The Re-Creation of Civil Society in Tanzania by Western Donors Following the end of the Nyerere Regime: How NGOs have come to Rule the Roost and Indigenous Forms of Associational Life have been Marginalized

Name - Mark McQuinn
Affiliation - School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK
Contact – mm22@soas.ac.uk

1. Introduction

Tanzania moved from the distinct post-independence political path of socialist self-reliance it followed for more than twenty years under the Presidency of Julius Nyerere (1961–1985) to reluctantly accepting an IFI-driven Structural Adjustment Programme in 1986. The subsequent uneven move toward embracing the post-Cold War 'new policy agenda' of the major Western multilateral and bilateral donors (neo-liberal economic policies based on private-sector growth and multiparty liberal democracy with an emphasis on 'good governance') gained pace under the rule of Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005). This 'remarkable political journey' (Harrison, 2010: 125) has been controversial, with advocates (World Bank, 2010, Nord et al, 2009) claiming that Tanzanian has become a major developmental success story and detractors (Harrison, 2010, Gould and Ojanen, 2005) arguing that such claims are based on unwarranted optimism, since there has been an over-concentration on economic growth at the expense of a concern with equity and national control of economic assets.

A key aspect of the new policy agenda is the attempt to open up the policy-making process to the 'participation' of citizens in the institutionalised context of civil society organizations (CSOs), leading to increased accountability on the part of governments. This paper examines the way Tanzanian civil society has been recreated following the end of the Nyerere regime, largely through the influence of Western donor agencies. The reconstituting of civil society has been a key plank of the new policy agenda, aimed at entrenching the values and institutions of Western liberal democracy. To receive aid and debt relief from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies the Tanzanian government has been pressured by external donors to show that its development plans include the 'mass participation' of civil society organisations, which represent a diversity of views from citizens. Through this process a consensus is generated as to what should form the basis of national development plans. This fieldwork-based research shows that some forms of associational life, such as trade unions, which have roots in Tanzanian society dating back to the colonial period, have been marginalized by external donors and the state and a 'new' managed civil society, centred on elite urban-based NGOs has been

created.

The paper firstly examines the arguments that Tanzania has become a developmental success story since adopting the new policy agenda in the 1990s, before focusing on the changing roles of – and relationships between - civil society and the state under the regimes of Nyerere and Mkapa. Conceptual frameworks for analyzing the role of civil society in general and then trade unions in particular are outlined. This provides the basis for an examination of the roles of NGOs and trade unions under the Nyerere and Mkapa regimes. The main findings of this fieldwork-based research [1] are that NGOs have become the leading actors among associational groups in Tanzania, largely through the influence of external donors, who frame their vision of civil society within a liberal perspective, drawing heavily on the arguments of Alexis De Tocqueville. The same donors have tried to limit the role of trade unions in Tanzania to that of a 'business unionism' approach to debates concerning the relationship between labour and capital, centred on acceptance of the main precepts of neo-liberal economic policies. It is argued that by employing a Gramscian analysis of civil society – rather than a liberal perspective - greater explanatory power regarding the roles of NGOs and trade unions in Tanzania is possible.

2. Tanzania as an IFI Show Case

For the IFIs, the economic and political policies adopted by the Mkapa regime in the mid-1990s heralded a decisive move in the right direction, following the initial steps taken by Nyerere's successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi in the latter half of the 1980s. These policies have led to Tanzania becoming an IFI show-case, portrayed as 'one of the best performers in Sub-Saharan Africa' (World Bank, 2010: 1) and praised for its sound 'macroeconomic policies, market oriented reforms, and debt relief [which] have provided a conducive environment for Tanzania's steady economic growth' (ibid). According to the IMF (Nord et al. 2009: 1), Tanzania has experienced a 'remarkable turnaround' characterized by 'buoyant' economic growth, 'booming' exports and poverty 'heading downwards.' Tanzania is currently ranked as the best country in Africa in terms of enforcing contracts (IFC, World Bank, 2011).

Overall, according to the donor community, 'Tanzania serves as evidence that ownership [of national policies] can be constructed through 'partnership' between state and donors' (Harrison, Mulley and Holtom 2009: 295), However, the argument that 'national ownership' of policies has been achieved, to a significant degree through the widespread 'participation' of citizens within the framework of civil society organisations can be challenged through a close analysis of

---

[1] The fieldwork findings – based on interviews with NGO and trade union officials in Tanzania, along with participant observation and document analysis.

the development of the civil society sector in Tanzania from the colonial period through to the rule of Mkapa.

3. Conceptualizing Civil Society

3.1 The Dominant Liberal Perspective
The ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), the French observer of US democracy, who made much of the associational world in which people decide their wants and needs and ask for them through associations, have been revived by the Western donor community and have become very influential in debates focusing on the role of civil society in development processes. For de Tocqueville (1845a, 1845b), associations are schools of democracy where open minded thinking, attitudes and behaviour are learned in order primarily to protect the rights of individuals. Associations should be constructed voluntarily at local, regional and national levels. Participation in such associations will lead to the inculcation of important civic virtues, such as tolerance and honesty, which will assist people in being able to put the interests of the group above that of the individual. The building of these civic virtues moderates public opinion and increases levels of trust and confidence in society. The resulting vibrancy of a many layered civil society becomes important in restricting over-weaning power, both on the part of the state and any particular group. De Tocquevillian ideas have been promoted with vigour by the World Bank, which provides many sources citing his arguments relating to civil society on its website.

3.2 The Gramscian Conceptualization of Civil Society
Gramsci differs markedly from de Tocqueville in his conception of civil society, arguing that exploitative capitalist relations are 'underpinned by a complex of moral injunctions that make these relations seem right and proper to all parties in the exchange' (Femia, 2001:139). People define their interests in terms of their own ideas and values, which imbues them with meaning. These might be false, class-biased and may mystify and cloud relations but we can 'never detach ourselves from some moral perspective or other' (ibid). This view forms the basis of Gramsci's concept of hegemony – how a set of ideas put forward by a ruling class become entrenched - and explanation as to why capitalism survives even when the objective conditions for a transition to communism are prevalent.

Gramsci focuses on how hegemony is created through consent and coercion (Morton, 2007). For Gramsci, power becomes embedded and embodied in the everyday routines of institutions and apparatuses. These important facets of the way power is used are not examined within a liberal perspective. Thus using a Gramscian perspective regarding civil society allows a more nuanced understanding of how certain institutions (NGOs) come to dominate particular apparatuses

(such as the civil society section in the PRSP process) while other institutions (trade unions) are marginalized, than is possible when employing a liberal framework of analysis.

For Gramsci (1977), cultural hegemony in relation to civil society is a vital area of study. Gramsci emphasized the potentially oppositional role of civil society as a 'public room' separate from the state and market where ideological hegemony is contested. Civil society contains numerous organizations and ideologies which both challenge and uphold the existing order. The political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes and societal consensus is therefore formed within civil society. Thus, using a Gramscian framework allows for the possibility of the development of influential civil society organizations, which identify transiently with a specific social sector of society and gain enough power and support to limit the power of the state, through having a strong influence on its policies. In Tanzania, NGOs provide a challenge to the state in such a way, as they have access to finance and power, through the patronage of foreign donors, which trade unions and informal associational groups lack.

3.3   Theorizing Trade Unions

Hyman (2001) identifies three main types of trade unionism. First, business unionism, centred on trade unions largely accepting the existing relations of market power and embracing the discourse of 'flexible' working practices and 'partnership' between capital and labour, leading to an emphasis on representing the interests of members mainly through collective bargaining. Second, revolutionary unionism exists, with the stress on representing the working class through militant anti-capitalist opposition. Third, some trade unions have moved towards social movement unionism (Bezuidenhout, 2002), which is a strategy where 'labour goes beyond the workplace … to form links with communities … while also working space through networking place to place within the same global corporation' (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008: 160).

For the labour movement in Africa, adopting any of these three approaches clearly and consistently is problematic, since an interregnum exists, marked by disorder, disorientation and dislocation (Von Holdt, 2003). This situation is reflected in contrasting views of the current state of - and possibilities for - trade unions. Lambert (2002: 186) argues that labour organizations are characterized by organizational decline. While some individual unions and federations have attacked the negative effects of global neo-liberalism on workers, these efforts lack rigour and have not had any 'significant impact or attract[ed] citizens into their ranks'. In contrast, Kester (2007: 3) argues that trade unions in Africa are very important in campaigning for institutional democracy based on balancing ownership with other social concerns

and are 'ideally placed to contribute to the democratization of the economy.' In addition, Kraus (2007a) points out that unions in many African countries played key roles in organizing protests and strikes during the 1980s and 1990s which were significant in overthrowing authoritarian regimes. Through such actions unions also created political space which other CSOs could use to confront monolithic governments. These actions have continued in a number of countries as neoliberal policies exacerbate existing inequalities.

4. Background: Civil Society during the Colonial Regime in Tanzania

The formation and activities of NGOs were tightly constrained by the colonial authorities in Tanzania. Kiondo (1993) records the founding of just eleven NGOs during the colonial period. The independence struggle stimulated an increasingly active indigenous civil society, based on the cooperative movement in the agricultural sector (which has existed since the 1920s), the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU) in the political arena (which became officially recognized as the first political party in Tanganyika in 1954) and a growing trade union movement, organized from 1955 by the Tanganyikan Federation of Labour (TFL). In addition, Chieftaincies in northern Tanzania during the colonial era contained 'a kaleidoscope of associational life, including lineages, clans, age-sets, credit groups (*upatu*), communal labour groups, sports clubs, dance societies, faith based organisations and courts of elders' (Gibbon, 2001: 822). Taking into account the active roles played by the co-operative societies and the TFL in working with TANU, the victory of the nationalists in 1961 was 'driven primarily by civil society groups' (Matlosa, 2004: 79). However, such organizations were quickly suppressed and/or subsumed within the organs of the ruling party under the post-independence regime of Nyerere.

5. Civil Society under the Nyerere Regime (1961 – 1985)

5.1 The Squeezing of Civil Society during the 1960s and 1970s

During the two decades following the achievement of independence from Britain in 1961 firmly imposed statist policies, supported by the international donor community and influential foreign NGOs, led to a situation where independent associational life in Tanzania was greatly circumscribed. From 1961 to 1978 only seventeen new NGOs were registered in the country (Kiondo, 1993).

The limiting by the government of the activities of CSOs intensified after Tanzania formally became a one-party state in 1965. For Shivji (1991: 85), the 'destruction of autonomous organised expression of the differences in civil society is the first profound effect of the monopoly of politics by the state-party.' State control became pervasive in the latter

half of the 1960s with the result that associational life 'at the national level was effectively crippled' (Tripp, 2000: 197).

The Arusha Declaration of 1967, based on the principles of socialism and self-reliance - along with the collectivization of agriculture under *ujamaa* - led to state structures gradually replacing the co-operative societies, which were proscribed in 1976 and replaced with '*ujamaa* associations'. Within a further year, remaining CSOs of substance, such as the Dar es Salaam Student Association (DUSO), were brought under state control. The worsening of economic conditions under ujamaa policies during the 1970s influenced the state's decision to tighten its control over development activities even further. This led to a 'removal of space for independent activity' (Jennings, 2007: 92-93).

Foreign donor funding and support for government policies were also significant in helping the state to maintain a grip as the leading agent of development. The IFIs and bilateral donors were at this time keen to support what they perceived as 'progressive non-communist development models' (Kiondo, 1993: 166). Tanzania received the highest level of official development assistance in Africa from 1977 to 1979, the majority being in grant form, which made it easy for the government to leverage.

The ideologies of foreign NGOs during the ujamaa period also limited the ability of indigenous civil society organisations to develop. Jennings (2008, 2001) shows how Oxfam (as well as other NGOs) supported the *ujamaa* programme on ideological grounds, and in doing so became 'surrogates of the state' and 'part of a process that withdrew power and representation from the grassroots' (Jennings, 2001: 131).

5.2   The Increasing Importance of the Role of NGOs during the 1980s

With the adoption of neo-liberalism on the part of the IFIs from the end of the 1970s, Tanzania's statist policies – and the Presidency of Nyerere - came under pressure, given the large dependence of the government on external financing. The Tanzanian government's acceptance of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 changed the dynamic between the state and civil society in Tanzania. Under the SAP, externally driven neo-liberal policies replaced statism and the ideology of *ujamaa* was rolled back.

As the democratic deficit brought about by the newly-imposed market-driven model became apparent during the 1980s, NGOs increasingly filled in the gaps by providing social services. NGOs were seen by the major donors as more efficient, less bureaucratic and not as corrupt as the state sector. This led to increasing numbers of NGOs entering the development arena in Tanzania. The doubling of the social service sector NGOs registering during the 1980s in comparison to the 1970s reflected the 'tremendous erosion of government capacity in

social service provision' (Kiondo, 1993: 171).

The changing relationship between the state and civil society in Tanzania during the 1980s led to the classification by Shivji (1991) of different types of NGOs operating in the country. Shivji identifies four categories of NGOs according to their socio-political alignment that emerged during this period; government-organised NGOs (GONGOs), foreign NGOs (FONGOs), local NGOs (LONGOs) - the majority of which were foreign funded (FFUNGOs) - and People's Organisations (POs).

The rise of GONGOs is related to the recognition of the government that NGOs were attracting a substantial amount of foreign funding. This stimulated efforts on the part of the Tanzanian government to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the work of NGOs, in order to obtain access to donor financing and to establish patron-client relationships with intended beneficiaries of the work of NGOs. FONGOs are mostly Tanzanian branches of Big International NGOs (BINGOs) and function to channel external donor financing into the operation of local initiatives or support for the existing work of indigenous NGOs. LONGOs are closely related to FONGOs in comprising local NGOs, formed and funded largely or wholly through international donor financing. FONGOs and LONGOs have in common a socio-political alignment to BINGOs. People's Organisations (POs) are often grassroots groups, which are self-financing or use international funding only as a supplement to their own fund-raising strategies. Some POs have confronted government policies and stood up for the interests of those being oppressed. Government antagonism towards POs critical of their policies was ameliorated during the 1980s by the need to have as many development agents as possible supplementing the increasingly beleaguered state provision.

Overall, the number and the activities of NGOs increased substantively in Tanzania from the late 1970s and through the period of SAPs in the 1980s, as the IFI-influenced move to neo-liberal policies led to the rolling back of state activities. The government's efforts to manage these challenges to its authority, centred on maintaining wide discretionary powers to register and de-register NGOs. This was done primarily through the Societies Ordinance, which proved a powerful tool of control, since it allowed the registrar of associational groups to refuse applications for registration and to de-register existing organizations. The state also monitored the work of NGOs in 'sensitive' sectors carefully and managed its own NGOs (GONGOs). 'Sensitive' sectors included all advocacy work, human rights and organisations working in areas where CCM had dedicated wings of the party; notably gender and youth.

5.3   The Role of Trade Unions under the Nyerere Regime

As with NGOs, the advent of independence in 1961 led to trade unions coming under strict state control. TFL leaders pressed the government for greater autonomy, which was rejected, leading to a series of strikes during 1962. The government reacted by passing a law requiring all trade unions to affiliate to the TFL if they wanted to retain legal status, thus facilitating close   state supervision. It also passed legislation making strikes almost impossible without the permission of the Ministry of Labour (Mwakyembe, 1986, Shivji, 1986).

The Preventative Detention Act of 1962 also presaged the emasculation of the trade union movement. This Act allowed unlimited detention at the President's discretion of anyone acting in a manner prejudicial to state security. The fact that the first person to be detained under the Act was the then President of the TFL, Victor Mkello, showed that 'the government was looking for an opportunity to snuff out the trade union movement' (Kapinga, 1986: 89).

Another key factor in the demise of an independent trade union movement was the mutiny in 1964 by soldiers demanding the Africanization of the Officers Corps. The Tanganyikan Federation of Labour (TFL) issued a statement in support of improved pay and conditions for the rebels, which infuriated the government, and ensured that 'its fate was sealed' (Rupiya, Lwehabura and Le Roux, 2006: 77). Trade unionists were accused of being involved in this attempted coup and over two hundred of them arrested. The TFL itself was subsequently officially dissolved by the government.

The formation by the government of the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) to replace the TFL occurred in February 1964. The government controlled NUTA and prevented the organization acting in ways inimical to its interests. Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) could only be struck between the government and NUTA, and individual trade unions could not even exist as separate legal entities outside NUTA.

TANU made it clear that strikes and large pay claims were unacceptable, which stifled the 'revolution of rising expectations' (Tumbo, 1969: 30), on the part of workers, following independence. The ruling party operated an effective 'divide and rule' policy in resisting trade union pay claims by stressing that the majority of employees in the country were poor agricultural workers, who had no comparable voice to trade unions to stand up for their interests.

In practice, NUTA did not represent workers' interests. None of its leaders were chosen by workers and its structures and objectives were defined by the legislature. At plant level NUTA provided for the

existence of Workers Committees but these were often close to management and commanded little respect from the shop floor. With striking similarity to the current situation existing in Tanzania critics accused the government of making deals with foreign capital on terms favourable to the investors and state officials and argued that NUTA's primary roles were to 'discipline and control workers... [and to] serve the interests of the ruling class' (Rwechungura, 1976: 51).

However, the publishing of Mwongozo (TANU Guidelines) in 1971 led to a period where workers were able to exercise a degree of power vis-à-vis management. Mwongozo contained clauses stipulating the need to eradicate corruption and stated that party officials and managers should set good examples to others through their lifestyles. These were used by workers to instigate actions against the abuse of the trappings of management power, which again resonates with contemporary events in Tanzania, where there is anger about the way wealth is paraded and power used by managers working for 'new [often foreign] investors' in the country. Between the publication of Mwongozo in February 1971and September 1973, numerous strikes occurred. Of these actions, the dispute at the Mount Carmel rubber plant from 1972 to 1973 (Tarimo, 1977, Mihyo, 1975) was decisive in making the government move against Mwongozo's adoption as a 'workers charter.' This was because the Tanganyika Development Finance Company (TDFL) was an investor in the Mount Carmel factory and British, German and Dutch development corporations were TDFL shareholders. Thus, a clash with the TDFL meant opposing powerful capitalist countries, which the government was not prepared to risk.

In the months following the end of the Mount Carmel dispute, therefore, the Tanzanian state moved to take control of factories away from workers. Official permission from TANU was made necessary before any industrial dispute could take place and workers' representatives deemed 'militant' were sacked and in some cases imprisoned (Bienefeld, 1979). As Davidson (1987) argues, the attempt through Mwongozo to build a party of mass participation against the power of state bureaucrats was a fraught process, illustrating the difficulty of bringing about systemic change within and against an established culture and structure.

As a result of the merger between the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar, the government formed a new trade union federation in 1979 to represent the whole Republic; Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania (JUWATA). President Nyerere oversaw the appointment of trade union leaders and was able to exclude and therefore silence potential dissenters to government policies.

Under JUWATA trade unions were subject to greater government control than had been the case with NUTA. JUWATA was forced to operate under CCM's constitution, whereas NUTA had at least worked under its own. The General Secretary of JUWATA was also the Minister of Labour and a labyrinthine system of regulations made strikes impossible. Thus, during the Nyerere regime the central organs representing trade unionists were placed in the untenable position of trying to defend the interests of both the state and labour.

5.4 Summary of the Role of Civil Society under the Nyerere Regime

All forms of civil society were tightly constrained by the state during the Nyerere regime. NGOs and trade unions both found it increasingly difficult to operate independently following the move in 1965 to a one-party state in Tanzania. As Kiondo (1993: 166) puts it, civil society associations found it hard to operate in an environment where 'probably more than anywhere else in Africa, the state successfully attempted to monopolise developmentalist claims, at least for most of the 1970s' (Kiondo, 1993: 166). However, the embracing of neo-liberal economic policies by the IFIs in the 1980s led to very different trajectories being followed by Tanzanian NGOs and trade unions under the Presidency of Mkapa.

6. Civil Society under the Mkapa Regime (1995 – 2005)

6.1 NGOs under the Mkapa Regime

The role of NGOs was stimulated by the adoption of the donor-driven new policy agenda during the 1990s. NGOs were perceived by the donors as important in constituting and cementing an active and varied civil society. Six hundred and four NGO registrations occurred between 1990 and 1995 (URT, 1995). Influential NGOs became concentrated in urban areas and in the main were 'established by educated elites who have the knowledge and contacts to start an NGO successfully' Mercer (1999: 249). The state did not embrace NGOs as 'partners' during the 1990s but instead tended to obstruct through bureaucratic means the 'gradual shift of power and prestige away from the bureaucracy to the civil society' (Mwapachu, 1998: xviii).

Research on NGO growth, activities and ideologies during the Mkapa regime reveals several key aspects. First, the donor driven nature of NGO work is apparent, with upward accountability to funders, through reliance on external funding, being more important than downward accountability to intended beneficiaries. Second, the new NGO sector is not organic in the sense of associations being created in response to the perceived needs of Tanzanian citizens (Pender, 2005, Shivji, 2004). NGOs have been scaled up in Tanzania from the 1990s, largely through the influence of external donors, which have provided most of the funding for this expansion. Third, the majority of the most influential

NGOs in Tanzania are urban based and run by well educated, middle class professionals. Fourth, NGOs tend not to have grand visions of how Tanzanian society should be configured but instead concentrate on day to day activities (Mushi, forthcoming).

The influence of donors and the difficulties involved in forming and maintaining effective NGOs outside urban areas are illustrated by the struggles to create organisations representing the concerns of pastoralists in Tanzania. The prioritization of donor interests above those of the pastoralists themselves and the need for good connections with state actors in order for NGOs to operate effectively is shown by the studies of Igoe, 2003 and Cameron, 2001. Cameron (2001) outlines how the Pastoralist Indigenous Non-Governmental Organization (PINGOs) Forum, founded in 1994 became over-laden with structures, driven by donor priorities, and was captured by a particular faction, leading to the withdrawal of external funding in 1999. Igoe (2003: 881) demonstrates that external aid from the international donors 'actually undermined the formation of civil society in pastoralist communities.' Too much time was spent on activities involving upward accountability to donors. Despite the rhetoric of 'partnership' and 'local ownership' of programmes the old top down relationship between northern donors and local NGOs remained largely unchanged.

A more positive view of the influence of Tanzanian civil society groups on development processes under Mkapa can be gained from the way that land and sexual harassment policies were changed as a result of concerted lobbying by NGOs. Consequently, the enactment of the Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act (1998) and the Land Act (1999) 'are the most significant achievement of the activities of civil organisations' (Mallaya, 2001: 27).

Nevertheless, in overall terms, the relationship between the NGO sector and the state during the period of Mkapa's Presidency, has been characterized as a series of 'peformative rituals' (Mercer, 2003) which legitimized continued economic liberalization policies and the discourse of good governance, based on partnership and participatory development. For Kelsall (2002: 598), this period saw the 'building of an ersatz, air-conditioned civil society' in Tanzania by donors keen to fund NGOs, following structural adjustment and the move to multi-party politics.

6.2   The Role of Trade Unions under the Mkapa Regime

While the role of the NGO sector increased in importance during the SAP period from the mid-1980s, the labour movement suffered, since the IFIs were 'openly hostile to trade union organizations' (Chambua, 1997: 309). Trade union membership was concentrated in the state sector, where - by the time the third phase of the SAP had taken effect

during the second half of the 1990s - redundancies had been substantive. Between 1993 and 1997 the public sector payroll was cut by 27%, from 355,000 to 260,000 (World Bank, 2000).

Mistrust between the state and representatives of labour remained during the SAP period with the government worried by the prospect of a strong and independent union movement that would mount a challenge to the policies being promulgated. Trade unions were by-passed in discussions on policy formation and SAPs were constructed and put into practice in a way which excluded the 'vast majority of the population (the urban poor, public servants and rural dwellers) from decision-making processes' (Rusimbi, 2003: 102).

Interviews conducted as part of this research show that the government acceptance of structural adjustment in Tanzania put trade unions in the position of guardians of welfarism. While unions provided opposition to SAPs partly to protect their own corporate interests in SOEs, they also voiced *popular anxiety* about the future of social services. In interviews, leaders of the larger trade unions stressed their belief that sectors such as water, health and education, should never be privatized, as they are concerned with public goods, equitable access to which must be seen as a human right for all Tanzanians.

Driven therefore by both self-interest and ideology, the Tanzanian labour movement did mount protests against the negative effects of structural adjustment on workers. However, it failed to address three vital issues. First, it did not systematically put forward alternative policies to SAPs. Second, it failed to develop detailed analyses of the relationship between multiparty liberal democracy and economic development in the country. Third, it was slow to adopt a participatory approach towards rank-and-file union members.

The trade union movement was forced into substantive changes not just by the influence of the structural adjustment programme but also through Tanzania's adoption of multi-party liberal democracy in 1991. At the 1991 JUWATA Annual Congress, workers called for more freedom for trade union activities and separation from the state. This pressure influenced the enactment of the Tanzanian Trade Union Act of 1991, which contained a provision allowing trade unions to be formed individually and separately from the structures of the federation, leading to the creation of the Organization of Tanzanian Trade Unions (OTTU) in 1992. At its 1995 Congress OTTU changed its name to the Tanzania Federation of Free Trade Unions (TFTU). However, the TFTU had an unclear status because under the provisions of the OTTU Act, OTTU was the only lawfully recognized Trade Union Federation. Therefore, the TFTU had no legal recognition under the OTTU Act (Kitindi, 1999,

Mukandala, 1999).

These developments show the unintended consequences arising in the labour movement as a result of the imposition of Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) policies in Tanzania. The PWC stresses the need to pay more attention to the sequencing of neo-liberal reforms than the original Washington Consensus and emphasizes the need to build durable and effective institutions before wider remodelling, such as privatization, can be put in place (Stiglitz, 2010, Stiglitz, 2002, Burki and Perry, 1998). However, in practice the donors acted in haste to drive the PWC reforms in Tanzania at the expense of time being taken to rigorously analyze and then implement effective new regulations, laws and policies. In particular, donor agencies pressed for freedom of association to be allowed in Tanzania, as a key plank of the move to liberal democracy. Consequently, the government came under pressure to replace the OTTU Act, but had little time to conduct research on its replacement. Thus, the promulgation in 1998 of new trade union legislation was rushed. The resulting reform produced confusing and contradictory results with two trade union federations operating, both of which had an unclear legal status.

6.3   The Trade Union Act 1998
The Trade Union Act 1998 (URT, 1998) came into force on 1 July 2000, replacing the 1991 OTTU Act and formally recognized freedom of association on the part of trade unions. All trade unions were dissolved and had to re-apply for membership of the new federation – the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA). The existing trade unions successfully applied to join TUCTA and the 'Old Guard' leaders mostly remained in place. However, some newly created unions attempted to form a separate federation, which they proposed to name the Tanzania Federation of Labour, after the organization which existed prior to independence. This attempt to form an alternative power centre to TUCTA continues to the present and is the source of rancour and division within the movement.

Under the 1998 Act, workers are allowed to organize trade unions which have their own constitutions, rules and elections. Individual trade unions and trade union federations also have the right under the Act to affiliate with, or be a member of, any consultative body registered inside or outside Tanzania. However, since 1998 there has been little external funding or support for the Tanzanian labour movement with the notable exception of DANIDA. Since 2000 DANIDA has given technical and economic support with the aim of making TUCTA a fully functioning organization. DANIDA works with all the trade unions affiliated to TUCTA as part of its overall remit to improve the labour market in Tanzania through the Business Sector Programme Support (BSPS) (Hansen, 2008a, Hansen, 2008b, DANIDA, 2002). From 1 July 2008,

DANIDA moved to the third phase (BSPS III) of its work, focusing on the technical capacity building of unions in the regions. BPS III also aims to bring about greater social dialogue involving representatives of labour, capital and the state and to develop corporate social responsibility. BPS III is therefore premised on the business unionism approach to labour movements. In overall terms, assistance aims to build up the physical and communications infrastructure of the trade union movement along with more efficient service delivery than currently exists.

7. **The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Process in Tanzania: How it has Entrenched NGO Dominance of the Civil Society Sector**

The onset of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process in October 1999 has led to changes in the composition, power dynamics and trajectories of the NGO sector in Tanzania, with foreign funded local NGOs (FFUNGOs) and foreign NGOs (FONGOs), coming to the fore and a new umbrella group, the Policy Forum created in 2001 to coordinate NGO work. Donor influence has also led to advocacy work becoming more prominent than had previously been the case (Gould and Ojanen, 2005, Pender, 2005).

The state response to these developments within the NGO sector has centred on the creation of a formal policy with regard to NGOs, the enactment of new legislation and the creation of a coordination body – the National Council for NGOs (NACONGO). Tanzanian NGOs are thus searching to articulate their policy directions amid attempts to control this key area by both the state and foreign donors.

For Gould and Ojanen (2005) a donor-driven emphasis on advocacy work by NGOs emerged at the end of the 1990s with the establishment of dedicated positions in major organisations that had hitherto concentrated on service delivery. For example, DFID commissioned research on civil society in Tanzania in 2000 (Alloo, 2000, Dangor and Nadison, 2000), which highlighted the importance of advocacy work.

Dangor and Nadison (2000), emphasize the need to build practical advocacy skills and argue that the main obstacle to the development of advocacy work among Tanzanian NGOs is the prevailing belief on the part of state institutions and civil society organisations themselves that it is 'political,' whereas 'true' civil society activities should be apolitical. This viewpoint is problematic for the work of CSOs, given that by its very nature advocacy involves recommending or supporting a particular cause or policy, making it necessarily political.

The government's efforts to regulate and direct NGOs since the inception of the PRSP started with the creation of the NGO Policy in 2000 (URT, 2001). This initiative fed into the enshrining of the Non-Governmental Organisations Act (No. 24) in 2002 (URT, 2002), which in turn set up the forming of the National Council of NGOs (NACONGO) in 2003 (URT, 2010).

NACONGO set up an 'NGO Code of Conduct' (TANGO, 2010, Hakikazi Catalyst, 2002a, 2002b) also called 'NGO Code of Ethics' (Policy Forum, 2008), the main aim of which is 'to establish core values and principles that shall guide the conduct and operations of all NGOs working in Tanzania' (Policy Forum, 2008: 1). The code focuses on the technical aspects of NGO work – governance, accountability, financial transparency, human resources, communication and information sharing and the relationship between NGOs and other stakeholders. NACONGO is currently working on developing rewards for NGOs which comply with the Code and sanctions for organisations breaking it, primarily to pre-empt state enforcement, which would imply 'weak ownership' on the part of NGOs (Policy Forum, 2008: 2).

Ensuring compliance with the Code in this way indicates that NACONGO has internalized the donor-driven liberal view of the role of civil society organisations in Tanzania, which is based on achieving consensus through amicable debates between a variety of associational groups and the state. The key point made by writers such as Cramer (2002) that 'ownership' of national policies is likely to involve conflicting positions and actions among both civil society and state organisations is not taken into consideration, as this would mean having to fundamentally rethink the liberal-consensus model.

8. The Relationship between NGOs and Trade Unions in Tanzania: Fieldwork Findings

Interviews with NGO and trade union officials, based on semi-structured questions, were used as a research tool to collect data when undertaking the three periods of fieldwork. [2] NGOs are involved in the PRSP process as members of the 'NGO Macro Group.' Nine of the thirteen NGOs which form part of the Macro Group were interviewed for this research. Twenty one trade unions are currently registered with the Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions and officials from all but one of them were interviewed from the research, as well as officials from all the departments which make up the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA). All the interviewees were asked to comment in general on their perception of the roles of – and relationships between – NGOs and trade unions in Tanzania

---

[2] The fieldwork was conducted in 2005, 2006 and 2008.

In general, the relationship between development NGOs and trade unions has been characterized by a large measure of distrust (Leather, 2005, Spooner, 2004) and this proved the case with regard to this research. The interviews showed that NGO officials overwhelmingly have little interest in, or regard for, the work of trade unions. Respondents consequently provided short answers when asked to comment on trade unions. The views of trade union officials concerning NGOs were more varied and are thus analysed in detail below. Trade union officials regard NGOs with a mixture of suspicion and envy. They have a strong perception that there is an increasing 'NGOization' of development work, which is cutting into areas where the labour movement has traditionally been active.

The most commonly made point was that both donors and the government favour NGOs over trade unions. None of the interviewees made distinctions between types of NGOs. Although several Tanzanian NGOs (Baraza La Wanawake, Hakielimu and the National Youth Council, for example) have been de-registered by the government following disputes, NGOs were perceived as a homogenous group with harmonious relationships with the state and international donor agencies. It was also argued by the majority of interviewees that NGOs are more fashionable and popular than trade unions, that NGOs duplicate the work of trade unions, that NGOs have better contacts than trade unions and that NGOs are upwardly accountable to donors, while trade unions are downwardly accountable to members.

With regard to NGO duplication of trade union work, one official argued that there is a danger that the situation in Tanzania might replicate that in Kenya, where NGOs have been encroaching on the work of labour organizations with no mandate but some success. NGOs have been quite successful in working to protect the rights of domestic servants, for example, while trade unions argue that they are more legitimate as representatives of this group. Another trade union official pointed out that Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) has campaigned vigorously for the rights of women in the workplace and that the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) has fought for basic employment rights for workers.

Such activities have led to a loss of space for the labour movement, which trade unions are becoming increasingly aware of, as more NGOs obtain finance to run high profile programmes in the areas of child labour and HIV/AIDS, while funding proposals for such work from trade unions are rejected. TRAWU officials, for example, pointed out that they had specialist knowledge of how HIV/AIDS was spread along railway routes and was leading to a high incidence of the disease amongst their members. Despite making this clear in funding proposals

to different donor groups their applications had been rejected. At the same time, NGOs with little specialist knowledge of key issues concerning HIV/AIDS in Tanzania had received funding from the same donors to run projects.

Another issue clouding the relationship between trade unions and NGOs outlined by TUCTA officials is government ring-fencing of funds for 'civil society development' and then giving it only to NGOs. Trade unions were told they were not eligible to apply for these funds. TUCTA officials feel that the refusal of funding prevents capacity building on the part of the labour movement and thus keeps them from challenging the government effectively during policy debates. The government is seen as being able through its control of funding mechanisms created by donors, to manipulate civil society into a form acceptable to them.

Individual trade unions do little work with NGOs. Only one trade union works regularly with NGOs. TPAWU works with NGOs in the UK, Holland and Germany on issues concerning pesticide control, the cut flower industry and Occupational Health and Safety. The Head of Research, Planning and Credit at TPAWU contributes to the sector publication (GOHNET) and argues that other trade unions should take this route and involve trained people in a wide variety of activities. CHODAWU had worked with a local NGO on a child labour project that was praised by officials as a 'good partner.' The problem with the project from the union point of view was its sustainability; a limited budget and time period for the project meant that the children who were taken from their places of work and reintegrated into the school system were not going to be supported until they had finished at primary level. The only way to make the project sustainable was to get more funding but applications were refused. Moreover, the TTU has done joint research with Hakielimu.

The work of TPAWU, CHODAWU and the TTU with NGOs is unusual. The interviews revealed that most TUCTA-affiliated trade unions work occasionally with NGOs (53%) or never (33%). Many officials of TUCTA-affiliated trade unions were negative in their attitude to NGOs and did not show interest in learning how to raise funds by replicating their strategies, despite 40% of interviewees arguing that 'NGOs are better at raising funds than trade unions.'

Donors are regarded by trade union officials as preferring NGOs to trade unions. This point was made by officials at the TTU, who saw different sides of NGO work. The efforts of Hakielimu in highlighting education issues in the country were praised but it was also argued that NGOs lack popular accountability, in contrast to trade unions. Moreover, NGOs are seen as more aggressive than trade unions in their

work and in pursuing relationships with other key agents of development, notably the state. An official from the General Secretary of TUICO captures the views of many trade unionists in asserting that 'NGOs chase donors much more widely and aggressively than trade unions.'

Corruption in the NGO sector and the prevalence of 'briefcase NGOs,' in particular, was also an issue raised by a number of trade union officials, one of whom contends that some 'NGOs do not work. The leaders get funds from donors … but they do not use them in the regions. They keep the funds for themselves.'

A different view was put forward by a relatively newer TUCTA official [3] interviewed, who was concerned about the suspicion many trade unionists have about NGOs and argued that the unions must actively forge links with them to strengthen the overall work of CSOs in Tanzania. Such connections are important for this official, as trade unions can use them to learn how NGOs act effectively in pursuance of their own interests when working with international donors and government officials, as well as using the media to their advantage and pursuing funding sources efficiently. A related argument was made by another official in an interview, who pointed out that trade unions wrongly have not forged links with, or learnt skills from, the influential professional associations in the country.

NGOs are attractive potentially as partners for trade unions wishing to move to a Social Movement Unionism strategy, through their financial capacity and closeness to the donors and government. However, the findings from this research indicate that mutual suspicion between NGO and trade union officials makes close collaboration problematic. The reasons for this mutual suspicion are summarized in Table 1 below.

---

[3] 'New' means appointed in the last five years rather than being part of the 'Old Guard' who have held positions from the OTTU period.

Table 1   Barriers to Effective NGO-Trade Union Collaboration in Tanzania

Issue	NGO Perception of Trade Unions	Trade Union Perception of NGOs
Accountability	Narrow accountability base – to members only. Do not represent the rank-and-file effectively. Poor methods of communication with members. Top down ethos.	No popular accountability, thus no democratic mandate. Not membership organizations. Impose themselves on constituencies Focus on upward accountability to donors.
Transparency	Do not make information and accounts readily available to members.	Produce reports and accounts for donors but not for intended beneficiaries.
Roots in Tanzanian Society	Historically linked closely to the state. Have alienated the workers as a result. Still living in the past era of the One Party State.	No roots in Tanzanian society, so do not understand their constituencies.
Corruption	Lack of transparency and top down way of operating make corruption likely and difficult to detect.	Endemic corruption in NGO sector – many 'briefcase' NGOs. NGO and state sectors inextricably interlinked. Thus, rent seeking a major motivation for forming NGOs.
Modus Operandi	Reactive, bureaucratic, inflexible.	Aggressive, insensitive, overly self-confident.
Participation	Unwilling to share ideas with other CSOs.	Participate largely in work with donors and the government
Funding	Limited, as it comes mainly from members.	From international donors, so NGO orientation and accountability upward.

Source: McQuinn (2011)

9. Conclusion

The rise to prominence of NGOs in Tanzania as the dominant civil society force is linked to macroeconomic processes going back to the 1980s when donors pressured the state to roll back the state and bring in a market driven model. The ensuing democratic deficit under Mkapa in the 1990s led to NGOs being fostered by major donors as service-providing gap fillers and evidence of the existence of a vibrant

associational life, which was seen as a necessary part of the new policy agenda. It also led to donors influencing the Tanzanian government to include NGOs in the PRSP process as the leading lights of the civil society sector.

Their championing of NGOs shows that the donors prioritize the participation of associational groups in Tanzania which fit in with their own understandings of - and visions for - civil society. Important elements of associational life, which have roots in Tanzanian society and legitimacy with members or constituencies, such as trade unions, burial societies, sports clubs, and credit associations, have been marginalized as the new policy agenda has been operationalized.

The adoption of a Gramscian perspective provides insights into the importance of civil society in Tanzania as a 'public room' where counter-hegemonic views are being put forward by some CSOs, which are able to influence the views of citizens and provoke the state into often aggressive action, which is then reported in the media, widening the debates. Through the use of a Gramscian perspective in the case of Tanzania it is possible to gain insights into how CSOs are applying ideologies and strategies which both uphold and confront the prevailing order. These varied actions can be encompassed within a Gramscian framework, as it goes beyond the liberal de Tocquevillian view, which is rooted in a narrow and consensual vision of the relationship between state and civil society, whereby a win-win scenario is the pre-determined outcome of participation in debates on national policies.

While the donors set out the overall vision for civil society in Tanzania under the Mkapa regime, this research demonstrates that the form of participation by Tanzanian CSOs in national policy processes is heavily managed by the government. For example, CSOs are not allowed input into the macro-economic policies that drive the PRSP process in Tanzania. These are based on standard neo-liberal precepts; privatization of the economy, liberalization of trade and capital markets, streamlining of the public sector and deregulation of the labour market. NGO and trade union complaints about CSO exclusion from macro-economic policy formation have been dismissed by the donors.

Furthermore, the donors driving the parameters within which CSOs take part in national policy processes have made no efforts to link to participatory models and methods which have a history in Tanzania, such as clauses from Mwongozo relating to the need for managers to lead by example, by eschewing ostentation and making personal behaviour ethical. The Workers' Committees institutionalised in many workplaces following independence could also be reexamined. Whilst

regarded as being too close to management in a lot of cases, they did create an indigenous participatory culture of sorts, parts of which could be drawn on in debates about how to include the views of workers concerning key issues such as poverty reduction and economic growth. Instead of looking for ways to draw on such relevant examples from the past in Tanzania, the donors prefer to use a small group of Westernised NGOs as a vanguard to put forward the views of Tanzanian citizens.

As well as trade unions, other forms of indigenous associational life, which have developed roots in Tanzania as by-products of economic, political, social and cultural forces, and thus do not need to be created by donors, are marginalized in the debates concerning national policy processes. These forms of associational life are important to many Tanzanians, in providing financial support, employment opportunities and social solidarity. As with trade unions, many of these associations have solid roots in society and the fact that they have been almost entirely ignored in the debates regarding national policy processes shows that the external donors are intent on creating a version of civil society in Tanzania in their own image.

Bibliography

Alloo F. (2000) 'Tanzanian Networks and the Vulnerable' in Waheeda S. and A. Albee (eds) (2001) <u>Selected Studies of Civil Society in Tanzania: Policy, Social Capital and Networks of the Vulnerable</u> Dar es Salaam: DFID

Bezuidenhout A. (2002) 'Towards Global Social Movement Unionism? Trade Union Responses to Globalization in South Africa.' In Jose A. (ed.) (2002) <u>Organized Labour in the 21st Century</u> Geneva: Institute for Labour Studies

Bienefeld M. (1979) 'Trade Unions, the Labour Process, and the Tanzanian State' in <u>The Journal of Modern African Studies</u>, Vol. 17, Issue 4

Burki S. and Perry G. (1998) <u>Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter</u> Washington, DC: World Bank

Cameron G. (2001) 'Taking Stock of Pastoralist NGOs in Tanzania' in <u>Review of African Political Economy</u>, No.87

Chambua S. (1997) 'Tanzania: A People in Distress' in Kester G. and O. Sidibe (eds) (1997) <u>Trade Unions and Sustainable Democracy in Africa</u> Aldershot: Ashgate

Cramer C. (2002) <u>Own Up! Does Anyone Out There have A Decent Theory Of Ownership?</u> London: SOAS, Centre for Development Policy and Research

Dangor Z. and D. Nadison (2000) 'Strategies to Enhance Civil Society Engagement in Public Policy in Tanzania' in Waheeda S. and A. Albee (eds) (2001) <u>Selected Studies of Civil Society in Tanzania: Policy, Social Capital and Networks of the Vulnerable</u> Dar es Salaam: DFID

DANIDA (2002) <u>Evaluation: Business Sector Support Programme Tanzania</u> Copenhagen: DANIDA

Davidson B. (1987) <u>Africa In Modern History: The Search for a New Society</u> Harmondsworth: Penguin

De Tocqueville A. (1845a) <u>Democracy In America: Volume 1</u> New York: Vintage

De Tocqueville A. (1845b) <u>Democracy In America: Volume 2</u> New York: Vintage

Femia J. (2001) 'Civil Society and the Marxist Tradition' in Kaviraj S. and S. Khilnani (eds) (2003) <u>Civil Society: History and Possibilities</u> Cambridge: CUP

Gibbon P. (2001) 'Civil Society, Locality and Globalization in Rural Tanzania: A Forty-Year Perspective' in <u>Development and Change</u>, Vol. 32, No. 5

Gramsci A. (1977) <u>Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci</u> (Edited and translated by Hoare Q. and G. Smith) London: Lawrence and Wishart

Gould J. and J. Ojanen (2005) 'Tanzania: Merging in the Circle' in Gould J. (ed.) (2005) <u>The New Conditionality: The Politics of Poverty Reduction Strategies</u> London: Zed

Hakikazi Catalyst (2002a) <u>Tanzania NGO Policy Forum: Towards A Protocol For Engagement In The Policy Process</u> Arusha: Hakikazi Catalyst

Hakikazi Catalyst (2002b) <u>The NGO Policy Group: Towards Formalisation?</u> Arusha: Hakikazi Catalyst

Hansen H. (2008a) <u>Paper for TUCTA Secretariat Retreat, September 2008: Mini-evaluation of Progress since Last Planning Retreat</u> Dar es Salaam: TUCTA

Hansen H. (2008b) <u>BSPS III Has Started</u> Dar-es-Salaam: TUCTA

Harrison G. (2010) <u>Neoliberal Africa: The Impact of Social Engineering</u> London: Zed

Harrison G., Mulley S. and D. Holtom (2009) 'Tanzania: A Genuine Case of Recipient Leadership in the Aid System?' in Whitfield L. (ed.) (2009) <u>The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for dealing with Donors</u> Oxford: OUP

Hyman R. (2001) <u>Understanding European Trade Unionism: Between Market, Class and Society</u> London: Sage

IFC, World Bank (2011) <u>Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations</u> Washington, DC: IFC, World Bank

Igoe J. (2003) 'Scaling Up Civil Society: Donor Money, NGOs and the Pastoralist Land Rights Movement in Tanzania' in <u>Development and Change</u>, Vol. 34/5

Jennings M. (2007) ' " A Very Real War": Popular Participation in Development in Tanzania During the 1950s and 1960s' in _International Journal of African Historical Studies_ Vol. 40, No. 1

Jennings M. (2001) 'Development is Very Political in Tanzania: Oxfam and the Chunya Integrated Development Programme' in Barrow O. and M. Jennings (eds) (2001) _The Charitable Impulse: NGOs and Development in East and North-East Africa_ Oxford: James Currey

Jennings M. (2008) _Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development and Ujamaa in Tanzania_ Bloomfield: Kumarian

Kapinga W. (1986) 'State Control of the Working Class Through Labor Legislation' in Shivji I. (ed.) (1986) _The State and the Working People in Tanzania_ Dakar: Codesria

Kelsall, T. (2002) 'Shop Windows and Smoke-filled Rooms: Governance and the Re-politicisation of Tanzania' in _Journal of Modern African Studies_, Vol. 40, No. 4

Kiondo A. (1993) 'Structural Adjustment and Non-Governmental Organisations in Tanzania: A Case Study' in Gibbon P. (ed.) (1993) _Social Change and Economic Reform in Africa_ Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet

Kiondo A. (1992) _Structural Adjustment, Political Pluralism and Participatory Politics in Tanzania: The Central Role of NGOs_ Dar es Salaam: TAAMULII

Kitindi O. (1999) _State Control Over Trade Unions Through Law from the 1990s: A Critical Overview_ Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam

Kraus J. (2007) 'Conclusion: Trade Unions and Democratization in Africa' in Kraus J. (ed.) (2007) _Trade Unions and the Coming of Democracy in Africa_ Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Lambert (2002) 'Labour Movement Renewal in the Era of Globalisation: Union Responses in the South' in Harrod J. and R. O'Brien (eds) (2002) _Global Unions?_ London: Routledge

Lugalla J. (1993) 'Structural Adjustment Policies and Education in Tanzania' in Gibbon P. (ed.) (1993) _Social Change and Economic Reform in Africa_ Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet

Mallya E. (2001) _Development Of Women NGOs: Case Studies Of Land And Sexual Harassment Legislation_ Dar es Salaam: Research And Education For Democracy In Tanzania (REDET)

Matlosa K. (2004) 'Civil Society and Democratization in Tanzania' in Karume S. (ed.) (2004) <u>Dilemmas of Political Transition: Towards Institutionalisation of Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania</u> Johannesburg: EISA

Mchomvu A. et al. (1998) 'Social Policy and Research Practice in Tanzania' in <u>Journal of Social Development in Africa</u>, Vol. 13, No.2

McQuinn M. (2011) 'The Position of Trade Unions within the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) Process in Tanzania' <u>Presentation: International Conference on Making Development Inclusive: The MDGs and Beyond</u> Bradford: University of Bradford

Mercer C. (2003) 'Performing Partnership: Civil Society and the Illusion of Good Governance in Tanzania' in <u>Political Geography</u>, Vol. 22, No.7

Mercer C. (1999) 'Reconceptualizing State-society Relations in Tanzania: are NGOs 'Making a Difference'?' in <u>Area</u>, Vol.31, No.3

Morton A. (2007) <u>Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Economy</u> London: Pluto

Mukandala R. (1999) <u>Trade Unionism In Tanzania: The Case Of The Tanzania Federation Of Trade Unions (TFTU) And Government</u> Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam

Mushi A. (Forthcoming) <u>The Need for a Vision and Strategy on the Part of Tanzanian NGOs</u> Birmingham: University of Birmingham, PhD. Research

Mwakyembe H. (1986) 'The Parliament and the Electoral Process' in Shivji I. (ed.) (1986) <u>The State and the Working People in Tanzania</u> Dakar: Codesria

Mwapachu J. (1998) 'Preface' in Tibaijuka A. (ed.) (1998) <u>The Social Services Crisis of the 1990's: Strategies for Sustainable Systems in Tanzania</u> Aldershot: Ashgate

Nord R. et al (2009) <u>Tanzania: The Story of an African Transition</u> Washington, DC: IMF

Nugent P. (2004) <u>Africa Since Independence</u> Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan

Pender J. (2005) <u>Less Interests, More Influence: The Paradox of Poverty Reduction and the Redefinition of Development</u> Dar es Salaam: SAID Workshop

Plastow J. (2005) <u>Pastoralism and Advocacy: Lessons from the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process in Tanzania</u>

Policy Forum (2008) <u>Transparency And Accountability Within Civil Society: An Opportunity For Self-Reflection</u> Dar es Salaam: Policy Forum

Rupiya M., Lwehabura N. and L. Le Roux (2006) <u>Civil-Security Relations in Tanzania: Investigating the Relationship between the State, Security Services and Civil Society</u> Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies

Rusimbi M. (2003) 'SAP For Whom? Grassroots Perspectives' in Chachage C. and M. Mbilinyi (2003) <u>Against Neoliberalism: Gender, Democracy and Development</u> Dar es Salaam: TGNP

Rwechungura G. (1976) <u>Workers Participation in Tanzania</u> Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam

Shivji I. (2004) 'Reflections on NGOs in Tanzania: What we are, what we are not, and what we ought to be' in <u>Development in Practice</u> Vol.14, No. 5

Shivji I. (1991) 'The Democracy Debate in Africa: Tanzania' in <u>Review of African Political Economy</u>, No. 50

Stiglitz J. (2010) <u>Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy</u> London: Allen Lane

Stiglitz J. (2002) <u>Globalization and its Discontents</u> London: Penguin

TANGO (2010) <u>More Coordination Needed</u>
Available at -
http://www.tango.or.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=54:more-coordination-needed&catid=1:latest-news
Accessed: 2 June 2011

Tripp A. (2000) 'Political Reform in Tanzania: The Struggle for Associational Autonomy' in <u>Comparative Politics</u>, Vol. 32, No. 2

Tumbo N. (1969) <u>Towards the Search for Permanent Unity of Tanganyika's Trade Union Movement</u> Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam

URT (1995) <u>Directory of Non-Governmental Organisations in Tanzania by 31st December 1994</u> Dar es Salaam: Government Printer

URT (2010) <u>NACONGO</u> Dar-es-Salaam: The President's Office

URT (2001) <u>The National Policy on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)</u> Dar es Salaam: Vice President's Office

URT (2002) <u>The Non-Governmental Organizations Act (No. 24)</u> Dar es Salaam: Government Printer

URT (1998) <u>Trade Unions Act, 1998</u> Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Labour

Von Holdt (2003) <u>Transition from Below: Forging Trade Union and Workplace Change in South Africa</u> Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press

Webster E., Lambert R. and A. Bezuidenhout (2008) <u>Grounding Globalization: Labour in the Age of Insecurity</u> Oxford: Blackwell

World Bank (2000) <u>Essential Action: Structural Adjustment and Labor - Tanzania</u> Washington, DC: World Bank

World Bank (2010) <u>Tanzania: Country Brief</u> Washington, DC: World Bank

Appendix 1

Figure 8.1   Tanzanian Trade Unions – Membership Concentration

Source: McQuinn (2011)

Appendix 2

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CHODAWU - Conservation, Hotels, Domestic and Allied Workers Union
TANGO - Tanzania Association of NGOs
TPAWU - Tanzania Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union
TRAWU - Tanzania Railway Workers Union
TTU - Tanzanian Teachers Union
TUCTA - Trade Union Congress of Tanzania
TUICO - Tanzania Union of Industrial and
URT – United Republic of Tanzania