless, a growing body of ‘global governmentality’ studies has developed in recent years (see e.g. Duffield 2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Larner and Walters 2004; Sending and Neumann 2006; de Larrinaga and Doucet 2010).

The DCR programme in Ituri was a rather obvious instance of a neoliberal governmentality. The underlying idea of “community reinsertion” was that individuals should become business entrepreneurs. Once ex-combatants were fishing, farming or shop keeping, emerging commercial interdependencies would raise the cost of violence. Peace would be in the interest of ex-combatants, who would accordingly assume a civic conduct. This approach’s rationality is derived from political economy, according to Foucault the genuine language of governmentality. At the same time, the idea was extremely naive, since it took little consideration of Ituri’s economic situation. Ex-combatants that lost no time with their
“starter-kits” seem to have understood better that they stood little chance of earning a living by putting up another small market stall besides existing ones. The district’s economy, especially the local income spend on household items, was destroyed by decades of state exploitation and civil war. Ex-combatants thus called for university education, or machinery for farming, cheese dairies, and fisheries. Their ideas revolved around migration as university students or export production. They believed they could make it when given the opportunity. Many ex-combatants shared a neoliberal, entrepreneurial governmentality: The consensus with the international approach to peace by business was most symbolically shared by the failed NGO ASAPI, which demanded the fulfilment of peacebuilders’ pledges eagerly but in an orderly manner.

...and its desiderata

Why, however, did the DCR programme fail despite the governmentality consensus between international agencies and their subjects? A profound criticism of Anglophone governmentality studies is provided by Jonathan Joseph, who argues that “in practice, neoliberal governmentality cannot be a universally valid technique”, because “outside of the social conditions of advanced liberal capitalism” the respective policies of international institutions are bound to fail (Joseph 2009: 425). The author criticizes that many governmentality studies restrict their analysis to abstract ideas and practices rather than concrete results in societies targeted by international actors. These works fail to adequately account for instances of “failed governmentality” (Joseph 2009: 420). Furthermore he posits that actual neoliberal policies are quite often coercively imposed on countries, such as the International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programmes. As coercion is not at the centre of the governmentality paradigm, the perspective adds little to the understanding of these practices. Joseph concludes that governmentality studies actually focus on the relationships between international institutions and nation states, and not on populations, because also the policies of international actors usually target states. He calls this “governmentality once removed.” (Joseph 2009: 424) This branch of IR studies thus, like many global governance studies, restricts itself to indirect relations of power in instances of internationalized rule.
How far does this criticism carry? As already mentioned above, the problem in Ituri was not the subjectivities of ex-combatants, even if they did not directly experience ‘the social conditions of advanced liberal capitalism’. Whether governmentality approaches fail because of a subjectivity gap or inappropriate social structures needs to be scrutinized more closely in individual cases. Yet Joseph may have a valid point regarding the question of coercion: While demobilization was presented as voluntary, the UN mission MONUC made it clear that non-compliers would be treated as criminals (Veit 2010: 156). Subsequently, ex-combatants were not allowed to adequately participate in the community reinsertion planning. Finally, those who remobilized were violently confronted.

Beyond Anglophone governmentality studies, the French political sociologist Jean-François Bayart employs the governmentality paradigm in his description of the “gouvernement du monde” in a different, more encompassing sense. Bayart’s historical sociology of the political lacks neither a historical perspective, as he describes the fundaments of contemporary globalisation as dating back at least to the 19th century, nor does he eschew an analysis of the societal consequences and responses to globalisation (Bayart 2007: 28). He argues that current globalisation processes are fuelled on the one hand by what others term institutions of global governance, i.e. states, IOs, private corporations and NGOs. On the other hand, there is an “appropriation [of globalisation] by the masses”, which pick up and reformulate the newly emerging opportunities (Bayart 2007: 290). This encounter between domination and processes from below, however, does not result in global governmentality, a global ‘we’ nor a homogenous from of global authority. The various, often contradictory, engagements rather result in the “heterogeneity, incompletion and contingency of the ‘event of globalization.’” (Bayart 2007: 28)

Yet Bayart’s insightful historical sociology of political globalisation also has its limits for the study of opposition to internationalised rule. Studies of global governance as well as global governmentality tend to evade the question whether liberal prescriptions for the non-Western world work, or what effects (intended or unintended) they result in. Bayart embraces the agency of the ruled, yet only to dissolve it into globalized subjectivities. The result of opposition is always already there, as part and parcel of a contradictory process resulting in ever-new patterns and practices of globalisation. Consider anti-colonial resistance, a significant historical form of opposition to international rule: “The spread and naturalization of the state ‘imported’ into Africa and Asia thus happened through anti-
colonial struggles: the white man has been chased away, but his ideological and institutional baggage has been kept.” (Bayart 2007: 26) Yet did anti-colonial movements struggle against statehood, or rather against being ruled by foreigners? Similarly, militant Islamism unfailingly reproduces the nation state (which is, in Bayart’s view to which I agree, a product of globalisation) instead of creating a “green international” (Bayart 2007: 80), the anti-globalisation movement “reconfigure[d] the public space worldwide” (Bayart 2007: 263) and the spread of terrorist suicide attacks from Sri Lanka to New York is interpreted as a “global political technique of the body” (Bayart 2007: 264). In a nutshell, protest invariably contributes to globalisation. The point here is not that these assertions are wrong; the problem is rather that such interpretation analyses everything from its result, and leaves little room for considering the emergence and development of social movements and their members’ subjectivities in their own right.

**Conclusion**

In this contribution it has been argued that globalisation entails forms of direct international rule, which have been conceptualised as relationships of authority between international actors and individuals. Among the examples were humanitarian military intervention, development cooperation, refugee regimes, and the takeover of governmental functions by private corporations. Such forms of internationalised rule are widespread in the global South, where they become increasingly deeply involved in the regulation of societies. Given that structures of authority interact with, and often shape societal opposition, it can be expected that particular forms of contestation to such rule emerge. The article scrutinised which theoretical approaches can be usefully employed to analyse such contestation to direct internationalised rule.

Social movement and everyday resistance studies, it has been argued, provide a useful vocabulary for grasping these practices of contestation. This strand of literature employs a perspective on politics “from below”, which allows the identification of repertoires, practices of jumping scales, and opportunity structures for social movements. However, the literature on social movements in contemporary globalisation presently overemphasizes the “newness” of these phenomena, as it lacks a historical perspective. Furthermore, its focus is mostly restricted on Western democracies, thus ignoring “politics in most of the world”.

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Disregard for the global South risks missing the most significant new and continuing forms of contestation to internationalised rule.

The global governance perspective on world politics, on the other hand, describes the institutional setup of current forms of internationalised rule. The alphabet soup of international organisations, international non-governmental organisations, private corporations and state institutions that together form regimes of authority in many political spaces, are adequately defined as global governance networks. However, the perspective does not seem to live up to its promises, as it lacks a theoretical place for non-organised or informally organised actors. Especially those who are excluded from governance structures fall off the analytical landscape. Global governance’s view from above thus needs to be completed with a view on “politics from below”. This would not only be necessary for a better understanding of contestation to internationalised rule, but also for minimizing the risk of taking the effectiveness of governance policies for granted.

Global governmentality studies, the second approach under scrutiny, also tends to limit its analysis to governance institutions and their practices. Governmentality studies are well-positioned to analyse the rationale of governance. Yet many studies only give minor attention to societal actors’ subjectivities, and the question of whether governance policies actually work. Moreover, taking overlapping or complementary subjectivities between rulers and the ruled for granted raises the risk of overlooking important aspects. In particular, governance subjects’ subjectivities may conflict with the rationale of ruling institutions, even if asymmetrical power relationships lead to a supposed consensus.

This paper is a mere preliminary conceptualisation of a field of enquiry, namely contestation to direct international rule. Many questions remain open, including that of theoretical perspective. In particular, a political sociology of the field needs to carve out the overlapping aspects of studies of contention and everyday resistance on the one hand, and perspective of government such as global governance and governmentality. It is in these overlapping aspects where the theoretical place of contestation to international rule is situated.
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