Bridging the Disconnect: Integrating Local Perspectives in Peace Processes

Sara Hellmüller

PhD Student, University of Basel

Researcher and Mediation Program Officer, swisspeace

ABSTRACT

In the context of civil wars, violence becomes highly localized, undermining the fundamental security of the population in conflict areas. In order to adapt to these new realities, the concept of human security has been introduced in the early 1990s. Thus, the security of the individual, rather than the state has moved to the centre of attention of the international community. However, while their protection focus has shifted from the state to the individual, their focus of who is assigned agency in a conflict context has not: it remains the state and in a substitutable manner the international community based on its 'responsibility to protect'. Despite the fact that 'local ownership' has become a frequently used term, both in theory and practice, it has neither been unambiguously defined nor thoroughly implemented. With regards to peacebuilding, two main ambiguities remain. The first relates to the counterparts chosen by the international community when engaging in a peace process and the second to whether ownership should be fostered during the design or only at the end of a peace process. The example of the peace negotiations in the DRC showed that international actors almost exclusively cooperated with national elites and that local actors were not relevantly involved in the decision-making processes. Such a structure led to developments that remain problematic until this day: the equation of elections with state building, the exclusion of certain communities as well as the ignorance of local causes of conflict. This paper discusses how increased inclusion of local perspectives in peace processes and thus a shift of the international community's focus of who has agency in a peace process could render the concept of human security more effective.

Introduction

The referent object as well as subject of security have changed since the end of the Cold War. While the individual has come to be seen as referent object of security with the new concept of human security, it has not been ascribed the concordant agency. It is still the state, and in a substitutable manner, the international community who is the main subject, i.e. the guarantor, of security. Despite the fact that empowerment is one of the objectives of human security and that the principle of 'local ownership' has been praised in theory by many peacebuilders (Reich, 2006: 3), the term 'local ownership' has not been unambiguously defined which has practical consequences. First of all, it is not clear whether local ownership

refers to national counterparts or local actors as partners in peacebuilding processes. Secondly, it remains ambiguous whether local ownership should aim at the inclusion of local actors in the design of the process or at their taking over at the end of a process.

The practical consequences of these two ambiguities surrounding the term were clearly illustrated in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as this article will show. It will first shed light on the changing concepts of security showing how and why the referent object and subject have changed. In a second step, it explores the actors dominating the design of a peace process and the counterparts chosen by the international community therein. It will do so at the example of the DRC. The paper will also depict how international actors' underlying principles as well as practical concerns inform their priority setting. One of their priorities in the DRC, as in many peacebuilding processes, was to hold elections. The article does not make a normative statement on whether elections should have been held or not, but critically analyzes the decision-making process and the consequences of the focus on elections. Despite claims for local ownership, international actors primarily worked with national elites and promoted largely pre-defined processes. Local actors were often denied agency in that civil society representatives were not substantially involved in the peace negotiations.[1] The article will show in a third part what consequences this denial had for the peace process in the DRC. It will not naively glorify the inclusion of local actors, but also show the challenges that international peacebuilders face in such contexts. Nonetheless, despite the difficult tasks that international actors face, if they are too dominant, it may run counter of what is most appropriate to build peace in a given context.

1) Security: Objects & Subjects

For a long time, the state has been considered the referent object as well as subject of security in international relations. It was the state's territorial integrity and sovereignty that needed first and foremost to be protected (referent object of security). State sovereignty has been at the basis of the international system since the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and its primacy is also reflected in the Charter of the United Nations. By the same token, it was a state's army and its other national security institutions that were in charge of guaranteeing security (subjects of security). It holds true that with the system of collective security, first enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations (1920) and then also in the Charter of the United Nations (1945), the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in international relations was conferred to the international community. According to article 39 of the UN Charter, in case the UN Security Council identifies a threat to international peace and

---

[1] For the purpose of this article, local actors are defined as the civilian population. If organized in associations, organizations or institutions they will be referred to as civil society.

security, it can "make recommendations, or decide what measures [...] shall be taken" to restore it. However, the Security Council could not play its role of guarantor of security in the decades following its establishment for two main reasons. First of all, the drafters of the Charter had conceived a military strong organ which the Council never became because it was dependent on the member states providing troops (Gordenker and Weiss, 1993: 11). Secondly, the Security Council was blocked during the Cold War by the vetoes of the two superpowers. This reminds us that UN member states are at the basis of the "collective security" system. Therefore, the state remained the main subject in the security field. As Baylis (2001: 245) noted, "[f]or much of the Cold War period most of the writing on the subject was dominated by the idea of national security, which was largely defined in militarised terms". Thus the sovereign state was for a long time considered the referent object as well as the subject of security matters.

With fundamental shifts in the nature of the international system, this fact has changed. First, through the increased interconnectedness based on technological and communicational innovations, threats have become globalized and state boundaries blurred (see Bellamy, 2004: 14-18). In such a context, states are not always able to protect their citizens from global dangers or have themselves become fundamental threats to civilians. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, civil wars have come to outnumber interstate wars (Gleditsch, 2009: 595). Therefore, the international community has increasingly taken up the role of being the subject; i.e. the guarantor of security in case the nation state cannot or does not want to assume this responsibility. Similarly, citizens, rather than the state, have come to be considered the object of security; i.e. civilians in need of protection.

The first shift away from the state's national army as main guarantor of security toward the international community increasingly sharing this task was made with a redefinition of sovereignty as responsibility. This is illustrated by the transformation of the interpretation of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security according to article 39 and thus legitimizes an intervention by the international community. Historically, albeit mentioned in the UN Charter[2], the protection of individual human rights and thus a state's citizens was largely subordinated to the respect of state sovereignty based on the principle of "non-intervention"[3] of one state into the internal affairs of another. However, since 1945, sovereignty has been increasingly redefined so as to accommodate human rights protection (von Einsiedel, 2005: 21). Before the end of the Cold War, respect for human rights in a given

---

[2] UN member states express their determination in the preamble of the UN Charter to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights." Article 1(3) proclaims the encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as one of the UN's purposes. Article 55(c) enjoins the UN to promote "universal respect, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms."[2] Finally, Article 56 confers an obligation to member states to take action in order to achieve the objectives announced in the above-cited Article 55.
[3] Article 2(7) UN Charter (1945)

state was considered as being within its exclusive domestic domain and an intervention would have been an impingement on its sovereignty. Since then, the Security Council has also allowed interventions on the basis of protecting human rights.[4] This indicates a "weakening of inviolable territorial integrity and a growing acceptance of certain forms of intervention" (Newman et al., 2009: 5). In this sense, Kofi Annan (in Moore 1998: 77) proposed the concept of 'positive sovereignty', which conceives sovereignty as "responsibility and not just power". Accordingly, sovereignty does not solely shield the territorial integrity and political independence of a state from intervention by other states and the international community more generally, but confers a duty to the state to ensure and respect security, human rights and fundamental freedoms of its population. In case a state is unwilling or unable to exercise this responsibility, the secondary responsibility of protection falls onto the international community. This idea is enshrined in the new concept of 'responsibility to protect' that was endorsed by the UN General Assembly at the High-Level Plenary Meeting in 2005.

The second shift which refers to the citizens of a state being considered as in need of protection, rather than the nation state, was made with the introduction of the concept of human security (Thomas, 2001: 161). First mentioned in the 1994 Human Development Report, the concept was introduced based on the argument that security "has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust" (UNDP, 1994: 22). Rather than focusing on these aspects of security, UNDP proposed to redefine security as "safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression" as well as "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives" (Ibid.: 3). The Commission on Human Security (CHS), established in 2001, defines human security as concept "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment" (CHS, 2003: 4). As opposed to state security (referring to a territory, a population and a government), human security distinguishes itself by acknowledging that threats stem from both internal and external factors to the state and by rendering the individual the main object of security. In this sense, it is based on the broadening and deepening of the traditional paradigm of security. It broadens the concept of security in that it includes threats beyond the ones to the national territory of a state.[5] And it deepens the traditional security view by focusing on both, the bottom-up component of empowerment and the top-

---

[4] Examples for such Security Council authorized intervention under Chapter VII due to massive abuses of human rights are the use of force to end a humanitarian disaster in Somalia in 1992 as well as in Haiti in 1994. These cases show the Security Council's willingness to include major violations of human rights in the definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security and therefore an increased commitment to protect individuals.
[5] This is exemplified in Kofi Annan's (2005) report *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all* in which he considers that "[t]he threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century includes not just international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences" (Annan, 2005: 24).

down component of protecting individuals. In its focus on empowerment, the concept of human security aims at promoting "strategies [that] enable people to develop their resilience to difficult situations" (Ibid.: 10). Protection, in turn, refers to mechanisms that protect people from threats that are beyond their control (Ibidem).

While these shifts are certainly applaudable, not least because they constitute a necessary adaptation of concepts and international responses to shifts in the reality of the system of international relations, there remains a fundamental question to be asked: if, besides states, the international community has come to protect citizens who are the main referent objects of security, in what ways can they also be protectors, i.e. why has the protection focus shifted but not the focus of who has *agency* in a conflict context? Without a doubt, the new concept of human security involves empowerment of local actors in its objectives, but the main subject to ensure security are still state actors, followed by the international community. So while before, the object and the subject of security were enshrined in the same entity (the state), this is no longer the case. The inquiry into these questions will be conducted by looking at peacebuilding practices. Peacebuilding as defined by Boutros-Ghali (1992: §21) in his Agenda for Peace describes the "[a]ction to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace". With an increased activism of the UN and different national and international NGOs in the domain of peacebuilding, different activities have come to be considered as integral part of such programs: security sector reform, development, humanitarian assistance, reconciliation, governance and rule of law programs. Several authors have shown that international actors still take on a top-down approach and primarily collaborate with national state actors, rather than local actors when engaging in a post-conflict context (Mac Ginty, 2008; Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009; Autesserre, 2010). This is all the more surprising as the importance of local ownership of a peacebuilding process has been acknowledged rhetorically by most international peacebuilding actors.

2) Peacebuilding: Actors & Decisions

2.1.) Local ownership

The term 'local ownership' has originated in the field of development cooperation. It was recently introduced in the peacebuilding field notably when former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, stated that "[Domestic peace] can only be achieved by the local population itself; the role of the United Nations is merely to facilitate the process that seeks to dismantle the structures of violence and create the conditions conducive to durable peace and sustainable development" (Annan, 2001). The concept still lacks a distinctive definition despite its frequent use (Reich, 2006: 7) and its implications in practice are equally contested (Pietz and

von Carlowitz, 2007: 5). From this definitional ambiguity, two problematic aspects can be derived.

Firstly, there remains the question of who is targeted to take ownership. Whereas "local" can be used to refer to local in distinction to national or state actors, it can also refer to national as opposed to outside, international actors. In a discussion on a research project by the Center for International Peace Operations[6] on 'local ownership', it was observed that most international approaches concentrated on the national elite (Ibid.: 13). Autesserre (2010: 247) has demonstrated with regards to the DRC that: "'[l]ocal involvement' is a buzzword for international interveners in the Eastern Congo, but it still refers mostly to involvement with the Congolese national elite". The ensuing problem is that national elites' approaches often only remotely, if at all, reflect the views of the general population and the situation becomes even more complicated in countries as large as the DRC where most of the national elites are in the capital, Kinshasa, and can thus not claim to adequately represent the population in the East. Moreover, the choice of national elites as partners has been supported by a "tendency to regard the local population as a uniform group whereas in reality most countries consist of very heterogeneous fractions of society" (Pietz and von Carlowitz, 2007: 13).

A second issue, with the lack of clarity of the term refers to the sequencing of local ownership. More specifically, authors are not unanimous on the question of whether local actors should own the process or the results. Will local actors be involved in decisions on the peacebuilding process or purely take over the outcome of a process that is predetermined by internationals? Chesterfield (in Ibid.: 6) defines local ownership as referring almost exclusively to the end and not the process of peacebuilding arguing that the conditions for a peacebuilding mission do not allow for substantial local input during the decision-making process. Narten (in Ibid.: 6), in contrast, considers it as referring to both, by defining local ownership as "the process and final outcome of the gradual transfer to legitimate representatives of the local society, of assessment, planning and decision-making, the practical management and implementation, and the evaluation and control of all phases of state-building programs". Similarly, Donais (2009: 3) defines local ownership as the "extent to which domestic actors control both the design and implementation of political processes", also arguing for a broad conception of the term. The design of a peace process often involves an analysis of the conflict wherefrom appropriate strategies are devised on how to end the conflict and re-establish peace. As a result of the strategies, corresponding programs are designed and implemented. In practice, peacebuilding processes are usually *designed* during peace nego-

---

[6] Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF)

tiations (e.g.: ceasefire agreement, demobilization and disarmament, power and wealth sharing dispositions, establishment of UN peacekeeping force, etc.) and *implemented* in the subsequent transitional phase that should lead to sustainable peace. Not all actors have the same influence, however. In a recently published leaflet, Peace Direct (2010) states that the "narrative of what is important in conflict resolution is dominated by internationals". With their setting the priorities, international actors often dominate a peace process in its design and are therefore also responsible of a large part of the outcome of this process.

These two ambiguities, and their consequences, will be analyzed in the following sections in order to show that local actors are rarely ascribed agency in designing the future of their country. At the example of the Democratic Republic of Congo, this article depicts that the peace process was largely negotiated between national elites and its design heavily influenced by international perspectives.

2.2.) The Congolese Negotiations

The DRC experienced two wars which came to be known as First and Second Congo Wars. An armed conflict first broke out in 1996 when long-term dictator Mobutu was ousted out of power by a coup instigated by the rebel forces of Laurent-Désiré Kabila with the support of Rwanda, Angola and Uganda. Kabila replaced Mobutu in 1997, but only one year later an attempt by Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebel forces to overthrow the new president Kabila heralded the Second Congo War in 1998 (Carayannis, 2009). The main armed groups were the *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC) supported by Uganda, the different factions of the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD)[7] supported by Rwanda and the Mai Mai[8]. Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia backed the Kabila government. A first attempt at settlement was undertaken in 1999 which concluded with the signature of the Lusaka agreement that required the parties to hold a national dialogue, to agree on a new political system, and to hold elections (Ottaway, 2002: 1002). Albeit the fighting did not stop, the national dialogue (the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, ICD) took place after a cumbersome start, when the conflict parties gathered in Sun City (South Africa) in 2002. The final "Global and All Inclusive Agreement" (also called the Pretoria II Agreement) signed in December 2002[9] stipulated the objective of reunifying the Congo, engaging in a process of national reconciliation and installing a transitional government to govern the DRC until national elections would be held in 2006.

---

[7] The RCD split into RCD-Goma supported by Rwanda and RCD-ML (Mouvement de Libération) backed by Uganda in 1999 (Carayannis, 2009: 7).
[8] Term referring to militia groups that formed on ethnic basis in Eastern Congo (Autesserre, 2010)
[9] The final act was signed in Sun City on 1-2 April 2003 (Rogier, 2006: 38)

After the negotiations in Sun City, many observers quickly stated that the terms of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement had been imposed by the international community (Autesserre, 2006: 6) and signed under the intense pressure of the USA, UN, South Africa and Western countries rather than out of a commitment of the conflict parties (Boshoff and Rupiya; 2003: 31; Rogier 2004: 35-36). Related to the two ambiguities of the term 'local ownership' stated above, two concordant criticisms arise that will be further elaborated in the following sections: The first criticism, with regard to the counterparts chosen by the international community, was specifically underlined by Rogier (2004: 39). He stated that the Pretoria II agreement "was reduced to a bargaining forum between warlords and predatory leaders". Indeed, many important stakeholders, notably civil society representatives, were not significantly included, neither in Lusaka, nor in Sun City. The second criticism refers to the dominance of the international community in the design of peace processes and the lack of local ownership therein. In this respect, the article will focus on the decision to hold democratic elections that the international community strongly promoted. The decision goes back to the Lusaka agreement, but was further detailed in the Global and All Inclusive agreement of Sun City in December 2002.

a.) Parties: Who decides?

The parties at the negotiation table in Lusaka were the two main armed groups (RCD and MLC), the government of Congo, as well as Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The signing of a ceasefire was an important step, but it was not an inclusive process. It included the parties that were directly considered as being able to torpedo the peace process, but not the ones who were required to build peace. Civil society representatives were largely excluded albeit subsequently mentioned in the Lusaka agreement (Tremblay, 2004: 25). The International Crisis Group (1999: 4) reported that "the war in Congo has offered little choice to the DRC population. The war has only involved two parties, the rebels and the Government, leaving no room for unarmed actors, a significant and diverse set of players, to have any input in the future of their country".

In the subsequent negotiations in Sun City, civil society organizations were explicitly invited to participate which stood in "sharp contrast to the exclusion of these groups from earlier mediation efforts in the DRC" (Carayannis, 2009: 8). At the first session of the ICD in Addis Ababa in October 2001, it was decided to incorporate "local Mai-Mai militias, religious orders, traditional chiefs, as well as other groups from the armed and non-armed opposition" (Rogier, 2004: 29). Although these groups were invited, the main negotiations still took place between the most powerful Congolese actors in terms of military strength: the government, the different factions of the RLC and the MLC. Civil society groups were well organized as

they managed to mobilize a broad spectre of representatives with a common agenda. As an example, 48 delegates met in Kinshasa in January 2002 to unify their agendas and to prepare a joint statement for the ICD. As such, they talked with a unified voice which rendered their input more efficient (World Movement for Democracy, *undated*). However, it was not easy for them to make themselves heard in the negotiations. As documented by Davis and Hayner (2009: 36), several obstacles complicated their inclusion. A first obstacle was the fact that Ketumile Masire, the international mediator in Sun City, did not speak French. Secondly, the fact that the negotiations took place outside the DRC, made it difficult for civil society representatives to consult with their constituencies. Thirdly, the problem was also that the armed conflict parties dominated the talks. Not only due to their number of delegates which exceeded the ones from civil society, but also based on the fact that negotiations were first held with belligerents and then, the results would be presented to civil society groups as final. In fact, civil society organisations "found it difficult to find their way in the forum while belligerent factions were simultaneously engaged in parallel discussions" (Rogier, 2004: 39). De Heredia (2009: 9) also concluded that, despite claims for involvement of civil society and 'local ownership', "the UN and the AU have been negotiating with armed men and it is with them that they are planning in detail the whole reconstruction of the country". Therefore, "[t]he talks at Sun City cannot be said to reflect civil society demands" (Davis & Hayner, 2007: 37).

This shows the above mentioned tendency of international actors to see national elites who hold the immediate power to either continue or stop fighting, rather than local actors, as their counterparts. It also depicts the concordant inclination of international actors to regard the civilian population as unitary.[10] Moreover, if the international community negotiates only with armed actors being part of the national elite, it can create a wrong incentive structure. Armed groups can be tempted to extend their violence in order to strengthen their negotiating position, but it can also incite unarmed actors to take up arms in order to be represented at the negotiating table. A study by Krummenacher and Deniz (2010) has shown that before negotiations took place in the DRC, attacks increased which can be ascribed to armed groups that wanted to augment their power by, for instance, conquer territories that can be used as bargaining chips in the subsequent negotiations. Actors, like civil society, not recurring to such power displays remained excluded.

The first problematic aspect demonstrated above was thus clearly present in the DRC: the counterparts of the international community were national elites and local actors were regarded as unitary. The second ambiguity, the international community's domination

---

[10] Autesserre (2010: 126-178) provides an impressive analysis of the cleavages within the different armed groups in East Congo refuting this assumption.

over the design of the negotiations, was also exemplified in Congo as shown in the next section.

b.) Outcomes: What is decided?

The marginalization of civil society representatives was problematic because fundamental decisions on the future of the DRC were already taken in Lusaka and not just during the Sun City negotiations to which the inclusion of the "forces vives" had been deferred to.[11] One of these decisions taken at the early stages of the negotiations was the holding of elections. The Lusaka Agreement in its annex A stated that in the national dialogue the parties shall agree on "the process of free, democratic and transparent elections in the DRC". Moreover, annex C stated that the national dialogue will lead to "a new political dispensation which will bring about national reconciliation and the early holding of free and fair democratic elections." This demonstrates the early decision upon the fact that elections would be held.

This sequencing of decision-making in peacebuilding processes is what Donais (2009) sees as one of the main impediments to substantive local ownership. His argument is that "key elements of the post-war settlement are locked in at the time of the signing of a peace accord" (Donais: 2009: 9). He considers this as the most crucial stage of a peace process, but also the stage which is least conducive to inputs from local actors (Ibid.: 9). At the moment of the signing of a peace agreement, decisions have to be taken fast because everyone, and especially the international community with its concept of 'responsibility to protect', aims at stopping the conflict and halting the suffering. In this endeavour, they primarily interact with national elites. Mobilizing civil society and collecting the views of the citizens demands time and is often considered an almost insurmountable practical task. Therefore, salient issues are decided upon at the moment of the signing of the first agreement and a general path is already given, most often to the detriment of the inclusion of civil society representing the civilian population.

The question to be asked in this respect is whether the decision to hold elections as well as the emphasis on "early" elections was necessary in the Congolese negotiations. An analysis of the motivations of the different negotiating actors at the moment, at which the decision was taken, suggests that it was not. The rebel forces strove for a deal that secured them equal status in the subsequent negotiations by weakening Kabila; Rwanda and Uganda wanted to have their security concerns acknowledged and the Congolese government wanted the foreign forces to withdraw. It is true that Kabila pushed for elections, because he

---

[11] The Lusaka agreement states, that "the inter-Congolese political negotiations process shall include besides the Congolese parties, [...], the political opposition as well as representatives of the forces vives [civil society]" (Lusaka Agreement, 1999).

was in dire need of legitimacy. But the elections he wished for would have been purely under his control (Rogier, 2004: 27). Therefore, the interests of the main belligerents could have been respected without enshrining elections in the ceasefire agreement. This suggests that the international community mainly promoted elections. Why was there a rush for elections? There is a conceptual as well as a practical answer to this question.

The conceptual answer is the dominance of the liberal peace paradigm. In order to understand how peacebuilding processes are designed, it is helpful to shed light on underlying assumptions that international peacebuilding actors hold. Paris (2003b: 463) has argued that these underlying assumptions and principles are part of a "global culture" which has emerged in international peacebuilding. This global culture is strongly influenced by the liberal peace paradigm. The idea that liberalism will bring peace has its roots in the thinking of Kant. He asserted that free trade between states in conjunction with a democratic government leads to peace (Gilady and Russett, 2002: 393). Later theorists took up Kant's ideas and asserted that democracies do not go to war against each other (Doyle, 1983; Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995) because citizens are the ones who decide in democracies on whether to launch a war or not, and they are unlikely to do so; because a war would run counter the business interests of states that are economically interdependent; and because compromise and plurality are the fundamental pillars of democratic states, these values are also carried into their international relations (Bellamy, 2004: 26). These arguments have led to the belief that "certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be more peaceful, both in their domestic affairs and in their international relations, than illiberal states are" (Newman et. al., 2009: 11). The international community implemented this approach in many post-conflict contexts, whereby it has come to be known as liberal peacebuilding (Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2004; Barnett, 2006). In this context, it can be defined as "the promotion of democracy, market-based economic reforms and a range of other institutions associated with 'modern' states as a driving force for building peace" (Newman et al., 2009: 3). In this way, the global culture of liberal peace influences international peacebuilding actors at the level of assumptions and principles that will inform their analysis of a conflict and hence also their strategy and consequent actions. International peacebuilding actors do not act in a normative vacuum, but are influenced by this specific culture that becomes increasingly consolidated through the fact that "peacekeeping agencies and their member states are predisposed to develop and implement strategies that conform with the norms of global culture, and they are disinclined to pursue strategies that deviate from these norms" (Paris, 2003b: 443). Consequently, the international community has come to see the spread of democracy as a prevention tool for the resumption of war in a post-conflict context. As Goetschel and Hagmann (2009: 62) state, "by adopting market liberalisation, good governance and civil society promotion as universal

recipes for peace, donor peacebuilding de facto and rather uncritically endorses democratic peace theory". Priorities of international peacebuilding actors are therefore largely influenced by the democratic peace paradigm. Because they are often the ones who set the priorities, there is a risk that these "external models 'crowed out the space' for people in the context to make their own ideas heard" (Anderson & Olson, 2003: 39). This leads to a situation where internationals – often conjointly with national elites having incorporated western concepts or see clear advantages in their promotion be it to gain legitimacy or for funding purposes – take decisions in the lack of a participatory analysis of the nature of violence or the priorities of local actors. As Ottaway (2002: 1005) notes, "[i]n countries emerging from collapse, what the international community considers best practice is not necessarily perceived by local actors as the answer to their problems". Within this focus on the promotion of democracy, elections are considered an indispensable tool. In fact, they have become a standard means in a post-conflict context, often within a determined timeframe after the signing of the peace agreement. Indeed, "major international organizations […] many of which have become vigorous promoters of liberal democracy [...] began to claim that elections were the only legitimate basis for governmental authority within states" (Paris, 2003b: 446). This was also the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

From a more practical perspective, there are several explanations for the decision to hold elections, all relating to time and financial constraints that most of the international peacebuilding missions face. There still exists a notable gap between the mandate given to peacekeeping missions and the resources provided. To overcome this gap, elections provide several advantages. First, they are a measurable and highly visible milestone event, much more than other peacebuilding activities which take more time to implement and whose results will only be visible after a substantial amount of time. In Sisk's and Reynold's (1999: 145) words: "elections […] have become a condition […] as the crowning event of a peace process". Secondly, a toolkit for the conduct of elections is readily available as they have already been implemented in different contexts. Therefore, international peacebuilding actors have confidence in the fact that they know how to organize them and they have clear guidelines and regulations to follow to make it a success. Finally, and probably most importantly considering the constraints, elections are often used as an exit strategy by international actors as they provide them with an elected and thus considered legitimate counterpart (Stromseth, 2006: 98). As stated in the ICG Africa Briefing (2004a), "[t]he Congo is in transition from a country ravaged by a major war to what is intended to become a reunified polity legitimised by democratic elections". Therefore, a peacekeeping mission often plans to withdraw shortly after the Election Day. This bears a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, the rush to elections can be seen as a means to ensure local ownership: the citizens of

a state elect their legitimate representatives. On the other hand, however, the process is imposed by the international community based on the belief that peace will come through liberalization, so local actors have little choice but to own the results of this pre-determined process. According to de Heredia (2009: 11), Congolese citizens found themselves imposed "an externally created state in which indigenous institutions are not even being contemplated". She concludes that "[t]he unrealistic expectation of building a state in a few years contradicts the logic of promoting the search for new institutions according to the self-determined needs, culture and identity of the Congolese" (Ibidem). Ottaway's (2002: 1017) assessment of such processes goes along the same lines: "Citizens will be taught to accept new national symbols, devised by outsiders if they cannot agree among themselves. Although the outcome of this process is supposed to be a democratic country, there is nothing democratic about the process". Different authors have shown that peace can rarely be imposed. Migdal (in Tull, 2010: 644), for instance, states that "the success of state-building depends first and foremost on bargaining and accommodation processes between national elites and groups in society [...]". In the DRC, "[t]he feverish pushing for the polls suggested that the ownership of the elections lay more with external forces than with Congolese actors" (Ibid.: 658).

<p style="text-align:center">*</p>

The fact that the international community mainly negotiated with national elites and that they feverishly pushed for the holding of early elections in the DRC, confirms that local ownership was not only interpreted as referring to national, more than local actors but also to the end result, much more than the decision-making process. As de Heredia (2009: 2) notes, "a new concept of local ownership has come to imply both a technical strategy and a normative guidance that, in reality, has re-stated the leading role of international actors above local actors. It has implied that local actors should eventually own a process that the international community has drafted for them". The practice of the promotion of 'local ownership' therefore rather follows Chesterman's definition, in that local people are supposed to take ownership over the end result of a process, rather than Narten's or Donais' which see it as including ownership over both, the design and the implementation. However, if local ownership at the level of the decision-making process (i.e. the negotiation process) is not guaranteed, there is a risk that the efforts of international peacebuilding interventions are counterproductive. Decisions are taken, such as the one to hold elections, which may not be the immediate priorities of the population. Concordantly, "[p]eacebuilding projects seldom involve local communities, the so-called beneficiaries, in the definition of what peace is or should be. Instead western norms are transplanted to conflict-ridden societies in developing countries" (Goetschel and Hagmann, 2009: 57). This can yield a high potential for conflict. As Rogier (2004: 39)

states, "[e]ven if an 'elite pact' might be necessary to end the war, it is not sufficient to build peace". In the DRC, it failed to do both.

The article now turns to an assessment of the transition period in order to explore the role of local actors, the consequences of the decision to hold elections on the overall peace process and to present some of the challenges of the involvement of local actors.

3) Local actors: Challenges of Exclusion & Inclusion
3.1.) The Congolese Transition

In the Pretoria II Agreement, a transitional government was decided upon according to the agreed "1+4 formula" with Joseph Kabila (his father had been assassinated in 2001) as president and four vice-presidents representing Kabila's supporters, the unarmed opposition and the two main rebel groups: the RCD and the MLC. The 62-member government was constituted in June 2003 and the National Assembly and Senate one month later (Reyntjens, 2007: 310). A referendum on the new constitution of the country was conducted in December 2005, legislative elections and the first round of presidential elections in July 2006 and the second round of presidential elections in October 2006 (Autesserre, 2010: 53). Joseph Kabila won the elections in a run-off battle against one of the transitional vice-presidents, Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC).

Although the political elite and international community dominated the negotiations, the Congolese masses were heavily involved in the transition and electoral process. Local actors "played a significant role in promoting voter registration and participation in the referendum" (ICG, 2006a: 2). They also implemented civic and voter education and organized election observation networks (Tohbi, 2008: 90). Albeit the electoral process had been imposed on the Congolese population by the international community most of them "were happy with it though, because it included the prospect of the end to the war" (Vlassenroot & Romkema, 2007:13). As such, their commitment mainly stemmed from the fact that they were incredibly tired of the war that had caused so much suffering and losses of human lives. The fact that people were desperately longing for a change was underlined by the voting pattern. People did not vote for a candidate, but against the leaders that had controlled their respective region during the war: "In Kinshasa-controlled areas, the vote went *against* Kabila and in favor of Bemba or Gizenga. In the areas controlled by one or another rebel authority during those years, the vote went *against* Bemba [...] and in favor of Kabila" (Weiss, 2007: 143).

However, the largely peaceful elections should not hide the fact that the violence in Eastern DRC has continued until this day. In what follows, the article does not attempt to make a normative statement on whether elections should or should not have been held. It merely tries to elucidate the consequences of the exclusion of local actors in the negotiations and in the decision to hold elections. Three main problematic issues can be depicted.

The first problematic aspect was that holding elections became equated with state-building (Autesserre, 2010: 105). The international community focused so ardently on elections, donors spent over 6 billion US$ in development and support to elections, but provided very little to the state institutions at the basis of a democratic country (ICG, 2006b: 1). The unbalanced funding may partly be due to the fact that "[t]he attitude of many international and national leaders has been to hold elections first and change the political system after (ICG, 2006a: 23). Yet, such an approach to statebuilding which focuses almost exclusively on the centralisation of state power is insufficient for the establishment of a healthy democracy if it is limited to the holding of elections (Tull, 2010: 657). As a result, the government was provided with electoral legitimacy in the eyes of donors, much more than of the Congolese people, which "emboldened it to seek unfettered state power, suppressing societal grievances as illegitimate, a process that donors have largely tolerated in their desire to see a reconstituted central state" (Ibid.: 645-6). Indeed, "many Congolese feel disenfranchised by a government increasingly reliant on strong-handedness, as its authority rests on weak national and local institutions – a crisis of governance that the elections did not solve" (Carayannis, 2009: 5). Therefore, locals perceived the elections as legitimizing the government's authoritarian attitude by claiming it to be part of a state-building project (Tull, 2010: 657). This is also mirrored in the post-election period as "the political process [became] more repressive and avenues for articulating grievances peacefully [became] more limited" (Carayannis, 2008: 13).

Secondly, the exclusion of local actors in the peace negotiations also implied an exclusion of locally formed militia groups which continued to fight in the East. This was specifically problematic in the DRC because the exclusion of certain communities was one of the triggers that had initially caused the conflict. The Pole Institute conducted consultations in some regions of the Congo[12] in 1999 after the signing of the Lusaka Agreement. Summarizing the statements, most of the interviewees felt excluded in the process and considered that only their inclusion could lead to the building of institutions that adequately represent all members of society. This was judged as indispensable to build peace because the exclusion of communities was seen as one of the main causes of the conflict in the first place (Pole

---

[12] Goma, Rutshuru and Masisi

Institute, 1999: 12). As such, it can be argued that the peace negotiations actually replicated one of the conflict causes. The exclusion of the Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsis from South Kivu) provides an example. The Banyamulenge settled in the Congo from Rwanda more than two centuries ago (ICG, 1999: 23). Other Congolese groups threatened them, however, and wanted to chase them out of the DRC arguing that they were not Congolese. The negotiations did not include the perspectives of the Banyamulenge and they thus continued to feel in danger. In 2002, they mobilized against the RCD forces with which they had been aligned during the war as they figured that their endeavour to become acknowledged as Congolese citizens was rendered more unlikely had they kept their alliance with Rwanda (Carayannis, 2007: 247). Other communities in Eastern Congo were equally excluded which sometimes led to a feeling of insecurity and the forming of local militia groups (Rogier, 2004: 40). Indeed, an analysis of the conflict shows that the continued violence was mainly instigated by "fragmented, micro-level militias who originally intended merely to protect their kinsfolk" (Autesserre, 2010: 7). Because the transition did not provide for an increased feeling of security for local actors in Ituri for instance, "most Ituri militias claimed that their community [...] still needed to protect itself from expropriation, oppression, and extermination by their local enemies" (Ibid.: 175). Another example is provided by the Mai Mai. The Mai Mai groups constantly form and reform based on ethnic bases. Their leaders have "never accepted the Lusaka Agreement cease-fire and have argued that so long as there are Rwandan troops in their area they will go on fighting them and their proxy, the RCD" (Carayannis, 2007: 247). This shows how excluded local actors, forming in militias, can threaten a peace process. Most of them did not make it to the negotiation table as they were not regarded as national elite by the international community.

Thirdly, the focus on national elections drew away attention from the continued violence in the East and its local causes. Autesserre (2010: 111) has shown that the mentions of the electoral process in the Secretary General's reports on MONUC increased during the transition and took up a third of the last two reports in 2006 whereas these latter reports only mentioned the security situation in North Kivu and South Kivu in one paragraph. The focus of the international community was on national and regional causes of the war[13], whereas "[l]ocal manifestations of violence, although often related to national or regional struggles, were also precipitated by distinctively local problems" (Ibid.:155). An example is provided by the District of Ituri. The main fighting occurred between two ethnic groups, the predominantly herding Hema, and the mainly farming Lendu. However, as demonstrated by Autesserre (2010: 175), these clashes were not purely caused by regional and national manipulation, but

---

[13] As regional cause they saw the invasion of Uganda and Rwanda and put diplomatic pressure on these two governments in order to prevent future interventions. Nationally, they considered the lack of leadership as reason for fighting and therefore pushed for the elections to reconstruct a legitimate and unified national government.

"violence continued because militias rejected the attempts by the Transitional Government, [...] to impose state authority in the district, since it would have jeopardized their control of local economic and political positions of authority". As such, they were often not coordinated on a larger regional or national scale, but "in pursuit of micro-level agendas" (Ibid.: 177). In such a climate, national elections will not help to solve the crisis, and – worst case – even further exacerbate the violence.

However, the above criticisms should not hide the fact that local ownership, even with the best intentions, is not easily achieved.

3.2.) Challenges of local ownership

Several obstacles exist that international peacebuilding actors have to deal with when aiming at implementing local ownership. It is not obvious to identify local counterparts as civil society actors are often narrowly entangled in the politics of their respective country: "heads of NGOs who interact as individuals with outsiders are close to political parties and simultaneously undertake many roles, using the resulting ambiguity to manipulate their contacts with foreigners" (Pouligny, 2004: 4-5). In the DRC, observers "even suggest[ed] a level of corruption in the manner that negotiations took place and political positions were apportioned to civil society actors" (Davis and Hayner, 2007: 37). In Sun City, some civil society organizations even aligned themselves with armed groups during the negotiations (Rogier, 2004: 39). It has to be borne in mind that these actors are all insiders to the conflict. Even though many accounts exist of the conciliating role of civil society actors and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, they should not be naively glorified. As Carl (2003: 3) states, "[w]hile they are vitally important, [...] traditional capacities for conflict management have failed to manage or contain the conflict". Another problematic aspect with the promotion of ownership is the instrumentalization of the 'traditional'. Groups may start to refer to the traditional as they want to benefit from the "supposed higher moral value to be gained by labelling a practice or attitude as 'traditional'" (Mac Ginty, 2008: 150). Moreover, certain actors may for instance start to mirror western society in the hope to benefit from the association with western donors. Pietz and von Carlowitz (2007: 9) describe another dilemma of international peacebuilders to select their local partners. On the one hand, their activities should be based on existing structures and traditions, but such power structures are often what have caused the war in the beginning. As Smith states "[t]he lines of division that led to conflict escalation normally survive the peace process: if war is continuation of politics by other means, peace is generally the resumption of the same politics, often by the same pre-war means. Groups with the capacity to own projects are usually connected to those political divisions or active parts of them" (Smith, 2004: 27). Two conclusions are important in this

respect: Local approaches should not be naively glorified and local actors should not be seen as apolitical.

Conclusion

The article has shown that whereas the concept of security now increasingly has as its object the local population of a given country, they are often still not ascribed the corresponding agency. In a conflict or post-conflict contexts, outsiders decide upon the way their security should be guaranteed. The article exemplified this fact by depicting two definitional ambiguities of the term 'local ownership': the fact that the international community still considers national elites as their main counterparts and the fact that the term is defined as local actors taking ownership over a pre-defined process and not over its design. Civil society representatives were largely excluded in the negotiations to put an end to the conflict in the DRC. The main negotiations took place between political elites under the pressure of the international community. Amongst other factors, this led to a prioritization on elections as a peacebuilding measure. Priorities were thus not set according to the conditions present in the country, but based on unquestioned pre-assumptions of international actors based on the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. The exclusion of local actors as well as the focus on elections had important consequences on the transition process of the DRC; such as the equation of elections with state building, the exclusion of specific communities which continued to fight, as well as a misinterpretation and ignorance of certain conflict causes. Local ownership is not easily achieved, but it seems intuitive that in order to rebuild peace in a more sustainable manner, international actors should allow for diverse actors, and not only elites, to express themselves in order to give the unheard the voice they deserve.

References

Adler, Emmanuel (1997), "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", *European Journal of International Relations* 3(3): 319-363.

Anderson, Mary B. and Lara Olson (2003), *Confronting War: Critical Lessons For Peace Practitioners*, Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, The Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., Cambridge MA.

Annan, Kofi (2001), *Report of the Secretary General, No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations*, UN Doc. S/2001/394.

Annan, Kofi (2005), *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, UN Doc. A59/2005.

Autesserre, Sévérine (2006), "Local Violence, National Peace? Postwar "Settlement" in the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003-2006), *African Studies Review* 49(3): 1-29.

——— (2009), "Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention", *International Organization* 63: 249-280.

——— (2010), *The Trouble With The Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Axworthy, Loyd, Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss (2001), "Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First", *Global Governance*, 7(1): 19-24.

Barnett, Michael (2006), "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War", International Security 30(4): 87-112.

Baylis, J (2001), "International and Global Security in the post-Cold War Era", in Baylis, J. and Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin (2004), *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bennet, Andrew and Joseph Lepgold (1993), "Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold War and Gulf Conflict", *Political Science Quarterly*, 108 (2): 213-237.

Boshoff, Henri and Martin Rupiya (2003), "Delegates, Dialogue and Desperadoes: The ICD and the DRC peace process", *African Security Review*, 12(3): 29-37.

Boutros-Boutros Ghali (1992), "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping", A/47/277 - S/24111, available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html (last consulted: 27.02.2011).

Carayannis, Tatiana (2003), "The Complex Wars of the Congo: Towards a New Analytic Approach", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 38: 232-255.

Carayannis, Tatiana (2008), *Elections in the DRC. The Bemba Surprise*, Special Report 200, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

Carayannis, Tatiana (2009), "The challenge of building sustainable peace in the DRC", *Background Paper*, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Carl, Andy (2003), "Supporting local capacities for handling violent conflict: a role for interna tional NGO's?", Occasional Paper, Conciliation Resources.

Commission on Human Security (2003), *Human Security Now*, available at: http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html (last consulted: 20.3.2011).

Davis, Laura and Priscilla Hayner (2009), *Difficult Peace, Limited Justice: Ten Years of Peacemaking in the DRC*, International Center for Transitional Justice.

Donais, Timothy (2009), "Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of local ownership in post-conflict peacebuilding processes", *Peace and Change* 34(1): 3-26.

———and Tobias Hagmann (2009), "Civilian peacebuilding: peace by bureaucratic means?", *Conflict, Security & Development* 9(1): 55-73.

Doyle, Michael W. (1983), "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs". *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12(3): 205–235.

Ekengard, Arvid (2009), "Coordination and Coherence in the Peace Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo", *Defence Analysis*, Swedish Defence Research Agency.

Einsiedel, Sebastian von (2004), "Policy Responses to State Failure" in Chesterman, Simon et. al., eds., Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance, New York: United Nations University Press: 13-35.

Gegout, Catherine (2009), "The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996 – 2006)", *International Peacekeeping*, 16(2): 231-244.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede (2009), "The Spread of Civil War" in Bercovitch, Jacob et al., eds., *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, London: Sage Publications: 595-612.

Gilady, Lilach and Bruce Russett (2002), "Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution", in: Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage Publications: 392-408.

Gordenker, Leon and Thomas G. Weiss (1993), "The Collective Security Idea and Changing World Politics", in: Thomas Weiss, eds., *Collective Security in a Changing World*, : 3-18.

Goetschel, Laurent and Tobias Hagmann (2009), "Civilian peacebuilding: peace by bureau cratic means?", Conflict, Security & Development 9(1): 55-73.

Haider, Huma (2009), "Community-based Approaches to Peacebuilding in Conflict-affected and Fragile Contexts", *Issues Paper*, Governance and Social Development Resource Center.

Heredia, Marta Iñiguez de (2009): "The space for Congolese self-determination between

absences and presences of the African Union and the United Nations", *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 3(1): 1-14.

Hoebeke, Hans, Stéphanie Carette and Koen Vlassenroot (2007), *EU support to the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Centre d'analyse stratégique.

Insight on Conflict, http://www.insightonconflict.org/ (last consulted: 27.02.2011).

International Crisis Group (1999), "The Agreement of a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace", *ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report*, N° 5.

International Crisis Group (2001), "The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Political Negotiation or Game of Bluff?", *Africa Report* N°37.

———— (2002), "Storm Clouds Over Sun City: The Urgent Need to Recast the Congolese Peace Process", *Africa Report* N°44.

———— (2003), "Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri", *Africa Report* N°64.

———— (2004a), "Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo", *Africa Briefing*, N° 18.

———— (2004b), "Maintaining Momentum in the Congo: The Ituri Problem", *Africa Report*, N°84.

———— (2006a), "Congo's Elections: Making or Breaking the Peace", *Africa Report*, N°108.

———— (2006b), "Escaping the Conflict Trap: Promoting Good Governance in the Congo", *Africa Report*, N°114.

———— (2006c), "Securing Congo's Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa Showdown", *Africa Briefing*, N°42.

———— (2007a), "Congo: Staying Engaged after the Elections", *Africa Briefing*, N°44.

———— (2007b), "Congo: Consolidating the Peace", *Africa Report*, N°128.

Joseph, Edward P. (2007), "Ownership is Over-Rated", *SAIS Review*, 27(2): 109-123.

Krummenacher, Heinz; Can Deniz (2010), "How International Policy Changes in Kivu are Reflected in THE FAST Early Warning Data, 2002-2007", *Genocide Prevention Advisory Network*.

Mac Ginty, Roger (2008), "Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace", *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 43(2): 139-163.

Masire, Ketumile (2001), "The Lusaka Agreement, Prospects for peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo", *African Security Review*, 10(1). Available at: http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/10no1/Masire.html (last consulted: 20.3.2011).

Moore Jonathan, eds. (1998), *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention*, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.

Newman, Edward, Roland Paris and Oliver P. Richmond, eds. (2009), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, New York: United Nations University Press.

Nsengimana, Fabien; Eugène van Kemenade and Aurélien Tobie, "Strengthening Local

Mediaton Efforts: Lessons from Eastern DRC", *IFP Mediation Cluster Country Case Study: DRC.*

Ogata, Sadako and Johan Cels (2003), "Human Security – Protecting and Empowering the People", *Global Governance*, 9: 273-282.

Ottaway, Marina (2002), "Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States", *Development and Change*, 33(5): 1001-1023.

Paris, Roland (2003a), "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?", *International Security*, 26(2): 87-102.

⎯⎯⎯⎯ (2003b), "Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture", *European Journal of International Relations*, 9(3): 441-473.

⎯⎯⎯⎯ (2004), *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peace Direct and Quaker United Nations Office, "Ripples into Waves: Locally-led Peace building on a National Scale", 2010, available at: http://www.insightonconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Ripples-into-Waves-concept-paper.pdf, last consulted: .

Pietz, Tobias and Leopold von Carlowitz (2007), "International and Local Policing in Peace Operations", *8th International Berlin Workshop*, Zentrum für Internationale Frie-denseinsätze.

Pole Institute (1999), "Dialogue intercongolais 1: points de vue des members de Pole Institute", *Regards Croisés*, 2.

Pouligny, Béatrice (2004), "Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peace Building: Ambiguities of International Programs Aimed at Building 'New Societies'", conference on *Post-conflict peace building: How to gain sustainable peace? Lessons learnt and future challenges*, held at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.

Prendergast, John and Emily Plumb (2002), "Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to Peacebuilding", in Stephen John Stedman, et al., eds., *Ending Civil Wars*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Ray, James Lee (1995), *Democracy and International Conflict*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Reich, Hannah (2006), "'Local Ownership' in Conflict Transformation Projects", *Berghof Occasional Paper*.

Richmond, Oliver P. (2004), "UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus", *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1): 83-101.

⎯⎯⎯⎯ (2009), "Liberal peace transitions: a rethink is urgent", Published on *openDemocracy*, available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net (last consulted: 27.02.2011).

⎯⎯⎯⎯ (2010), "What is your alternative?", Published on openDemocracy, available at:

http://www.opendemocracy.net (last consulted: 27.02.2011).

Reyntjens, Filip (2007), "Democratic Republic of Congo: Political Transition and Beyond", *African Affairs*, 106(423): 307-317.

Risley, Paul and Timothy Sisk (2005), "Democracy and United Nations Peacebuilding at the Local Level: Lessons Learned", Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

Rogier, Emeric (2004), "The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: A Critical Overview" in: Mark Malan and Joao Gomes Porto, eds., *Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies: 25-42.

Russett, Bruce (1993), *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Saxby, John (2003), *Local ownership and development co-operation – the role of Northern civil society*. Ontario: Canadian Council for International Co-operation Resource Document.

Sisk, Timothy D. and Andrew Reynolds (eds.) (1999): Elections and Conflict Management in Africa. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C.

Smith, Dan (2004): Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act To gether. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding. Oslo: PRIO, International Peace Research Institute.

Stromseth, Jane (2006): "Blueprints for Post-Conflict Governance", In: Jane E. Stromseth, David Wippman, Rosa Brooks: *Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law after Military Intervention*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 85 – 133.

Tohbi, Vincent (2008), "The Elections in the DRC – International and National Contributions", In: *Elections in Post-Conflict Countries – Lessons Learned from Liberia, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, and Kosovo*, Report of a ZIF/KAIPTC Seminar, June 12–14, 2008, Accra/Ghana: 87-90.

Thomas, Caroline (2001), "Global governance, development and human security: exploring the links", *Third World Quarterly*, 22(2): 159–175.

Tull, Denis M. Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War in: International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2009, pp. 215-230

Tull, Denis M. (2010), "Troubled state-building in the DR Congo: the challenges from the margins", *Journal of Modern African Studies* 48(4): 643-661.

Tremblay, Philippe (2004), "La Transition Politique en République Démcoratique du Congo: Une Chance Historique", *Droits et Démocratie*, Centre international des droits de la personne et du développement démocratique.

Tschirgi, Necla (2004), *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations,*

Challenges, Prepared for the WSP International/IPA Peacebuilding Forum Conference, New York.

Tshiyoyo, Dieudonné (2007), *Post-Transitional Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.

Van Tongeren, Paul; Malin Brenk; Marte Hellema; Juliette Verhoeven, eds., (2005), *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Van Tongeren, Paul (1999), *Inspiring Stories of Peace-building. In: People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World*, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, in cooperation with the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) and the Co-existence Initiative of State of the World Forum.

Vlassenroot, Koen and Hans Romkema (2007), "Local Governance and Leadership in East ern DRC", The Hague: Oxfam-Novib.

Weiss, Herbert F. (2007), "Voting for Change in the DRC", *Journal of Democracy*, 18(2): 138-151.

Whitman, Shelley (2003), "Balancing Act: An Insider's View of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue", *African Security Review*, 12(4): 133-135.

World Movement for Democracy (*undated*), *A Short History of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Involvement of NGOs in the Peace Process*, available at: http://www.wmd.org/resources/whats-being-done/ngo-participation-peace-negotiations/history-conflict-democratic-republic (last consulted: 20.3.2011).

Lusaka Agreement (1999), available at: http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/drcongo/cdreader/bin/2lusaka.pdf (last consulted: 20.3.2011)

Global and All Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Inter-Congolese Dialogue – Political negotiations on the peace process and on transition in the DRC (2002), available at: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/DRC%2020021216.pdf (last consulted: 20.3.2011)

United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, Strengthening of the United Nations system. « Identical letters dated 18 February 2011 form the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council. Agenda item 120. 22 Ferbuary 2011. A/65/747 – S/2011/85.

United Nations Development Program (1994), "Human Development Report", Oxford, Oxford University Press, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/ (last consulted: 20.3.2011).

Commission on Human Security (2003), "Final Report", New York, available at:

http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html (last consulted: 20.3.2011).