

New Citizens and a New Beginning

Repatriation and nation building after genocide in Rwanda

VERY PRELIMINAR DAFT
Paper for ECAS 2011

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Matobo camp

Jean-Pierre gets up just before dawn, dresses quickly and goes to the exercise place outside the building. There, he stands in the morning mist, shivering slightly, together with 150 other Hutu men who have all returned recently from the massive refugee camps in Eastern Zaire/Congo. At 6.30, the RPF officer in charge emerges and they sing the national anthem. Afterwards he goes to the kitchen area to do cleaning. By 8.30 they are back in the barracks where they eat bread and drink hot, sweet tea. Classes start at 10 AM. Today they are expecting guests from Kigali; a government representative arrives together with his assistant in a 4WD. He is a young, slim man who talks passionately to them about Rwanda's history and the true causes of the genocide. Jean-Pierre and his fellow returnees sit still and give the appearance of listening while the young man from Kigali explains that there is no real difference between Hutu and Tutsi; that these were labels invented by the wazungu (the white people) so that they could split the black people and prevent them from resisting the power of the wazungu. He tells Jean-Pierre and the other men that greedy politicians, under the influence of the Belgians and the French, misused these terms after independence and made uneducated peasants – like themselves – believe that Hutu and Tutsi were enemies, when in fact they are brothers. This is all over now, the man from Kigali declares with a big smile. Now we can live together in peace and unity, as we did before. We simply our eyes and realise the truth and not listen to the lies of the past. We need to look forward to a new future of unity.

Jean-Pierre listens to the man and at one level he agrees while at another he does not. He knows exactly who was a Hutu and who was a Tutsi on the Hill where he grew up. Even here he can guess who is who. So why say that they are the same? And wasn't it the Tutsi who attacked the country in 1990 because the Hutu had been 'on top' since 1959? Wasn't that the reason why we – the Hutu – were told to kill them in 1994? And wasn't it them who won the war, and who therefore are 'on top' now? Jean-Pierre has no problems with the Tutsi being on top. He simply has to act accordingly. If only they do not hurt him and he can get some land or another source of income. So why is the man from the government talking about us all being unified? This must be a way of keeping power - a way of tricking people like himself.

Of course Jean-Pierre does not pose these questions to the man from Kigali. He is wise enough to know that one does not question those who have power – not openly at least. And why should he pose such disruptive questions anyway? Who

would it benefit? Not himself certainly. It is better to let things move – smoothly. Jean-Pierre knows how to manoeuvre and keep out of trouble – although it has been difficult to navigate since the violence began, exile in Zaire and the shifts in power.

He does not blame the man from the government who is simply trying to reinforce his newly won military power by winning the minds of the people. In fact Jean-Pierre respects him, and he claps at the end of the presentation – just like everyone else in the room – neither less nor more. In that way he can show respect and in that way he may be able to move forward in life. Jean-Pierre has been in the ingando camp for six weeks and in another six weeks he will be able to leave the camp as a new person – if everything goes to plan. He will be able to start a new life as a new citizen in the new Rwanda. He can hardly wait.

This paper explores the process whereby the Rwandan state attempts to transform returning refugees like Jean-Pierre – who left Rwanda after the genocide and who stayed in camps in Tanzania and Zaire, run by the same leaders who organised the genocide – into new citizens of the new Rwanda; a Rwanda without ethnicity or hatred. I argue that the ingando camps act as points of transition where returning refugees are transformed from ‘bad life’ to good citizens. There are resemblances here with the liminal sites in rites de passage. I will elaborate on the similarities and the differences just as I will explore the meaning of ‘bad life’: is this naked life in Agamben’s sense? Are they *l’homme jetable*, as Balibar describes it? Or is there something more to the kind of being of these potential genocidaires? Do they carry the stain of the genocidal mentalities of the old regime? And can they therefore ever be truly cleansed? This paper tries to explore the ways in which the Rwandan state handles these returnees, in particular through programmes of reintegration such as the ingando.

Another set of questions revolve around the relationship between the approach of the post-genocide Rwandan state and the common perception of refugee repatriation among international donor and relief agencies, concerned with refugee protection and with post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. It has often been pointed out in the literature that refugees are perceived as matter out of place (Douglas) in the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki). Nevzat Soguk refers to refugees as a Derridaean supplement, both destabilising and reinforcing the nation-state-citizen trinity (Soguk 1999). In this hegemonic discourse, therefore, repatriation is equivalent to ‘normalisation’, where the anomalous refugees return to their original place in the order of things. Such a simplified understanding of repatriation has long been criticised by refugee scholars¹ because it assumes that repatriation means an unproblematic return to something prior to flight. It ignores the fact that both refugee and ‘home’ have changed in the meantime, and that moving to what once was home is in fact

¹ See Black and Khoser, Morsink, Markowitz and Stefansson (2004), Jansen and Löfving (2009). For Rwanda, see D. Newbury.

² There is a twist to this, since the New Rwanda is supposedly also a return to an

moving to somewhere completely new. 'In this case, paradoxically, 'repatriation' might be considered the *beginning* of a refugee cycle.' (Black & Koser 1999; 9). In the case of Rwanda, the state is explicit about not wishing for a return to 'home' as it was before the genocide and exile but a move to a 'new Rwanda'.² This implies that the returnees should be created anew; hence the camps for people like Jean-Pierre.

I have argued elsewhere that refugee camps become the containers within which to put and maintain this anomalous humanity – these fragments of bare life (Turner 2010). However, as I have also argued, camps never are simply empty containers that produce time pockets to sustain a population. The international agencies in charge of the camps do their best to create empowered citizen-subjects. Although UNHCR and other agencies are primarily charged with 'care and maintenance' as it is called, they also perceive of a need to prepare the refugees for the day they will return to 'normality', and through various community development programmes they try to create a responsible and reasonable 'community' out of what they perceive as a traumatised, apathetic mass of refugees. In other words, the critique among scholars of the assumption amongst practitioners that 'homecoming' is unproblematic, is somewhat misleading, as these agencies are in fact to a large degree preparing refugees for return.³

Meanwhile the refugees themselves are not merely passive victims of history – put temporarily outside history while in the camp. Rather, they are active creators of history. Scholars have argued that refugee camps are like cities (Agier, Jansen) and that refugee agency actively negotiates the camp, creating new identities. I would take the argument further, namely that the very abnormality of the camp – a non-place outside the polis of men – actually creates a room for hyper-politicised subjectivities, and history is created even more in the camp than elsewhere. This is the paradoxical nature of the camp as depoliticised and hyper-politicised: its very non-political nature, its attempts to become a non-place outside of history, creates a vacuum that gives room for 'pure politics' to a much higher degree than 'normal cities'.

In the case of Rwanda there were a number of discourses on refugee repatriation that came into play. First there was the international community that was concerned with the 'rights' of the refugees (land rights, right to fair trial, etc.). These rights were decontextualized in the sense that they were not concerned with the radical shifts in Rwandan identity politics of Rwanda from pre to post 1994. In human rights discourse, rights hinge on a universal humanity beyond political context, and are therefore unable to accommodate political contexts. So

² There is a twist to this, since the New Rwanda is supposedly also a return to an original, authentic and untouched Rwanda from before colonialism introduced the kind of 'divisionist' thinking that led to the genocide. In other words, the ingando camps are about removing old ideas and returning to something more pure.

³ Similarly the policy debates on post-conflict reconstruction acknowledges the need to start afresh.

when UNHCR prepares refugees to become democratic citizens in a new post-conflict state, it is creating an apolitical citizenry that merely can claim universal 'rights'.

The RPF dominated state on the other hand, was concerned with creating a radically new Rwandan nation and therefore also with erasing any traces of the old Rwanda. In line with the international community, the Rwandan state wanted to imprint a new beginning on the returning refugees.⁴ However, as opposed to the international community, it does not perceive the refugees as bare humanity – as blank slate that is ready to be written on and who's rights to protect. The returning refugees in the eye of the new Rwandan state are Hutu who fled the country after the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994 and who have been subject to intimidation and indoctrination by the ringleaders of the genocide both before and after 1994 when they put up base in camps in Zaire and Tanzania. This is not far from the reality that many returning Hutu like Jean-Pierre had experienced in the camp, although he may not recognize the image of intimidation and force and rather would perceive of himself as an active agent following certain strategies in order to achieve certain goals in life – and to follow his convictions.

Capturing the state and the people

The genocide created population movements on an unprecedented scale. In the course of just two days (28-29 April 1994) an astonishing 250 000 Hutu crossed the border at Rusumo falls into Tanzania, and in just five days, starting 14th July, 850 000 Hutu crossed the border into Goma, Zaire (Eriksson, 1996). By late 1994 an estimated 550-600 000 Rwandan Hutu lived in camps in Tanzania (Eriksson, 1996, Whitaker, 2002)(UNHCR 2000), while 1.2 million were in Zaire, 27 000 in Burundi and 10 000 in Uganda. Finally an estimated 1.5 million people were internally displaced (UNHCR 2000, 246). This is out of a total population of 7 million.

In the course of six months in 1994 600 000 'old caseload' refugees, the new term for Tutsi who had fled in the 1960s, returned from Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire, and in the following years the figure reached 1 million (van Leeuwen, 630).⁵ An estimated 25-40% of the present population in Rwanda is post-genocide returnees, from the 'old caseload' and from the 'new caseload'

⁴ By calling them returning refugees I am positioning them according to a universalising category. I might as well have called them Hutu, thus alluding to another universalising categorisation, which nonetheless is more in line with context.

⁵ It was from the ranks of the returnees from Uganda that the new elite would emerge, due to their high levels of education, their positions in the RPF and the trade and personal networks that they had with the remaining Tutsi diaspora in Europe, North America and East Africa.

which returned after much pressure from the Rwandan government in late 1996 and onwards.

The camps in Zaire and Tanzania (each of them as big as a fair sized city) were organized along the lines of the old state, physically divided into prefecture, communes, etc. and controlled by the same bourgmestres, préfets and other civil servants who planned the genocide (Halvorsen 1999, Joint Evaluation 1996).⁶

While the new RPF dominated government attempted to create national unity and reconciliation by abandoning ideas of ethnicity and race, the Hutu refugees across the borders were preparing for the day that they could return by force and reclaim the Rwandan state. In particular in Mobutu's Zaire arms were smuggled into the camps in large quantities, and the camps became training grounds for militias and ex-Soldiers. The camps became in other words a security issue for the new Rwandan state as Hutu militia made raids into the Northwestern parts of the country, killing civilian Tutsi.

The assumption – held by the Rwandan state and by the international community alike – was that the majority of refugees were innocent civilians who simply wanted to return to their fields but who were being kept hostage by an elite of genocidaires who needed them as a human shield and as cannon fodder. For a long while the relief agencies and the Rwandan authorities therefore ran information campaigns in order to convince the refugees that the country was indeed safe to return to. Disappointed with the results in terms of refugee repatriation and impatient with in particular Mobutu's lack of will to prevent the armed elements in the camp, the Rwandan government decided to force the refugees home. This led the Rwandan government in late 1996 to attack the camps in Zaire, with intention to force the refugees to repatriate.⁷ The rationale behind the attacks was in essence the same as the information campaigns run by the UNHCR, namely that the civilian refugees were being held hostage by a handful of genocidaires. Therefore by attacking the camp leadership, the population would be liberated from its grip and gladly return to Rwanda. Space does not permit a detailed account of the events that took place in Zaire in December 1996 and 1997, as the conflict escalated and became interwoven with local and national conflicts in Zaire – including the Banyamulenge who are descendents of Rwandan migrants living in Kivu and who have been subject to discrimination and withdrawal of citizenship rights on several occasions – leading to the downfall of Mobutu and the creation of the Democratic Republic of

⁶ This obviously caused some moral concerns for the international community involved in aiding the refugees. MSF decided to leave the camps while most relief agencies decided to turn a blind eye to the fact and keep feeding the refugees. As we shall see later, they made a clear distinction between the 'innocent, deserving civilian' refugees and the 'manipulators' who were keeping the former hostage.

⁷ At first the Kigali regime denied any involvement in the uprising and in the attacks on the refugee camps. Since then, however, the government has admitted direct engagement. For accounts, see Prunier 2009, Pottier, Emizet 2000, Mills.

Congo. By early 1997 virtually all Rwandan refugees staying in camps in Tanzania had returned⁸ while the majority from Congo had done the same.

In Dorsey's words, the repatriation of the Hutu from the camps in Tanzania and Zaire was the final stage of Rwandan 'normalization' (Dorsey 2000; 321), and it followed a well-known pattern of public awareness campaigns followed by military force. In order to understand this pattern – and understand the kind of state that is being established in Rwanda – it is helpful to briefly explore the kind of regime that took power after 1994 – and in particular; how it took power. RPF⁹ was created in Uganda by Tutsi refugees who had fought alongside Museveni in his liberation war and who initially had been rewarded with high posts in Museveni's government and military. However, they were quickly sidetracked in Uganda and decided instead to invade Rwanda in order to fight for their right to return (Mamdani, Ottunu, Reed). The movement that was inspired by Maoism, was characterized by a harsh discipline, hard work and an ethics of being told not to trust anyone – even in the movement. There was a strong sense of purpose and mission and the fact that the RPF managed to stop the genocide in July 1994, only added to this sense of mission. In the words of an anonymous RPF officer, the RPF has 'an historic role to accomplish in this country.' 'It must not abandon it on the way,' it has 'taken on responsibility, it must assume it.' (Quoted from Dorsey 2000; 312-313). In other words, the state that was taking shape after the genocide had the moral upper hand because it had stopped the genocide, while the international community did nothing, it had achieved this through a strong ethics of sacrifice and discipline and a strategic military leadership. Furthermore, winning the war gave the leadership a strong sense of having been given a responsibility that it had the duty to take upon itself.

The strategy for this movement was twofold and has remained so since. On the one hand, it believes that the ordinary population – whether Hutu or Tutsi – has lacked education and has therefore been susceptible to manipulation and oppression by colonialism and greedy politicians. It is therefore concerned to liberate the population through education and enlightenment. On the other hand, it is ready to strike swiftly and severely down on anything and anyone who could obstruct its mission. This can be seen in the massive campaigns to remove 'genocidal mentalities.'

⁸ When Rwanda attacked the camps in Zaire, the Tanzanian government gave the refugees one month's notice to leave the country, tacitly supported by the international community who could no longer see the reason to feed a population that was a security danger for the fledgling new Rwandan state (Cf WHITAKER, B. (2002) *Changing Priorities in Refugee Protection: the Rwandan repatriation from Tanzania. New Issues in Refugee Research.*

⁹ For the sake of the argument it is not necessary to distinguish between the RPF and the RPA. Likewise I will use RPF, the Rwandan state and the Rwandan government interchangeably. I am aware that they are not synonymous, but de facto RPF controls the government and the state and it is a highly militarised institution.

Central to the project of creating a new Rwanda is the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, which was established in 1999, with the vision to strive for 'a peaceful, united and prosperous nation' (www.nurc.gov.rw). It mainly tries to achieve its goals through various forms of civic education as well as monitoring what is perceived as 'genocidal mentalities'. In its mission statement it emphasises amongst other things: 'Educating and mobilizing the population on matters relating to national unity and reconciliation; Denouncing and fighting against acts, writings and utterances which are intended to promote any kind of discrimination, intolerance or xenophobia.' (www.nurc.gov.rw). This illustrates the twofold approach of RPF; on the one hand disseminating information about unity and reconciliation, while monitoring and 'combating' ideologies and actions that go against unity on the other hand. In the concluding chapter of a report by the NURC on 'The Causes of Violence after the 1994 Genocide' it comments on what it calls 'wickedness' as a cause of violence, whether the violence is against Genocide survivors or domestic or sexual violence. This kind of wickedness is caused by ignorance, the report claims, and continues :

'It has become a mentality, a sub culture peculiar to some of Rwandans. It cannot be uprooted at once, as by a stroke of magic wand. It requires for the long-term efforts that must be led to several fights by very wide-ranging actors.' (NURC 2008; 119-120)

The objective for NURC then is to 'uproot' this mentality bit by bit. The means to do so are primarily to re-educate the masses and to combat the divisive ideologies of the old regimes. Concretely, NURC has several so-called 'reconciliation tools' to achieve these goals; prominent among them are Itorero and Ingando.¹⁰ On the other hand, however, the government established in 2008 (?) the CNLG (Commission Nationale pour la Lutte contre la Génocide) which has the objective of monitoring and combatting genocide mentalities wherever they may be hidden in society (interview Director of CNLG, January 2009). CNLG represents in other words the 'other side' of RPF's strategy. So, while the ingando camps, like the one that Jean-Pierre was in, are central governmental tools in educating the population and hence creating new citizens of the new Rwanda without the stains of the old genocidal regime, the governance of the RPF also relies on vigilance and the elimination of enemies in much more direct ways. Theoretically, this is interesting because it reveals how biopower and sovereignty are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary bio-power relies on a

¹⁰ While the Rwandan state paints a self-portrait as the avant-garde of a new generation of African leadership, calling itself the New Rwanda and comparing itself to Singapore, there are striking similarities with the ideologies of newly independent African states back in the 1960s and 70s. For instance the *imidugudu* programme is very similar to similar villagisation programmes in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania, despite the government's claims to the opposite (van Leeuwen, 2001). For analysis of the national unity discourse in Ghana and Tanzania, see Dorman, Hammatt and Nugent (p 7-8).

security discourse that sets the limits of where bio-power is applicable and where sovereign power begins.¹¹

By July 1994, the RPF won the territory through military force – at first slowly from 1990 to 1994 and then rapidly in 1994. However, even then it mostly had control over the urban areas and the main roads. The hills where the most of the population lived, still needed conquering. The next step was not only to conquer the territory but also win the minds – and preferably the hearts – of the population that the RPF had ‘liberated’.¹² This consisted in teaching the peasants about the true nature of Rwandan history and society. However, as long as the refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire continued to exist, the mission of liberating the Rwandan people from their genocidal ideologies and colonial mentalities could not be completed. Using force to empty the camps and bring the Hutu refugees back ‘home’ was a necessary step in this mission. The next step after liberating these Hutu from their leaders in the camps, was to liberate them from their mentalities. This is where ingandos enter the picture.

Ingando

“Ingando” is taken from the Rwandese verb “Kugandika” that refers to halting normal activities to reflect on, and find solutions to national challenges. In ancient Rwanda, Ingandos were first developed by the military. Whenever Rwanda faced disasters (wars, natural calamities etc), the Mwami (King) mobilized and prepared the population through Ingandos. (NURC’s homepage)

Ingandos are called a number of different things: solidarity camps, education camps, civic education camps, reorientation camps, etc. The government claims that it is inspired by a traditional institution, although the precise meaning of the term ingando is debated as is the link between the modern ingandos and their presumed traditional inspiration (see Pureková 2008; 20 and Mgbako 2005; 208).

The first official ingandos were established in 1996 under the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports. They were for old caseload returnees from Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, Uganda and Europe and meant to give these returnees who were enthusiastic about rebuilding their homeland but who mostly had never been to Rwanda before, a sense of nationalism. In particular there were potential divisions between the Anglophone Tutsi returning from Uganda who made up the top echelons of the new regime and the Francophone Tutsi returning from Burundi. While the former perceived of themselves as Rwandans and had been

¹¹ This is no new argument. Agamben argues in his re-reading of Foucault for merging of bio-power and sovereign power. It may also be argued that Foucault himself in later works saw the two forms of power as historically intertwined (as opposed to the impression he gives in *The History of Sexuality and Discipline and Punish*).

¹² Apparently the RPF had a hard time 1990 – 94 because the population that they supposedly had liberated, usually fled the territories that they had conquered (Mamdani, Prunier).

interpellated as such while in exile in Uganda, the latter had lived in a country that was deeply split along ethnic lines and had been treated distinctly as Tutsi while in Burundi. The ingandos were meant to install a common identity in line with RPF ideology.

It is believed that ingandos were inspired by RPF cadre schools that were established in 1990-93 as means of grassroots mobilization of the population in exile in Uganda and Tanzania and in the conquered territories of Northeastern Rwanda, and may be inspired by similar camps in Uganda (Mgbako p208).

Pasteur Bizimungu, then president of the republic officially launched programme for 'national political awareness' of the returning Hutu refugees in May 1997. He talked about a youth camp: 'This camp, like many others which will take place countrywide are aimed at integrating the youth that have just returned from exile in the current social and political life.' (Radio Rwanda, May 24 1997, quoted in Purdeková 2008; 21). And at a Conference in July 2003 on: 'Elections and Accountability in Africa' in Sussex, Mr. Protais MUSONI, Minister of State in Ministry of Local Government, Information and Social Affairs, defined ingando thus: "Ingando", solidarity camps, were initially established to help reintegrate refugees returning to Rwanda from DRC, but they have since been expanded to help instruct government officials, students waiting to enter university, and others, in the ideas of unity and reconciliation. The experience in the solidarity camps, through a high level of interaction, seeks to demystify and break down barriers between people, and in doing so freeing expression – these could be barriers of ethnicity, or region, hierarchy, wealth or power.'

Later ingando camps have been used for a number of different groups and it is the aim of NURC that all Rwandans at one point in life should attend an ingando. At present, the types of ingandos can be split into two overall groups. 'The government makes an important distinction between ingando solidarity camps and ingando re-education camps. Solidarity camps are for politicians, civil society and church leaders, gacaca judges and incoming university students whereas re-education camps are for ex-combatants, ex-soldiers, confessed génocidaires, released prisoners, prostitutes, and street children.' (Thompson 2011; 333-334).

On the one hand are those who have a special responsibility to stand out as role models in society due to their privileged positions in society. This means that university students, diaspora youth, school teachers and various civil servants are expected to attend a certain kind of ingando, and that they are expected to spread the word afterwards. As this newsclipping from the government friendly New Times shows: 'The Executive Secretary of National Unity and Reconciliation Commission Dr Jean Baptist Habyarimana, has challenged students completing Ingando to transfer the knowledge acquired during their course to other youths in the country. (...) 'We have come from a situation marked by a very difficult past. Teachers and students need to first understand the source of this sad past in order to build a meaningful vision for the future generations,' he said.' (New Times 3 March 2010).

The other group consists of those subjects who are not yet to be perceived of as full citizens and who therefore potentially threaten the stability of the new nation. These are genocide suspects released from prisons (PRI 2008), ex-combatants and others returning from Zaire and Tanzania, street kids and prostitutes. They are in Hindess' words the kind of life that is perceived not yet fit for liberal freedom and self-governance. Certain groups, lack the required capacities for autonomous conduct. These capacities, Hindess argues, can be developed either *'through compulsion, through the imposition of more or less extended periods of discipline [or] by establishing a benign and supportive social environment'* (Hindess 2001: 101).

The camps for street kids caught the eye of international media in April 2010, when New York Times published an article called 'Rwanda Pursues Dissenters and the Homeless' and where the author remarked that 'Nearly 900 beggars, homeless people and suspected petty thieves, including dozens of children, have recently been rounded up from the nation's neatly swept streets and sent — without trial or a court appearance — to this little-known outpost. They will spend up to three years here being "rehabilitated," learning skills like bricklaying, hairdressing and motorcycle maintenance. (...) But on the mainland, people describe it as an Alcatraz.' (New York Times 30 April 2010). In May 2011 the first group 'graduated' from Iwawa island under much pomp and circumstance, including the participation of the Prime minister and diplomats. The Rwandan government took this occasion to counter the international critique. The New Times reports from the event: '(Prime Minister) Makuza observed that the centre achieved its initial objective which was to transform street children into responsible and skilled citizens. "A lot was said when this centre opened; critics had a field day spreading all sorts of false rumours, but fortunately we did what is right for our people." "Our actions speak for themselves."' (New Times 19 May 2011). And in an editorial called 'Iwawa graduation puts falsehood peddlers to shame' the New Times explains: 'The future, indeed, looks bright for these youths who, only yesterday, as street children, were a threat to security particularly in the urban areas where they roamed aimlessly.' (New Times 20 May 2011). By claiming that the graduation of the former street kids is proof of the success of Iwawa, the state reveals a strongly patronizing and high modernist state (Scott 1998), bent on social engineering where the ends justify the means.

From 1999 NURC has been in charge of ingandos. The ingandos for ex-combatants from Zaire last 2 ½ months. They include an aid package at the end of the training and are financed 47% by the World Bank. The activities include sports, singing, daily chores and lectures. The curricula changes between types of ingando but consists mostly in unity and reconciliation, history, democracy, development and HIV / AIDS awareness.

There are only few studies on ingandos, and it is particularly difficult to get an impression of the effects of ingandos and the opinion of participants. Mgbako's study of ingandos for ex-combatants revealed that participants were often optimistic about their own future, seeing the ingandos as a means to reach a better future by starting a new life.

'We want to truly live in society because many of us have never lived in society'

We are told we had bad mentalities'

'They're trying to upgrade us to the level of the local people. If you come back from the bush and go straight to the people, you don't know their mentality. Ingando teaches us this.' (Mgbako 2005)

From these small fragments of interviews it appears that the participants themselves perceive of ingando as a transition – as a means of becoming something else and something new. They see a need to become like other people – to have the same mentality – in order understand each other and cohabit. Furthermore, there is a sense, not only of becoming different but also of becoming 'someone' as such; they move from the bush to civilization.

These statements should of course not be taken at face value, and it should be kept in mind that these participants are mainly in the ingando camps because they are compelled to do so and because they see it as part of a deal where the state promises them a future in harmony and at a more tangible level a starting package, if they follow the programmes for 2 ½ months. There is no doubt that these statements operate at one level of truth and that the participants operate with several layers of truth, as Ingelaere has demonstrated in relation to the gacaca courts. However, they certainly express a discourse of ingandos as transition centres that are meant to change the mentalities and personalities of those who have been outside the new Rwandan nation one way or another, and they are aware that this is the intended purpose of the camps.

Whereas the first ingandos for returning old caseload Tutsi were about creating a shared identity by being together 24 hours a day, sharing the same food (Mgbako 2005; 8), the later camps for returning Hutu were about removing certain mentalities. Purdeková argues that the 'Ingando camps are microcosms of the attempted linkage between repatriation and reconciliation through de-ethnicization' (2008; 18). She argues that full repatriation cannot happen without some kind of reconciliation and that the government of Rwanda has realized this. The government assumes, however, that in order to reconcile and create social cohesion, it is necessary to de-ethnicize the population.

I would argue that this is the crux of the matter: in order to re-patriate, reconcile and re-integrate the former combatants from Zaire, the present state is trying to take the Hutu out of the Hutu. For de-ethnicization is implicitly about removing the ethnicity of the Hutu. The ethnicity of the Tutsi is not a problem – perhaps because it is a victim category. It is therefore official policy now to talk of the genocide against the Tutsi, rather than simply the genocide. This is, in fact the only place where it is officially condoned to mention ethnicity. The state is not simply educating subjects to become citizens. Neither is it converting bare life into political life. It is removing bad life in order to create good life.

Imidugudu (unfinished)

In this section we explore the villagisation projects (imidugudu) that have been established in order to accommodate the many returning refugees. This is an example of social engineering where the state takes modernist and developmentalist decisions on behalf of the population. International donors have been skeptical of the programme but have supported it half-heartedly because it has been packaged as an emergency relief measure to ensure housing for 270 000 families with no housing.

According to the 1993 Arusha accords, which the new government chose more or less to follow, returning 'old caseload' refugees could not reclaim property and land. In 1994 when hundreds of thousands of Tutsi returned from Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire, they often simply occupied the land and buildings that the fleeing Hutu had left shortly before. Upon the return of these Hutu in 1996-97, these old caseload returnees were expected to vacate the properties. Despite the massive scale of potential problems and conflicts, this process has gone surprisingly well. As a means to address these issues, the government decided on a grand resettlement plan, imidugudu. There were other reasons for the government to choose imidugudu, besides resettlement of repatriating refugees: One was a perception that it would lead to more efficient land use to have people settled in villages rather than spread out in the countryside. Another consideration was that such villages would contribute to security and to reconciliation. The government's goal was that the entire population should live in such settlements. It was in other words an example of grand social engineering.

As van Leeuwen observes in relation to umudugudu, the state's programme of villagisation: 'The programme was thus in line with the reconciliation message, advocated by the new government, that the country had enough resources to sustain all Rwandan people, and that every Rwandan living abroad was welcome to repatriate.' (van Leeuwen, 2001). Such policies stand in stark contrast to the old regime's signals to Rwandan exiles that the country could not take more population pressure.

The New Rwanda is defined very strongly by being what the old Rwanda was not. Time and time again government representatives conjure up the image of an old Rwanda that led to the genocide and that therefore must be avoided by all means. One defining characteristic is the insistence on a non-racial, non-ethnic definition of belonging to the nation. This inclusive approach to national belonging and citizenship also includes returning exiles as well as the diaspora – as long as they have the correct mentality, which can be 'fixed' in the ingando camps as described above.

Conclusion

The international relief agencies in charge of refugee repatriation realise that return is not unproblematic; refugees need assistance in order to be reintegrated into society. Refugees, according to these agencies, need training in the art of participation before being let back into the national order of things. Refugees – in particular those in camps – are perceived as bare humanity; as blank slate that need programming before they can become active citizens again. At first sight, the ingando camps are doing exactly this: writing on the blank slate. However, at closer scrutiny, we discover that ingandos are more about cleaning the slate. The Rwandan authorities believe that the returning Hutu are slates that have been written on by colonialists and Hutu extremists in Rwanda and in the camps. The task for the ingandos is therefore to clean the slate and find a true identity underneath.

Ingandos are transition sites, important to transforming returnees and other misfits into enlightened citizens of the New Rwanda. The question is, what kind of life were they before? The participants talk about wanting to be part of society, and about coming from the bush. This indicates that refugees are perceived as bare life. On the other hand, there is an explicit aim in the ingando programmes to extract something from within these participants before putting something new in instead. I experienced the same discourse when discussing education programmes with a teacher at the Gisozi memorial in Kigali. 'We need to remove their bad thought, before we give them new ones', he explained.

They are trying to take the Hutu out of the Hutu. In order to create a non-ethnic being. But isn't this an impossible task? Once you admit to the existence of the ethnic label you also buy into its magic. You cannot remove something that does not exist.

How does this relate to understandings of sovereign power, citizenship and exile? I do not have the answer to this but it appears inadequate to talk of bare life, homo sacer, l'homme jetable, wasted life, etc. These are all defined as lack. What we are encountering here is a kind of lack that also has a negative imprint on it. Genocide has stained these subjects in a manner that links them to evil.

It is significant to recall that ingando and imidugudu – just like gacaca, itorero, umugando – are Kinyarwanda terms and refer back to allegedly authentic, cultural institutions. So while there is much talk about a new Rwanda and a new beginning, there are also references to pre-colonial institutions.

Taking Hutu out of Hutu – to find original Rwandan. Unstained.