

Panel 7: “Aid as a Means of power for Developing States?”

**Internationalisation of Policymaking and State Power in Mozambique: the case of the Conservation Sector.**

International aid is present in almost all sectors in Mozambique, a “donor darling”. Since the end of the 1970s, and more particularly since the end of the civil war in 1992, international actors have shaped the policymaking process in the conservation field; they take part in the elaboration of national regulations and in the management of conservation areas (CA) such as national parks. As other African states, the country is *a priori* dependent on external funding, technology and expertise (Igoe & Brockington, 2007: 438). Bi and multilateral donors, international conservation organisations and private foundations infuse Mozambican policies with their financial support and their narratives – most of them linking conservation and sustainable development<sup>1</sup>. In a neoliberal context, new forms of conservation management are being institutionalised throughout the country, such as public-private partnerships for national parks management and transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs)<sup>2</sup>.

In Mozambique the national parks are not private entities (although dynamics of privatization in the policymaking process can be observed, as I will argue), but belong to the public sphere. They are formally managed by the state apparatus, through the Ministry of tourism. Nevertheless, there exists indeed a neoliberal climate, illustrated for instance by the new tools that are being discussed and (supposedly) soon implemented in the conservation sector, such as a trust fund and a semi-autonomous national agency for conservation areas management. The development of private concessions within national parks, seen as the providers of the parks’ main income, is also an important dynamic in the Mozambican scene. This is about the institutionalisation of a less centralized state that would above all have regulatory functions, that is to say an assessment power. This kind of narrative is supported by most of the donors present in the conservation field in Mozambique (the World Bank, USAID, AFD...).

The modalities of the implementation of such new tools on the national scene are the objects of debate and negotiation processes between the state, donors and international conservation organisations (WWF for instance). These discussions form a forum, that is to say places and moments where policies are intellectually constructed, where recipes of public policies are elaborated and susceptible to fuel public decisions, and where the relevant

---

<sup>1</sup> As a matter of precision, I equate conservation and development (conservation/development) as far as the aid relationship is concerned. Following Büscher who quotes Bending: “ ‘the radical critique of development (...) can be extended to this sphere of environmental governance’, especially since with the advent of sustainable development the two are often intertwined in theory and practice” (Büsher, 2010: 31).

<sup>2</sup> “TFCAs are increasingly seen as ‘products’ that can provide business opportunities to multinational corporations and local communities alike. (...) Although TFCAs cannot be labelled an exclusively neoliberal invention, their major proponents have proven remarkably adept at turning them into neoliberal constructs that serve the ongoing transformation of the regional conservation/development nexus into a competitive commodity market” (Büscher, 2010: 36).

information for the running of public policies is constituted (Hassenteufel, 2008: 150). This forum is composed of donors and state representatives – above all coming from the tourism Ministry. As I will show, the conservation forum, which is particularly mobile and plastic, is part of the new aid architecture: in a sector-wide approach, donors and state representatives meet regularly within working groups aimed at supervising the policymaking process and giving some key inputs. The regular meetings of key donors and state actors within this informal forum underlie what I call a conservation arena. This is not about the conciliation of different worldviews to conceptually produce some common ‘public policies recipes’. Indeed, the conservation arena represents the places and the moments where institutionalised compromises are negotiated between donors and state representatives<sup>3</sup>. In other words, this is about the making of decisions. I will show that donors are key actors in this process in that they generally actively participate to the conservation forum, and to the conservation arena. The forum and the arena produce the conservation norms and rules that underlie the conservation field on the national scale. Indeed, the CA management (also made of international inputs) is made in reference to these norms – and at the same time, there regularly appear some divergences with the latter. Indeed, some norms are not totally respected (which is an illustration of conflicts and power relations between the centre and the CA administrations); and a second phenomenon is about the multiplication of ad hoc decisions from the centre as to the regulation of specific CA. I will show that this is the illustration of the dialectic that exists in the conservation field between the internationalisation of policymaking and the preservation of state power.

As a matter of fact, donors’ involvement, both for CA management and for the elaboration of national regulations (through the forum and the arena), calls into question the state’s role in the policymaking process. What kind of leeway is there for the Mozambican state? Which interest does it have to negotiate and to implement new tools of state-making, when the international actors apparently dictate the rules of the game?

A symbol of state sovereignty and a tool for natural resources and population control (Dunn, 2009), national parks are part of the state-making process. The analysis of the making of national regulations and of CA management is thus a way of questioning formal co-production in the policymaking process, between the state and its international/private partners. According to my hypothesis, the analysis of the aid relationship – as it can be observed within the conservation forum and arena in Maputo, the capital-city, and in the framework of the management of two national parks – shows that the conservation field in Mozambique is both a matter of international inputs and of preservation (if not expansion) of state power.

I argue indeed that the conservation sector is an illustration of the state’s extraversion (Bayart, 1989). Though there exists an important involvement of international aid, one can speak of a co-production in the policymaking process. Indeed, the state is still part of the game. As far as CA are concerned, its absence from their financial structures and its *a priori* weak ascendancy in their everyday management do not impede it to use them as a means to further its local expansion. More precisely, the CA are sustained by international funding and propose technical solutions to conservation and poverty reduction – in line with the norms supported in the conservation forum in Maputo. These depoliticized aims are *in fine* a means for Frelimo to extend its state power. At the head of the country ever since the independence, the Frelimo party has indeed become synonymous with state.

---

<sup>3</sup> I here borrow the definition of “public policy arena” proposed by Hassenteufel: “the places of negotiation of institutionalised compromises” (Hassenteufel, 2008: 135 – my translation).

CA in Mozambique are therefore in-between entities, half conservation/development enterprise, half a tool serving the state-party Frelimo, a mix between international aid and the state. The internationalization of policymaking can therefore be seen as a kind of compromise between the state (central and local) and the international donors. Conservation may not be a priority for the Mozambican state, which anyway cannot afford it. It can thus delegate this mission to international actors, but be very present when conservation/development activities are tied to population and territory control. CA management are therefore closely tied to political and partisan issues. Similar signs of state control can be observed within the forum, and significantly within the conservation arena. Indeed, the making of regulatory and legislative decisions remains, at the end of the day, in the hands of the state. Its acceptance of international inputs does not impede it to (try to) legislate according to its own political interests<sup>4</sup>.

\*\*\*

This paper is about the conceptual framework of my research, which is in progress. The aim here is to think the conservation sector in Mozambique, through the lens of the three kinds of field research I made over the last three years. I studied indeed three scenes, which are particular institutional orders where one can analyse the relationship between the Mozambican state and its international donors.

❖ First, the scale of Maputo. As I already mentioned, there exist a conservation forum and a conservation arena in the capital-city – both of them being quite linked.

#### *A conservation forum.*

I more specifically studied the elaboration of a new text, called “Política de conservação” (Conservation Policy). This is a non-coercive text, but it is part of the classic Mozambican procedure for legislative matters. Indeed, a Policy is usually issued, fruit of several months (or years) of debate and consultation of the main stakeholders (state actors, donors, NGOs, private sector...). Such a text gives some main orientations and underlies the consensual narratives and key tools that are supposed to be implemented when a law will be passed, or a decree issued in the sector. The elaboration of the Conservation Policy lasted approximately two years, between 2007 and 2009. It had been expected for a long time, as showed by some donors reports (FAO, the World Bank). As a matter of fact no text, no national regulation specifically dedicated to the conservation sector existed. The latter was a mix of legislation about forest and wildlife, land, tourism, fisheries and environment. Some of these laws and policies were sometimes contradictory (Lunstrum, 2009), notably as far as the CA status was concerned<sup>5</sup>. The making of the Conservation Policy figured among the agenda of the TFCA department of the Ministry of tourism, whose particularity is to be funded by the World Bank (since 1997 and until 2013). The elaboration process consisted in meetings between the main Mozambican ministries directly interested by conservation issues (tourism, environmental coordination, agriculture, fisheries), donors and conservation organisations (national and international). Three national seminars were organized, in order to collect the inputs of the provincial actors. A firm of consultants was hired to organize part of the process, and to write up the Policy. In parallel, a Conservation Group regularly met and gave some inputs to the consultant firm. This Group was composed of the key donors in the conservation field (AFD, the World Bank), international conservation organisations (WWF, IGF). Though informal,

---

<sup>4</sup> By the use of tools such as delays and a sort of game on state fragmentation, which makes it generally unclear of “who” is in charge to make decisions and give answers, as I will show.

<sup>5</sup> For instance, regarding the right for local populations to have land rights within CA.

this Group was considered a subgroup of the Environment Working Group, which is part of the aid architecture mentioned above. The Conservation Group was led by the Ministry of tourism – although they were formally invited to participate, the other ministries almost never participated to the meetings.

The Conservation Policy represents the conciliation of narratives tied to different worldviews, namely the ones of the participants to all the meetings (formal and informal) and to the drafting process. It is the compilation of past legislation; of recommendations of previous international workshops organized in the past years relatively to conservation issues<sup>6</sup>; of recommendations of donors' reports<sup>7</sup> (which advocate tools such as a trust fund and a semi-autonomous agency for CA management, which are legitimate on the international scene); and of the professional background/culture of the actors (for example, some key Mozambican actors, most of them linked to the TFCA department, are former vets from the agriculture Ministry). The elaboration process which under-plied the text tells us about the making of conceptual compromises regarding "public policies recipes". It is about the modalities of the conciliation of diverse worldviews, from an intellectual point of view, but also from a material point of view. Indeed, these conciliations are about certain places and moments, rivalries and friendships, formal and informal.

From a methodological point of view, the study of the elaboration process of the text is thus a way of understanding the modalities of the relationship between state and international actors. One of the first observations is the key role played by what I call the 'national-internationalised actors', that is to say the "transfer brokers" (Stone, 2004; Whitfield, 2008) who are the link between the different worldviews. Most of these go-betweens are/were members of the TFCA department. They are part of the Mozambican state, but are paid by the World Bank to whom they also have to report inasmuch as they have to perform what I call a 'double allegiance': to the donor, and to the state. They thus master both languages and worldviews, and make the debates and conciliations easier and more fluid. On the other hand, their privileged position toward the donors' world turn them in a somehow delicate position toward the members of the other ministries, including the tourism Ministry<sup>8</sup>.

### ***A conservation arena.***

Similarly to the conservation forum, the conservation arena is not a formal institution; it is also plastic and mobile. Indeed, it brings together state and donors actors, but not necessarily always the same ones and not necessarily in the framework of the same meetings. Indeed, the conservation arena represents the places and moments where institutionalised compromises are negotiated between donors and state representatives. In other words, this is about the making of decisions. Contrary to the forum, it is about the more concrete negotiation of public policy tools. These tools have been previously discussed and intellectually institutionalized through the forum – in that view, the forum and the arena are intrinsically tied to one another.

I more particularly analysed three case studies: the negotiations regarding the setting-up and the implementation modalities of the conservation trust fund, and of the agency for CA management; and the beginning of the elaboration process of the conservation law.

---

<sup>6</sup>Notably: MITUR, MICOA, "Conferência sobre financiamento sustentável para áreas de conservação em Moçambique", Maputo, 21 e 22 de Novembro de 2007. This workshop was organized by USAID, AFD, KfW and WWF.

<sup>7</sup>Notably: Republica de Moçambique, Ministério do Turismo, Direcção Nacional das Areas de Conservação, *Vantagens e desvantagens da gestão das áreas de conservação em Moçambique por uma entidade para-estatal*, por François Lamarque e Samiro Magane, programa de Parceria FAO-Paises Baixos (FNPP-Florestas), FNPP/GLO/003/NET, Maio de 2007.

<sup>8</sup> As far as their wages are concerned for instance.

▪ Trusts funds are tools that are flourishing around the world. In the Mozambican context, the idea is that donors constitute a capital<sup>9</sup>, whose interests would form an annual budget that would be used for conservation purposes. The aim is to have a steady budget for conservation matters. The other objective, a leitmotiv in donors' discourse, is also to institutionalise autonomy and transparency in the financing of at least part of the conservation sector. Indeed, the trust fund would be managed by an independent board, with no hierarchical tie to any ministry. The setting-up of such an institution is thus quite an issue for the Mozambican state: it would represent an interesting source of income – but it could be a quite autonomous body, free to finance its own priorities. The interviews and the observations I made showed that the donors and international conservation organisations involved in the project (above all WWF, AFD and the World Bank) had clear pretensions regarding what the trust should be<sup>10</sup> (emphasizing the necessity of autonomy of the institution), while the state representatives were rather advocating a less independent body, tied to the national agency for CA management, and with a right of inspection from the state.

The idea of a trust fund emerged through international workshops in Mozambique and donors' reports, notably one in 2008 entitled "Feasibility Study on Creation of a Conservation Trust Fund in Mozambique"<sup>11</sup>. It was then discussed within the Conservation Group, and the WWF took the leadership in elaborating the juridical and financial bases of the project. This whole process<sup>12</sup> was made of negotiation between state actors and donors notably regarding the content of the trust's mandate, the composition of the board and the juridical framework of the institution. These discussions occurred within the Conservation Group (notably as a way to provide information to the actors of the sector), the WWF office, seminars, formal and informal discussions... The analysis of this process sheds light on the rivalries that exist among donors; between donors and state actors; and even between state actors – namely between representatives of different ministries regarding the future leadership of the trust. This is thus about the transfer of a public policy tool, legitimate/fashionable on the international scene and appropriated on the Mozambican scene through the work of international and national actors.

▪ The second case study is the discussion around the setting-up of the national agency for CA management. Similarly to the trust fund, the agency has been debated for some years, notably in donors' reports and in the Conservation Group. This is an international and a regional trend<sup>13</sup>. The Mozambican CA are currently managed through the Ministry of tourism and its National Directorate for Conservation Areas (DNAC). The setting-up of a national agency would mean a (supposedly) quite autonomous institution, with its own budget. The mandate and organisational framework of the agency were discussed within the Conservation Group, and within an interdepartmental committee, mainly composed of representatives from the tourism (including members of the TFCA department) and the agriculture Ministries. The elaboration process was formally led by the state, contrary to the trust fund. However, the TFCA department (funded by the World Bank, as previously mentioned) led the setting-up of the process, which is analytically interesting, for this department is a 'half-half' entity, formally part of the state, but that also has to report to the donor who funds it. Once again, the 'national-internationalised' actors, who are here the staff of the TFCA department, are the key actors of the setting-up of a new public policy tool.

<sup>9</sup> The desired aim would be around 100 billion dollars.

<sup>10</sup> Which does not mean that there were no rivalries nor conflicts between donors to that respect.

<sup>11</sup> Allen D. Putney, Hélio Neves, *Feasibility Study on the Creation of Conservation Trust Fund in Mozambique*, May 2008, A Report to the Biodiversity and Conservation Group of Mozambique.

<sup>12</sup> Which covers several years and which is still not completed yet, for there are only donation promises from donors, which amount is for the moment not enough for the trust to properly function; moreover, there has been some delay notably as far as the juridical framework was concerned.

<sup>13</sup> The South African agency, Sanparks, is often cited as an example in the interviews.

▪ Finally, the study of the elaboration process of the conservation law sheds another light on the policymaking process. As a matter of fact, the law represents the natural next step after the adoption of the Conservation Policy. It is supposed to be clearly inspired by the conclusions and priorities underlined by the Policy. Now the elaboration process of the law shows that the state takes control again – but in a specific way. Indeed, the Conservation Group met with much less regularity since the Policy was adopted in August 2009<sup>14</sup>, and thus did not give much input regarding the law. Similarly to the national agency for CA management, an interdepartmental committee was set up in order to draft the law. It was mainly composed of representatives from the tourism and agriculture Ministries. According to the interviews and the observations made, the leadership was here again the TFCA department's. The latter is composed of a qualified and well-paid staff. Since the donors are not precisely very present in this elaboration process (though the Conservation Group began to meet again at the beginning of the year, and received the first drafts of the law for comment), one can consider that the state is much more in a controlling position – all the more so as the drafts of the law do not appear to completely follow the Conservation Policy (interview with a WWF officer, March 2011). Nevertheless, the process is led by the TFCA department, a 'half-half' entity, infused by the World Bank worldviews. The construction of a legislative tool, a symbol of the state sovereignty, is therefore not totally controlled by the state.

#### ***International inputs and state power.***

From a methodological point of view, thanks to direct observations of meetings (formal and informal) and semi-directive interviews, I construct a contextualized analysis of the collective policymaking process. It situates the actors' interactions through the lens of their respective worldviews, to the resources they have and to the interests they pursue (Hassenteufel, 2008: 105). More precisely, state representatives at the end of the day value the control of the state as to the adoption of key tools that are tied to state authority in the framework of state-making. In that view, the conservation law tends to be disconnected from the international actors inputs – at least compared to the elaboration process of the Conservation Policy. The trust fund is hoped to be closely tied to the national agency for CA management – geographically (as far as its headquarters are concerned) and financially (the trust is hoped to at least partly sustain the activities of the agency) (interviews with representatives of the tourism Ministry, April 2010; March 2011). On the other hand, donors value public policy tools that correspond to their global goal of 'good governance', that tells about "transparency", "accountability" and "autonomy". In their discourse, these neoliberal notions are linked to the conservation and development nexus.

At the same time, the analysis is somehow more complex for many key state actors are paid by donors – namely the World Bank as far as the TFCA department is concerned. Even if the international inputs sometimes tend to be minimized, especially in the conservation arena, they are nevertheless still quite present, through the double allegiance of these 'national-internationalised' actors, which is a common trend of the aid relationship:

« The promotion of 'technical assistance' (donor staff and consultants working within or seconded to the civil service of the recipient countries), and the practice of conditioning aid on the establishment of special 'projects units' attuned to the objectives of specific donor interventions bring donor agencies *inside* recipient bureaucracies. (...) donor-employed or

---

<sup>14</sup> This can be interpreted in diverse ways. Indeed, it coincided with the leaving of the (informal) coordinator of the Group, a member of the TFCA department. Furthermore, the making of the Conservation Policy had been the main discussion theme of the Group for months, while the other ones (trust fund, CA management agency) were comparatively somehow less talked about.

donor-contracted staff have often become instrumental in preparing and implementing programmes *on behalf of* the recipient state itself. This increased contact enables more intimate surveillance of the political and bureaucratic scene within African states and thus more pervasive influencing by donors » (Whitfield & Fraser, 2008, p.13/15).

More:

« ‘Technical’ assistance that accompanies aid packages does the political work of building compliance with external demands into the fabric of national administrative orders; and does so by instituting systems, standards and procedures (...) that deeply entrench donor interests and perspectives » (Mosse, 2005, p.8).

In my hypothesis, state actors and international actors do co-produce the public action, seen as a collective fabric. The conservation forum tells about the translation of international notions within the national scene. It is an intellectual process made of time, friendships and rivalries, formal and informal meetings and seminars. The forum thus represents the commonly – and often temporarily – shared notions and (still abstract) tools, born of the debates between national and international actors. These notions and tools are then more concretely and sharply negotiated between these actors, when it is about their setting-up and implementation – this process forms what I call a conservation arena. The policymaking process is therefore the fruit of the interconnection of the forum and the conservation arena – whose relative fluidity is for a great part due to the action of the transfer brokers<sup>15</sup>. They are the ones who permit the conciliation of the international inputs and the preservation of state power. Indeed, they daily negotiate that the interests of the state and the donors be conciliated.

As I will show next, one can better speak about the ‘expansion of state power’ (and not only its preservation) as far as CA management is concerned. As to the forum and the conservation arena, one could better speak about the preservation of state power – notably from a symbolic point of view. For instance, to make sure that a representative of the state (if not the Head of state) will be the president of the trust fund board.

❖ I then more particularly studied the management set-up of two national parks, that is to say two specific local governance modes of nature management. The two CA were chosen because they incarnate two important management models in the conservation sector in the international/regional scene nowadays: Gorongosa National Park (GNP) is a public-private partnership, and Limpopo National Park (LNP) is a transfrontier CA<sup>16</sup>.

All national parks report to the Ministry of tourism, which has provincial directions in every province. Both national parks are located on several districts<sup>17</sup>. That is why I refer to the ‘local state’, that is to say the provinces and the districts (their heads are named by the central state). The districts are composed of several departments, tied to the provincial services, but none of them is especially dedicated to tourism. Indeed, the CA administrations notably work together with the district services of planning and infrastructures, and the services of economic activities.

### ***Gorongosa National Park.***

---

<sup>15</sup> It is important to emphasize that the transfer brokers in the conservation sector are not only the staff of the TFCA department. Indeed, they also are the participants in the sector (conservation forum and arena, CA administrations) who are usually Mozambican, well-qualified, paid by donors or international conservation organisations. They master the worldviews and the vocabulary of both the donors and the state.

<sup>16</sup> Together with Kruger National Park in South Africa, and Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe.

<sup>17</sup> Mozambique is subdivided into 11 provinces, each of which being subdivided into districts – there are 128 districts in the country.

In 2008, a co-management agreement was signed between the Carr foundation, an American philanthropic foundation, and the state of Mozambique, for 20 years. Two pillars were identified: biodiversity conservation and tourism development. The signature of the long-term agreement (*LTA*) represents the beginning of the Gorongosa Restoration Project (GRP), name given to the public-private partnership, supported by the funding of the Carr foundation, as well as of the USAID and the IPAD (Instituto Português de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento). A first experience of ppp in Mozambique in the conservation sector<sup>18</sup>, the agreement stipulates a 20-million-dollars contribution from the Carr foundation, and a participation of 158,000 dollars per year from the state until 2014.

I adopted the same methodology as with the analysis of the conservation forum and arena in Maputo. The interviews and observations were thus led with the purpose of assessing the interactions between all actors in their context (Hassenteufel, 2008: 105), which is double. First, there exists an important involvement of international actors, notably in the management set-up. For instance, the figure of the park warden does not exist, and is replaced by an oversight committee composed of the president of the Carr Foundation and a representative of the Ministry of tourism<sup>19</sup>. Second, the role of the national and local historicity has to be taken into consideration. GRP's activities cannot ignore the political and partisan issues that are at stake, as far as the national park is concerned. Indeed, even though Frelimo has hegemonic power over the region, the rivalry between Frelimo and Renamo is still present in the region. Indeed, the Gorongosa region was particularly affected by the conflict that opposed Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) to Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana). Frelimo had led the liberation struggle against the Portuguese rule, and was running the country since independence. Renamo, a rebellion movement, at first supported by South Rhodesia and South Africa, challenged Frelimo's power. They confronted quite regularly in the Gorongosa region, for the Serra da Gorongosa, a mountainous massif located next to the park, was one of the most important bastions of Renamo. Nowadays, the Gorongosa region can still be considered as a region infused with tensions; part of the population still supports Renamo (Forquilha, 2010), which became a political party after the Peace Agreements of 1992.

However a national park, a state tool of territory control, the international dimension of the project seems to erase its state dimension. Put it differently, the internationalization of policymaking can be seen as a kind of compromise between the state (central and local) and the international donors. Conservation may not be a priority for the Mozambican state, which anyway cannot afford it. It can thus delegate this mission to international actors. Now, the emphasis on conservation and development does appear to depoliticise the 'development apparatus', which brings technical answers to biodiversity protection and poverty reduction. The GRP programmes are therefore meant to be neutral, scientific, and could therefore be seen as contributing to an "anaesthetisation of politics" (Harrison, 2010: 56).

I argue to the contrary that central and local state are part of the policymaking process, though at the periphery of it – especially when conservation/development activities are tied to population and territory control. In that view, GRP is an in-between entity, half conservation/development enterprise, half a tool serving the state-party Frelimo, a mix between international aid and the state. Indeed, the internationalized policymaking of which the GRP is part of cannot be understood without a political and partisan dimension. The party-state apparatus is part of the game, for the GRP is an opportunity for it to locally extend. Indeed, international and national actors do pursue diverging interests, have different kinds of

---

<sup>18</sup> Except Niassa National Reserve, which is managed since the 1980s by a joint venture between the state and private partners.

<sup>19</sup> Their role is to supervise the activities of the park, managed by four directors.



resources and adhere to specific worldviews. International actors tend to realize their aim of conservation, coupled with philanthropic development ambitions, while central and local (province and districts) state intend to maintain their control over the resources and populations. They especially do so through the giving of the 20% of income of the park<sup>20</sup>, which is the occasion of a ceremony where the district administrator emphasizes the responsibility of the state apparatus in the betterment of the populations' livelihoods. The GRP's administration participates to the ceremony and to the message it gives, for it is part of the compromise that allows it to perform its mission of conservation and poverty alleviation. In that view, and though it is not its intended aim, the project performs sensitive political operations involving the expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission (Ferguson, 1990: 256). Indeed, GRP cannot escape the partisan dimension of the region. Policymaking is necessarily politicised, and does not remain only neutral and technical. It is also notably dealing with local communities who are not necessarily willing to adhere to conservation worldviews, notably for land tenure worries but also because of a persistent reluctance to adhere to Frelimo. In a sense, even if GRP is regularly perceived as a vague and/or private entity, it can be seen as playing Frelimo's game.

### ***Limpopo National Park.***

LNP was created in 2002. It used to be a hunting reserve since the 1960s. The particularity of the park is to be a transfrontier one, together with Kruger National Park (South Africa) and Gonareshou National Park (Zimbabwe). My research did not particularly focused on the transfrontier issues of the management set-up, though the regional influence of South Africa has indeed to be taken into consideration<sup>21</sup>. Contrary to GNP, there is a park warden, who directly reports to the Ministry of tourism. He therefore represents the state within the administration framework of the park. However, he is paid by the project that supports the development of the park since 2005. The project is funded by KfW (the German development bank) and by AFD (French Agency for Development). KfW and AFD funds have different areas of priorities: KfW more specifically supports the resettlement process, the administration and the protection departments; AFD finances the community support program and the infrastructures department. The whole project is currently facing some financial and institutional constraints that impede it to achieve its goals. One of the main sources of delay is the resettlement issue<sup>22</sup> that is highly controversial. As a matter of fact, this process gave birth to a certain rivalry between the Ministry of tourism and the Ministry of agriculture: both promised vast portions of land to different projects. The Ministry of tourism promised land to the resettled communities of the park, while the Ministry of agriculture later promised the same land to a South African firm specialized in agro-business. This whole controversy, added to other sources of conflict (notably important delays in the building of the first houses for the resettled communities), affected the development of the project<sup>23</sup>. Donors notably

---

<sup>20</sup> According to the law of forests and wildlife (1999), CA have to give 20% of their income to the local communities.

<sup>21</sup> This influence can for instance be thought of by analysing the role of the Peace Park Foundation (PPF) within the administration framework of the park: a project manager from PPF is a key actor in the set-up. This South African NGO has an important experience in CA management, for a great part inherited from the long South African tradition in conservation.

<sup>22</sup> A voluntary resettlement process is in course in order to resettle the local communities currently living inside the park – more precisely, inside the wildlife and tourism areas. This concerns approximately 6,000 inhabitants.

<sup>23</sup> The complexity of this controversy is about the involvement of many actors, state and international ones, who acted according to their own interests and regarding their respective resources. Representatives of both ministries supported their lines while the donors' representatives, especially KfW who funds the resettlement process, become more and more reluctant to finance such an uncertain project, all the more so as it was contradictory to the World Bank's guidelines in the matter. This affected the development of the project as a whole.

complained about the lack of coherence of the state: the rivalries between ministries made it quite difficult to obtain explanations about the controversy, and above all made it difficult during a long time to obtain a clear commitment of the state in one way or another.

Contrary to GRP, the LNP's declared philosophy is not a philanthropic one, though it advocates the alliance between conservation and development – in accordance with the mainstream norms that prevail in the conservation forum in Maputo. The development of private concessions within the park is a declared objective, but it has been hardly implemented until now, as I will mention it in the third part of this paper.

The institutional set-up of the project is an interesting combination of state and donors actors. The administration of the park is headed by a park warden (a Mozambican) and a project manager (a South African). The latter is paid by PPF, and supervises the implementation of the project funded by KfW – and the financial matters of the AFD funded project. The park warden and the project manager, together with the financial manager (also paid by PPF), form the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) – which reports to a Steering Committee (SC). KfW recognizes this set-up, while AFD understands that the park is headed by the park warden. Now in the course of his activities, the project manager manages many activities of the park that ought to be only managed by the park warden – who appears to be regularly absent from the park. The rivalry that thus exists between these two actors – an international one and a national-internationalised one – is mediated by the SC, which meets every quarter. It is composed of the project manager and the park warden, of PPF representatives, and of KfW and AFD who act as observers. The chairman of the SC is the DNAC director – but in fact the director of the TFCA department (the former director of DNAC) regularly replaces him, which is analytically interesting.

The politicization of policymaking does exist, but in different ways compared to GRP. Indeed, the existence of a park warden implies that he acts as a public figure representing the state. He directly reports to DNAC, and is quite regularly convoked by local and above all by central state to participate to meetings, where he represents the park. One could say that the state has a direct eye – and a direct say – in the park activities through his action. This is partly true, but at the same time, he ends up being quite often away from the park, which is actually for a great part managed by the project manager, that is to say by an international actor with a donor agenda. Moreover, the park warden is himself paid by the project, and receives in addition a little income from the state.

As far as the local state is concerned, one can observe the same dynamics as in Gorongosa: the giving of the 20% is also used by the district administrators to reinforce the state apparatus in the region – though, as in Gorongosa, the park does not systematically appear as belonging to the state: it remains largely perceived as a private entity by local populations.

The controversy about the lands next to the park can be thought of in terms of (re)politicization. Indeed, this is not just about conservation, it is also about the Mozambican state that is not able to stand a clear position regarding the way it intends to develop this piece of land. It is about a state represented by rival ministries linked to international and quite diverse interests – conservation on the one hand, agro-business on the other. As Harrison puts it:

“One of the ‘unintended consequences’ of the disintegration of the state apparatus is that various external agencies co-opt different ministries for different purposes. (...) the institutional tapestry of the state is (...) heterogeneous, riven with rivalries, different (external) alliances, and *modus operandi*. (...) The state itself is internally differentiated (...) and conflicts of interests limit or delay processes of reform. Many interviewees, both within government and agencies involved

with the government noted the conflicting ideas and interests of Ministers, who work collectively through the Council of Ministers” (Harrison, 1999: 329/331).

Nevertheless, even if the state appears fragmented and more reactive than proactive, it definitely is part of the game.

### ***International inputs and expansion of state power.***

In their own ways, GRP and LNP illustrate the dialectic between international inputs and expansion of state power. Though they do not have the same management structure, nor the same donors and institutional set-up, nor a similar socio-historic context, they both receive important international inputs, in terms of international actors physically present on a daily or at least a regular basis in order to participate to the decisional process; and in terms of financial resources and narratives. They both mix international and state actors in their institutional engineering: in their management team and in their relationships with the local and central state.

Both parks face the challenging equation between conservation and development, especially in that the latter is a matter of populations’ willingness to cooperate and to adopt – at least formally – the conservation language. This equation is sensitive within the parks, since some communities still live inside them, although it is not legal. But the real challenge is located in the buffer zones. They are the places where both parks most invest (financially and symbolically) to make the populations adhere to their conservation/development project. And this is where the interaction with the local state is particularly interesting, for it represents the encounter between international development apparatuses and local representatives of the state who do not have many means, who are not necessarily used to the conservation language and worldviews – but who try and manage to benefit from it, as the giving of the 20% of the parks’ income for instance illustrate it. In that respect, the comparison between the two buffer zones is quite relevant as to the local manifestations of statehood. Indeed, the buffer zone surrounding GNP does not belong to the park’s territory. It has been informal for years, and was recently recognized by a decree (summer 2010). However, it is still an area over which the park does not have any kind of jurisdiction. To the contrary, LNP’s buffer zone is considered as a part of it. Nevertheless, even if the buffer zone is part of LNP’s boundaries, the question of the kind of jurisdiction LNP’s administration actually has over the territory and populations remains quite vague – and the legislation is unclear. That is why interviews with local state representatives and with the parks’ administration are quite interesting when it is about “who governs?” the buffer zones. There exist a wide range of answers – which have in common the acknowledgment that without a close cooperation with the local state (and especially the district administrators), the buffer zones’ government would not be possible. Now a successful government of these areas is crucial for the national parks, for their (economic) development is key for the success of conservation within the parks.

I argue that national parks, funded and for a great part ruled by international funds, are tied to state power matters. Be it within the CA administration or in the framework of the regular relationships with central and local state actors, the national parks cannot escape from political and partisan issues. They represent an opportunity for the state to be physically present in the hinterland – although this is not always a success, for both parks are still regularly perceived as private entities by the local populations. Nevertheless, national parks belong to the state apparatus, and they also represent a financial opportunity – coupled with a development perspective through tourism, on a more long-term perspective.

In my hypothesis, partisan issues are clearer on the local scale than they can be at the level of the capital-city, where they are more complex to define and to outline. Indeed, national parks are about territory and populations' control. To borrow Jeffrey Herbst words, "consolidation of rule is also a function of how the state system defines territorial control (Herbst, 2000: 23). In Mozambique the state is confused with the ruling-party Frelimo. Political matters are thus necessarily partisan ones. The way Frelimo rules the hinterland is about the administrative zoning of the country in province, district, administrative posts and localities. The heads of each level are appointed by the central party-state. National parks thus represent another way of being physically present, of controlling the territory and the populations (the rangers are paramilitary staff), and of providing some welfare to local communities on behalf of the state-party. In that view, GRP and LNP take part to the same framework, though in different ways.

- ❖ I finally read the conservation sector through the lens of the links between the conservation forum and arena of the capital-city, and the two local case studies.

As previously mentioned, the ambition of this paper is to outline a conceptual framework for the analysis of the conservation field in Mozambique. This field is read through the dialogue between the three evoked scenes: the one located in Maputo, where donors and central ministries' representatives directly interact to shaping the national regulations of the conservation sector – and the local ones, with the cases of GNP and LNP, whose management set-ups are about the daily interactions between international, national-internationalized and national actors<sup>24</sup>.

### ***The conservation sector: a public action framework.***

Conservation is thought as a public policy sector, in the sense that it forms a more or less coherent range of activities in which a mosaic of actors work and invest, and that is supported and contested by many actors too. These actors are plural, their worldviews and interests do not systematically correspond to one another, but their collective action and their interactions around conservation issues outline a conservation sector<sup>25</sup>. The existence of a common vocabulary and grammar of public action (with key notions that infuse the stakeholders' discourses such as governance, transparency, participation, local communities, tradition...), based on the translation and negotiation on different worldviews and interests, allow to analyse the conservation sector as a field of institutional orders, made of interests, ideas and norms.

The concept of institutional orders (Carter & Smith, 2008) refers to mobile arenas where public and private actors, national, national-internationalised and international actors meet. Their meetings and exchanges structure the problems' definitions as well as the negotiation regarding the adoptions of instruments aiming at the sector regulation. The institutional orders are co-produced by actors whose expectations and systems of references are particular, but who share a grammar of action – which is regularly negotiated, specifically through the regular meetings and work together of the stakeholders.

The arenas are mobile: the actors who compose them are not always the same (for instance, a donor representative can attend a meeting once and a while, a ministry

---

<sup>24</sup> The latter are part of the parks' staff, and can also be representatives of the local state at the district or provincial levels.

<sup>25</sup> It is worth noticing that conservation in Mozambique mostly refers to conservation areas issues. CA receive indeed most of the attention and investment from donors and private actors, such as tourism entrepreneurs – and from the legislation. As a matter of fact, the Conservation Policy almost entirely focuses on CA.

representative may always attend seminars and meetings while another one may refuse to attend a reunion but send a note to comment a draft); the themes that are discussed change over time. The idea of mobility also means that certain actors may form punctual networks and/or coalitions regarding a specific issue – even if they do not necessarily work together on a regular basis<sup>26</sup>. Finally, the idea of mobility means that the arenas are not specifically territorially based – though they are usually formed in reference to territorial entities, namely CA. In that view, Limpopo and Gorongosa National Parks do form specific arenas, in the sense that they face specific challenges and have particular institutional set-ups – in other words, they illustrate particular modes of nature governance. At the same time, the latter are not self-closed: they cannot be read without taking into account their links with the capital-city – that is to say with the conservation forum and arena. Borrowing Carter & Smith words: “they both affect, and are affected by, the overall institutional order (the polity) within which they are located” (Carter & Smith, 2008: 268).

In the conceptual framework I propose, CA do form particular arenas, but they are part of institutional orders because of their ties with other arenas. The conservation forum and arena that form in Maputo are the producers of instruments, rules and norms, which are to be translated and put into practice in CA, by their respective administrations – in the framework of their relationships with the local state, that also has instruments, rules and norms to put into practice. CA are thus supposed to be managed in conformity with the norms produced in the capital-city. Now CA management is about the activities led by CA’s administrations (for a great part inspired by international inputs), but also by the agenda and institutional specificities of the local framework to which they belong. As a matter of fact, specific norms are produced within the course of CA management, for they are part of a particular socio-historic context, they bring together a certain kind of stakeholders and they face diverse challenges. Some of these specific norms are locally negotiated and decided, and others are ad hoc decisions, issued by the central state (most of the time by the Council of Ministers). I argue in the last part of the paper that this trend is a key expression of state power.

To summarize, the conservation sector is made of mobile arenas, which junctions form institutional orders. The latter represent the links that exist between each CA<sup>27</sup> and the capital-city<sup>28</sup>, notably in terms of ideas and norms. The field research I made revealed that though the vocabulary and the grammar of public action used in the conservation forum and arena in Maputo and in GRP and LNP are often formally the same, they reflect quite different realities depending on the context. The fact that there exists a formal coherence of the conservation sector means that CA management set-ups cannot be cut from the national polity. GNP and LNP are national parks, they have to be in conformity with the law – and they are the objects of the debates and negotiations occurring in the capital-city, that is to say in the conservation forum and arena. The notion of institutional order is a way not to think public action in a rigid multi-scales perspective, in a centre/periphery fashion. To the contrary, it is a way of understanding the conservation sector as a field of forces deeply linked to one another and which mix and deal with one another all the time. Borrowing Hassenteufel definition of contemporary public action (Hassenteufel, 2008: 137), it can be thought of as resulting from a superposition of interactions that involve interdependent actors, whose actions determine the others’ while being determined by them. The collective making of public action is the product

---

<sup>26</sup> This was for instance the case concerning the addition of the top of the Serra da Gorongosa to GNP. Part of the success of this addition is due to the intense lobbying realized by the president of the Carr Foundation and some of his Mozambican directors, notably towards key actors in the Ministry of tourism. In that view, personal relationships, that is to say informal networks, were key.

<sup>27</sup> I here understand CA as the local governance model they form, that is to say not only the CA’s administration, but also their relationships with local communities and the local state.

<sup>28</sup> It is worth mentioning that there also exist links between the CA. Many of their staff, especially the directors, know each other and have worked in each CA.

of configurations that are more or less strongly structured, stable and coherent. These configurations juxtapose multiple levels of interactions that are more or less strongly institutionalised. They can only be understood by taking into consideration the resources, worldviews and interests of the different involved actors.

***International inputs and state power.***

As mentioned, the dialectic relationship between CA and the conservation forum and arena is notably particular in the sense that it is part of the overall institutional order – the Mozambican polity. The latter is for a great part supported by international funding and cognitive inputs. International inputs (in terms of narratives, resources and actors) thus underlie every moment, every place, every arena. It is not a level above the national scene/polity, but it infuses the whole policymaking process. In that view, the study of the conservation sector tells about the aid relationship through the lens of the policymaking process as it appears in various institutional orders. The latter mix together actors, interests and norms, and are about formal national coherence – and, at the same time, the multiplication of ad-hoc situations.

Indeed, GRP and LNP formally aim at similar outputs; they subscribe to the general philosophy shared by the national texts (policies, decrees, laws) and the donors' objectives – for instance: the participation of local communities (linked to the community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) trend); the development of private concessions for tourism. There thus exist common norms and aims, which are put into practice and locally negotiated in particular ways. In that view, these local public action repertoires are supposed to be illustrations of the norms and rules produced by the central power – and at the same time they are completely original. One can say that they are both connected and disconnected to the overall institutional order.

The (dis)connection that can be observed is double. First, each CA has a particular agenda. Now since the CA's administrations are for a great part led by the donors' agenda, this can be interpreted as a prevalence of their inputs. This is partly true: there exists some autonomy of these administrations, which manage on a daily basis the CA. The central Ministry does not have a total control of these administrations. This is particularly the case of GRP<sup>29</sup>. As far as LNP is concerned, the functioning of the SC shows that DNAC sets back from the debates<sup>30</sup>, which all the more allows the manifestation of donors' weight – whose agenda has anyway to be fulfilled, according to the signed agreements regarding LNP's development project. However, as we have seen, the activities carried out by the CA's administrations could not be fulfilled without some cooperation with the local state. Second, one can observe many ad hoc situations/decisions. The example of the private concessions is interesting in that regard. There exists no legislation on that point – although this corresponds to a donors' demand, and to the declared national objective of tourism development. According to the *LTA*, GRP is able to put into practice its own tourism policy – which thus does not correspond to any national legislation. As far as LNP is concerned, the development of private concessions is a very slow process, for it is subject to the decision of the Council of Ministers. Indeed, since there is no precise legislation on the matter, the Council of Ministers is the only institution able to make decisions.

---

<sup>29</sup> Interviewees at Sofala province and the tourism Ministry regularly criticized the important autonomy of GRP, and its lack of communication/information.

<sup>30</sup> According to some of the donors, DNAC is even reluctant to fully participate to the decision-making process. This point is to be studied ahead, for it tells about the functioning of the tourism Ministry, and especially its direction. Indeed, the crucial decisions appear to be above all taken by the proper minister, and also by the head of the TFCA department.

In other words, most of the national coherence in the conservation sector is a matter of discourses and of declared objectives. All institutional orders make references to the same norms and yet, most of the decisions are ad hoc. The lack of regulatory tools, added to the certain autonomy of the local modes of governance of nature, turn each institutional order a unique and original one. I argue that this is precisely this lack of regulatory tools that enables the state to maintain its state power on the policymaking process. The fact that the arenas of public action are mobile and plastic can indeed be considered as a means for the state to partly remain in the driving seat.

As a matter of fact, norms and rules produced in the capital-city are inspired by international inputs, as the functioning of the conservation forum and arena show it. Norms and rules are indeed the products of negotiations, transfers and institutional imitation. But one particularity of these norms and rules is that they are not quite consolidated. There exist important delays in the approval of policies, decrees and laws, and some decisions are locked by the top of the state – most of the time the Council of Ministers. This is especially true regarding LNP and, to a lesser extent, to GRP. As a ppp, the latter is, at the end of the day, more autonomous than LNP. However, some decisions remain dependent of the top of the state. This is for instance the case of the addition of the top of the Serra da Gorongosa to the national park.

The divergences from the formal norms can partly be explained by the fact that these norms are not totally consolidated in the first place – that is to say in the conservation forum and arena. As I have argued, these norms are made of international inputs and they are the fruits of negotiations and transfers. But they are not fully consolidated, as showed by the important delays in the elaboration of national texts. There sometimes is no norm – this is the case of the status of the buffer zones i.e. who governs these areas? How are their jurisdiction shared between the CA's administration and the districts and the province? In other situations, the norm is vague, which makes it all the more easy to play with – and power struggles to manifest themselves. This is for example the case of the payment of part of the CA's income to the state apparatus. According to the law (2009), CA are due to give back to the state their whole income, and to receive back 80% of it. The modalities of this payment have changed over time, and are different for GRP and LNP. But both CA have experienced troubles with the central state in that matter: in both cases, the central state did not regularly give back to the CA the 80% – or even did not give nothing at all. CA's income thus became quite a crucial issue – both CA sometimes refused to give to the state any of their income.

In my view, the absence of consolidated norm is not so much a sign of the central state weakness as a means at its disposal to maintain its state power towards CA that have a tendency to be quite autonomous – at least in their everyday management. As a matter of fact, conservation is not a crucial public policy sector for the Mozambican state – even if tourism is a potential vector of development. It can thus delegate CA management to other (mostly external) actors/institutions, all the more so as it has a direct political and partisan interest to do so, for CA are a means for territory and population control. At the same time, the state maintains its state power by keeping a control and a regulation from the top. So if on a daily basis CA management can become autonomous for a large extent, some decisions nevertheless have to be endorsed by the central state. The fact that decisions from the Council of Ministers or presidential decrees are often needed to break the deadlock thus tells about the functioning of the party-state Frelimo. Policymaking in the conservation sector is therefore an in-between situation: on the one hand, there exists some internationalisation of the process, which does not happen without any conflict, power struggles nor networks and interests

coalitions, on the central and local scenes<sup>31</sup>. On the other hand, there exists a state that is still quite present and remains keystone for certain crucial matters.

### **References.**

- Bayart, Jean-François, *L'Etat en Afrique*, Paris, Fayard, 1989.
- Büscher, Bram, "Anti-Politics as Political Strategy: Neoliberalism and Transfrontier Conservation in Southern Africa", *Development and Change*, 41 (1), pp. 29-51, 2010.
- Carter, Caitriona, Smith, Andy, "Revitalizing Public Approaches to the EU: 'territorial institutionalism', fisheries and wine", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15, 2, PP. 263-281, March 2008.
- Dunn, Kevin C., "Contested State Spaces: African National Parks and the State", *European Journal of International Relations*, 15, 3, pp. 423-446, 2009.
- Ferguson, James, *The Anti-Politics Machine*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Forquilha, S. C., « Chefferie traditionnelle et décentralisation au Mozambique : discours, pratiques, dynamiques locales », *Politique Africaine*, N° 117, pp. 45-62, mars 2010.
- Harrison, Graham, "Clean-Ups, Conditionality & Adjustment: Why Institutions Matter in Mozambique", *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 26, No. 81, pp. 323-333, Sep. 1999.
- Harrison, Graham, *Neoliberal Africa. The Impact of Global Social Engineering*, Londres, Zed Books, 2010
- Hassenteufel, Patrick, *Sociologie politique : L'action publique*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2008.
- Herbst, Jeffrey, *States and Power in Africa. Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Igoe, Jim, Brockington, Dan, "Neoliberal Conservation: A Brief Introduction", *Conservation & Society*, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 432-449, 2007.
- Lunstrum, Elizabeth, "Neoliberal Land Reform and the Limpopo National Park", *The Geographical Review*, 98, 3, pp. 339-355, July 2008.
- Mosse, D., "Global Governance and the Ethnography of International Aid", in Mosse, D. & Lewis, D. (Eds.), *The Aid Effect. Giving and Governing in International Development*, London, Pluto Press, 2005.
- Stone, Diana, "Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the 'Transnationalization' of Policy", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11, 3, pp. 545-566, 2004.
- Whitfield, L., Fraser, A., *The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*, GEC Working Paper 2008/42, July 2008.

---

<sup>31</sup> And it is worth noticing that this internationalisation is notably about the apparition and institutionalisation of instruments meant to build a decentralized state.