The Local Arena of Power Sharing. Between Patterns of Adaptation and Continued Disorder

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In 18 out of 19 peace accords signed in Africa 1999-2008, some form of power-sharing between incumbent leaders and rebel groups was stipulated to end civil war and restore political order.[1] Often proposed by external mediators, it is not exaggerated to say that power-sharing has become a blueprint for peacemaking, a conflict resolution mechanism to lay the foundation for peace. This begs the question whether the popularity of power-sharing arrangements is justified by the results, i.e. do power-sharing agreements in war-torn countries lead to less violence or even peace as its proponents suggest?[2] Or at the very least, do power-sharing arrangements, roughly conceived as a form of mutual accommodation of political and military elites, provide sufficient incentives to use less violence, that is, to de-militarize power struggles and to pave the way for the return to peaceful politics?

Our point of departure is the observation that processes of power-sharing produce outcomes that exhibit significant variances, both within and across countries. While some result in transitions to peace, in other cases insecurity and situations of 'neither war nor peace' persist - especially at the local level

Even a cursory look at countries where power-sharing agreements have been signed among national political and military elites indicates that it does not necessarily bring about an 'outbreak of peace'. This is to say that peace does not trickle down to the sub-national level as evidenced by ongoing violence and insecurity in virtually all countries affected by civil war. The alleged peace process does not unfold in a territorially uniform fashion. Less violence may be observed in some or perhaps most areas, but not in others. The latter may be especially true for former hotpots of conflict that saw most of the violence during the war. This puts into question the assumption that the sharing of national power leads to a

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[1] Andreas Mehler, 'Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not so Obvious Relationship', African Affairs 108 (2009) 432, pp. 453-473.

[2] In this paper, we are concerned with civil wars, not the violence associated with disputed elections that was observed in Kenya and Zimbabwe. On these instances of power-sharing, see Nic Cheeseman/Miles Tedi, 'Power-Sharing in Comparative Perspective: The Dynamics of "Unity Government" in Kenya and Zimbabwe', in: The Journal of Modern African Studies, 48, 2010, pp. 203-229.

territorially uniform and locally meaningful peace process that extend across the national territory.

Before proceeding further, a note on the term local peace is in order. Galtung (1965) has classically distinguished between 'negative' and 'positive' forms of peace: Whereas negative peace involves the mere 'absence of violence', positive peace refers to the 'integration of human society' (or in more contemporary terms 'human security').[3] In line with the bulk of the conflict management literature we define peace in 'negative' terms, not least because the notion of 'positive peace' is inherently difficult to operationalise.[4] It is also too demanding a condition because power-sharing is only one device to set a long-term peace process in motion. Thus we understand local peace as the absence of violence or physical insecurity for local citizens.

The promise of power-sharing

International mediators self-evidently put considerable faith in power-sharing as a pacifying arrangement. But academic research has also produced evidence to suggest that power-sharing is an effective tool to build peace. Hoddie/Hartzell for example, employing a statistical analysis of 38 civil wars that were settled through negotiations (1945-1998), conclude that power-sharing provisions in peace settlements have a 'demonstrated ability' to foster post-war peace.[5] Likewise, Barbara Walter has argued that the more power-sharing is included in a peace agreement the better would be the result. The reason why power-sharing is considered as key to achieving peace in post-conflict environments pertains to the 'security dilemma'. When warring factions are settling for peace, each party fears the defection of the others. As stakeholders (especially minorities) fear that reconstituted state power may be used to harm their interests, there is urgent need for power-sharing institutions to provide guarantees in order to make commitments to peace more credible. This line of reasoning is represented by Walter's 'credible commitment theory', which posits that combatants will

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[3] Johan Galtung, 'On the Meaning of Nonviolence', Journal of Peace Research, 2 (1965), 3, pp. 228-256.

[4] As we focus on the local arena it is excluded that we use standard definitions of 'violent conflict' offered by the Correlates of War project or the more refined Uppsala Conflict Data Program (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP) as these only provide country-level data and do not disaggregate local levels of violence. We assume that a) post-conflict violence can be significant for the functioning of the social fabric on the local level well below the threshold of 25 deaths per year, and b) that conflict parties in the local arena are not necessarily easy to be identified as being state actors (on one side) which is one of the reasons why 'battle-related deaths' will not be a useful category.

[5] Hoddie, Matthew and Hartzell, Caroline, 'Power Sharing in Peace Settlements: Initiating the Transition from Civil War', in Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars. Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 83-106.

walk away from the negotiating table as long they believe that a settlement could leave them permanently excluded from political power and expose them to continued abuse.[6] Accordingly, solutions that offer combatants only the chance to compete in elections will not convince them to sign and implement peace agreements. Instead, they will look for ways to guarantee them control over key leadership positions in order to protect them from future harm. They link their survival to be part of the government.[7] Power-sharing is therefore a 'key mechanism for solving the commitment problem in a post-conflict context of severe distrust and vulnerability'.[8]

The unexplored local-national nexus

By and large the academic debate on post-conflict power-sharing is silent on the effects of peace arrangements on the sub-national level. This is echoed in dominant practices of peace agreement negotiations. The implicit assumption for both seems to be that the sharing of power among former adversaries will have pacifying effects across the state and its territory. In other words: a peace process based on power-sharing is presumed to be a territorially uniform process. This assumption is questionable for three sets of reasons:

1. Armed conflicts that have come to an end were – as a rule – not territorially uniform phenomena.

- Most conflicts originate in specific locations or provinces at the sub-national level, frequently in the periphery of a country, as was the case in the DRC, Chad or Sudan. Thus all conflicts (and politics) are to some degree local.

- Local or regional grievances are frequently mobilised in civil wars. Examples include the alleged economic or political marginalization of certain areas or groups of citizens. As for the latter, feelings of being second-class citizens have played a prominent role in the conflicts in DRC, Sudan, Liberia, Central African Republic or Côte d'Ivoire.

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[6] Walter, Barbara F., Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
[7] Brown, Stephen/Zahar, Marie-Joëlle,. 'Committing to Peace: Soft Guarantees and Alternative Approaches to Power Sharing in Angola and Mozambique', Journal or Peacebuilding and Development, 4 (2008) 2, p. 75-85.
[8] Walter, Barbara F., Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 19.

- Local or regional opportunities are at stake, such as access to natural resources: DRC or Chad are clear examples.

- Most conflicts are not fought throughout a national territory. Some areas are more affected by violence than others. This legacy of violence is a significant impediment to peace, and it may have implications for national peace too.

2. The second set of reasons has to do with the nature of power-sharing agreements

- Power-sharing arrangements are pacts among national elites. The content of those agreements almost without exception accommodate exclusively elite interests.

- The distribution of positions of power is often limited to the level of the central state and - with only some exceptions - does not touch the local level.

- The initial (local) root-causes of conflict are not addressed and other proximate causes are at best implicitly dealt with. Local grievances, and access to local opportunities, are largely ignored by national peace accords.

3. The third set of reasons concerns the nature or organisational strength of the main actors.

- It is unrealistic to presuppose that the signatories to an agreement have the political will, power and organisational cohesion to implement the provisions of a peace agreement one-to-one throughout the national territory.

- Spoilers can emerge, particularly at the local level, to challenge the settlement, be they parties that were excluded from the deal, or factions that distance themselves from a deal that was struck by their leaders.

- More specifically, former rebel movements frequently transform into political parties as a result of a peace agreement. But the distance between the national and local level within those formations (and within older established parties) can give rise to significant tensions. If a pre-conflict crisis of representation is followed by a post-conflict crisis of representation, factors that may have contributed to violence may remain salient.

- Finally the cohabitation of new (=former rebels), state and traditional elites in the former hot-spots of a conflict may follow different logics than the cohabitation of competing elites in the capital.

To summarize, major gaps in the literature exist as regards the impact and reverberations of national power-sharing accords on the local level.

- We find surprisingly little systematic empirical work on the prospects of post-conflict power-sharing with regard to the potential re-ignition of armed conflict in former hot spots of a civil war, places like Bouaké, Man (Côte d'Ivoire), Voinjama (Liberia), Cibitoke (Burundi), Masisi (DR Congo) etc.

- The local-national link is insufficiently explored. The meaning of power-sharing for influential actors in arenas of violence at the sub-national level, especially as regards competing elites in their respective local strongholds, is largely ignored. Most of the research on the transformation of rebel movements focuses on the national level, neglecting that these groups often have roots in particular regions and among particular constituencies with distinct local concerns.

- The literature on rebel governance does not pay much attention to the specific post-conflict rationale in legitimizing the maintenance of power positions as well as the interplay with state actors on the local level, i.e. the production of order. Papers by Förster on Northern Côte d'Ivoire (Korhogo, in particular) and Heitz on the rebel-held city of Man in the West are notable exceptions.[9]

- Conversely, the existing literature on local peace initiatives tends to ignore the national context, the power games of new (rebel), modern (state, party) and old ('traditional') local elites, as well as the patron-client ties that may link them to national politics.

It is our assumption that violence in war-torn countries or parts thereof can endure or be re-ignited *locally*, because the aforementioned aspects are underestimated. And, conversely, that the explanation for the success of agreements – or its spatial variances – can largely be found

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[9] Förster, Till: Maintenant, on sait qui est qui: Statehood and Political Reconfiguration in Northern Côte d'Ivoire, in Development and Change, 44 (4), 2010. Heitz, Kathrin: Power Sharing Seen From Below. Local Forms of Power Sharing in the Rebel-Held Parts of Western Côte d'Ivoire, in Africa Spectrum 44 (3), 2009.

at the local level. This is to say that in the wake of power-sharing agreements the continuation or resurgence of violence at the sub-national level goes well beyond the mere existence of 'local pockets' of violence. If 'former' hotspots of conflict remain violent, the very objective of a peace agreement remains elusive. As important is the fact that violence on the sub-national level may have the potential to derail the so-called national peace process. A perspective that pays attention to variations at the sub-national level in any given country is essential for understanding how peace processes evolve. In both normative and political terms, implementing peace requires more than basic agreements among a handful of elites – if only for the fact that the signatories to power-sharing agreements, notably contemporary insurgent leaders, may not represent cohesive political organisations or societal interests.

Our perspective on the nexus between local and national peace is informed by the postulation that national elites and their international supporters (mediators, peacekeeper) cannot simply act upon the local level and its actors. The key assumption is therefore that national peace and power-sharing accords are unlikely to trigger a country-wide peace if they ignore powerful local actors and their interests.

Sub-national comparisons

Our research question derives from the gaps in the literature identified above: under what circumstances do power-sharing agreements, as key components of national peace accords, contribute to successful transitions from war to peace, especially in areas at the sub-national level that were seriously affected by violence prior to the peace settlement?[10] In other words: what are the factors that explain the variances of outcomes both within and across countries where power-sharing agreements have been implemented?

Our more specific research questions are:
1. Which modes and variants of the broad power-sharing formula are adequately adapted or being adapted to national and sub-national (local) circumstances for order to spread across the entire national territory of a post-conflict state?
2. How does the local adaptation of the national peace agreement provisions affect local peace?

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[10] Obviously, to control for the pacifying effect of power-sharing, we need to select and analyse local arenas that were affected by violence.

3. If local peace has taken hold in the wake of power-sharing: what are the main determinants of this successful process? Can we identify patterns of adaptation that explain peaceful outcomes?

4. What are the repercussions of success and failure on the local level for the national level?

We expect various political factors and institutional arrangements of power-sharing agreement to strongly influence the prospect for peace in the immediate 5-6 years after a peace agreement. More specifically, we assume that successful power-sharing (one that contributes to peace on the national level) requires arrangements that include consideration of local politics, interests and actors. With this in mind, we postulate five hypotheses that guide our research.[11]

1. The quality of the negotiation process determines the prospects for both local and national peace. In other words: successful peace-promoting power-sharing requires its extension to the local level.

Peace negotiations vary enormously in depth and duration.[12] A good number of peace agreements consist of only a few pages of paper and may just acknowledge the principle that former rebels get important positions in government or that combatants are integrated into the national army. A comprehensive agreement on the main elements of a power-sharing deal in the negotiation phase that also addresses the local level (local elites and their interests) improves the prospects that the agreement will instigate peaceful change.

2. The inclusion of meaningful elements of territorial power-sharing increases the likelihood of both local and national peace.

Relatively few peace agreements contain elements of territorial power-sharing, although, as the literature shows, these may be well suited to accommodate grievances on a local level. In recent years (1999-2007) out of 18 power-sharing agreements in Africa only Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Comoros, Djibouti, Mali and Sudan formally included territorial power-sharing

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[11] Note that these hypotheses do not build on each other.
[12] Sisk, Timothy D., Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.

arrangements. We postulate that territorial power-sharing is contributing to peace because – by its very definition – it addresses local or sub-national concerns and interests. It is important to note that these arrangements may be formal or informal.

3. A high degree of implementation of a power-sharing arrangement is a necessary condition for lasting peace both on the local and the national level.

One common flaw in the debate on the impact of peace accords is to take the letter of an agreement for an actual fact. While signatures under an agreement may show an initial commitment by a handful of national elites, this is hardly enough to convince their followers to follow suit. It follows that we only study cases of national power-sharing agreements that have been – at least partially - implemented. Only then can we meaningfully study the impact of national peace accords on the local level.

4. The extension of power-sharing to the local/sub-national level involves the re-ordering of power relations on the local level, but it will only contribute to local peace if new and widely acceptable patterns of authority emerge.

In civil wars the authority of the state is violently contested and displaced by non-state armed groups (rebel organizations). In the wake of power-sharing agreements that extend to the local level, former rebel strongholds emerge as contested fields where 'old' and 'new' elites (local rebel commanders, businessmen, newly appointed representatives of the central state etc.) participate in a difficult and contentious process of competition and mutual accommodation. Rare accounts on the processes of political re-composition and adaptation document the political saliency of this issue.[13] We expect that peace is more likely to take hold if a mutual accommodation of local elites is taking place.

5. The ability of new local authorities to transfer local concerns upward to the national agenda and, in turn the inclusion of local arenas into the distribution of public goods and (political and economic) resources is crucial for maintaining peace.

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[13] Förster, Till: Maintenant, on sait qui est qui: Statehood and Political Reconfiguration in Northern Côte d'Ivoire, in Development and Change, 44 (4), 2010. Heitz, Kathrin: Power Sharing Seen From Below. Local Forms of Power Sharing in the Rebel-Held Parts of Western Côte d'Ivoire, in Africa Spectrum 44 (3), 2009.

In contrast to the previous hypotheses, which are centred on local and national elites, this proposition is concerned with the public legitimacy of both power-sharing provisions and the configurations of political order to which they contribute. In some places, war may have been fought to articulate the specific grievances of discriminated ethno-regional minorities or marginalized regions.[14] When joining governments of national unity, rebel leaders are supposed to represent those groups or regions and to guarantee their peaceful integration into the restored national political order. This pertains to issues of authority and legitimacy, but also representation from the perspectives of local communities. Rather than constituting the mere accommodation of elites, local power-sharing would involve political representation (from below) and the (re-)distribution of public goods (from above) via elites.

We will operationalise the independent variables as follows:

1. Quality of the negotiation process: The substance of a negotiation process can be determined by a content analysis of an agreement (sophisticated, medium, superficial) and an assessment of the negotiation intensity. We assume that the inclusion of local interests is crucial to promote peace.

2. Inclusiveness of the negotiations: The degree of inclusiveness (ratio of included versus excluded significant armed actors and moderate forces) is the key indicator for this variable. From a local perspective this ratio may look differently than from the national perspective. The inclusion or exclusion of territorial aspects of power-sharing needs to be determined.

3. Degree of implementation: Only the local level analysis allows for a clear answer to what degree a peace agreement was implemented: was political, military and territorial power shared (to a high, medium, low degree) where it was expected to matter most?

4. Re-ordering of power relations on the local level: It involves a qualitative assessment of meaningful local power-sharing (formal, informal, de facto) between 'old' and 'new' elites in political, military and/or economic terms. Whether this leads to new or reconfigured patterns of authority and whether these are locally accepted needs to be determined through fieldwork.

5. Channelling local concerns to the central government: A media analysis will show whether (still salient) old grievances in former arenas of violence remain on the national agenda and inform public opinion. Each investment locally originating from

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[14] Cederman, Lars-Erik, Wimmer, Andreas and Min, Brian, 'Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis', World Politics 62 (2010) 1, pp. 87-119.

the national budget, the extension of an electrification scheme etc. following the peace agreement can be put on record and its meaningfulness for the local population can be determined qualitatively. The same holds for central government decisions that have plausibly a strong political bearing on local communities, e.g. citizenship laws.

To assess the variable outcomes of power-sharing agreements, we propose to undertake sub-national comparisons, i.e. comparing the impact of national power-sharing accords in sub-national localities on the level of districts. Case selection is directed by diverging outcomes (peace in one, ongoing insecurity in the other). Thus we will analyse local arenas of violence (= former war zones on the level of districts) to control for the presumed pacifying effect of power-sharing across the national territory. In so doing we hope to identify factors and patterns of local adaptation (or lack thereof) to account for the pacifying effect (or not) of national power-sharing agreements.

The case of the DR Congo

The wars that wrought havoc in the DRC since 1998 were supposedly terminated in late 2002, when the Congolese insurgent movements and the Kabila government (with minor participation of civil society and the political opposition) signed a national peace accord. At the heart of the agreement was the formation of a government of national unity that was to rule the country until multiparty elections would end the transition in 2006. The power-sharing agreement included political, military and to a lesser degree territorial and economic components.

The core of the agreement concerned political power-sharing in the national institutions in the capital of Kinshasa. Ministries of the unity government were distributed among the former belligerents. At the top of the government, Kabila remained head of state but was henceforth flanked by 4 vice-presidents (2 of whom were former rebel leaders). The political sharing of power also extended to parliament, where seats (in the national assembly and the senate) were distributed among the former government, rebels and civil society and opposition groups. In military terms, the accord stipulated the amalgamation of the former armed groups and the former army into a new national army. The command of Congo's military regions was distributed among rebels and the camp of President Kabila. The economic component of

power-sharing was less pronounced, though it included the distribution of parastatal companies among the signatories of the agreement. Finally, the accord had also a territorial dimension to the extent that provincial governors were to be designated according to the principle of consensus. However, the governors were not appointed until May 2004, suggesting the sensitive nature of the territorial dimension.

As was to be expected, the period between 2003, when the government of national unity took office and 2006, when post-conflict elections formally ended the power-sharing arrangement, was characterized by almost constant tensions, political conflict and occasional bouts of violence in Kinshasa. Nonetheless, the government – under intense pressure from the international community – did not collapse. While many contentious issues remained, a return to war between the former belligerents was prevented, suggesting that the buy-in tactic worked reasonably well. And at least in theory, the country, long divided in three major parts, was unified. From the point of view of the national elites in the unity government and its external promoters, the power-sharing deal was a relative success. And as had been envisioned from the outset, the arrangement, despite delays, was ended when largely orderly presidential, legislative and provincial elections were organized in 2006.

Even so, the transition was far from being an unmitigated success. Today we know that the high politics in the capital of Kinshasa and the show of unity of its elites did barely contribute to the pacification of the country where it mattered most. That is, in eastern Congo, especially the two Kivu provinces, violence continued unabated throughout the transition, even peaking in the 12 months following the national peace accord and leading to an upsurge of internal displacement that mirrored the worst years of the war (ca. 2000/2001). The two Kivu provinces, where the war (as well as the preceding one in 1996/97) had started, continued to be the theatre of unspeakable atrocities, much as had been the case between 1998 and 2002. While periods of relative calm were certainly registered, the region never experienced a return to peace. Thus, as much as the Congo war was not a territorially uniform process, the post-agreement period was characterized by a very uneven spatial patterns of peace and violence. While the Kivus remained a hotbed of violence, the rest of the country registered slow but steady progress in terms of security.

The principal source of ongoing violence were remnants of the former RCD rebellion, the principal insurgent group that had ruled the Kivus and much of eastern Congo during the war. RCD representatives under the leadership of RCD president Ruberwa had joined the unity government in Kinshasa, but an equally important group of political and military officials first tacitly, and in due process openly rejected the peace process. This group, mostly composed of

Rwandophones (Tutsi and Hutu) and soon to be led by Laurent Nkunda, correctly assessed that the transition arrangement only offered them a short-term protection of their interests. This was probably due to the (again correct) expectation that the envisioned elections would politically annihilate the former rebellion (now a political party) and thus deprive it of the political and economic power it had acquired during the war.[15]

These issues soon led to renewed violence and a political polarization of the region that had distinct local (and regional) characteristics. Chief among them were grievances of the new insurgent group (CNDP) that pertained to the status and power of its main supporters, the Banyarwanda: the 'doubtful' Congolese nationality of the minority group, conflicts over access to local resources (mainly land access, but also the control of local trade) and the return of Congolese Tutsi who lived as refugees in neighbouring countries. Evoking these grievances to rally local support, the Nkunda faction (with active Rwandan support) justified its uprising in as an act of self-defence.[16] As a militarily effective group, it was able to prevent the Kinshasa government to take control of North Kivu. With some justification, it also pointed to the negative consequences that power-sharing had meant for Rwandophones in South Kivu province, where intense military rivalries between newly arrived military officers from Kinshasa and former RCD officials had led to violence and finally ethnic pogroms against Congolese Tutsi in 2004.

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully analyze these events, suffice it to say that local interests and dynamics played a crucial part in the ongoing violence in eastern Congo, a vast region where the Kinshasa-based national peace process remained elusive. This is not say that the national power-sharing agreement could have been expected to address local 'root causes of conflict' such as persistent conflicts over access to land or citizenship. Nevertheless, the accord – and its short time horizon – were apparently inadequate in terms of their adaptation to local interests and actors. This is even more intriguing when considering the fact that the Kivus were the region where the war had started both in 1996 and in 1998. In addition, violence was also driven by external factors such as the ongoing presence of Rwandan rebels (the FDLR) and the concomitant interference of the Rwandan government in eastern Congo. Separating these factors from Congo's local and national politics presents a major difficulty to accurately assess the effectiveness of the power-sharing process. Likewise, the fact that the Ituri district (north of North Kivu) was not included in the power-sharing

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[15] The RCD enjoyed exceedingly little support among the local population in the regions it had occupied during the war. This was mainly due to the fact that it was locally perceived as a stooge of its foreign backer (Rwanda), but also the excessive violence it used to control the region.

[16] It began in 2004, resumed forcefully in late 2006 and lasted until 2009 when Rwanda withdrew its support for Nkunda and convinced the CNDP to sign a peace agreement with Kabila.

agreement is also to be considered. Starting in the late stages of the Pretoria negotiation process, the various Ituri militias increased military activities, perhaps partly to impose their participation in the negotiations from which they were excluded. This led to major civilian displacement.

The Congo war was not a territorially uniform process. Much of the country was initially affected by violence, but the scale and intensity of violence changed significantly over time. The only areas that were consistently and highly affected by violence were North Kivu, South Kivu and to some extent Ituri. To call the peace agreement of 2002 a success would by definition require that the resulting peace process in the DRC to had a pacifying impact on the most violent areas of eastern Congo. However, this was not the case. Despite of lulls of violence, the Kivus actually saw continuing violence between 2002 and 2006.

However, even within the Kivus, not all areas were equally affected by violence. Arguably, this was not the result of power-sharing, which only partly stipulated a mostly military power-sharing (and which did not work). Periods of relative peace were observably in areas where one party to the conflict succeeded in establishing a political and military monopoly rather than sharing power with 'former' foes. This point to the fact that power-sharing was often not implemented or only partially in the form of various informal arrangements. An example is North Kivu, where the former RCD rebels (cum CNDP) were not challenged by the Kinshasa government after the governor of the province (E. Serufuli) struck a deal with the national authorities – an arrangement that led to relative peace in the run-p to the 2006 elections. During this period, the former rebels were able to maintain military control over the province as well as its economic resources. At least to some degree local concerns were also channelled up to the national level, for example, when the transitional parliament adopted legislation that defined Congolese citizenship rather inclusively to accommodate the Tutsi community from which the rebellion drew large support. To some extent, then, power-sharing arrangements were contributing to political stability during the transition, but this process was reversed with the 2006 elections. Its results shifted power away from the Tutsi to the ethnic Nande community and sparked renewed violence by the CNDP to defend the alleged interests of the Tutsi community. In the final analysis, the peace process during the power-sharing period was a spatially uneven process.

Concerning our hypotheses, the following conclusions are suggested:

1. The negotiation process leading to the peace agreement had been fairly inclusive, with the notable exception of Ituri, which was not represented in Pretoria. As indicated

above, this may have had a negative impact on peace in the areas as local militias belatedly tried to fight their way to the bargaining table. To some degree, then, the power-sharing process, had a negative indirect impact before it was even signed.

2. The inclusion of territorial aspects of power-sharing was limited and it took different forms. In North Kivu, for example, the former RCD rebellion retained de facto control in the early stages of the transition. When RCD governor Serufuli was re-appointed by Kabila in May 2004 this situation was largely legalized. But it also meant that power-sharing was not implemented *within* the province. Territorial power-sharing on these terms was such that North Kivu was left to the RCD, with North Kivu remaining a satellite of the RCD within the country. The situation was different in South Kivu, where the Kabila camp took control and neutralized the RCD. Because the military aspects of power-sharing were unresolved, this led to fierce tensions and eventually renewed violence between former RCD soldiers and the Kabila camp.

3. The latter aspect points to the uneven implementation of power-sharing provisions in the Kivus. The Pretoria agreement had – probably consciously – not addressed the implementation of the most contentious aspects as they were to pertain to the former strongholds of the RCD. These included the political, administrative and military control of the Kivus. Thus, when the government of national unity took office, crucial power-sharing arrangements were still to be negotiated rather than simply implemented. As a consequence, subsequent developments were shaped by de facto power relations in the Kivus rather than abstract power-sharing distribution principles. This, in turn, was fostered by the fragmentation of the RCD. While its leader, A: Ruberwa, participated duly in the Kinshasa government, some of his followers who had remained in the Kivus opposed the transition and followed their own agenda. They resolutely opposed the application of power-sharing in North Kivu, while South Kivu escaped their control.

4. As a result, the re-ordering of power relations in North Kivu was limited. This, however, was contested by local groups in North Kivu which opposed continued RCD rule. Ethnic tensions were the consequence, especially as the end of the transition (2006) came in sight.

5. Thus distinctly local concerns in North Kivu significantly shaped the transition and power-sharing process as RCD renegade commanders refused to follow orders from Kinshasa. The political agenda of the new Nkunda rebellion highlighted these concerns: Congolese citizenship for the Tutsi community, protection of the Tutsi

community against threats from Mai Mai militias and FDLR rebels, the refusal of military commanders to be deployed outside of the Kivus as well as concerns over economic agendas (land, mineral resources). Because these concerns were not addressed in Pretoria and because local forces had no confidence that they would be solved to their satisfaction after the transition (and the 2006 elections), they opposed the Kinshasa-based power-sharing transition. As a result, violence continued in parts of the Kivus.

The case of Côte d'Ivoire

Compared to the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire is a different case both in terms of war and peace. A failed rebellion both in North and South with ongoing armed encounters at the frontline. Particularly fierce was the fighting in and around Man close to the Liberian border. Behind the frontline several atrocities were committed both in Bouaké (north) and in the cocoa-producing area (south-west) and - a climate of fear with death squads operating in Abidjan. But large parts of the country never experienced any form of combat, like the Eastern part bordering Ghana or most northern cities that were quickly controlled by rebel-forces enjoying widespread popular support. This quick description shows that war was indeed not a territorially uniform process.

The country experienced a series of failed mediation attempts in the period 2002-2004, those were in so far inclusive as all political parties represented in Parliament and all rebel groups took part, but no single mediation effort extended to the local level. The most salient difference to DRC is in terms of the intensity and duration of the war. In Côte d'Ivoire war resulted in probably less than 2,500 dead in this phase and close to none between 2005 and 2007 when the Ouagadougou agreement was signed. The rebellion (at some stage taking the name of Forces Nouvelles; FN) was able to control and one may say govern large parts of the territory over these years. Powerful local FN commanders ruled with little restriction "their" share of the country and took their part of the "national cake". Militias close to President Gbagbo and local self-help groups became important in the South-Western part of the country. In the period of "no war, no peace" (2003-2007) varying situations of de facto power relations developed.

The peace agreement of Ougadougou itself was not very sophisticated, but it can be termed highly exclusive. Not only did major national elites play only secondary roles (including party leaders Ouattara and Bédié). It did also not make explicit arrangements for the different zones

of the country with their different pre-war and post-war grievances and power relations between actors of variable strength. The only, but perhaps significant territorial aspect in the Ouagadougou agreement, was the return of the state administration to the rebel-held territories of the North, which automatically created a situation of cohabitation of rebel and central state power at the local level - but an informal one. How power would be shared at the local level was not agreed upon. The Ivorian state pretended to rule the North but with very limited means, while individual rebel commanders plus local self-help groups (in particular hunters' associations, the 'Dozo') had distinctively more means of coercion at their disposal.

The concrete power-sharing at elite level between President Gbagbo and rebel leader Soro – turned into Prime Minister, was not made part of the agreement though it was clearly related and a pre-condition for Soro to sign. This created a situation where Soro was rewarded explicitly for taking up arms,[17] and the local commanders of the Forces Nouvelles only informally maintained their power position as long as the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process had not completely ended. They were confronted with the return of the state administration and with the fact that the power-sharing deal was only transitional. Elections would be postponed time and again, but they would be held at some point – not a particularly attractive perspective if nothing else was in the negotiation package. At first sight this is a pact between national elites ignoring local realities and interest. This nevertheless created a relatively strong incentive for them to reinvent themselves as civilian strongmen and local politicians (see Förster 2010 for the case of Korhogo). This means that local rebel commanders had to care about local legitimacy and/or keep their military means to start new rebellions (which they did as the later developments showed). It is extremely interesting to see how different types of elites arranged with each other on a local level during the formal power-sharing phase (2007-2010).

Côte d'Ivoire went to presidential elections in late 2010 without any significant DDR process. This had disastrous effects as could be witnessed during the recent crisis. Somewhat contested election results in the second round of elections showed at least one thing: a clear pattern of vote distribution between accentuated northern strongholds of Ouattara and a majority of constituencies voting for Gbagbo in the south while frequently not in such an overwhelming fashion. When Gbagbo did not accept defeat a schism developed, Ouattara opted for a military solution in March 2011 and in the end a military conquest of the Gbagbo-loyal parts of the country was organised by the reformed rebel army with the help of France and UN

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[17] This is the main critical argument against power-sharing in Denis Tull/Andreas Mehler: The hidden costs of power-sharing: Reproducing insurgent violence in Africa, in: African Affairs; 104 (2005) 416, pp. 375-398.

peacekeepers. Gbagbo was finally arrested on 11 April 2011. While not all combat was over at that time, it appears to mark the end of this new and brutal episode of war. The new civil war claimed probably more lives (3,000) than the first one in the course of only few weeks. Again, the war was not at all territorially uniform. E.g. Man and Bouaké, two places that saw outrageous acts of violence during the first war remained largely calm. Scenes of intercommunal violence and one-sided violence took place at very precise locations: in the cocoa-belt and in Abidjan mainly (and here in Abobo and Yopougon mainly), suggesting that local peace in those places was ephemeral over the entire period from 2002 onwards. The forces loyal to Ouattara committed serious crimes against humanity with up to 1,000 dead in Duékoué (south-west). Many hypotheses for this pattern may be formulated: There is some probability that the quick pace of rebel movements towards Abidjan spared the hinterland bloody battles. It also might be that Bouaké remained calm because Gbagbo supporters had left after the bloody events in 2004. But a further hypothesis is that some local arrangements between different communities and their leaders helped to keep emotions and mobilisation low in those weeks.

Conclusion

This paper presents a preliminary outline of a new research project and tentative hypotheses and observations that are to be corroborated through field research. Our main aim was to introduce a new perspective on the analysis of power-sharing agreements that highlights the variability of outcomes both within and across countries. Our preliminary research suggests that power-sharing, as a conflict resolution formula, escapes a clear-cut assessment, both in positive and negative terms. It shows that political pacts among national elites are an insufficient condition for peace to take hold. National actors may seek to act upon the local level. But in an environment in which both the capacity of the central state as well as the cohesion of political and military organisations are relatively weak, actors on the local level are able to assert their interests vis-à-vis national elites. As a result, national peace processes remain elusive on the local level if they do not take into account local institutions, actors and interests. No matter how sophisticated national peace agreements are (they are often not), they don't survive the stage of implementation if they run against local structures that have interests on their own. This points to the challenge to adapt the requirements of national peace to the local level in order to find mutually acceptable arrangements that provide political and military guarantees to local interests. This is not an impossible task, as a number of examples suggest. Only then will peace processes become locally meaningful, i.e. they contribute to less

violence and insecurity, providing a new basis for the reconstitution of political order. This research project will seek to identify factors that explain under what circumstances this can be achieved.