DEVELOPMENTAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND SERVICE DELIVERY CHALLENGES IN POST-MANDELA SOUTH AFRICA

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Abstract

The possibility of a developmental public administration presupposes the possibility of the development state in the sub-Saharan African postcolony. The former is inconceivable in the absence of the latter. In this paper, we shift the paradigm of developmental public administration from efficient service delivery to democratic governance, in the process, undertaking radical revision of the idea of public provisioning. We argue that public administration in current democracies cannot be viewed in isolation from public engagement and popular participation and therefore micro and macro policies aimed at reforming the public service for better service delivery must engage with these issues critically. This is what is herein conceptualized as developmental public administration. We contend that the eventual outcome and success of this developmental public administration will depend on the possibility of the developmental state.

Key Words:

Developmental Public Administration; Developmental State; Democracy; Governance; Postcolony; Sub Saharan Africa

Introduction

As Thandika Mkandawire (2001) laments, standard developmentalist literature especially of the 1980s and 1990s propagated a doomsday picture of Africa; that negative literature orated that developmental states were impossible in Africa because of the dependence of African economies and their atypical levels of rent seeking. (Mkandawire, 2001, p. 289) In spite of the economic success of some African economies such as Botswana and Mauritius during the same period, the Afro-pessimism prevailed during that period and, more worrisomely, continues to inform international scholarly opinion to date. Moreover, if we may add, both African and foreign media help to reinforce the negative portrayal of sub-Saharan Africa as a subcontinent replete with non-developmental states, dashing any glimmer of hope for developmental public administration in this part of the world.

However, we contend that since a developmental state is possible on the subcontinent, developmental public administration is, consequently, possible here. For Mkandawire, an African developmental state is both a historical and a theoretical possibility:

> Neither Africa's postcolonial history nor the actual practice engaged in by successful 'developmental states' rules out the possibility of African 'developmental states' capable of playing a more dynamic role than hitherto. (Mkandawire, 2001, p. 289)

Thus, for him, Africa has had developmental states in aspiration and economic performance, and so the failure, on the part of development theorists who paint Africa pitch dark, is due to the excessive leveling of the African political-economic landscapes. The leveling of Africa –its homogenization - is a result of an invidious comparison of African states in crisis with idealized and tendentiously characterized states elsewhere. In other words, Africa's worst-case scenarios are compared odiously with utopias, not really-existing states. Such homogenization has led to the demonization of all African postcolonial states. The analytic tradition, which is the champion of such Afro-pessimism, has in its dubious developmentalist diagnosis "occulted African states, making concrete analysis of their character", for example, as "non-adjusters" in contrast to "strong-adjusters," the utopias. (Mkandawire, 2001, p. 290)

The standard definition of the developmental state privileges economy-based performance and economic success, and on this rather narrow, jaundiced reading, a strong state is, tautologically, one whose economy is strong and vice versa, a strong economy yields a strong state. In this circular definition, states are developmental in terms of both ideology and structure. *Qua* ideology, a developmental state has a developmentalist mission which amounts to its ensuring economic development (high rates of economic growth and accumulation and high levels of investment in science and technology and industrialization). On the Gramscian framework - see, for example, Castells (1992) as cited in Mkandawire (2001)-, the elite are the bearers, the mobilizers and the engine of the developmentalist mission inasmuch as they are the ones that constitute the ideological hegemony, thereby rendering the developmentalist project

essentially a hegemonic project. At the behest of the elite hegemony, the basic assumption of the standard developmentalist literature is that a strong state will *mutatis mutandis* be developmental by being autonomous, that is, if the elite hegemony will safeguard it from private, sectional interests (rent seeking).

Nevertheless, since the state can abuse its autonomy in a predatory manner, this literature has social anchoring to urge the state to gain adhesion of key social actors. Thus, ideologically, a strong and hence developmental state has an agenda of developing the country; it is led by an elite hegemony, and is autonomous without being a sole political player because it is socially anchored. (Mkandawire, 2001, p. 290) *Qua* structure, a developmental state has the capacity to implement economic policies sagaciously and efficaciously as determined by institutional, technical, administrative and political factors. (Mkandawire, 2001, p. 290)

> Recognition of episodes and possibilities of failure leads us to a definition of a developmental state as one whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic development. (Mkandawaire, 2001, p.291)

Proxies such as tax efforts and public expenditure can be used to measure such seriousness. Africa has had and still has developmental states. Early on at independence, nationalism was both an anti-colonialist and a developmentalist ideology. In other words, for the first crop of African state leaders –at least in the 1960s and 1970s- nationalism

was the drive of the developmentalist ideology (Mkandawire, 2001, p.295), as exemplified by Nigeria's Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's dream of an "African renaissance", which has recently been echoed by South Africa's Thabo Mbeki. In the subsequent decades after independence, the neoliberal agenda delayed, and in most cases derailed, the African states' developmentalist missions. The neoliberal agenda's instrument of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) strangled the African economies in the name – not hope- of economic liberalization. The neoliberal agenda's international finance institutions (IFIs) –the global financiers – pushed African states into a condition of naïveté of the depoliticized quest for "technocratic" governance. (Mkandawire, 2001, p.292) Under global technocracy, emphasis was placed on market-driven, export-oriented development strategies in African economies.

Consequently, the market was de-regulated, state enterprises were privatized, and public expenditure on social services and development projects was substantially reduced. The African state withdrew involuntarily from the market economic sphere, minimized into a night watchman state. Demonized as a "failed", or "dysfunctional", state in the management of larger societal issues, the minimalist view of the state held sway in the standard developmentalist analyses of the African state, especially in the 1980and 1990s. Mkandawire, 2001, p.293) Concerning the African states during this period, these analyses diagnosed gross market failure, authoritarian rule, dependence, lack of ideology, softness and proneness of the state to capture by special interest groups, corruption, and lack of technical and analytical capacity, among a plethora of failures and weaknesses. (Mkandawire, 2001, p.294)

The analyses that demonized the African state, as a failed state, were similarly demonizing of African public administration, arguing that the African public service had utterly failed and had become irrecoverably dysfunctional. The African public service was characterized negatively, as an irredeemable cesspool of corruption, abuse, waste of resources and gross incompetence – a malignant cancer of the state. Thus, under the regime of the IFI's SAPs, and at the behest of the western donor community, the African public service underwent downsizing, which translated into massive retrenchment in the name of "capacity building." (Mkandawire, 2001, p.309) Disappointingly, the downsized, or rather capacity-built, African public service did not improve in its performance; the real wages declined; its highly-educated and well-trained personnel left for green pastures, leading to the much dreaded brain drain. The western donor-driven capacity-building efforts to resuscitate the African public service by downsizing it flopped.

Heralded by the wave of multiparty politics, when the hitherto minimalist African state returned to the social scene as a democratic (universally-elected) African state, as a champion of good governance, as - a shift in political register that is more marked from the 1990s to the first decade of 2000s -, the democratic state was faced with an incapacitated public service. Such a public service could not support the state's efforts in service delivery. Poor service delivery has dampened the emancipatory potential of popular democracy and hence the specter of a weakly-delivering public service. Thus, while the idea of good governance marks the return of the African state, a weakly-

delivering public service undermines the democratic promise. For Mkandawire, capacity-building, which entails downsizing the public service and which further entails periodic massive retrenchment of personnel, is not developmental for postcolonial Africa:

> Rather than exclusive focus on capacity-building, focus in Africa should first and foremost be on the valorization of existing capacities through better 'capacity utilization' and retooling of the public service, reversing the brain drain and repairing the main institutions of training that have been starved even as donors set up new ones to produce parochial skills required in their new projects. (Mkandawire, 2001, p.307)

Thought in another way, the African public service is notorious for underutilizing and misallocating intellectual, leadership and managerial capacities as well as its rare skills. For example, Africa's public universities and similar higher education institutions are increasingly becoming chronically resource-starved as universities' host states' commitment to financial and material support diminishes gradually, and as donor fatigue gets worse. Consequently, the idea of a state-owned and –run university is receding fast into the past. Considering the high prospects of a weakly-delivering public service in postcolonial Africa, a new era is fast approaching when the state will not be able to provide university education as a public service on the continent. Then, state ideologues will most likely self-servingly argue that the state can afford to ditch its universities because university education *per se* is not an essential social service – public provisioning can dispense with university education.

Yet, there is no guarantee that continued downsizing - which will most possibly include continued privatization, further decreases in the human resource contingent, more outsourcing, stricter public expenditure, aggressive tax revenue collection, de-unionization and the freezing of unions' calls for salary increases - will render the public service sector efficient and effective. The wind of multiparty politics blowing on the African public service sector notwithstanding, full democratization (for example, accommodation of critique and voices of protest, transparency and accountability) of the public service sector may not necessarily lead to improved public service delivery. Thus, there is a slippage, or disjuncture, between democracy and service delivery in Africa today –and the slippage undermines the democratic promise of development for all the people.

Post-Mandela South Africa illustrates clearly how a weakly-delivering public service undermines the democratic promise of multiparty politics. While South Africa registers considerable success in the area of democratic governance, continued poor service delivery poses a serious threat to its political stability. For example, according to Susan Booysen (2007), [i] between March 2004 and March 2006 there were between 1,500 and 2,000 service delivery protests in various metropolitan areas of South Africa. (Booysen, 2007, p.23) While protest can be seen as a healthy element in democratic governance, the high frequency of such protests, which are sometimes marked by violence, is worrisome. These protests attest to the massive backlog of service delivery in South Africa.

The upsurge of protests in South Africa does not suggest popular discontent with the ANC-led state and government. The ANC continues to command majority votes in both general elections and local government elections. Recently, at the April 2009 general elections, the ANC got a clear majority vote, in spite of COPE, a splinter political grouping from the ANC that emerged on the South African political scene following the historic December 2007 Polokwane ANC Convention. Moreover, the protests have not led to voter apathy; an increase in incidents of protests has not led to a decrease in voter turnout at the polls. Rather, the protests have gained a positive character and henceforth entered the vocabulary of democratic governance. For Booysen, in South Africa today voting and protest are complementary mechanisms that achieve service delivery. In other words, the voice of protest has become public participation, as a mode of democratic governance, at par with voting. South African publics deploy their voices of protest, just as they deploy the ballot, as a way of pressing their demands on a weakly-delivering public service. Uniquely, through both practices - protest and vote, or brick and ballot – South African publics display sustained support for the ANC. The protesters-cum-voters have not switched their allegiance and loyalty from the ruling party to the weakly present opposition parties (Booysen, 2007, pp.25-26) and this is in spite of the dismal performance, for example, absentee representation, by ANC-based public servants such as ANC municipal officials and councilors in the country. (Booysen, 2007, p.28)

To make matters more complicated, a higher voter turnout does not necessarily mean that there is a higher commitment to democracy on the part of voters and that a lower voter turnout means that there is a lower commitment to democracy. Political players and

political parties in the country are not in the game to 'lose.' They participate with the sole intention of winning and often failure to win means a rejection of the outcome of elections. This observation urges us to rethink democratic governance.

Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democracy offers a window of hope of taking on board some of these entrenched viewpoints. In the case of large parts of Africa, formal voting also becomes problematic since it is quite difficult to determine 'voting quality,' that is, how many voters are able to cast their vote based on detailed policy preferences. Deliberative democracy forces us to think about issues of political rationality, competence, consensus and ideology. In a way therefore, deliberative democracy would much more easily build on and influence the existing stocks of social capital much more than the current notions of democratic participation as described above.

Whereas good governance proponents insist on formal channels for entrenching participatory opportunities in the form of *imbizo*, school governing bodies, District Health Management Boards (DHMBs) as essential to increased citizen participation in governing processes, deliberative democracy calls for the enhancement of the representative process. Nancy Fraser (1993)[ii] goes further to develop pillars of social justice amongst which is what she conceptualizes as 'participative parity.' According to her, participative parity requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers. She goes on to show that this would depend

on two factors namely: distribution and recognition. She characterizes the former as the 'objective' factor requiring that participants must have the material resources to ensure their independence and access to goods. Regarding the latter, which she terms as the 'inter-subjective' factor, she argues it requires that cultural values express respect for all members of society and do not discriminate against some because of their 'difference'. This latter distinction is indeed very pertinent to the Kenyan case where there are traditional norms that at times militate against the achievement of such parity.

These ideas are further propounded by Iris Marion Young[iii] to ensure a greater reach even amongst the least articulate in a society in terms of public policy grammar. Young interrogates issues of political inclusion and exclusion in multicultural societies in order to attain democratic ideals. She develops the idea of communicative democracy in order to deal with politics in a more inclusive way. As discussed earlier, political inclusion in many societies is at times threatened because the processes of debate and decision making often marginalize individuals and groups because the norms of political discussion are biased against some forms of expression especially for the illiterate members of the society. Furthermore, it is often difficult to achieve participative parity in traditional democratic practice in political settings akin to that of Kenya also because of the existing deep material inequalities.

Young thus broadens our understanding of democratic communication by reflecting on the positive political functions of narrative, rhetorically situated appeals, and public protest. For her, concepts such as those of the civil society and the public sphere need to

be reconstructed to accommodate plural forms of communication among debating citizens societies. She argues that the scope of a polity should extend as wide as the scope of social and economic interactions that raise issues of justice. Take as an example globally driven environmental policies here. We often find that most African countries have highly sophisticated legislation around these issues that often do not take account of the local people's interaction with say wildlife. This is often so because the dominant forces pushing for the adoption of such legislation is at times removed from the local experiences Young's reflections are interesting in the sense that she would appear to be recommending the establishment of global democratic principles, while at the same time maintaining the need to preserve significant local autonomy in governance in order to promote political equality. This position neatly captures the essence of this research paper in the argument for the development of governance paradigms that are in sync with the local populace while at the same time meeting the expectations of global principles.

Both models of participative parity as well as communicative democracy respond positively to the challenges of equality of participation within group activities in which more often than not the advantaged individuals in society are able to get heard as opposed to the disadvantaged. It is important to keep in mind Fraser's distinction between distribution and recognition in participative parity for it is often in distribution that service delivery challenges are situated. This is due to differences in talents and resources; for example, the advantaged have education, literacy and personal wealth, and the internal democracy for the representation of their group interests. These models offer an escape route from the 'iron law of oligarchy'[iv] since it is the tendency of

representation of members within groups. Because representation is skewed in an oligarchy, it follows that participation will be skewed as well. This is possible even in the presence of very strong political parties since corporate pluralism can easily cause the control of the public agenda to be alienated from the citizens and elected representatives. It is worth repeating here that democracy, in accordance with the deliberative model, has more to do with social interactions than with corporate structures thus offering a theoretical handle that would be handy in deepening the reach of the state in African contexts using such pertinent concepts as social capital.

The way ethnic considerations have been manipulated to sabotage multiparty politics is a case in point in trying to show that sometimes what is good for the gander is not necessarily good for the geese. Kwasi Wiredu[v] observes that the demise of the one-party system has made the problem of working out a suitable political system an urgent one in Africa. According to him, it is doubtful that the system of multiparty democracy can meet the democratic aspirations of the people for socio-economic development. Wiredu argues that multiparty politics has an in-built tendency to place any one group of persons consistently in the position of the minority that can easily develop into disaffection with the system.

However, his recommendations for Africa are rather radical. He advises that Africa should dispense with multiparty democracy. He does not argue in favour of single parties. He urges African leaders to try to learn from traditional forms of governance that relied more on consensus rather than majority rule *per se.* Wiredu is also worried about political

parties because, by definition, they are organizations of people of similar inclinations and desires with the sole aim of gaining power for the implementation of their agenda. Thus, they lack the required degree of acceptability to infuse elements of meaningful and effective citizen participation into the notion of participatory democracy.

In a participatory environment and given the right forms of social capital, individual citizens recognize their roles and responsibilities within a larger community as well as knowing about other citizens' needs. Through debate, compromise and decision, people learn to link their concerns with those of others. They thus learn to deploy what Adam Smith referred to as self-interest properly understood. This conceptualization of participation is pertinent because it privileges political education over socialization insofar as both public and private decision-making practices are concerned. Having explored in some detail the environment into which public provision is situated, we will now move on to look at the impetus for service delivery reforms.

Developmental Public Administration; the Impetus for Service Delivery Reforms

This paper grapples with the question of how the state and the citizens in general can work together for the co-production of quality public services. Civic engagement and community participation are seen as possible channels that could be used in restructuring the social fabric of the South African state today. Such a move would ensure that in many instances, the communities themselves are able to identify the services they need.

Berlyn[vi] takes this point further by pointing out that the community itself is a 'plethora of contrast' as regards issues around literacy, language, incomes and so on. This diversity offers increased motivation for the government to devise a common thread to pull all the separate parts together. As a fledgling democracy, there is a need for unity of purpose, action and effort to build harmony and coherence to help the fight against as crime, violence and corruption in South Africa.

From the late 1980s, the major drive for public sector reforms emerged at first from the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and later on by the importation of private sector practices in the public sector. Indeed, even the clamour for multiparty politics in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa was simultaneously awakened by the demand for efficiency, transparency and accountability by the people from the governors. These moves were mainly propelled by, on the one hand, increasingly dwindling resources, and on the other hand, a more demanding and increasingly better-informed citizenry. The great advances in technology especially those relating to Information and Communication (ICTs) also added to the impetus.

With a new type of democratic governance unfolding, it became increasingly difficult to maintain traditional hierarchical command control models of governance that had supported the authoritarian dispensations. On the other hand, citizens began to query instances where there were escalating costs of intervention with little evidence of return on investment; the silo approach to governance resulting in inefficient and ineffective service delivery and waste in resource of government; the 'one size fits all' solution

approach and other sources of poor service delivery. One could say these were the seeds of the idea of a responsive and consultative (used here in the sense of encouraging participation from stakeholders) governance approaches.

These practices easily tie into the concept of social capital once public service reformers latch onto the notion that effective delivery of a range of government services requires productive working relationships based on mutual respect and cooperation between the community of users and service providers. With such arrangements, transaction costs (often vastly escalated by corruption amongst other system failures) as well as the perennial scarcity of resources within a developing country context would tend to be much more effectively dealt with within theory. Thus, it is argued in this paper that the establishment of a shared purpose, shared principles, and performance monitoring principles and shared skills development goals should precede the formulation of a good governance code.

Today, it would seem that most public service delivery concerns are being addressed by the incorporation of private sector management techniques for service excellence. For example, there has been much emphasis on innovation and entrepreneurship in terms of how service delivery could be improved to satisfy the customer who is also a citizen. This has often meant the introduction of a management culture that emphasizes the centrality of the citizen as a customer as well as accountability for results. With this shift in orientation, also come structural or organizational choices that promote decentralized control through a wide variety of alternative service delivery mechanisms including

quasi-markets with public and private service providers competing for resources from policymakers and donors.

South Africa retains to a great degree the tradition of the apartheid civil service that was bequeathed to it in 1994. There is still strong evidence of hierarchical bureaucracies, which have not been replaced by chains of inter-linked contracts. As Alford[vii] states, current global public service reform efforts are aimed at making governance processes and services more client-focused. He also points out that this restructuring is grounded also on the premise that governments are increasingly running short of resources to address service delivery and hence the call for alternative ways of delivery that brings government close to the people. Added to these efforts has also been the need to improve coordination across policy, program and service delivery.

All over the world, citizens are demanding seamless service delivery or one window structure to promote responsiveness to client needs and overcome jurisdictional boundaries. Citizens are frustrated with duplications, gaps and lack of integration. One option to address these challenges would be for the government to prioritize partnerships between departments and with non-government sectors as delivery vehicles. These developments have created room for cultural change in the carrying out of regular government business.

Accountability and risk management are emerging as key areas for good governance. The challenge is getting the right balance between upwards accountability and downwards responsiveness. Theoretically, social capital offers a framework for developing a zone between vertical, horizontal and citizen accountability given the networks of reciprocity and obligations that it entails. The result of public service reforms should be to develop a coordinated and collaborative method of achieving results for complex problems.

Politics and public administration inter-phase

The inter-phase between public administration and politics is pertinent precisely because most political players see the instruments of state power as a veritable tool for influencing public provisioning in favour of their constituents. Other than South Africa, none of the other sub-Saharan states has a systematic and scientific home-grown rationale for the current bureaucratic structure other than the desires of political leaders and donors' demands for structures. It is of importance that boundaries are drawn between politics and public administration. In drawing the boundary, a key issue is whether the greater concern should be to promote policy coherence, improve service delivery, and protect administrative due process, or all of the above, which is normally the global concern of good governance. The literature mostly contends that a focus on policy coherence results on functions that are more likely to be horizontally integrated complicating accountability relationships in the executive while the more common model of interaction protects administrative due process and focuses on vertical accountability. This is typified by a separation of politics and policy making from administration on the assumption that

government is more efficient when administration is walled off from political influence. This is one of the arguments of good governance that is often short-circuited by negativity.

In a sense, a growing concern with efficient and effective service delivery has blurred these boundaries, resulting in a merging of political and administrative concerns through a strategic alliance in the name of improved delivery. Indeed, according to Hyden and Court[viii], it is this blurring of boundaries that has enabled the Bretton Woods Institutions to delve into what traditionally would have been considered the internal politics of a sovereign state in the name of good governance. In functionally integrated departments, policy and administration are joined yet separate. Often, top positions are reserved for political appointees, but civil servants hold the remainder. Procedural rules that specify how civil service positions are to be filled, purchases made, and other administrative actions carried out are intended to create a politics-free public administration.

Within a country's context and culture, there are also informal understandings of where the boundaries are drawn, how they are enforced, when and how politicians intervene and how contact between the two areas is maintained. Max Weber argued that the tension between the expertise of managers and politicians' control of the machinery of the state, represented a key to understanding modern government. Since then, a large literature has developed on the subject. Opinions tend to be divided between those who consider that managers' expertise provides them with a hegemony in policy-making (administrative dominance), and other, more recent approaches, focusing on institutional arrangements

that allow to politicians to effectively influence implementation. Both perspectives concur that a modern professional administration cannot operate without broad authority delegated by political leaders.

A comparative analysis of broad approaches identified in the review of the relevant international experiences demonstrates that the manner in which roles are defined and boundaries set cannot be isolated from the history of the country, the specific public sector transformation experience, and the values established for the public administration system within the country. Drawing from international experiences, is thus not just a matter of application of specific approaches, but require a careful reflection on the appropriateness of the approach to the intended context and values established for public administration.

From Public Administration to Public Governance; Legitimate Public Bureaucracy

The practice of public administration has undergone a constant process of evolution. Shabbir Cheema[ix] cites four key phases through which the conceptualization of public administration has evolved, namely: traditional public administration, public management, new public management and governance. There is a direct relationship between effective and efficient public administration and democratic governance. In addition, public confidence in the political system and the legitimacy of a given government is increased where the public service delivery system is effective and the

various public institutions work in concert towards the protecting citizen's rights and ensuring efficient and effective use of public resources. For Cheema however, the public sector management capacity to achieve these objectives is determined by among other things merit-based recruitment; effective human resource development strategies; motivation and commitment of civil servants and transparent processes of policy formulation, budgeting and implementation.

Increasing globalization has meant that the public sector is under even greater pressure to increase its capacity to deal with the opportunities and challenges presented by globalization. Notably, this has meant a shift from control, to a greater concern with accountability and transparency, along with effectiveness and efficiency. Traditional public administration was perceived as a set of structures, institutions and processes characterized by among other things, hierarchy, continuity, impartiality, legal-rational authority and professionalism. It was charged with providing human security, protecting property, establishing and enforcing societal standards. In practice, however, public administration faced severe criticism for its slowness, red tape, paternalist approach to citizens, waste of resources and its overwhelming focus on process and procedures instead of outcomes.

The second phase, public management, focused on the application of management principles including efficiency, effectiveness, customer-orientation and greater sensitivity to public needs. It further called for expanding the role of the private sector and minimizing the public sector. In essence, it sought to use private sector principles in

public sector organizations. The third phase, termed New Public Management, improved on these objectives by further focusing on outcome-oriented partnerships between the public and private sectors in service delivery.

The fourth phase is Governance, which is often defined as a 'system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, social and political affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector.[x] Governance involves three actors: the state, which creates a conducive political and legal environment; the private sector, which generates jobs and income and the civil society, which facilitates social and political interaction. Good governance has recently been seen as the means to achieve the millennium development goals, chiefly based on its concern with equality of opportunity and the pursuit of equity in the form of social and economic justice for all citizens.

From the above four phases, what emerges is that public administration has retained its traditional functions of the state including maintenance of law and order, setting societal standards and goals and protecting citizens. However, the above four phases suggest that public administration has historically responded to the new contexts, challenges and emergent needs, by constantly revising its objectives and evolving new strategies to meet its goals. Because of the set goals, there is a need therefore to put in place a system of performance measurement.

From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that there is a need for public bureaucracy reformers to emphasize policies that promote home-grown solutions to the development challenges even in the face of greater globalization. Kasimis and Papadopoulos[xi] define globalization process as:

> The character of rapid changes occurring across the globe, referring to the increasing inter-connections among different localities, practices and systems as well as illustrating the impact of particular incidents or processes which have occurred in specific areas upon the rest of the world.

The increase in foreign direct investments by multi-national corporations, the Internet, technological innovation and the globalized financial markets are continuously breaking down the traditional borders of modern states. This makes the developmental space a global space and the response to local situations should be reflective of what is happening in the global arena. Yet, there is no evidence that the differentiation in performance among national economies will reduce. This makes it imperative for governments to continue playing a role that would maximize comparative advantages. It is this tension, between the global and the local, that the author maintains can best be abridged by taking into account the existing levels and nature of social capital.

Traditionally, public administration in Africa has been riddled with corruption and political interference. The demarcation between public service and the executive

authority has been blurred with the executive attempting a one-man show. The result has been rape and plunder of state coffers and a demoralised workforce that is barely functional. Often there is a lack of initiative as public servants attempt to anticipate the preferences of the ruling elite before taking action on any issue.

High standards of public governance are the essential foundation for achieving sustainable economic growth and social cohesion. Without high standards, there can be no confidence in the integrity of public institutions or indeed in the value of democratic processes in promoting and protecting the interests and well-being of citizens. Good governance and the fight against corruption should not just be new catchwords in international cooperation. If well formulated such the ordinary citizen buys into the concepts, both the New Public Management discourses as well as good governance represent the keys for successful reform and for equitable and sustainable development.

There is increased concern in the public and in the international development partners about conflicts of interests amongst public sector managers. There is need for public sector transparency, responsiveness, and accountability. The public should as much as possible be allowed access to information on government activities in order to petition government and seek redress through impartial administrative and judicial mechanisms.

Conclusion

Therefore, in order to negotiate the slippage between service delivery and democracy, for a state to make a valid claim to being a developmental state, one of the key missions of its public bureaucracy is aggressive poverty reduction. Thus, both technological and human resources in the public service have to be developed in tandem to support poverty reduction. There is good reason to suppose a strong link between administrative capacity and development. The proposed public bureaucracy in this study envisages the continuous development of specialist skills among the front-line staff since this will be crucial to the quality of public provisioning as well as the ability of the service to go well beyond what is currently on offer. For target communities, it would entail not only the development of skills to enable them to participate effectively in development projects but also an added emphasis on encouraging and enabling people to maintain their skills, rather than on getting specified tasks done within a given time. There would have to be strong links between the decision-making organs of the state and the front-line and management level of the bureaucracy to facilitate good joint planning at the individual level and help in pre-empting or dealing with problems. This is the surest and best way for post-Mandela South Africa to follow for it to achieve the lofty status of a developmental state with a developmental public administration.

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[iv] Wikipedia traces the 'iron law of oligarchy' as a political theory to the German sociologist Robert Michels in his 1915 book, Political Parties. The theory states that all forms of organization, regardless of how democratic or autocratic they may be at the start, will eventually and inevitably develop into oligarchies. An oligarchy is here taken to mean government by a few, especially by a small faction of persons or families as well as those making up such a government. Available at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_law_of_oligarchy]. Retrieved on July 3, 2006.

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