

# **Rwanda, The Epicentre of the Great Lakes Conflict System**

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## **Abstract/Intro**

Rwanda's bloody recent history affects not only the country itself, but it permeates throughout the Great Lakes Region. What this paper attempts to illustrate is some of the theoretical concepts surrounding this history and, in particular, notions surrounding 'genocide ideology'. Furthermore, issues of racism have a fundamental part to play in this violent story and these will be addressed in relation to Rwanda and its neighbors.

The paper seeks to illustrate some of the main political issues in the Great Lakes as a result of the Rwandan conflict and outline whether there was a consistent genocide ideology throughout these countries, or whether each had a unique identity that metamorphosed and transformed over time or according to individual cultures.

The paper finally asks what lessons have been learnt from such appalling atrocities and whether these have been put into practice in intervening years.

## **Introduction**

Whether genocide is an actual ideology or not is debatable but it certainly is a developing stream of ideas rooted in fear and thirst for power usually in the context of a history where the people are of different origin. So the genocide idea or ideology begins with the process of identification and stigmatization of the 'other' that is, labeling of the 'other' and eventually the separation of the 'other' from the rest of us'.<sup>1</sup> However relying on ideology alone as the main explanation for historical events, raises at least three important questions; what is the source of the ideology itself? Why it believed? (3) What does ideology have to do with action and behavior?<sup>2</sup>

The 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such; Killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.<sup>3</sup> Robert Melson on the other hand defines genocide as a policy initiative that uses massacre and other means to eliminate a communal group or social class from the social structure.<sup>4</sup>

As the events leading up to the 1994 Rwanda genocide were unfolding, one of the biggest misunderstandings in the region was that this was merely an internal and perennial Rwandan conflict. The region, therefore, was caught flatfooted as the presumed internal Rwandan “ethnic” conflict spilled over and engulfed the entire Great Lakes. The price of these assumptions is still being paid today. For example the 1994 genocide caused an influx of more than 2 million refugees into the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo [formerly Zaire]. These refugees include many who have since been implicated in the massacres.<sup>5</sup>

### **Regionalisation of Rwandan Conflict**

That so-called ‘Hutu Revolution’ would be the event to spark the kith and kin syndrome in the region, where the racial ideology would cross borders to be replicated in the countries surrounding Rwanda, marking the beginning of the conflict that would later engulf the Great Lakes.

**Uganda:** In Uganda the Rwandaphones inhabiting the land along the Bufumbira Volcanic Ranges and other parts in south-western Uganda assumed a new identity and started calling themselves Bafumbira, drawing their name from the volcanic range, and called their language Kifumbira. This was in order to distance themselves from the Rwandan refugees and their baggage of discrimination and violence. Nevertheless, the Bafumbira were Rwandaphones, both culturally and linguistically, including the social categories of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, which were however now “racially” tinged.

**Congo:** As the kith and kin syndrome took root, the first stirrings of conflict in the region began in the Congo, coinciding with the 1959 Rwandan refugee influx in the country. Successive governments started questioning the nationality of the Rwandaphones in the country. Given that the majority of refugees were Tutsi “constructs”, the effect was to cast a doubt and question the nationality of the Congolese Tutsi, especially those in Northern Kivu. The Rwandaphones of alleged Hutu origin in the region tried to evolve and integrate themselves as genuine Congolese, creating conflict fault lines in the area<sup>6</sup>.

In South Kivu, the Rwandaphones inhabiting the area along the Mulenge Mountains assumed a new identity and started calling themselves the Banyamulenge, naming themselves after the mountains, just like the Bafumbira in Uganda.

**Burundi:** In Burundi, the 1959 Hutu Revolution in Rwanda polarized and animated the Hutu-Tutsi relations in the country, which hosted the largest number of mainly Rwandan Tutsi refugees. With time, the Tutsi refugees would inevitably be drawn into the Burundian political strife.

Meanwhile, the country had unstable governments, which would result in assassinations of prime ministers, Prince Rwagasore and Pierre Ngendandumwe. This culminated in the overthrow of the monarchy and ushered in a military government headed by Captain Michael Micombero. Successive Hutu coup attempts at the possible agitation of the Rwandan Hutu government, led to more violence and entrenchment of the Tutsi military in power. This resulted in continued influx of Burundi Hutu refugees into Rwanda from the late sixties to the late eighties. The 1972 Hutu coup attempt in Burundi resulted into Hutu massacres by the Tutsi military<sup>7</sup>.

In “revenge”, the Hutu government in Rwanda killed and exiled thousands of Tutsi in 1973. This resulted in the Tutsi military further entrenching itself in power and dominating the Burundian politics, a reality that may need to be addressed by the new political dispensation. In the meantime, the young 1972 Burundi Hutu refugees got secondary and university education in Rwanda. These included the immediate former leadership of the main Hutu political party FRODEBU, all of whom got their political training and indoctrination from the Hutu Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND) of President Habyarimana.

**Tanzania:** In Tanzania, on the other hand, Rwandan refugees (‘the 1959-ers’) were naturalized under President Nyerere. However, this did not continue with the influx of the mainly Hutu refugees from Burundi in the late sixties and seventies. In fact, the large numbers of the Hutu refugees from Burundi polarized the population in the parts of the country where they settled, by invoking their ‘ethnic’ hatreds on the otherwise stable society under the *Ujamaa* socialism. This ensured Tanzania its place in the Great Lakes conflict system.

It can be appreciated therefore that with this exportation of the Tutsi-Hutu animosities from Rwanda, it is evident that the social relations between the kith and kin in the region were animated and polarized. The polarization assumed the easy assimilation of the Hutu “natives”, as the Tutsi continued to be aliens in their countries of exile.

Great Lakes scholars in conflict management, such as Dr Makumi Mwagiru of the University of Nairobi, acknowledge that a country must, as a rule, have a necessary confluence with its neighbours, together forming a regional entity in a complementary system. A system in this case is defined as a set of patterned interactions, also described as having both ‘a rhyme and a reason.’ From this, conflict in a regional system can be explained, tracing its course to an epicentre from which the conflict finds its root<sup>8</sup>.

In the case of the Great Lakes, the epicentre of its conflict system can be traced to Rwanda, whose connections with her neighbours is historical, cultural and linguistic among Kinyarwanda and Kirundi speakers found within all the countries in the region. Though Rwanda has a population of just over 10 million, as a linguistic and cultural group, the Kinyarwanda/Kirundi speakers are kith and kin with the same social structures, and are estimated to number well over 30 million in the Great Lakes Region.

## **2) Causes of the Rwandan conflict that matured into the 1994 Genocide**

The beginning of the conflict in Rwanda is historical however, starting with the coming of colonialists. Through the colonial strategy of divide and rule, the Germans, then the Belgians and their cohorts, the Catholic Church, were able to split an erstwhile one people along ‘racial’ lines, pitting them against one another to violence that reverberates to this day.

Racism, as an ideology, is predicated on exclusion and marginalization of one group of people by another. However, it is widely accepted by social scientists that race or ethnicity is not an essential category based on the objective, physical existence of genetic, linguistic, or

cultural differences but a socially constructed category of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, through employment of clichés and stereotypes<sup>9</sup>.

It is in this light of racism that the Great Lakes genocide ideology can be understood.

The genocide ideology may stem from racism. Specifically, the deconstruction of the Rwandan society into races was mainly informed by a Belgo-Roman Catholic conspiracy.

The conspiracy resulted in the creation of different racial identities or “ethnic groups”. They also fostered superior and inferior perceptions of one for the other creating previously un-existing conflict based on those complexes. This resulted into exclusion and marginalization of one group of people by another. These constructed identities were animated and entrenched in the social psyche through the joint conspiracy of the colonial authorities and the Roman Catholic Church<sup>10</sup>.

The point is, as so many studies of Rwandan history have insisted on the political aspect that emphasised exclusion of Hutu from political power, the Belgo-Roman Catholic conspiracy created and institutionalised a latent conflict that it would exploit at the end of colonialism. In effect, as the scholar Mahmood Mamdani would argue, the Tutsi “settler prerogative” was established over the native Hutu during the colonial period<sup>11</sup>.

However, at the time of independence by the late 1950s, the Belgian colonial administration turned around and unloaded all its political errors onto the Tutsi because some of them were the first to agitate for the country’s independence. The Hutu, on the other hand, were made to believe that it was the Tutsi who were their oppressors, and therefore agitated for emancipation from the Tutsi rather than demand for national independence. Henceforth, the Belgian colonial administration and the Catholic Church adopted a policy of sustained support for the Hutu against the Tutsi<sup>12</sup>.

In essence, the hitherto Tutsi “settler prerogative” was replaced by the Hutu “native prerogative” that evolved into the three Hutu “revolutionary” themes, namely<sup>13</sup>:

- Exiling or returning “home” the Tutsi “settlers”,
- Marginalise and intimidate the alien Tutsi, and,
- As a final solution, exterminate the *inyenzi* (Tutsi cockroaches).

This is how the two post-independence leaders of Rwanda put it in explaining the differences between the two constructed racial identities:

Kayibanda Grégoire, President, First Republic (1962-1973): “Two nations in a single state – two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy, who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were dwellers of different zones, or inhabitants of different planets.” – Speech on 27th November, 1959

Habyarimana Juvénal, President, Second Republic (1973-1994): “The unity of ethnic groups is not possible without the unity of the majority. Just as we note that no Tutsi recognizes regional belonging, it is imperative the majority forge unity, so that they are able to wade off any attempt to return them into slavery.” – MRND Congress, 28th April, 1991

The two post independence leaders used the Hutu identity as dogma for political organization in the Hutu parties, Parti du Mouvement d’Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU), Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), Coalition pour la Défence de la République (CDR), etc.

This “racially” driven hatred by the “Hutu natives” found expression in the 1957 Hutu Manifesto, which agitated for emancipation from the Tutsi domination at the expense of national political independence. This resulted into the 1959 ‘Hutu Revolution’ that saw the massacre of tens of thousands of Tutsi and the exodus of 100,000 others into exile in the neighbouring countries<sup>14</sup>.

#### **4) The Rwanda Patriotic Front and Army’s (RPF/A) Anti-racist Struggle**

In the period after the overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda in 1979, the Rwandan refugees in the country were scapegoated and at times blamed for the excesses of the Idi Amin regime. And when the National Resistance Movement started the guerrilla campaign in 1981, President Milton Obote blamed Rwandans for supporting the then rebel leader, Yoweri Museveni, who was derogatorily being referred to as a Rwandan, and therefore a refugee or alien.

Come 1982, Rwandan refugees in Uganda alongside some Kinyarwanda speakers in the country were expelled, thereby disenfranchising the latter. These Rwandan refugees and Uganda Rwandaphones found themselves stranded and were refused entry into Rwanda by the Habyarimana Government. This provoked a new sense of Rwandan nationalism within the region. In the meantime, the Habyarimana regime tightened its noose around the Tutsi in Rwanda, the perennial enemies of the regime. Thus the “racial” hatred within Rwanda deepened under government orchestration with continued Tutsi pogroms.

Against this background the Rwanda Patriotic Front was formed to end the discrimination and gain back their natural, inalienable rights as Rwandan citizens, even if it meant use of force. The continued pogroms in and outside Rwanda led to the RPF gaining in strength and membership. It also led to the RPF resolve to end the regional conspiracy and menace against the Rwandans through armed struggle, beginning with the October 1990 RPF invasion of Rwanda<sup>15</sup>.

It was with this invasion, however, that the Habyarimana regime felt persuaded to put in place a genocidal machinery that was informed by the entrenched racial ideology against the Tutsi. In time, with the other RPF struggles to prevent Tutsi killings, there would come into being the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the RPF, which was brokered by the international community within the Great Lakes context to prevent further bloodshed.

Arusha was an African initiative in which both the OAU and several African states played a central role. The president of Tanzania was the facilitator of the process. But western nations were involved as well, including just about every party that should have some presence. The OAU was instrumental not only in bringing the parties to the bargaining table, but also in setting an agenda that addressed the imagined root causes of the conflict.

In a series of separate negotiations, most of the major issues were tackled: the establishment of the rule of law and a culture of human rights; power sharing in all public institutions; the transitional arrangements that would obtain until elections were held; the repatriation of refugees; the resettlement of internally displaced persons; and, the integration of the two opposing armies.

The Arusha Protocol III on military integration was the most difficult part of the negotiations, as it was based on “ethnically” perceived quotas that would still ensure the Hutu domination of the military. For instance, the Rwandese Patriotic Army were allotted 40 per cent of the men in the military, and the Force Armée Rwandaises (FAR) 60 per cent on the understanding that the former were Tutsi and the latter Hutu. This illustrates how the root cause of the conflict, that is, the constructed racism, was not addressed, but used as part of the solution by allotting quotas to the supposed different people and parties<sup>16</sup>.

Thus, the Arusha Peace Agreement could not prevent the 1994 Rwanda genocide that led to over one million people dead. That is despite the warning of Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, the Rwanda Government chief negotiator, about the “*apocalypse deux*” after the signing of the Agreement. The aftermath of that “apocalypse”, also saw the massive exodus of 2.5 million Rwandan refugees into the region. Alongside, the refugees was the fleeing genocidaire Government that in exile would only rekindle the latent “racial” divisions in the already fragile Great Lakes Region<sup>17</sup>.

## **5) Post-genocide Rwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**

As the situation unfolded, the genocidal forces continued their “racial” mission in the Kivus with the complicity of the Mobutu government and the French collaboration through the *Turquoise* arrangement. There followed UN resolutions in which it was acknowledged that the Interhamwe and ex-FAR were a menace in the DRC and continued their genocide ideology, as illustrated in the killing of the Tutsi in the Kivu region. The targeted Congolese Tutsi fled to Rwanda in 1995 and 96 and settled in Gisenyi Prefecture. When the insurgency broke out in Rwanda in 1997 and 98, these Congolese Tutsi and their Rwandan brethren were targeted by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe insurgents.

At the same time, the 2.5 million Rwandan refugees in the Kivus were held hostage by the genocidaire military, who converted humanitarian assistance into military hardware to destabilize the new government in Rwanda. This called for preemptive attacks on the ex-FAR and Interahamwe bases in the refugee camps in 1996. It resulted in the repatriation of the 2.5 million Rwandan refugees and the eventual overthrow of Mobutu. Laurent Desiré Kabila was installed the new President of Zaire in May 1997.

Despite the propping up of Kabila as an ally in Rwanda’s intention to neutralize the genocidaire forces, Kabila reneged on “a gentleman’s agreement” and turned around to

support the *Interahamwe* and ex-FAR. This resulted into increased insurgency operations in North and Western Rwanda in the years 1997 and 1998, taking advantage of the security vacuum created by the increased Rwanda Patriotic Army deployment in the DRC. In August 1998, the RPA re-launched into Eastern Congo to deny the insurgents in the North and Western Rwanda a rear base and supply of arms from Laurent Kabila.

Meanwhile, the same security concerns predicated on the racist paradigm in the genocide ideology of the ex-FAR and the *Interahamwe* reappeared under Laurent Kabila's sponsorship, this time pleading a Tutsi/Hima (Rwanda/Uganda) conspiracy against his regime. This "racist" interpretation found sympathy with President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, himself a professed victim of white racism, and, as Mamdani would say, informed his "conservative nationalism" that saw the replacement of the "settler prerogative" with the "native prerogative"<sup>18</sup> demonstrated in the current Zimbabwe land policy. However, the Zimbabwean opposition saw Mugabe's intervention in Congo as a ploy to scapegoat his domestic problems while pleading pan-Africanism.

Mugabe used his position as the Chairman of the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) Military Commission to draw into the conflict countries that included Namibia and Angola. In the case of Angola, however, their involvement was subject to Laurent Kabila denying Jonas Savimbi of UNITA a rear base in the Congo. The conflict, pitting Uganda and Rwanda on one side, and all the above countries on the other, led to the Lusaka Peace Agreement of July 1999. Some of the provisions in the agreement included the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Congo.

## **6) Regional Peace Initiatives**

In the case of Rwanda, the Rwanda Defense Forces' (RDF) withdrawal was subject to the disarmament, demobilization, re-assemblment and repatriation (DDRR) of the ex-FAR and the *Interahamwe*. Implementation of the agreement<sup>19</sup> stalled, leading to Rwanda's unilateral withdrawal in October 2002. This means that the issue of the ex-FAR and the *Interahamwe* and their genocidal racist ideology remains unresolved, as they continue to receive unqualified support from President Joseph Kabila, who took over from his assassinated father.

South Africa, being a regional power with economic interests in the Congo, has of late become a dominant actor in the Great Lakes conflict system. Unfortunately, in pursuing its national interests, South Africa is blind to the racist paradigm within the region's conflict system as exemplified by the ex-FAR and *Interahamwe* bigotry with complicity from Kabila.

South Africa fails to grasp that the false racial paradigm in the Great Lakes Region, unlike in Zimbabwe and South Africa, is not as it used to be in black against white and vice versa, but an enduring colonial construct of false *white* (Tutsi) against Negroid Bantu (Hutu) *black*, as typified by the perpetual nationality debates in the DRC.

Likewise, the Burundi peace process, which was facilitated by the former Vice President, Jacob Zuma, ironically recognizes the Tutsi and Hutu as separate institutions (i.e. political parties, quotas in the military, etc) and therefore antagonistic parties in the conflict. This is

predicated on the wrong premise that this was a civil war between the Hutu and Tutsi, when it really was a power struggle between elites thriving on the ignorance of the Burundi masses and peasantry<sup>20</sup>.

## **7) Challenges for Rwanda**

This Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy may entail the security dilemma in Burundi and the region through the balkanization and institutionalization of the political life along the unsustainable racial constructs, which find expression in the current political parties and quotas in the national army in Burundi. How can a sectarian Hutu or Tutsi party or army serve national interests? It can only be a recipe for continued antagonisms and conflict locally and in the region. A clear example of this is the 2004 massacres of the Congolese Tutsi in Gatumba Refugee Camp in Burundi by the FNL-PALIPEHUTU party militia. Our experience in Rwanda is that the Tutsi genocide may not have happened, had it not been for the sectarian Hutu military that planned and executed it. This genocide has continued to be a challenge for Rwanda.

The challenges for Rwanda, however, are both internal and external, and are defined by the genocide ideology. But these internal and external challenges are intertwined in the solution for Rwanda and the region. In other words, charity must begin at home, which means that regional integration must be preceded by national integration.

The Rwandan genocide entailed disintegration and collapse of the state, leaving the Government with no resources to address the socio-economic concerns of the population – a population that was desperately wretched and polarized by the very act of the genocide. The complexity and peculiarity of the Rwandan genocide was that it was between close relatives, in which siblings set on each other and neighbour killed neighbour.

Contrasting it to the Holocaust or the Armenian genocide, the Germans decimated the Jews and the Turks the Armenians. In both of these cases there was a socio-cultural difference between the victims and perpetrators, as opposed to Rwanda which had none whatsoever between its people.

While the Armenian and Jewish survivors found a solution by going home or finding a place to run to, the Rwandans had nowhere else to go and had to live with each other. Given that dilemma, it was through the dynamism of the Rwandan heritage that a homegrown solution had to be found in the Gacaca as a re-integration mechanism.

Through this all-inclusive process of intra-community conflict mediation, Rwanda is being re-born through reconciliation predicated on truth and justice. This will ensure the unity of a people, in whose strength, even the external challenges such as those posed by the unrepentant Interahamwe and their cohort genocidaires will be checked.

To achieve that national unity and re-integration, the Gacaca as a people-driven process will provide the renaissance or rebirth of the nation in the aftermath of colonialism and the genocide. To this end, there is a six step approach in the Gacaca's overall strategy.

These are



- the coming out with the truth among the stakeholders;
- the administration of justice;
- dispelling any perceptions of impunity;
- the collective ownership of the tragedy;
- reconciliation through the concept of intra-community conflict mediation; and,
- socio-economic and political development, both at the individual and national level.

In this entire process, the truth forms the basis of success of the six step Gacaca strategy towards national integration. There are some truths, foremost of which is the truth about the unity of the Rwandan nation. It is this truth that has all along eluded Rwandans and many Rwanda scholars, since the coming of the colonialists. It has been about the Rwandan identity and how Rwandans historically related to each other. It includes the truth about their social relations and the alleged “historical wounds” that continue to impact on the current social discourse. It is also the truth about the social categorization of Rwandans into different races. There is also the truth about colonial reconstruction of the Rwandan society that forced Rwandans into their own self-denial as one people, their heritage and historical social institutions<sup>21</sup>.

These distortions of the truth form the bedrock of the colonial racist ideology that informed the Rwandan genocide. Unless, and until, we understand these complexities of the truth, reconciliation and re-integration may not be possible in Rwanda.

Regionally, it remains the same that unless the truth of the Rwandan genocide and the racist ideology behind it is understood, it will continue to pose a challenge not just for Rwanda, but for the region and the world at large. The fact that the Interahamwe genocidaires can find sanctuary in the region underlies the manifest indifferences and complicity to the genocide ideology in the region.

## 8) Conclusion

If Rwanda could sell the genocide ideology to the region, so can Rwanda sell its example of national unity and re-integration? Rwanda has started by “de-racializing” its society and being all-inclusive, so that citizenship is not based on descent but residence. In other words, you are citizen of Rwanda because you say so. Rwanda therefore is a microcosm of what an integrated Great Lakes Region could be.

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Endnotes:

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. Obote Odora., Understanding and Fighting genocide Ideology., The 13th Commemoration of Rwanda Genocide at African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa-Ethiopia 7th April 2007

An ideology is an organized collection of ideas. The word *ideology* was coined by Count Antoine Destutt Tracy in the late 18th century to define a "science of ideas" An ideology can be thought of as a comprehensive vision, or a set of ideas proposed by the dominant class of a society to all members of this society. The main purpose behind an ideology is to offer change in society through a normative thought process. Ideologies tend to be abstract thoughts applied to reality and, thus, make this concept unique to politics. Ideologies are very common in the world of politics. David W. Minar describes six different ways in which the word "ideology" has been used: (a) As a collection of certain ideas with certain kinds of *content*, usually normative; (b) As the *form or internal logical structure* that ideas have within a set; (c) By the role in which ideas play in *human-social interaction*; (d) By the role that ideas play in the *structure of an organization*; (e) As meaning, whose purpose is *persuasion*; and (f) As the *locus* of social interaction, possibly. For Willard A. Mullins, an ideology is composed of four basic characteristics: (a) it must have power over cognitions; (b) it must be capable of guiding one's evaluations; (c) it must provide guidance towards action; and, (d) as stated above, must be logically coherent. See

<http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideology>

<sup>2</sup> Robert Melson., *Revolution and Genocide and on the origins of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust*, University of Chicago Press 1992.

<sup>3</sup> Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, New York, 9 December 1948, <http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.htm>;

In 1944, a Polish-Jewish lawyer named [Raphael Lemkin](#) (1900-1959) sought to describe Nazi policies of systematic murder, including the destruction of the European Jews. He formed the word "genocide" by combining *geno-*, from the Greek word for race or tribe, with *-cide*, from the Latin word for killing. In proposing this new term, Lemkin had in mind "a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.

**Holocaust Encyclopedia** " <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007043>

<sup>4</sup> Revolution and Genocide: An interview with Robert Melson

<http://headoverhat.blogspot.com/2007/06/interview-with-robert-melson.html>

<sup>5</sup> Rwanda: How the genocide happened., BBC <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/1288230.stm>

<sup>6</sup> Rutazibwa Privat (ed.), 1999, *Les Crises des Grands Lacs et la question Tutsi: Réflexions sur l'Idéologie du Génocide dans la sous-région*, Kigali, CRID.

<sup>7</sup> Burundi, *Génocide d'Octobre 1993. Des Associations de la Société civile dénoncent*, Bujumbura, Mai 1996.

<sup>8</sup> Mwagiru M., *Conflict: Theory, Practice and Processes*, Nairobi, 2000. (See also Mwagiru M., *International Management of Internal conflict in Africa: The Uganda Mediation*, 1985, (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Kent at Canterbury, October 1994)

<sup>9</sup> Uvin Peter, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*, West Hartford, Kumaria Press Inc., 1998.

<sup>10</sup> Semujanga Josias, *Origins of Rwandan Genocide*. Amherst, Humanity Books, 2003

<sup>11</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*, Kampala, Fountain Publishers, 2001.

<sup>12</sup> Logiest, Guy, *Mission au Rwanda*, Bruxelles, Didier Hatier, 1988, p.135

<sup>13</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *op. cit.*, pp.129-135.

<sup>14</sup> Harroy, J.P., *Rwanda de la féodalité à la démocratie 1955-1962*, Hayez, Bruxelles, 1984, p303

<sup>15</sup> Rich Orth, "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective", in Susan E. Cook (ed.), *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda New Perspectives*, New Haven, Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 2004, p.231

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<sup>16</sup> Arusha Peace Agreement, 1993

<sup>17</sup> Melvern L R, *A People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda's genocide*. Cape Town, NAEP, 1986, pp. 52-60.

<sup>18</sup> Mamdani, *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> Lusaka Peace Agreement, July 1999.

<sup>20</sup> Marc Manirakiza, "Nation-Building in Burundi: History and its impacts on the future", *Conflict Trends*, 2/2005, pp44-48.

<sup>21</sup> Frank Rusagara, "Gacaca as a Reconciliation and Nation-building Strategy in Post-genocide Rwanda", *Conflict Trends*, 2/2005, pp.20-25.