

Fixing the State

Development, Recognition, and Community-Based Organizations in Tanzania

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INTRODUCTION

If you happened to find yourself wandering the dusty streets of a sleepy residential area in southern Dar es Salaam in the spring of 2005, you probably would have noticed considerable activity at a local water kiosk. The colorful assortment of battered buckets and jerrycans neatly arrayed in a line would have caught your eye, as would the crowd of mingling vendors with their pushcarts and the massive, 20,000 liter concrete water tank looming nearby. The ownership and management of this operation would have been unclear, however. No signs would have been posted to indicate that the delivery of this essential basic service was the recent result of an unlikely partnership between the municipal government and a community-based organization (CBO) from Kibongo, the adjacent neighborhood.¹ The former had constructed the tank and laid the network of pipes to connect it to several other water kiosks placed throughout the settlement; the latter had a legitimate claim to the water.

Kibongo was one of seventeen communities in Dar es Salaam to receive newly dug deep wells in 2001 as part of the Community Infrastructure Program (CIP), a development project jointly funded by the World Bank and Irish Aid. In cooperation with city officials, donors selected the project sites based on both perceived need and the availability of water fit for human consumption; i.e., it should not be too salty, which is often the problem with wells in Dar es Salaam. At the donors' insistence, however, local government was prohibited from controlling the wells. Instead, community-based organizations (CBOs) were granted the rights to the wells and the revenues generated from the sale of water, with the understanding that the profits would be used to maintain and expand the system. Under this scheme, CBOs were expected to sell water to residents either by the bucket at water kiosks, or by charging them a flat fee for the water they received via direct connections to their homes. The Beach Development Association (BDA), the only registered CBO in Kibongo at the time of the cip, took control of the two wells that remain

in its possession today. The nature of that control has changed, however, as state actors found new uses for the water.

In 2004, the municipal government and the city water authority announced that they were going to construct the aforementioned water tank in the settlement next to Kibongo, where repeated efforts to drill for water had proved unsuccessful. Their plan to fill the tank with water from one of BDA's wells was met with disbelief and a concerted effort by the CBO's leaders to resist the state's appropriation of their resource. In the end, the state prevailed but offered one concession: BDA was granted the right to sell the water from the kiosks supplied by the new tank, including those constructed on the grounds of the local primary school and recently built municipal (ward) office. While the situation in Kibongo is, to a certain extent, exceptional, it is one of several examples of services being delivered through some form of state-society partnership in Dar es Salaam.

The outcomes of such cooperation are equivocal. It should be stressed, for example, that water is available for the first time in many of Dar es Salaam's residential areas thanks to the efforts of CBOs. These organizations have also taken on various other infrastructure and service activities that have traditionally been the bailiwick of the state including, but not not limited to, solid waste management, road maintenance, the reconstruction of public schools, the care of orphans, and HIV/AIDS education. While acknowledging achievements on issues such as these, numerous studies have also criticized contemporary efforts to involve "communities" as partners in the implementation of development projects in various contexts. Referred to by the World Bank as both "community-based development" (CBD) and "community-driven development" (CDD), the overall approach is grounded on the assumption that "community" participation will not only ensure that projects are responsive to the needs of the poor, but also pay dividends in terms of sustainability, efficiency, and effectiveness. However, an oft-cited critique commissioned by the World Bank shows such assumptions to be wanting.² In their thorough review of numerous community-based and -driven projects, Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao conclude that the evidence suggests that, on balance, such projects are inefficient, captured by elites, and succeed only when there is government support and/or long-term external intervention.

My purpose in this book is neither to condemn nor to praise what has become a particularly pervasive approach to development in Tanzania and elsewhere across the global South. Rather than attempt to evaluate the failures and successes of different manifestations of community-based development, I use the current infatuation with "community" as a lens to understand how the putative division between state and society is produced. My view of this boundary begins with the axiom that the state is not an object, site, or agent that is separate from society, but rather an image, an effect, a representation that is produced and reproduced through configurations of arrangements, policies, and practices. These configurations create the appearance of a world divided into state and society. Some may sustain the image of a coherent,

controlling state that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in a given territory and to rule through rational law (i.e., Max Weber's ideal-type state); others may serve to undermine or attenuate such a perception. As I will discuss in greater detail below, I adapt this understanding of the dynamic state-society boundary primarily from the scholarship of Joel Migdal and Timothy Mitchell. In somewhat different ways, each challenges the prevailing view of the state that has largely been taken for granted by social scientists and development practitioners for more than six decades.

My title, *Fixing the State* is intentionally ironic and requires explanation at the outset. On the one hand, it draws attention to long-standing assumptions found in writings on the state which underpin the current discourse and practice of development. From this perspective, the state is an autonomous, coherent, unified actor. But it is also one that, in many contexts, has seemingly neither functioned well as an agent of development nor demonstrated the capacity to play a significant role in a globalizing economy. When speaking of the state in Africa, for example, the term is often modified with less-than-flattering adjectives such as "failed," "corrupt," "fragile," and "weak."³ Those falling into the latter category are often characterized as having a limited ability to foster an environment conducive to economic growth, to maintain legitimate political institutions, to gain compliance for official policies without the use of coercion, to extract resources, and to appropriate or use those resources in determined ways.⁴ But this framing is not completely devoid of optimism. Although presumably lacking in essential capacities, the African state, development actors suggest, can be rehabilitated. It can be redirected by policies that not only place clear limits on its ability to engage in and/or regulate market transactions, but also impel it to shift responsibility for a variety of social welfare functions to non-state actors such as CBOs. In short, the state can be "fixed," as in repaired, renovated, or structurally adjusted.

On the other hand, the title indicates the book's primary object of inquiry: the active and ongoing production of the state as a discrete object separate from society. Although the verb "to fix" is perhaps most commonly understood in the sense of repairing or mending, it also means to fasten something in a particular place or position, to give something stability or constancy. Thus in contrast to international development actors who characterize their prescriptions, projects, and partnerships as "fixing" the state in terms of improving it, my principal usage of the term refers to the processes and practices which create the image of the state as an autonomous object and of the world clearly divided between state and society.

This book therefore examines the dynamic but historically grounded production of difference; i.e., the variable configurations of particular arrangements, policies, and practices which differentiate state from society in urban Tanzania. Although this boundary is both shifting and permeable, Timothy Mitchell reminds us that efforts to maintain it are significant because they generate resources of power.⁵ With respect to the present focus on community-based development, the analysis which follows will demonstrate the many ways that power accrues in

both the organizations that constitute the state and, to a much lesser extent, those that represent urban communities.

Two distinct configurations have proved effective not only in establishing and sustaining a state-society threshold, but also in amplifying the power wielded by actors on both sides of the divide. The first configuration, which I call “recognizing community,” refers to techniques that municipal, national, and international development actors deploy to produce autonomous, self-managing, responsible consumers (e.g., of services), both individually and collectively, who take responsibility for their own development.⁶ It does so by transforming the horizontal social networks found in every urban community into a set of structured opportunities and constraints that affect the way residents express their interests, understand their responsibilities, and act to address collective problems and needs. By inducing participation in CBOs and asserting a clear difference in the authority and responsibility of the state and community actors, as exemplified by the introductory vignette about Kibongo, government institutions are able to mobilize a broad array of human and material resources; resources that, in the absence of efforts to advance the distinction, are apt to lie dormant. It must be stressed that the extent to which state actors are able to appropriate labor, money, and/or materials is of considerable importance in settings such as Dar es Salaam, where, much to the detriment of state coffers, the majority of residents make a living in the informal economy, lack title deeds to their houses, and have proved unwilling to pay property taxes. But the benefits are not entirely one-sided. For those “communities” that have become both the agents and objects of development, assertions of the state-society boundary can be empowering, insofar as it creates the capacity and/or autonomy for community residents to make demands on urban planners, their elected representatives, and other state actors. In short, it provides them with the necessary legitimacy to act as an interlocutor with both the state and an array of international development actors.

The second configuration I call “rendering political.” This is a product of government actors making public statements, eliminating or co-opting autonomous organizations, crafting legislation, and enforcing existing laws which proscribe particular activities and claim-making by non-state actors. As a result, certain practices are not only deemed to be exclusively within the realm or right of the state, but also shielded from public scrutiny. This, in effect, (re)produces the image of the state as a coherent entity separate from society. I adapt the phrase “rendering political” from Tania Murray Li’s remarkable account of the development apparatus in Indonesia.⁷ She fashions the concept “rendering technical” to capture the interplay of discourse and practice that serves to designate and delimit the objects of development intervention. In her usage, the act of “rendering technical” makes visible the conditions to be improved, confirms the “expertise” of those who claim the right to “diagnose deficiencies,” and legitimates the techniques that constitute actual schemes of improvement.⁸ By rendering development issues technical, Li argues that they “are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical,” insofar as those proffering technical prescriptions tend to eschew analysis of the power structures that produce the conditions in need

of improvement.⁹ My adaptation of the phrase is thus the opposite side of the same coin. Rather than focus on the arrangements, policies, and practices that demarcate the specific conditions that ought to be subject to “expert” interventions, my usage captures efforts to ensure that certain development issues fall solely within the purview of state actors. This not only serves to “fix” an ever-shifting boundary between state and society, but also bolsters the authority of the former.

My argument, in short, is that the prevailing approach to international development produces outcomes which are incompatible with its underlying assumptions and intended objectives. The various programs and projects which fall under the rubric of communitybased or -driven development are meant to shift control and accountability from central authorities to community-based organizations and other local actors; to improve the targeting of poverty programs; and to ensure that scarce resources are used effectively, efficiently, and with an eye toward sustainability. But while the overall explicit objective of CBD/CDD is to reverse power relations to the benefit of non-state actors, I will demonstrate in the following chapters that, in fact, what is strengthened is both the image of a coherent, efficacious, and autonomous state, and the capacity of state organizations exercise authority. Rather than “fixing” the state in terms of reforming it, improving its ability to create and sustain an environment in which community-based development actors can succeed, contemporary development efforts help to “fix” the elusive and dynamic boundary between state and society in a manner that enhances the power of the former.

REFORMING THE STATE

From our contemporary vantage point, development via community-based actors appears to be an idea borne of pragmatism rather than radicalism. In urban contexts such as Dar es Salaam, where extraordinary population growth has run in tandem with chronic resource scarcity and an inability to provide infrastructure and services commensurate with demand, the argument that the success of development interventions is a function of incorporating beneficiaries in project planning, implementation, and operation is compelling. After all, the longstanding, top-down approach to development in Dar es Salaam has little claim to success. Rather than producing a well-organized and sustainable city, it has yielded a sprawling agglomeration of settlements in which the majority of solid waste goes uncollected and less than 20 percent of residents have a direct connection to the water supply system.¹⁰ While it would be inappropriate to characterize the city’s development as a failure simply because it has diverged from both local master plans

and global ideal types, it has resulted in a configuration that is unsatisfactory to most of its residents. The poor quality roads and limited water and sanitation infrastructure found in most parts of the city are chronic sources of frustration. In this light, community-based development seems immensely practical and worth pursuing. It is another potentially effective tool in the development toolbox, another component of an overarching development project that has gone through multiple iterations over the past six decades.

And yet this shift to community as both the object and agent of development is quite radical. Notwithstanding the reasonable desire to bring about immediate and tangible improvements to the local level, and the seemingly obvious (and long overlooked) role to be played by local actors, efforts to induce urban residents to invest their time, energy, and resources into the projects from which they stand to benefit was a profound break from the status quo. To appreciate the scale of this shift requires a brief review of the state-led development project which prevailed until the imposition of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s. It is to this task that this section of the chapter now turns.

In the first decades of independence, postcolonial governments in sub-Saharan Africa assumed nearly complete control over the economy, polity, and society. National development was understood to be the improvement of one key indicator (i.e., the sustained growth of gross domestic product) and the result of the actions of one critical actor (i.e., the developmental state). Comprehensive state intervention and control was justified on three grounds. First, the very stability of nascent states hinged on the capacity of various government actors to bring about a tangible increase in people's standard of living. Failure to deliver on the promises that fueled the push for independence could have undermined the state system across the global South. Second, given the undisputed weakness of Africa's indigenous bourgeoisie at independence, the international development community, which provided the requisite loans, countenanced state-sponsored projects and the subsequent expansion of the public sector; the private sector was far too limited to meet either the demand for employment or public goods. Third, the commitment of many countries to redistribute income on ethical grounds warranted the creation of socialist or Keynesian-style welfare states. In sum, the postcolonial state sought to occupy all of the economic, political, and social space in order to direct development.

In Tanzania, both the colonial and postcolonial state exhibited centralizing tendencies that were impelled by similar concerns. Both were under pressure, for example, to stimulate economic growth by expanding the production of export commodities, and they sought to do so through the application of "high modern" rational planning and scientific methods emanating from the center.¹¹ Both were also concerned with political stability, though in very different ways. After World War II the British confronted restive populations in their colonies eager to change the status quo. The creation of representative local government authorities—which in Tanzania were somewhat incongruous structures that ran parallel to those of the "native chiefs"—were meant to

relieve some of the pressure and serve as “a channel of expression for Western-educated young men in the districts. . . .”¹² They also served to draw local government closer to the central state.¹³

The postcolonial state acted quickly to extend the ambit of these local political institutions, depriving the traditional authorities of their formal status within a year of independence and thereby removing a potential impediment to the ruling party’s monopoly of political life.¹⁴ The postcolonial state in Tanzania also took steps to eviscerate groups deemed to be too independent of state oversight. Any organized group that could serve as a competing center of power and thereby interfere with national development goals was viewed with suspicion.¹⁵ This initial manifestation of the configuration I have referred to above as “rendering political” began to take form as early as 1964, when independent trade unions were brought under the direct control of the national political leadership. The dissolution of the Tanganyikan Federation of Labor (TFL) and its replacement with the TANU-controlled National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) stemmed from its position on Africanization and the concern that union leaders had ambitions to use the army mutiny as a catalyst for further political change. Similarly, the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA), a grassroots organization committed to socialist principles, was banned in 1969 for promoting a form of socialism that did not depend on a strong central party.¹⁶ The fate of the RDA was a harbinger of things to come for cooperatives. Although it sought to maintain its role in rural development, the cooperative movement was eventually dissolved by the state in 1975–76.¹⁷ This act “completed a trend in official policy that saw the successive elimination of all autonomous organs of self-administration in the hands of the rural ‘middle class.’ The central state was now omnipresent.”¹⁸ In short, the elimination of the cooperative movement was the culmination of arrangements, policies, and practices that were deployed to ensure that the development project fell solely within the purview of state actors.

By the mid-1980s, the bottom had fallen out of the state-led approach to development in Tanzania and elsewhere across the African continent. Postcolonial states that had struggled for nearly two decades to stay afloat in the midst of a severe economic crisis found that they continued to lose ground. Prominent development actors, most notably the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, argued that, in the absence of a drastic change in policy, these countries faced more of the same: slow economic growth, marginal agricultural performance, rapid population increase and balance-of-payments problems. The efforts of states to supplant rather than improve the functioning of markets, a practice pejoratively referred to as dirigiste dogma, had not worked as hoped.¹⁹

As the star of state-led development waned, a new understanding of political economic practices began to take root globally. Neoliberalism, as it has come to be known, is arguably both an ideology and a theory of the most efficient means to achieve human well-being. Adherents maintain that a rising quality of life for the greatest number of people “can best be advanced by

liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”²⁰ The role of the state is therefore to develop and maintain an enabling environment for such practices to take root. As a consequence of the hegemony of neoliberalism, leaders across the global South were impelled to undertake a series of major economic and, later, political reforms. While the components of reform varied from country to country, they typically involved some or all of the following: fiscal austerity, tightening of credit, currency devaluation, trade liberalization, wage reductions, tax reforms and/or privatization.

Concern for the political factors of development became paramount as the economic crisis continued to linger in spite of pro-market reforms, eventually prompting calls for institutional reforms. While market-oriented policies were still deemed necessary to reduce the reach of the supposedly overextended state, development actors argued that they needed to be supplemented by institutional change, improved (democratic) governance, and human capital development.²¹

In its 1989 report, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, the World Bank continued to treat the state as a major part of the continent’s economic problems. But now it also saw it as an integral part of the solution; the state merely had to be reoriented or “fixed” so that it could play a key role in promoting the private sector, which, in turn, would lead to increased productivity. In order to do so effectively, “requires an enabling environment of infrastructure services and incentives to foster efficient production and private initiative. It also requires enhanced capacities of people and institutions alike, from the village to the upper echelons of government and industry.”²² The fact that African states lacked the capacity to create and administer a pro-market environment was deemed to be the root cause of the continent’s economic crisis, one which, according to the Bank, was essentially a “crisis of governance.”

The subsequent promotion of democratic reforms by the World Bank and other development actors, then, stems from the belief that improved economic performance would follow from developing a rational bureaucracy, decentralizing power from the national to the local level, and consolidating key political institutions. These, in turn, would be reinforced by the creation of a vibrant civil society; i.e., a mosaic of communitybased and national-level associations able to engage in public debate and monitor state actions. By increasing accountability and creating more effective and transparent institutions, the state, so the argument ran, would be better able to implement adjustment programs. International development actors sought to make their economic and political prescriptions more attractive by maintaining that they reinforced one another, as in some kind of propitious feedback loop. They claimed, for example, that economic reforms would stimulate demand for further democratic ones, that “a liberal economy creates the conditions under which a civil society of associations autonomous from the state can flourish.”²³

THE RISE OF COMMUNITY

Community-based and -driven development was predicated on much more than the neoliberal impulse to place limits on state power. In order to bring about tangible improvements to the local level, the obvious corollary of reducing the scope and scale of the state's presence in society had to be the empowerment of community actors and their inducement to participate in development initiatives. To be sure, the view that popular participation is a crucial component of efforts to enable the world's poor to exert greater influence over the decisions and institutions that affect their lives had long been well established in the literature; development scholars had for decades highlighted both the benefits of various forms of participation and the ways that these forms have been shaped by the ever-shifting landscape of development.²⁴ What changed during the consolidation of neoliberal development discourse and practice, however, was the requirement that communities must be actively transformed so that they not only contribute human and material resources, but also take "responsibility for their own selfimprovement by tapping market power, conducting themselves in a competitive arena, and acting in a calculated manner."²⁵

As a consequence of this shift, invoking "community" has become commonplace in international development. A range of projects, from rain forest conservation to urban service delivery, emphasize the "community" as the appropriate target and agent of change. Both proponents and critics of development insist that more "community" empowerment and involvement is the answer to intractable problems. The former argue that efforts to maximize the participation of "community" members in the design, implementation, and management of projects will pay dividends in terms of sustainability, efficiency, and effectiveness. The latter suggest that "community" is a critical component of people's efforts to exercise more control over the decisions that affect their lives and to counter the disempowering effects of a universalist development discourse.

The World Bank maintains that its commitment to community-based and -driven development is evidence that its approach to transforming the global South has undergone a significant "paradigm shift" in the past two decades. Specifically, it claims to have moved away from a "top down" to more of a "bottom-up" approach to development. Although there are minor differences between CBD and CDD, the overall purpose of both is to involve communities as partners in the implementation of development projects. As described in a World Bank publication about CDD, the practice is grounded in the assumption that community participation will not only ensure that projects are responsive to the needs of the poor, but also pay dividends in terms of sustainability, efficiency, and effectiveness. It will do so because it:

gives control of decisions and resources to community groups. CDD treats poor people as assets and partners in the development process, building on their institutions and resources. . . . CDD has the potential to make poverty reduction efforts more responsive to demands, more inclusive, more sustainable, and more cost-effective than traditional centrally led programs. . . . [It] is an effective mechanism for poverty reduction, complementing market and state-run activities by achieving immediate and lasting results at the grassroots level.²⁶

While a skeptic might dismiss the declared paradigm shift as little more than a veneer for business as usual, the Bank has, in fact, committed an increasing share of its resources to CBD/CDD projects: conservative estimates place the growth from \$325 million in 1996 to \$7 billion in 2003, a twenty-fold increase in less than a decade.²⁷ Moreover, as the world's preeminent development institution, the Bank's actions have occasioned a broader shift in the discourse and practice of international development. Indeed, in the now crowded field of donors, development agencies, and nongovernmental organizations, one would be hard pressed to find any that eschews "community."

Notwithstanding the lofty hopes and promises of community-based and -driven development, it has not emerged as an unvarnished success. There is little empirical evidence, for example, to suggest that it works as imagined or that this approach to development is more efficient, equitable or sustainable than the top-down projects it seeks to replace.²⁸ Critics have assailed this approach for relying on an idealized and decontextualized view of community. By implicitly characterizing urban and rural "communities" as internally cohesive and, for the most part, harmonious entities, such community-based approaches not only reveal their lack of grounding in reality, but also, and more importantly, obscure local structures of power. As a consequence, they often serve to entrench rather than remedy pervasive inequalities. Capture by local elites, for example, has been a consistent concern debated among proponents and critics of CBD and CDD.²⁹ Another critique concerns the costs and benefits to those induced to participate. Whereas the proponents of participatory approaches to development emphasize the agency they afford ordinary citizens, in the sense of increasing their capacity to direct social change, critics claim that such projects simply shift the responsibility and cost of service delivery to the expected beneficiaries.³⁰

In the case of Dar es Salaam, the broader trend of invoking community has manifest itself in the emergence of community-based organizations (CBOs). Typically formed by and for individuals residing in a geographically bounded and administratively defined area, usually a municipal subward, CBOs, which sit at the nexus between urban neighborhoods and a wide range of local, national, and transnational development actors, have become the primary vehicles for popular participation in development efforts.³¹ The proliferation of these organizations has been nothing short of phenomenal; the handful of CBOs observed in the early 1990s mushroomed into well over one hundred a decade later. That is, more than half of Dar es Salaam's subwards

now claim to have some sort of community organization concerned with improving infrastructure, delivering basic services, and/or producing other collective goods.

The prevalence of CBOs is a poor indicator of their accomplishments, however. These organizations have a disappointing track record not only when it comes to mobilizing local resources for development projects, but also in facilitating the participation of the broader community. To date, only a handful of these organizations can point to tangible and sustainable improvements in the neighborhoods they purport to represent. With respect to what is arguably Dar es Salaam's most pressing issue—water provision—the operation of functional and profitable local water supply systems has largely been limited to a few CBOs. More important, their success, like the few others thus far able to improve infrastructure or provide services, has been predicated on their ability to channel external resources and/or serve as partners or subcontractors for projects initiated elsewhere. While playing the role of developmental intermediary is not entirely at odds with either the initial conceptualization of CBOs or the broader expectations for community participation, it does bump up against a fundamental assumption that has made these organizations attractive to development actors operating at multiple scales: namely, that CBOs are well positioned to co-produce public goods by mobilizing an untapped pool of local human, financial, and material resources. By virtue of their being rooted in the local, CBOs are expected not only to attract finances not easily captured by a weak tax collection system, but also to inspire communal physical labor not sufficiently marshaled in an era of neoliberal multiparty politics.³²

Two types of explanation have emerged to account for the many shortcomings that have been observed across the global South with respect to community-based approaches to development. The first explanation is rooted in notions of organizational and relational capacity.³³ On the one hand, community-based actors have proved unable to fulfill the role ascribed to them by neoliberal policymakers and development practitioners. Their limited practical skills and inability to mobilize the requisite resources has left them ill prepared to take on the welfare responsibilities that have been shifted downward to them. On the other hand, the failure to produce sustainable development outcomes has been framed as a lack of synergy; i.e., there is insufficient, formalized cooperation between community-based actors and the various entities that constitute the state. A second, and related, way that scholars have sought to account for the limited success of CBOs has been to focus on the institutional blueprints that structure the relationships between them and the state in development efforts. Analysts writing in this vein suggest that community-based and -driven development may not be consonant with the dominant norms that have long governed the relationship between the state and society, specifically with regard to mobilization and participation.

Both explanatory frameworks help us to make some sense of why CBOs and other community-based actors have fallen short of the lofty expectations heaped upon them. And a clear strength of

these explanations is that they are broadly generalizable. Community actors in myriad contexts lack basic organizational capacities and/or receive limited support from the relevant organizations of the state. The drawback, however, is that such characterizations of the situation tend to be historically truncated. That is, they assume that the inability of community-based actors to transform local-level development is a recent issue, one which can be resolved with a contemporary technocratic tool. More importantly, as I will argue in the remainder of this book, these explanations are limited because each is based on a spurious understanding of the state and society. They view the division between the two as static, as a boundary which separates distinct, coherent objects from one another.

In my view, the state is not so clearly an actor that is inherently separate from the society of which it is a part, but rather an image, an effect, a representation that is produced and reproduced through configurations of arrangements, policies, and practices. Understanding why community-based and -driven development has so far failed to yield efficient, effective, and sustainable development outcomes, I argue, requires discovery of the way in which the state is “fixed.” It requires, in short, an analysis of the processes and practices which create the image of the state as an autonomous object.

FIXING THE STATE

This section is under construction.