Articulating politics of liberation and autochthonous identity in claiming communal land rights in the Nuba Mountains region, Sudan

(Draft)

Dr. Guma Kunda Komey[1]

gumabrain@hotmail.com

Introduction

This paper is an ethnographic analysis based on a sixteen months-fieldwork carried out, in three phases, during 2005-2007 in the Nuba Mountains region, Sudan. It is part of an on-going larger research project titled 'Contested autochthony; land and water rights, and the relation of nomadic and sedentary people of South Kordofan / Nuba Mountains, Sudan'[2]. Following this introduction, the central question and focus of the research are formulated in part two. Part three attempts to construct a conceptual perspective centered on 'region' concept, a base upon which *claims of autochthony* and the *autochthonous identity* rest. This is followed by a brief spatial-temporal overview of the Nuba Mountains region, as a cumulative and dynamic process of ethno-politico-social construction, in part four. Parts five, six and seven represent the core of the paper where the Nuba myth of origins, its territorial attachments and political expressions and/or actions are discussed, followed by a presentation of two fieldwork-centered ethnographic cases from the region. The two cases demonstrate how the autochthonous identity politics is articulated in claiming communal land rights by the sedentary Nuba, as self-identified indigenous group to the region; and how these autochthonous claims are persistently being contested by the nomadic Arab groups. These claims and counter claims, their territorial attachments and political expressions/actions, are pursued by these two competing conglomerates of ethnic

[1] Guma Kunda Komey is an Assistant Professor of Human Geography, Juba University, Sudan. Currently, he is a Senior Researcher at the Collaborative Research Centre: Difference and Integration conducted by the Universities of Halle-Wittenberg and Leipzig, Germany.

[2] The project is headed by Professor Richard Rottenburg of the Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Halle, and is part of the Collaborative Research Centre: Difference and Integration conducted by the Universities of Halle-Wittenberg and Leipzig, Germany (http://www.nomadsed.de). The project is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) for the period 2004-2008. While the invaluable support of these institutions is acknowledged, the views expressed in this paper are not necessarily representing these institutions.

groups, in a situation of multiple and overlapping communal land usage, control and ownership. Finally, part eight concludes.

Research question and focus

As argued elsewhere (Komey, 2006), the underlying root causes of the Sudan's civil war (1983-2005) were claimed to be diagnosed, negotiated and finally transformed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement[3] (CPA) signed on January 9, 2005 between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Despite the fact that many interwoven root causes were behind the eruption of the civil war, the question of the *autochthonous claim* of the land rights by the indigenous communities is hypothesized here as one of the roots causes of the civil war in Sudan in general and in the South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains region in particular. Therefore, after the formal end of the war, the question which arises is how the conflict between the nomadic *Baqqāra*[4] and the sedentary *Nuba* people of South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains on the one hand, and the contradictions between *traditiona*l land rights and *modern* state policy on land rights, on the other hand, may be resolved? The issue involves aspects of *territoriality*, *space*, *boundaries*, *land rights* and *ethnicity* including their political, economic, cultural and religious dimensions.

In view of this central question, the paper intends to trace analytically the autochthonous identity politics and its salient discourses, as constructed and pursued by the Nuba, a self-identified indigenous group in the region, and to demonstrate the Baqqāra counter responses within an overall regional and national political setting during the civil war and thereafter. The focus is on how the Nuba constructs their main line of argumentation in claiming an autochthonous position, and how they articulate their ethno-political identities in the struggle for communal land rights in terms of access, use and customary ownership. This is not an easy struggle in a region which experienced several centuries of migration, forced displacement, slavery,

[3] For the full text of the agreement see: www.usip.org/library/pa/**sudan**/cpa01092005/cpa_toc.html

[4] The term *Baqqāra* (plural) or *Baqqāri* (single), which means cattlemen, applies to 'an Arab who has been forced by circumstances to live in a country which will support the cow but not the camel. [...] The physical conditions, upon which his existence depends, are a dry district for grazing and cultivation in the rainy season connected by a series of waterholes with a river system where grass and water are available during the summer months' (Henderson 1939: 49).

domination/subordination, and all kinds of ethnic mixture and relations (Lloyd 1908, MacMicheal 1912/67, Stevenson 1965, and Salih 1982).

The Nuba autochthonous claims to land rights are presented in categories of ethnicity, culture and religion, among others. Though these categories, at least in the Nuba consciousness, are strongly tied to the Nuba Mountains region as their ancestral land, they have doubtful references, far from being clear and are not simply given to be used. Rather, they emerge while being invoked. Moreover, their autochthonous claims have been consistently undermined by the Sudanese modern state authorities coupled with challenges and contest from other local ethnic groups, namely the Baqqāra Arabs of *Ḥawāzma*[5], among others. The issue involves a confrontation between *legality* and *legitimacy*: the legality of the Sudanese modern state's legal land framework, and the legitimacy of the traditional social institutions and authorities of the involved ethnic communities (De Wit, 2001). The state's legal land framework aims at regulating land rights based on modern state principles while the traditional social institutions and authorities aim at maintaining the customary land rights and the practices of their respective communities, though they compete against each other along ethnic lines.

Understanding autochthony as a claim to collective rights on the basis of belonging to an indigenous group, with strong ties to an ancestral homeland, implies that it is associated with an ever-increasing articulation of collective rights in categories difficult to reconcile with the principles of a modern state. It also implies that *autochthony* is a *tie* between *territory* and *collective identity*. In the context of the ethnic settings in the Nuba Mountains, this is problematic not only for the relation between the nomadic Baqqāra and sedentary Nuba groups but also for the relation between the various Nuba hill communities. This is because the Nuba communities are not used to making of clear-cut territorial boundaries; and because their feeling of

[5] 'The word *Ḥawāzma* originates from an Arabic word which means 'tie together'. During the sixteenth century …, there were a lot of tribal clashes and many small tribes in Kordofan felt a need to cooperate. They formed the Ḥawāzma by swearing on the *Qur'ān* that they would always give up their own claim to independence if needed for the sake of the whole tribe; since then many groups and individuals have sworn the Ḥawāzma oath' (Haraldsson 1982: 26). As a result, Ḥawāzma is becoming more than a tribe or even an ethnic group. It is a conglomerate of ethnic groups as it flexibly extended its alliance to integrate other non–Arab ethnic groups. For example, the six tribes of *Zenāra, Takārīr, Jellāba Howāra, Gawāma'a, Bedayria* and *Slaves* form *Halafa* one of the three major sections of *Ḥawāzma*. The other two are *Rawāwqa* and *'Abdul 'Ali*. According to MacMicheal (1967: 151-52), none of these six tribes that form *Halafa* is genealogically Arab like most of the Ḥawāzma groups. They were integrated into Ḥawāzma in the middle of eighteenth century after they swore an oath binding them to the Ḥawāzma alliance.

Nuba-ness, as a unifying factor of their ethno-political identity, is still in making. This is manifested in their recent emerging *politics of resistance and liberation* centered on territoriality and ethnic identity. Therefore, the Nuba collective position is something more about becoming than being. In other words, their process of forming a collective identity strongly tied to the Nuba Mountains region is emerging while being invoked by the government and the other ethnic groups co-existing with them in the region, particularly the Baqqāra.

Region as a base for autochthonous identification: a conceptual perspective

The concept of 'region' is fundamental in the following discussion. As concept, it is usually loaded with social, ethnic, economic and, therefore, political meanings and symbols. Therefore, region is conceived in this paper not as a mere geographical space but as a societal set-up full of political, ideological, socio-cultural and economic dynamic realities (El-Tayeb 1989). It is conceptualized as: i) *local response* to historical dynamic processes of external/internal forces and realities; ii) focus of *identification* i.e., the inter-relationship between land territory and ethnic /community identity; and as iii) *medium for social interaction*, and its role in the creation of regional patterns and characteristics (Murphy 1991, italics added).

The significance of regional understanding is manifested in the dynamics of ethnic and/or nationalist movements, as part of an open and complex process of identity formation. Collective identities are what people make of them. They are not pre-given but feelings of community and solidarity, which have evolved through history as social, political, and economic processes within the context of their own well defined, demarcated, or loosely perceived territorial entities (Martinssuen 2003). Therefore, a national or sub-national territory or region is more than a spatially demarcated political or politico-administrative unit:

'It is a source of identity and self-sustaining resources; it is an 'historic' territory, a 'homeland', a rightful possession of one's forefathers through generations. It is distinctive and a unique territory; and the identity of the nation is bound up with memory, and this memory is rooted in a homeland' (Williams and Smith 1983: 509).

With the rise of the idea that societies are defined territorially, socio-cultural and political identities are fundamentally tied to territorial affiliation. Given the

importance of ideas about territory for the ways that individuals and groups see themselves and the world around them, some acknowledgment of the role of territorial affiliation is necessary within the context of nation building process. What lies behind the framework of political territories or formal ethnic regions are spatial constructs with deep ideological significance that may or may not correspond to political or formal constructs (Murphy 1991, and Komey 2004). These ideologies are forged in the territorial struggles that produce particular regional arrangements and understandings; and these, in turn, shape ideas, practices and an overall orientation of the group.

In Sudan, a country characterized by complex diversities of its physical and ethno-cultural landscape, the term region has emerged as a self-identifying concept that serves as a focus of cultural, linguistic, and historical identity. It also functions as the context within which the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial problems of resource allocation and distribution of political power are contested. Ethnic groups which occupy a particular region make their demands to central governments on the basis of their region. Thus, the concept of region has been obviously concretized as a political category, a contiguously definable geographical space, with specific character, image and status in the mind of the inhabitants of each region (Komey 2005). The formation of ethno-regionally-based political organizations in the 1960s[6], which shifted later to armed struggle movements, is self-explanatory evidence.

This implies that ethnic regions are explicitly understood to be places whose distinctiveness and identity formation rest on socio-political grounds. As social constructions, regions are necessarily ideological and no explanation of their individuality or character can be complete without explicit consideration of the types of ideas, perceptions, attitudes and aspirations that are developed and sustained in connection with regionalization processes within the context of nation building process (Murphy 1991, Martinussen 2003, and Mohamed Salih 1984b).

It is within this conceptualization of the region as a source of ethno-political entity, an ancestral homeland and as a base for livelihood survival that the positions of the

[6] Reference can be made to the Sudan African National Union (SANU) in the Southern Sudan, the General Union of the Nuba Mountains in the Nuba Mountains, the Beja Congress in Eastern Sudan, and the Fur Development Front in Darfur (See, for example, Harir, H. and Tvedt, T. (eds.) (1994)).

Nuba, the Baqqāra, and other ethnic groups in the Nuba Mountains region can be understood, and analyzed accordingly as interrelated local social fields within broader socio-economic and political perspectives at national level and beyond.

The Nuba Mountains region and its ethno-social construct: an overview

The Nuba Mountains lie in South Kordofan State which covers an area of 30000 square miles, in the geographical centre of the Sudan. It is chiefly inhabited by a cluster of the Nuba peoples self-identified as indigenous to the area. They are of African origins and followers of Islam, Christianity and traditional religions. However, their territory falls within the political boundaries of northern Sudan. Northern Sudan is dominated by the Arab culture and the Islamic political ideology which hardly value the cultural heritage of such self-identified indigenous communities. The Nuba land and people represent an ecological and ethno-cultural transitional zone along the south-north political dichotomy. According to the 1955 population census, the Nuba were estimated at 572,935 representing six per cent of the total population of the Sudan. Today, the population estimates of the Nuba Mountains region amount to 1.7 million with Nuba representing about seventy per cent (Government of Sudan, 2006: 06). Despite their statistical majority, 'they constitute a political minority due to their social and economic marginalization' (Mohamed Salih 1999:01).

The Baqqara who arrived into the area of the Nuba Mountains over 200 years ago as pastoral nomadic peoples represent the major sub-ethnic group of Arab origin (Lloyd 1908, MacMicheal 1912/67, Sagar 1922, Cunnison 1966, and Suleiman 1999). The Baqqāra move seasonally southwards through the hilly Nuba areas towards the traditional homelands of the peoples of South Sudan during the dry season, and then back northwards during the rainy season. In the recent years, some of these nomads have gradually been transformed into agro-pastoral and sedentary groups with significant engagement in the traditional and mechanized rain-fed cultivation in the Nuba Mountains (Henderson 1939, Battahani 1986, and Gore and *et al* 2004). Other small but extremely influential groups includes the *Jellāba* from northern and central Sudan, and the *Shawābna*, a Creole group of mixed origins. The Baqqāra and Jellaba are Arab-speaking Muslims who migrated to the Nuba Mountains, in several waves since the turn of 17th century, for slave raiding and trade, though the nomadic Baqqāra

were initially in search for grazing land. There is also a sizable number of *Fellāta* (West African migrants) who migrated to the Nuba Mountains in search for work as agricultural laborers in the cotton field during the 1920s before they obtained permanent citizenship status (Mohamed Salih 1999, Manger 1984, 1988).

Several works like that of Lloyd (1908) MacMicheal (1912/67), Nadel (1947), Stevenson (1965), Spaulding (1987), Mohamed Salih (1999), among others, agree that the Nuba peoples were the first to settle in the area for more than 500 years before other groups came in. For centuries, the geographical area where the Nuba tribes live has been known as *Dār Nuba*: the land of the Nuba. Before the arrival of the Arabs into their dār, 'the Nubas enjoyed a period of comparative tranquility … During this period of peace the Nubas cultivated huge tracts of the country, their crops stretching for miles into the plains around their Jebels (Lloyd 1908: 55).

The term 'Nuba' is commonly used to refer to the indigenous inhabitants of more than eighty hill communities of the Nuba Mountains who are dominantly sedentary groups that practice traditional rain-fed agriculture as their main livelihood. Not withstanding the racial, ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Nuba hill tribes, there exists something like a 'Nuba culture', a cultural make-up common to all the various groups. It does not pervade the whole cultural life of the groups; yet it goes deeper than merely a common system of livelihood – a cultural affinity that could be explained, in the common environment, as an adjustment of essentially dissimilar groups to identical conditions of life (Nadel 1947: 3-4). Based on this feeling of togetherness and common history, their ethno-political identity has progressively been constructed with strong ties to the territory of the Nuba Mountains as their autochthonous ancestral homeland; though this has systematically been contested by the other ethnic groups in the region as revealed in the following debate.

Due to some major historical and contemporary dynamic forces, the indigenous Nuba peoples were forced to resort to the hilly parts of the region, while plain fertile lands had forcefully been occupied by others, mainly the Baqqāra. The historical forces include, among others (i) the influx of Baqqāra Arabs in waves into the region and their effective participation in the pre-colonial slave-raids (Lloyd 1908); (ii) the Turco-Egyptian rule and its successive slavery campaigns against the Nuba (MacMicheal 1912/67, Sagar 1922, and March 1954); and (iii) the British colonial

rule and its closed districts policy (Gillan 1931, Nadel 1947, March 1954, Stevenson 1965, and Mohamed Salih 1999) associated with the Arabs practice of overlordship (*sid al-darib*) over the Nuba (Lloyd 1908, Gillan 1930 and Mohamed Salih 1988). While the contemporary forces include (i) the postcolonial state associated with two separate, yet interrelated dynamics namely: the Jellaba domination over the national politics and wealth including land, and the outright grabbing of the land by government for public and private mechanized schemes (Roden 1972, 1975, Mohamed Salih 1984a, 1999, Manger 1984, 1988, Battahani 1980, 1986, and Ibrahim 1988); and (ii) the central government's waged war associated with mass displacement, ethnocide and genocide (African Rights 1995, African Watch 1992, Mohamed Salih 1999, Komey 2005)[7].

As a result of this longstanding history of systematic socio-cultural, economic and political marginalization by the successive national governments, the Nuba were forced to resort to the armed struggle when they joined the Southern-led SPLM/A in the 1980s. As argued for elsewhere (Komey, 2006), the extension of the civil war from the Southern Sudan to the Nuba Mountains in 1985 brought about new dynamics that came to have significant repercussions on the rights of communal land ownership or access of use in the region.

First, the normal co-existence of the sedentary Nuba and the other ethnic groups in the region, ceased to exist when bulk of the Nuba were supported by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) while the Baqqāra, the Shawābna, some Nuba and other ethnic groups were siding with the Islamic-based central government led by the National Congress Party (NCP).

Second, as the war intensified, the Nuba Mountains territory was progressively divided into two geo-political and administrative parts: (i) areas controlled and administered by the Islamic-based Government of the Sudan, with the Baqqāra having upper hands in the political affairs while the Nuba were alienated from their land; and (ii) areas controlled and administered by the Nuba-led SLPM/A associated with effective land management by the Nuba peoples, and with the Baqqāra nomads

7 See also Manger 1994, 1998, 2003, 2006; Suleiman 1999; Rahhal 2001; Harrigin 2003; and Gore, et al 20.

having no access to their traditional seasonal grazing lands and water in this part of the region throughout the war period.

Third, the two parties pursued two different policies pertained to land rights in their respective controlled territories. In the SPLM/A controlled areas, all the communally owned lands based on customary practices were recognized as legal rights and strengthened further. The SPLM/A initiated it's 'Land Action Strategy' (SPLM 2004) which meant to empower the Nuba communities in administering their claimed land at different levels of their social and spatial organizations. The strategy, which is still in making, recognizes two different types of customary land rights in the SPLM/A controlled areas i.e., customary *ownership* rights for the Nuba indigenous people, and customary *use access* rights for the some nomadic groups who have longstanding seasonal access to the same lands (Manger 2006:13). Contrary to the SPLM/A strategy, the government continued the policy of grabbing arable lands for public and private investments based on the 1970 Land Act which considers all the customarily owned lands by the communities or individuals as government lands. Therefore, the government offers no legal recognition for the customary land rights (African Rights 1995, Mohamed Salih 1999, and Harrigin 2003, and El-Imam and Egemi 2004, and Manger 2006).

In a nutshell, the war dynamics intensified antagonism between the two divided territories along ethno-political lines leading to a recurrent mass displacement mostly among the sedentary Nuba. It also stimulated the articulation of ethnic identities in the struggle for land as source of socio-political identity and economic survival as the following field-centered ethnographic cases demonstrate.

The Nuba myth of origins: its territorial attachments and political expressions

The Nuba self-identification as an indigenous group is manifested in their oral history and myths of their origins, their cultural and religious practices, and in their contemporary political struggle. All these manifestations are tied to their claimed territory as base for ethno-political identity and source of their livelihood and economic survival.

Despite their strong feelings as indigenous people to the land they inhabit, little is known about the ancient history of the Nuba. Their own traditions and memories yield

sparse information (Nadel 1947). This might be ascribed to the successive historical events, outlined above, which had significant disturbances on the Nuba memory of their history of movement paths and subsequent settlement patterns. However, still there exist some sort of tribal mythology which links the origin and past of the different Nuba groups vaguely with their different localities within the whole region of the Nuba Mountains or beyond (Sagar 1922, Nadel 1947, Kramer 1987). In fact, most Nuba summarize their past in one sentence: 'We have always lived here' (Nadel 1947: 05). Moreover, most of the self-given names of their individuals, social organizations and habitats are loaded with indigenous meanings strongly attached to their claimed autochthonous land. For example, the *Krongo* people living southeast of Kadugli and north of Lake *Abyaḍ*, do not call themselves Krongo but *Katu-mo-di*, meaning 'people of the home', a term which they do not apply only to themselves, but also to other people of the Nuba nearby (Kramer 1987:1-2). The *Keiga* people, a case in point, living north and northwest of Kadugli, especially the elders believe that all Keiga communities originated from *Kulu* sub-hill in *Keiga Tummero* hill, and from there they gradually spread all over the present Keiga territory comprises of four hill communities of *Tummero*, *Luban*, *al-Khayl*, and *Dameik*. The Keiga first ancestor *Kulu* believed to be somehow sprung out of the earth on the top of a hill which came to be named after him as Kulu. The Kulu successive generations all over the present Keiga land call themselves *Kado-de-madi*. In their own language, *kado* means 'nation or people', and *de-madi* means 'the land or the home'. So, *kado-de-madi* means 'the people/nation of the land or the indigenous people' versus the *Kamal-ga* people which means 'the camel riders/owners'. The *Kamal-ga* joined them, as late comers, upon their recent arrival from North Kordofan (Interview: Sulaymān al-Ahaydib, Keiga Luban, February 15th, 2007).

Today, kulu sub-hill is conceived by the Keiga people as religious point of reference. It is a scared place where some ancestral worshiping and rituals are performed annually with exclusive participation of *kado-de-madi* affiliated families of all Keiga hill communities. Hence, Kulu hill becomes a unifying factor which continues to give the Keiga sense of attachment to their territoriality, not only as a religious reference point but also as source of their autochthonous identity, and a base for their socioeconomic livelihood survival. This highly localized case is more or less typical

among the different Nuba hill communities, though with some variations in the details of each narrative.

In their recent political struggle during the civil war and thereafter, the Nuba elites especially the diasporas started a process of constructing a collective political identity, centred on the Nuba self-identified notions of indigenous people and autochthonous claims to their historical land. They shifted the case from local to global level when they launched an advocacy campaign, aiming at attracting the international community towards their then going tragedy as indigenous people facing genocide and ethnocide during the civil war. In the 1990s, several of their Europe-based forums were formed such as 'Nuba Solidarity Abroad', 'Nuba Survival' and its newsletters of 'Nafir' and 'The Nuba Vision' in London, and 'the Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization' (NRRDO) in Nairobi, Kenya. These entities, among others, played a crucial role as mouthpiece and vocal voices for the voiceless Nuba peoples at the time they were completely isolated from the international community. A quick look at issues being raised in the above-mentioned two publications and others reflects the centrality of the Nuba autochthonous claim over their land as source of their ethno-political identity, socioeconomic livelihood and survival: 'What is Slavery', 'Agriculture in the Nuba Mountains', 'the Question of the Land', 'Nuba Culture', 'Nuba Land Rights' and 'Nuba Lands on Sale', to mention just a few (Manger 2006). Moreover, the Nuba leaders and elites were able to engage and instrumentalize some international actors and human rights organizations in this advocacy campaign. Several published works attest to this: *Sudan: Eradicating the Nuba* (Africa Watch, 1992), *Facing genocide: The Nuba of Sudan* (African Rights 1995), *Land alienation and genocide in the Nuba Mountains* (Mohamed Salih, 1999), *The right to be Nuba: the story of a Sudanese people's struggle for survival* (Rahhal 2001), *Proud to be Nuba: faces and voices*[8] (Ende, 2007) and Ende's current internet *Nuba Mountains Homepage*, among others. In supporting the Nuba struggle and movement as indigenous group of the Nuba Mountains region, a Sudanese scholar succinctly affirmed that:

'The Nuba are indeed *the indigenous* peoples of the Nuba Mountains; they have the strongest *ties* to their *lands* and have lived in this region since or before colonization. The Nuba are now dominated by

[8] The author noted that 'all revenues of the book beyond production costs will be used to the benefit of the Nuba people, preferably in the field of preserving cultural diversity' (Ende 2007a: 1).

other groups with markedly different cultures. Like other indigenous peoples, the Nuba were not incorporated into Sudanese's mainstream political culture. […]. [T]he Nuba share at least two predicaments with indigenous peoples the world-over: state-sponsored policies assist in the *systematic appropriation of their land and natural resources* by colonists, capital, and private business interests. Also, their human rights are denied and political persecution, *ethnocide*, and *genocide* continue even after European colonialism has ended' (Mohamed Salih 1999, 1-2, 4, italics added).

The Nuba movement took a new shape at this stage of their struggle that followed the CPA. The stage associated with gradual returns of their internally displaced persons (IDPs), the refugees, the diasporas and the SPLM/A-led fighters and leaders to their homeland. This Nuba ethno-political emerging position was systematically popularized through a series of tribal conferences usually sponsored by the Nuba community-based organizations (CBOs), under the political patronage of the Nuba-led SPLM/A[9]. All these conferences seem to have been inspired by the All Nuba 1st and 2nd Conferences initiated by the SPLM/A and funded by some international organizations, on November 2nd-4th, 2002, and April 5th-8th, 2005, respectively. They took place in Kauda, the political and military headquarters of the SPLM/A in the Nuba Mountains. The ultimate aim is to foster the sense of 'Nuba' as a united ethnic group with one political destiny anchored on the 'Nuba territoriality' as an ancestral homeland and source of their socio-cultural heritage and livelihood. Towards that end, these conferences focus consistently on issues related to *Nuba identity* and *cultural revival* with strong ties between *ethnicity* and *territoriality*. This is manifested in the recent process of *renaming* of some tribes, places, natural and human features by their *Nuba indigenous names* while disregarding all that are not connected to the roots and history of the Nuba peoples. For example, the *Krongo-Massākīn* tribes Conference of 2005 resolved that the Arab names of their places of *Buram, Reikha* and *Teis* areas were henceforth to be renamed by their original Nuba names as *Tobo, Tolabi,* and *Tromo* respectively. Within this context, the Nuba would proudly call their overall claimed territory 'Nuba Mountains', the first official name for the region from 1914 to 1928 during the colonial administration, while the name 'South Kordofan' has

[9] For example, reference can be made to the Abol 3rd Conference in Kobang, April 13th-16th, 2005; the Leira 3rd Conference in Ḥajar Bako, April 16th-18th, 2005; the Irral Payam Conference in Shwai, April 21st-22nd, 2005, the Krongo-Massākīn tribes Conference in Farandella, Buram County, May 29th-June 1st, 2005, the All Keiga Second Conference, Keiga Tummero, April 12th – 14th, 2006 and the Temein Third Conference, April 13th –18th, 2007, just to mention a few.

consistently been imposed upon by the successive Arab-based national governments and their non-Nuba alliances in the area.

The Nuba of Keiga and the Dār Jami' Arabs land-based discourses and claims

In this part and the subsequent one, specific local ethnographic cases of the Nuba-Baqqāra land-based dynamic encounters in terms of cooperation/complementarities and competition/conflicts are presented and analyzed. In so doing, two competing lines of argumentations are highlighted. First, the Nuba autochthonous claims to the communal land ownership rights centered on their historical and customary legitimacy, though contested. Second, the Baqqāra Arabs counter claims to have equal rights not only in terms of their traditional rights of access and use of land and water, but also in terms of full rights of ownership to the same land. This Baqqāra claim is centered on a combination of historical and customary legitimacy and the legality of the Sudanese modern state, though persistently defied by the Nuba.

The Keiga people and locale

The Keiga people are a sub-ethnic group within the Kadugli-Krongo ethno-linguistic group with population estimated below 10000. They speak *Keiga* which is part of a *Nilo-Saharan* language. They are clustered in north, northwest and west Kadugli in four hill communities/tribes of Keiga Damik, Keiga al-Khayl, Keiga Luban and Keiga Tummero, in addition to Keiga Jerru which is part of a different group of Temein (Stevenson 1984). Each of these tribes has its own loosely defined territorial boundaries within the overall customary Keiga lands. Keiga Tummero, the case in focus, is composed of four sub-villages or sub-hill communities of al-Joghba, Tummero, Keidi, and Kulu respectively, situated in a line from the west to the east at the foot of the southern part of their main hill known as Keiga Tummero. Southward of each hill community there is a wide plain arable land that continues to the borders with the Laguri and Saburi hill communities. This land constitutes a farming zone during the rainy season and a pasture land for nomads during the dry season. Two major water courses run through this arable plain with seasonal water points known as *mashaqqa,* and other permanent water points known as *baṭ-ha*. The *baṭ-ha* provides permanent water supply for humans, livestock and horticulture during the dry season. It is within this ecological environment that nomadic and sedentary peoples are

constantly in the process of daily encounters in terms of cooperation or complementarities, associated with keen competition and recurrent disputes over the limited land and water resources.

Several agro-pastoral groups of the Baqqāra Arabs particularly the Dār Jāmi' Tūwāl and Fellāta also live on the same land traditionally claimed by the Keiga as their historic homeland. These non-Nuba groups allied under one federated native administration system. At present, part of the Baqqāra of Dār Jāmi', a sub-tribe of Rawāwqa of Ḥawāzma, have established their Imāra[10] (a native administration unit) under the paramount chieftainship of Amīr Mūsa Somi in the Keiga Luban territory with al-Kweik settlement point as the seat of their native administration and court, under the leadership of 'Umda[11] Somi Tāwer. In addition to the Dār Jāmi' agro-pastoralist group and their allied Fellāta known locally as Takārīr, there are other smaller but influential Arab groups including (i) part of the Awlād Nuba sub-tribe of Rawāwqa of Ḥawāzma, who are basically based at Tukswana in Laguri area, but some of them have extended their settlements northwards into Keiga Tummero's agricultural land at its southern border; (ii) the Zenāra Arabs, who migrated from North Kordofan during the drought of the 1980s and are currently concentrated in a fertile land in al-Joghān area in the Keiga Tummero territory; (iii) some Bedayriya from North Kordofan; and (iv) several nomadic Arab groups, namely Dār Na'yla, Shenābla, Ḥumr, Missiriya and Dār Shalango, who only come to the region with their cattle during the dry season. These groups invariably practice agro-pastoralism, mechanized farming and trading, with a recently growing tendency towards claiming land ownership, resulting in the autochthonous claims of the Nuba of Keiga being seriously contested (Interview: 'Umda al-Yiās Ibrāhīm Koko, Keiga Tummero, June 5th, 2005).

[10] *Imāra* is a term introduced by the Islamic-oriented government led by the National Congress Party in the early 1990s as part of its Islamization program among native leaders. Though it is associated with social leadership, the term also connotes that this social leader, by virtue of his leadership position in time of peace, is also a commander (*Amīr)* of the Islamic fighters (*Mujāhidīn*) during the *jihād* war. In the past this native administration unit was termed *Nazirate* for the Arabs or *Mekship* for the Nuba; the native leaders were called *Nāzir* or *Mek* respectively.

[11] *'[*'*U]modia* is a general term for a group of villages, numbering from two or three up to thirty or more. The ['U]modia is essentially a concept derived from the Arab tribal organization, whereby each tribe is ruled by a Nāzir, beneath whom there is a number of *[*'*U]mdas*, each responsible for an ['U]modia, and beneath the *[*'*U]mda* is the *Sh[ay]kh*, who is the headman of a small group of families, if the people are nomadic, or often of a village if the people are settled' (Government of the Sudan 1958: 07, italics added).

The Keiga people and the articulation of autochthonous claims to land rights

The people of Keiga, like the other Nuba tribes, believe that they are the indigenous population who inherited their present land territory from their forefathers quite a long time ago. Therefore, others who have lately joined them by ways of settlement, grazing, farming and trading only enjoy rights of access to their autochthonous land, and no rights of ownership. In this respect, the people of Keiga Tummero have several legends, stories and line of argumentation related to land autochthony.

For instance, they narrate how the Arabs of Dār Jami' were hosted, for the first time, upon their arrival in Keiga territory. Based on their oral history, several elders from Keiga stated that there were inter-tribal conflicts between two sections of Arab tribes of Dār Betti and Dār Jāmi' in their original place called Baraka in al-Qoz of North Kordofan during the Mahdiyya wars. Having lost the battle, the Dār Jāmi' were forced to flee southwards to the Nuba lands, seeking refuge and protection. Upon their arrival, they were divided into groups with each one targeting specific Nuba communities in their respective hills. A group led by Shaykh Tāwer (the founder of Dār Jāmi' in the area) approached the Keiga leaders at Kolo hilly point. They were well received and accommodated on top of the hill together with their horses, where some of their material culture still exists today. Through time, however, and with assistance of various state power forces, these late comers, the *Kamal-ga*, started to strengthen their presence as sedentary as well as nomads on land claimed by the Keiga. Today, several local dynamics and discourses suggest that the Keiga Tummero autochthonous claims have progressively been contested by this Dār Jāmi' Arabs.

The annual Nuba campaigns of clearing roads under supervision of their native leaders during the Turco-Egyptian and the British colonial periods is one of the widely shared arguments among the Nuba in general and the Keiga in particular to substantiate their collective ownership rights of their customary land as indigenous territory. My informant, 'Umda al-Yiās Ibrāhīm Koko of Keiga Tummero argued that during the British colonial period the people, under the leadership of the local chiefs, used to annually clear the Dilling-Kadugli road, which used to pass in those days through Keiga Tummero. In the process of the campaigns to clear the bushes along the road after each rainy season, the people of Keiga Tummero used to receive the work from the Nuba of Debri at al-Ganāiya point, and hand it over, in turn, to the

people of Keiga Luban, who, in turn, pass it over to those of Saburi. The claim is that there were no *kilinki* (borders) between the Nuba and any Arab group despite their seasonal presence. He argued further that these Arabs never participated in the annual road clearing campaigns; and whenever they were asked to participate in the campaign, my informant continued to argue, they used to say to the *mufatish* (the British inspector) or *māmūr* (the British administrative officer) in front of the Nuba native leaders that they have nothing to do with the Nuba land, and that they were not inhabitants of this territory but merely seasonal nomads who were passing-by. Their homeland, they claimed, was in Kordofan (Interview: 'Umda al-Yiās Ibrāhīm Koko, Keiga Tummero, June 5th, 2005).

From the Nuba point of view, that was recognition of their autochthonous land ownership rights by the Arabs, who are contesting these same rights today because of several ecological, ethno-political and socio-economic changes. The emerging agro-pastoral Arabs' attitude towards claiming ownership rights over some of the Nuba historical homeland territory have intensified the recurrent conflicts at grass root levels between the sedentary Nuba and the nomadic Baqqāra in the Nuba Mountains.
The Keiga Tummero people were also able to narrate numerous historical and current cases of land-related conflicts between them and some agro-pastoral Arabs in the area. In 1951 a dispute erupted over a farming land between Keiga Tummero and Dār Jāmi' when a pre-harvested grain of Shareif Koko of Keiga Tummero, was intentionally set on fire on his far-farm by a man from Takārīr affiliated to the Arabs of Dār Jāmi'. The incident occurred because each party was claiming to be the real owner of the contested farming land. The conflict escalated when moved from individual to communal level and there were fatalities in both sides. The involved people in each group were trialed in court in Kadugli and some were imprisoned for fourteen years. The imprisoned people from the Keiga side were portrayed by the Keiga communities as heroes who defended their ancestral land. In addition, the entire Takārīr families who were settling inside Keiga's claimed territory were transferred, by court decision, southwards into Teisi 'Abd es Salām beyond the Keiga Tummero territory. After sometime, however, some of these Takārīr started to gradually return and practice traditional farming and grazing inside the southern parts of the Keiga territory along side with the Keiga farmers.

During the 1980s, the issue re-surfaced again when some of these Takārīr demanded a payment of *Dīya*[12] or alternatively a piece of farming land as compensation for their three people killed during the 1951 conflict. The demand for land in particular was rejected in a native court held in al-Bardāb in the presence of 'Usmān Belāl Ḥāmid al-Lika, the Nāzir of Ḥawāzma-Rawāwqa and then chairman of the north Kadugli rural court, and Mahdi Somi Tāwer, the 'Umda of Dār Jāmi' including the Takārīr. The claim was rejected when the 'Umda of Dār Jāmi' and Ahmed Mālik, a Takārīr leader, swore in the court and acknowledged that the Takārīr have no land throughout the Keiga territory to claim or quarrel over.

During 1986-87, the dispute erupted again when Muhammad Ibrāhim Shaddād of Takārīr sued twenty one Keiga farmers in Kadugli civil court, on the ground that they cultivated his farming land. The court settled the dispute in favour of Keiga farmers but no documents were kept by the Keiga for that matter. During the civil war, the Shadad family moved out of Keiga and went back to the place of their origin in North Kordofan. After the peace agreement in 2005, they returned but with more new family members from Jafīl, al-Birka and Umm Se'eda in north Kordofan. They started to practice mechanized farming as well as livestock grazing insight the Keiga territory. Later, it was revealed that they had managed to get an approval from the concerned government authority in Kadugli for seven mechanized projects in a wide area within the shifting cultivation zone of the Tummero sub-hill communities. In June 2006, forty-nine Keiga farmers challenged this approval which was granted without their consent. They went on and cleared the area for their semi-mechanized collective farms. In response, Muhammad Ibrāhim Shaddād went to the security office in Kadugli and a complained against the concerned Keiga Tummero farmers. As a result, al-Yiās Ibrāhīm Koko, 'Umda of Keiga Tummero and two of his shiyūkh (plural of shaykh) were summoned by the security authority and questioned about issue. However, the case has not yet been resolved (An Interview: Sulaymān Shirra, Keiga Tummero, February 14th, 2007).

The Keiga 'Umda expressed his strong opposition to any government approval for a mechanized project to the outsiders inside the Keiga communal land in the name of

[12] *Dīya* is an Islamic-based compensation paid by the murderer or his/her family to the family of the murdered person.

'small farmers' collective scheme'. Responding to my question regarding the government plan to transform the communal lands into individual private registered holdings, he stated that:

'I initially opposed to the proposed small farmers' collective scheme which intend to include the communal land of the Keiga Tummero hill community by way of grabbing. Later, I felt that some government officials have started to intentionally by-pass me while incorporating some of my Shiyūkh in the process of land surveying, plots allocation and distribution. In any case, the new owners who have been granted some land by the government inside Keiga, can not have access to their respective designated plots as long as they are different from those who customarily owned it' (Interview: 'Umda al-Yiās Ibrāhīm Koko, Keiga Tummero, February 14th, 2007).

The people of Keiga Tummero claim that the land currently occupied by the Arabs of Awlād Nuba in the border area between the Keiga Tummero and the Laguri tribe is part of their ancestral land and which was famous for cotton production by the Keiga farmers until the 1940s. Gradually, however, the Baqqāra of Awlād Nuba started to gradually move from the Laguri side and settled into the area. Through time, they started to claim ownership over the territory while the Keiga peoples perceived them as users and not owners of the land. In this regard, an elder from Keiga Tummero noted that:

'These Arab peoples came to us and our grandfathers gave them access to our land, in good faith, after they took an oath to respect our coexistence. But they have betrayed this oath and have by now grabbed most of our arable land. Also, those who recently came from Kordofan are deliberately encouraged by their leaders to expand territorially at the expense of our customarily owned lands. As these peoples continue to create many problems including claiming lands, we can not continue to peacefully coexist with them; unless all of our land-related grievances are fairly redressed and all of our inherited territory is restored' (Interview. Adam Abu Shūk, Keiga Tummero, June 9th, 2005).

Based on the Keiga line of argument and the associated practices, it is obvious that the Nuba recognize the existence of 'farming boundaries' between Nuba hill communities and some sedentary Arab groups who coexist with them. This type of boundaries, from the Nuba point of view, is meant to allow for others to have access to rights of use while ownership remains exclusively theirs as indigenous groups. In other words, the Nuba perceive all non-Nuba groups, nomadic or sedentary who coexist with them on their perceived ancestral land, as mere land users and not owners in any sense. The case of the Nuba of *Keiga* showed that they perceive the Arabs of *Dār Jāmi*, who

coexisted with them for several centuries, as people who have full rights of use access but not ownership:

'Places like Chalib and Umm Salaf between Laguri and Keiga, though they are traditionally part of the Keiga lands, they were allocated for the Dār Jāmi' Arabs by the Keiga for farming usage. Also, al-Bardāb area which is part of Keiga Luban was allocated in 1934 to a newly coming-in group of Fellāta who arrived from West Africa. We, the Keiga and these Felātta, have peacefully been co-existing and we had no intention to remove them after they had become Sudanese citizens. So, they may enjoy life-time rights of usage over al-Bardāb but its ownership remains an exclusive right for the Keiga people' (Interview: Sambo Sayīd Tia Keiga Luban, February 10th, 2007).

In a nutshell, the Nuba recognize no territorial boundaries with any Arab and other non-Nuba groups even if they encounter them along the farming boundaries. In other words, the Nuba perceive the Arabs and other non-Nuba who coexist with them as subordinate when it comes to land ownership. However, the perspective, line of argument and the associated practices of the non-Nuba groups are completely different as demonstrated below.

The Baqqāra of Dār Jāmi' and their counter claims of land rights

In an interview with Muhammad al-Shafei' al-Mā'mūn, a Kadugli-based merchant from Dār Jāmi' Tūwāl, he claimed that the Dār Jāmi', like all other Ḥawāzma-Rawāwqa, are real partners with Nuba in the communal land rights. They are partners not only in terms of land usage but in ownership as well. He argued that:

'Our ancestors fought for, defended and died on this land. When we, the Ḥawāzma-Rawāwqa, were defending the plain areas, the Nuba were fortified on their respective hilltops leaving our ancestors to face the common enemies alone. Therefore, our unshakable attachment to this land is an inevitable result of our historical reality' (Interview: Kadugli, January 10th, 2007).

This view is strongly expressed in another interview with Muhammad 'Lwān Ḥāmid, a nomad from Awlād Nuba. He came from his *farīq* (cattle camp) nearby the Keiga Tummero hill community to attend the Keiga weekly local market. He claimed that:

'We, the Awlād Nuba of Ḥawāzma-Rawāwqa, are physically coexisting with Nuba of Keiga Tummero and those of Laguri and Saburi with al-Darūt area being the centre of our own territory. We share boundaries with Dār Jāmi' in the west, Laguri and Saburi in the south and Keiga Tummero in the north. Our territory includes rijil al-'ajāl, al-Bokhsa, Umm Garin, Hejir al-Bāṭil, al-Joghān and al-Tāsh' (Interview: Keiga Tummero, February 9th, 2007).

Other nomadic Arabs complained bitterly about some actual experiences of mistreatment by some Nuba, especially the youth and elites not only during the war but also after the peace settlement. Ḥassab al-Nabi ‘Abdul-Faḍīl and al-Nūr Faḍl ‘Abdul-Raḥīm are two nomads from Awlād Raḥma of Awlād Nuba of Ḥawāzma-Rawāwqa. They were interviewed in their *farīq* (nomads’ camp) close to Keiga Tummero hill community. They recognize the difficulties facing the agro-pastoral Arabs and the sedentary Nuba to re-gain their pre-war peaceful and mutual coexistence despite their long history of socio-cultural interaction including intermarriage and overlapping in habitation and movements:

‘Despite peace achievement and the end of war, things have not gone back to their normality particularly for us nomads of this region. Somehow we are managing our daily life with our neighbours, the Nuba of Keiga, Liguri and Debri but we are unable to practice our pre-war periodic migratory movement southwards into the Jebels of Moro and Korongo. Some of our people went there but they were forced to retreat back with their cattle following their mistreatment there by some local Nuba people and their local institutions. We often encounter some Nuba armed youth or elites who tell us that ‘this is not your land and we do not want you here with us any more’. It is this new and educated generations who want to upset the long history of peaceful coexistence and complementarities between us, the nomadic Arabs and the sedentary Nuba, in this area. All our problems used to be managed with no difficulties though we, Arabs and Nuba, were almost all illiterate. Education is supposed be a uniting and not a dividing factor. But with the advance of education among the new generation, conflicts among us have increasingly become part of our daily life, and their solutions are increasingly becoming beyond our reach today’ (Interview: nomads’ camp, Keiga Tummero, February 12th, 2007).

In an interview with al-Bushra Somi Tāwer[13], one of the prominent native leaders of the Dār Jāmi’ based at al-Kweik in Keiga Luban, he rejects the notion of tribal boundaries between the already physically and socio-culturally mixed up sedentary Nuba and agro-pastoral Arabs on the same locale for centuries. Instead, he calls for Nuba-Arabs unity and solidarity as the only way for reversing the marginalization process continued to be practiced by the successive central governments. He also complained bitterly on the government’s practice of land grabbing from the local communities:

[13] He is the son of Somi Tāwer and the paramount Nāzir of all Rawāwqa Nazirate 1964-1968. He is a prominent member of Umma Party who represented the area at the National Parliament in 1968-69. Currently he is the chairman of the Dār Jāmi’ native court based at al-Kweik in Keiga Luban. In his words: “My father Somi Tāwer was one of the leading figures in Keiga area who participated in laying out its ethno-political settings and territorial mapping during the colonial period”.

'With Nuba, especially the Keiga, we have no territorial or social boundaries. This is so because we continued to peacefully coexist over the same territory for generations, amicably shared all land resources, and willingly pooled together our socio-cultural practices including inter-marriages. In short, we are eventually becoming one through this long history of coexistence, cooperation and complementarities. The time is thus ripe for the Ḥawāzma Arabs and Nuba alike to realize and appreciate this history of their own making. They ought to unite because they are all marginalized by the successive central governments which exploit their land resources including oil for the development of the central and northern regions of the Sudan' (Interview: al-Bushra Somi Tāwer, al-Kweik, February 13th, 2007).

Apparrently,'Usmān Bilāl Ḥāmid al-Lika, the paramount Nāzir of the Ḥawāzma-Rawāwqa Nazirate since 1989, holds the same position but with sharper argument. He rejects the notion of tribal boundaries in the way the Nuba conceive it. In his view:

'The region had never experienced any formal tribal boundaries. The practice has been that the Nuba utilize the hilly land and its immediate surroundings while the Arabs exploited the vast plain land beyond these hilly areas. So, for every two adjacent Nuba hill communities, there were always Arab communities on the plain land between the two Nuba hill communities. This territorial arrangement was reinforced by Nuba-Arab alliances such as that between the Rawāwqa of Dār Jāmi' Tūwāl and the Nuba of Keiga, the Rawāwqa of Awlād Nuba, the Nuba of Saburi and Laguri, and between the Rawāwqa of Dalamiyya and some Nuba in the Moro hills. These Arab-Nuba neighbourhood patterns and alliances resulted into some sort of territorial boundaries not between the Nuba hill communities but between a group of allied Nubas and Arabs with another similar group in neighbourhood. For example, there were, though overlapping, traditional territorial boundaries between Dār Jāmi' and Keiga as two groups under leadership of Somi Tāwer[14], on one hand, and that of the Arabs of Awlād Nuba and the Nuba of Laguri and Saburi under leadership of Ḥāmid al-Lika, on the other. These are not tribal boundaries but territorial arrangements agreed upon by the leaders of these coexisting Arabs and Nuba communities. The notion that Nubas have territorial boundaries with their counter Nuba and not with Arabs, and that the Arabs have no land here, can hardly stand against the historical and contemporary obvious realities. This notion, no doubt, is a recent constructed political position by some ethnically-based elites with an intention of changing the course of the long history of Arab-Nuba co-existence' (Interview: 'Usmān Belāl Ḥāmid al-Lika, Kadugli, February 22nd, 2007).

It is evident that the perception of the nomadic Arabs, at both grass root and leadership level, is firmly grounded on some historical practices in the Arab-Nuba relations, namely 'Arab overlordship over the Nuba'. The overlordship practice (*sid*

[14] Somi Tāwir was the Nāzir of all Keiga, Nuba and Arabs alike during the colonial period before the British Government decided to separate the Nuba native administration from that of the Ḥawāzma Arabs in the mid-1930s (Gillan 1931, Stevenson 1965).

āl-darib), literally means the owner or master of the road/passage. It was an institution which gave the Baqqāra administrative *shiyūkh* the power to exercise full suzerainty over the Nuba by way of preventing them from leaving their hills or establishing any external contact without prior permission (Lloyd 1908, Gillan 1930, and Salih 1982) It reflects the long history of the Arabs' hegemonic power that continued to dominate the Nuba-Arab relations following their arrival into the region. This early hegemony came to have far-reaching implications on the Nuba autochthonous claims over their traditional land in terms of accessibility, usage and ownership rights. The arrival and eventual domination of the Arabs over the Nuba people and their territory were reported by the British Governor of Kordofan as early as 1908:

'In Southern Kordofan the Nubas enjoyed a period of comparative tranquillity until the arrival of the Baqqāra Arabs from the west, which took place probably about 120 years ago. During this period of peace the Nubas cultivated huge tracts of the country, their crops stretching for miles into the plains around their Jebels. The Baqqāra tribes on their arrival divided up the country among them, the Ḥawāzma taking the eastern and central Jebels and the Ḥomr the western. The Missiriya at that time only had a few small Jebels in the north-west of Dār Nuba. The Baqqāra at once began to raid the Nubas, enslaving all on whom they could lay hands, and taking all their grain and cattle they could find. The Nubas in defence retired into their Jebels and terraced them for cultivation in remote parts, where horsemen could not approach them. *Gradually each sub-tribe of Baqqāra took their own zone of Jebel round which they settled, and which they protected as far as they could from the raids of other sub-tribes, in return for supplies of slaves and grain*' (Llyod, 1908: 55, emphasis added).

This initial one-sided, imposed, unequal and exploitative type of ethnic relations continued to prevail throughout the Turco-Egyptian, the Mahdiyya and the first half of the British-Egyptian rule despite the British policy of closed districts in the region. And it is this initial history upon which the present Baqqāra try to legitimatize their claims as historical partner in the Nuba land, not only in terms of access to use but also in terms of rights to customary and legal ownership. The Nuba hardly accept this line of argumentation. Instead, they conceive it as a continuation of the Baqqāra hegemonic mentality embedded in the overlordship practice. In 1930, Kordofan Governor, Mr. Gillan acknowledged that the Arab overlordship of Nubas occurred basically in three areas in Southern Kordofan Province including the Ḥawāzma Rawāwqa claims over certain hills in Kadugli District as follows:

'(a) Awlād Nuba (Nāzir Ḥāmid al-Likha) claim over Laguri and Saburi;

(b) Dar Jāmi' ('Umda Somi Tāwer) claim over Keiga; and

(c) Dalamiyya (Muhammadān Bahlūl) over certain Moro hills' (Gillan 1930:1).

The overlordship practice was shortly curtailed when Mr. Gillan himself decided to put an end to the practice through his written note to the District Commissioner of Southern Kordofan in which he suggested that: 'I think the system of the Arab overlordships of Nuba hills wants putting an immediate stop to even at the cost of some trouble to ourselves' (Gillan, 1930:1).

The struggle over land ownership claim is strongly felt in the daily discourses among the common peoples of the different competing yet coexisting Nuba and Arab groups. They hardly share similar perception on land rights. To exemplify, while I was in al-Kweik market, I randomly asked the following question to several people representing Keiga and Dār Jāmi': whose land is this? I mean al-Kweik neighborhood. Though the question was so simple and direct one, it immediately categorized the respondents into their respective ethnic markers and the associated perceptions. For the Nuba respondents: It is al-Kweik of Keiga Luban. How about Dār Jāmi'? I asked the same Nuba respondents. One Keiga man responded that though we hosted them for quite long time, and they have become part of our social and spatial landscapes, the Dār Jāmi' have no land here. He concluded that a guest no matter how long he stays, he will never be an owner because, from the Nuba perspective, 'land may be loaned to a friend or a quest for the purposes of cultivation or building, but it remains the property of the family who may exercise their rights at any time' (Hawkesworth, 1932:1986). The Dār Jāmi' Arabs responded, to the same question, by saying that: It is al-Kweik of the Dār Jāmi'. Where then is the Keiga Luban's territory? I asked the Dār Jāmi'. They pointed to the Keiga Luban hill nearby excluding its adjacent plain lands where al-Kweik is situated. The contest over al-Kweik territory in this debate is obvious.

While the above case indicated that the Nuba claimed territory is hardly under their control because of the nomadic Arabs persistent cohabitation, the below case shows how some nomadic and sedentary Arabs find it so difficult to regain their pre-war rights of access to settlement, farming and grazing land, following their compulsory mass departure from the Nuba claimed territory during the civil war. Despite their relentless negotiation associated with their symbolic, and perhaps tactical, political repositioning, they remain internally displaced even though the Nuba Mountains CFA

and the Sudan CPA have been in place since January 2002 and January 2005 respectively.

The ʻAyātqa nomads and the Nuba politics of liberation in al-Azraq

The setting

Al-Azraq is a relatively small village in the eastern part of Heiban, and about 105 km east of Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan State. During the civil war, al-Azraq was under control of the Government of Sudan with a military base, while its surroundings were all under control of the SPLM/A. Administratively, it is part of Heiban local administrative unit in the government records while it is part of *Irral Payam* which covers areas of the Leira, Abol and Shwai communities in the SPLM/A politico-administrative and military system. This SPLM/A system were established during the war and maintain thereafter in the absence of actual integration of the SPLM/A liberated areas and the government controlled areas.

The Leira and ʻAyātqa settlement in al-Azraq

Al-Azraq is also part of the Leira tribal territory with ʻAyātqa agro-pastoralists representing the main nomadic group of Baqqāra in the area. Although the ʻAyātqa came to the area as nomads, some started to gradually settle and practice farming including horticulture in the fertile areas of al-Azraq (Interview: Ḥāmid Satār, Khartoum June 11th, 2006)[15]. They seem to have had peaceful relation with the sedentary Leira community throughout the pre-war period as they continued to share many daily life activities in terms of neighborhood, grazing, water sources, market exchange and farming.

During the pre-war period, the ʻAyātqa, like many other nomads in the Nuba Mountains, used to follow an agro-pastoral mode of life in al-Azraq and the surrounding areas which provide them with pastures, water points, market place and farming land. The whole family stays in the *farīq* during the dry season in the area, and as the rainy season starts, the younger members of the family move gradually

[15] Ḥāmid Satār is the prominent Shaykh of ʻAyātqa Awlād Abu Zona. Following the war intensification during mid 1980s, his family were forced to retreat northwards into the Bedaryya area of ʻAloba in north Kordofan. As prominent elder of the ʻAyātqa, he was a member of the local native administration and its court in al-Azraq and Heiban since 1950s to the 1980s.

northwards with their cattle. The remaining family members stay behind and engage in traditional cultivation and horticultural management, till they are joined again with the cattle at the end of the rainy season. Due to this cyclic movement centered on al-Azraq, ‘Ayātqa were systematically integrated into the wider socioeconomic system in the area, as some were engaged in local trading; some children joined the schools; and a few of their prominent elders were co-opted as members of the native administration and local courts (Interviews: Mukhtār Ḥāmid Satār[16], al-Azraq, May 6th, 2005; and ‘Ali Corenilous, Ḥagar Bago, May 3rd, 2005).

Conversely, the beginning of the SPLM/A operations in the area in 1989, transformed this cooperative relations between the Leira and ‘Ayātqa into antagonistic ones when both sides were instrumentalized by the two warring parties, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. Consequently, as the SPLM/A moved progressively into the area, the ‘Ayātqa nomads started to retreat with their livestock northwards into the government controlled areas of Umm Berembeita, Kortala within South Kordofan, and ‘Aloba in North Kordofan. Upon their arrival to Umm Berembeita, according to Bakol Kalo Ghabūsh[17] of Leira, some of them swore an oath to attack the Nuba Leira areas. As a result, some ‘Ayātqa young members were mobilized by the government, recruited as militia forces as well as informants within the government army that launched excessive military campaigns against the Leira villages including al-Azraq and the surrounding hamlets (Interview: Bakol Kalo Ghabūsh, al-Azraq May 28th, 2006).

[16] Mukhtār Ḥāmid Satār is a teacher and the son of Shaykh Ḥāmid Satār. He decided to come back to the area after the Cease Fire Agreement in 2002 as teacher in al-Azraq Primary School despite the inability of the rest of his family to come back due to Leira resistance to their return.

[17] Bakol Kalo Ghabūsh is one of the few nomads from the Leira of al-Araq, who accompanied the ‘Yātqa nomads during the war period when they retreated with their cattle into the government controlled areas. After the CFA, he returned back to al-Azraq with his over 500 cattle. His presence among the ‘Ayātqa during the war in Umm Berembeita, gave him an opportunity to be an eyewitness to some of the government and ‘Ayātqa militia operations against the Leira areas.

The Leira politics of resistance and liberation and the return of 'Ayātqa to al-Azraq

After the CFA[18] in 2002, which granted free movements of the civilians and the voluntary return of the internally displaced population, the 'Ayātqa nomads wanted to come back to al-Azraq. For them al-Azraq is perceived as their homeland and livelihood base in which they own some permanent assets mainly horticulture and shops[19]. However, the return of 'Ayātqa to al-Azraq proves to be not an easy process, because their return attempt was and is still being strongly resisted by the Leira people. The Leira resistance is indoctrinated and driven by the SPLM/A politics of liberation centered on tribal land as source of autochthonous identity and livelihood.

The Leira people, especially those affiliated to the SPLM and who actually control most of their claimed territorial lands, argue that the 'Ayātqa people were hosted by their ancestors, and eventually given rights of access to the Leira customary land and its resources following their run away from their homeland in Kordofan due to the Mahdiyya war. It is further claimed by the Leira that when the struggle started in the Nuba Mountains against the central government and not against the Arabs, the 'Ayātqa decided not to collaborate with the Leira in defending the land. Instead, they ran away and sided with the government against the Leira people and came back as militias in order to take over the land. By doing so, the Leira argue, the 'Ayātqa group has, in fact, expelled itself and there is no way to have access to the territory including al-Azraq without the consent of the Leira people. This has to be based on new terms attuned to the spirit of 'liberation' and the vision of the 'New Sudan'.

Although the 'Ayātqa[20] confessed that some of their members were recruited as militias and/or as members of *Qūwāt al-Difa' al-Sha'bi* (Popular Defence Forces,

[18] Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement was brokered by the Government of Swiss Confederation and the United States of America at Bürgentstock, Switzerland on January 19th, 2002. It establish for immediate cessation of hostilities, disengagement, and redeployment of all combatants in the area to defensive positions. It allowed for free movement of people and goods as well as for opening up corridors for humanitarian assistance. The whole process, which continued up to the date of signing the CPA in 2005, was supervised by a Joint Military Commission under International Monitoring Team. For the full text see: www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/**NubaCeasefire**.pdf

[19] For example, Ḥāmid Satār, the main 'Ayātqa leader, mentioned that his family members left behind in al-Azraq several horticultural farms with a total of 224 mango trees, in addition to two well built shops and houses.

[20] I was able to meet and interview several members of the 'Ayātqa community who see themselves as internally displaced persons in Umm Berembeita waiting to return to al-Azraq. The interview was

PDFs), and actually fought against the Nuba-led SPLM/A, they denied a claim put forward by the people of Leira stating that the ultimate intention of the Arabs militias was to wipe out the Nuba before they can take control over their indigenous land:

'As 'Ayātqa militia, we never went back to attack Azraq, never. However, we participated in some of the big military operations which usually include the army, al-Difa' al-Sha'bi, and the tribal militias. Such operations are usually launched and commanded by the Sudan Army Forces, though in some cases some militias may launch their own campaigns in search for cattle and loot[21]. Our participation was limited to many formal military operations in different places including some Leira areas like Ormi and Serf al-Nīla' (Interview: Ḥāmid Sa'īd 'Ūmar, Umm Berembeita, February 2nd, 2007).

The 'Ayātqa message here is that their participation in such an operation can not be counted against them as community because those joint operations were carried as part of the war led by two political systems, i.e., the Sudan Government and the SPLM/A. Moreover, there were Nuba including Leira personnel in the government army, the militia groups, and in al-Difa' al-Sha'bi.

The Leira land-based discourses and position driven by the politics liberation were clearly expressed during the deliberations of their 2nd, 3rd and 4th community conferences held in their liberated areas in Ghidrro in 2004, Hajar Bako near al-Azraq, April 2005, and in Sarf al-Nīla, April 2006, respectively. In these conferences, the 'Ayātqa representatives who persistently attempted to attend and participate in the conferences' deliberations and resolutions were hardly allowed to do so except in the opening ceremonial sessions. Despite this Leira resistance, the 'Ayātqa did not give up. Instead, they started gradually to shift and reposition themselves in these emerging political realities of the post-war era in the region, associated with the political and military domination of the Nuba-led SPLM/A over the Leira territory. The

---

conducted in form of informal but guided discussion with a group of over twenty 'Ayātqa leaders in Umm Berembeita including: Ḥussein Ḥassan al-Daba, Muhammad Sanad, Ḥamūda Digayl Sa'īd, Ḥussein al-Zein, 'Ūmar Ahmed Kheir, Ḥamid Sa'īd 'Ūmar, Shannan Maqdam and Sa'īd al-Tom al-Digayl

[21] This narration concurs with various literature of the civil war in the Nuba Mountains. For example, de Waal (2006) succinctly noted that "The early period of war was marked by militia massacres and extra-judicial executions by military intelligence. In a mixture of reprisals and counter-insurgency, some of it pre-emptive, a coalition of military offices and local militia commanders escalated violence against the Nuba. The first step was arming of local Arab tribes by the government, initially as panicked response to an SPLM/A attack in the region in 1985, and in 1989 they were formalized into 'Popular Defence Forces'. The militia committed the worst massacres of the war, driven not only by orders from their paramilitary command, but also by their own search for cattle, loot and cheap labor" (de Waal, 2006:2)

repositioning aims at securing their return to their grazing, farming and settlement land in and around al-Azraq. My informant, Sa'īd al-Tom al-Digayl, one of the 'Ayātqa political figures, pointed to some of their political steps taken towards the SPLM/A as a new emerging important military and political actor in the region. In this regard, he noted that:

'After the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement in 2002, the 'Ayātqa sent a delegation composed of ten leaders in 2003 to Kauda, the SPLM/A regional headquarters. They met 'Abdul Azīz al-Hilu, the then Governor of SLPM/A controlled areas, the Nuba Mountains Region. In the meeting, the 'Ayātqa delegation congratulated the SPLM/A leaders for reaching the agreement, expressed their political support to, and declared their decision to join the SPLM/A' (Interview: Umm Berembeita, February 2nd, 2007).

Pointing to their consistent attempt to attend the Leira annual conferences, negotiate their new position and express their desire to return to al-Azraq, my informant, Sa'īd al-Tom al-Digayl noted that the Leira did not admit the 'Ayātqa delegation into their second tribal conference in Ghiderro in the SPLM/A controlled areas in 2004. The Leira justified their rejection on the ground that the relationship between the two communities was still tense, though the Ceasefire Agreement was already in place. In the Leira third conference held in Hajar Bako in 2005, however, the 'Ayātqa delegation was allowed to attend the conference, and they were able to somehow discuss the Leira-'Ayātqa broken relations during the war. They ended by re-assuring the need for reconciliation and co-existence of the two communities. But it was noted that the whole process needs efforts and time before it is a reality on the ground.

In the Leira 4th tribal conference in 2006, the 'Ayātqa were formally invited to participate with official delegation, composed of two representatives among their leaders, accompanied with their cultural team led by some *ḥakāmāt*[22] (folklore singers and dancers) to participate in the cultural display during the conference. The delegation was warmly received and welcomed when it arrived to the conference venue. However, some confusion occurred upon the arrival of some Leira elites from Khartoum on the same day. They objected to the presence and participation of the

[22] The *ḥakāmāt* (plural of *ḥakkāma*) institutions were instrumental in mobilizing tribal militias, and the *mujhidīn* during the civil war through their songs centred on praising the *jihad* mission, the heroes and martyrs of what believed to be a holy war. It is these same institutions which have shifted their focus, in post-war era, from culture of war towards culture of peace and reconciliation. This shift is a response to the political shift and repositioning exercised, by their tribal leaders, for the sake of their own collective survival in a region currently dominated by political fluidity and peace fragility.

‘Ayātqa delegation in the conference. Their view was that the time was not yet ripe since there are several pending issues which need settlement before a practical step is taken towards reconciliation and the normalization of relations. Though the ‘Ayātqa delegation was allowed to physically remain in the conference, they were actually neutralized when the Leira decided to exclusively use their own indigenous language in the conference deliberations throughout the first day. On the following day, however, the conference went back to use both Arabic and Leira languages in the deliberations. At that point onwards things started to move, though slowly, in the right direction towards inclusion and reconciliation (Interview: Sa’īd al-Tom al-Digayl, Umm Berembeita, February 2nd, 2007).

In an interview with ‘Waḍ Sa’īd Komi, one of the Leira SPLM/A young leader and an administrative officer in Irral County, he outlined the SPLM/A general policy pertained to the Nuba indigenous land. Each Nuba tribe is encouraged to identify and fix the boundary of its own traditional territory but with no expulsion of any other ethnic groups living within that defined territorial land. However, he noted that:

‘It is vital for these other ethnic groups to recognize and respect the Nuba rights of communal ownership over their land. We here in the liberated areas of Irral County perceive groups like the ‘Ayātqa, Shawābna, and Awlād Ghabūsh, among others, as groups which have rights to co-exist as far as they adhere to this fundamental policy. We considered them as part of the marginalized groups which were used by the central government against our people during the war. Such people deserve to be made aware of their rights and to urge them to side with us for better coexistence. There is a great need for embarking on an inter-ethnic reconciliation process in the area. The Nuba of Leira, for example, should be prepared to forgive the ‘Ayātqa for their atrocities and negative contribution during the war, provided that the ‘Ayātqa should be equally prepared to recognize the undisputable rights of ownership of the Leira people over their communal territory in which they coexist and share its usage’ (Interview: ‘Waḍ Sa’īd Komi, Heiban, February 27th, 2007).

He disclosed that they have already started a negotiation process towards that end. He noted that the SPLM/A conviction is that the ‘Ayātqa, like many other Arabs groups in the Nuba Mountains, were not aware about the implications of their siding with the government during the war against their own partners in the region. They were also not aware of the real intention behind the SPLM/A struggle because of the misrepresentation of the SPLM/A image during the war by the government media and the related institutions. They portrayed the SPLM/A justified struggle especially here in the Nuba Mountains as a mere war against the Arabs by the Nuba. However, after

the signing of the CPA in 2005 which paved the way for dialogue at different levels, most of these local Arabs have started to understand the SPLM/A real intention and its vision of the 'New Sudan'. The evidence is that they have started to join the SPLM as it starts shifting gradually from a politico-military liberation movement to a proper political party (Interview: 'Waḍ Saʾīd Komi , Heiban, February 27th, 2007).

These developments were necessary but not sufficient to create peace and security among the 'Ayātqa when it comes to the decision to return to al-Azraq. In fact, most of the 'Ayātqa families in Umm Berembeita, Kortala and 'Aloba believe that they can not return to al-Azraq at the present time because of several reasons but insecurity, domination of culture of war instead of culture of peace, and severe shortage of water supply in al-Azraq were emphasized. Despite these circumstance, the 'Ayātqa have not lost hope of returning to their perceived homeland sometime to come. In their leader's words:

'We have no land other than al-Azraq. We have a valid oath with Leira and other Nuba communities. Therefore, we were not supposed to betray this oath during the crisis, though, unfortunately, some did when they participated with the government against the Nuba. Today, the 'Ayātqa people need to re-negotiate and reconcile with their brothers the Leira, before they can consider the possibility of returning home. Right now, there is no social peace, no security and no effective government institutions to put things in order. Unless this situation is reversed, our return will remain a remote but not an impossible event' (Interview: Ḥāmid Satār, Khartoum June 9th, 2006).

In short, it is obvious that the 'Ayātqa nomads were made to evacuate themselves when they felt unsecured as a result of the war. But it is also evident how, later, some of them were consciously or unconsciously mobilized by government army to participate in attacking the Leira villages. Despite the accomplishment the CPA, the political and social situation is still ambiguous as to how to restore the previously mutual co-existence associated with amicable multiple use of land rights among these two competing ethnic groups. The urgency of the situation stemmed from the fact that one party (the 'Ayātqa Baqqāra) has completely lost access to the historically shared territory. While the other party (the Nuba of Leira) have exclusively and effectively controlled their territory with possibility of 'others' to have conditional access of use to their 'liberated land'. For the 'Ayātqa and possibly all the nomadic Baqqāra in the region, the restoration of the pre-war peaceful co-existence is still possible to attain. For some Leira and perhaps the bulk of the Nuba, however, the damages caused by

the previous partner the Baqqāra, are beyond repair and their autochthonous claimed territory was liberated to remain so. This latter position represents the new Nuba generation, politically indoctrinated with the 'New Sudan' vision. This vision is associated with the politics of liberation and resistance against the institutional structures and functions of the 'Old Sudan'. In their view, it is these institutional structures and functions of the 'Old Sudan' which consistently established for their multiple socioeconomic marginalization and underdevelopment, political subordination, land alienation, ethnocide, genocide and eventually the loss of not only their indigenous ethno-cultural identity and land but perhaps their very survival.

Conclusion

The paper asserted that the *autochthonous claim* of the land rights by the indigenous communities is one of the roots causes of the ethno-political tensions and eventually the civil wars in Sudan in general and in the Nuba Mountains region in particular. In the context of the ethnic settings in the Nuba Mountains, the paper attempted, through field–note–centered ethnographic materials, to demonstrate how the autochthonous identity politics is being articulated in claiming communal land rights by the sedentary Nuba, a self-identified indigenous group to the region. At the same time, it traced how the Nuba autochthonous claims are persistently being contested by the nomadic Arab groups. These claims and counter claims are noticeable in the ethnic territorial attachments, political expressions/actions, and in the lines of argumentation pursued by these two competing conglomerates of ethnic groups, in a situation of multiple and overlapping communal land use, control and ownership.

The Nuba self-identification as indigenous group is depicted through their oral history and myths of their origins, their cultural and religious practices, as well as through their contemporary political struggle, fueled by their emerging autochthonous collective identity, and indoctrinated by the 'politics of resistance and liberation'. All these manifestations are tied to the claimed territory as base for their ethno-political identity and source of their livelihood and economic survival. With this autochthonous position, the Nuba perceive all other ethnic groups in the region as mere users of their autochthonous land when it comes to ownership entitlements.

However, the Nuba autochthonous claim of communal land rights, though vigorously pursued through the politics of autochthonous identity and the liberation movement, it has not only been contested by the Baqqāra coexisting in the region but it has also been consistently undermined by the Sudanese modern state's legal and politico-administrative systems. The issue involves a confrontation between the *legality* of the Sudanese *modern state legal land framework*, and the *legitimacy* of the *traditional ethnic institutions and authorities* of the self-identified *indigenous communities*. The state *legal* and *politico-administrative institutions* undermine any autochthony-based claims of rights to the indigenous groups which find themselves at the margins of state wealth, power and socio-cultural representation in national identity. At the neighbourhood level, the confrontation is between these *traditional social institutions and authorities* of the indigenous groups and the other coexisting ethnic groups as latecomers who inevitably compete over the shared land resources for their survival. In fact, the perspective, line of argumentation and the associated practices of the Baqqāra suggest that they are claiming land rights not only in terms of access to use but also in terms of rights of ownership.

To sum, in the absence of a viable Sudanese state with political will and ability to progressively achieve the spatial integration of its national territory as economic, social and political space, it is likely that the trend and complexity of articulating the autochthonous identity politics in claiming collective land rights by different Sudanese territorially-based communities will increasingly continue to rise. This, in turn, will inevitably sustain the recurrent ethno-political instability which not only undermines the nation-building process but endangers the very survival of the Sudan as an existing state.

References

Abdul-Jalil, Musa Adam, 'Land tenure and inter-ethnic conflict in Darfur', in ACTS: *Report of the conference on land tenure and conflict in Africa: prevention, mitigation and reconstruction* (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 2005), 53-71.

Adams, Martin, 'The Baggara problem: attempts at modern change in Southern Darfur and Southern Kordofan, Sudan' in: *Development and Change* 13, 2 (1982), 259-289.

African Rights, *Facing genocide: the Nuba of Sudan* (London: African Rights, 1995).

Battahani, Atta Hassan, el, *The State and the agrarian question: a case study of Southern Kordofan: 1971-1977* (Khartoum: M.Sc. Thesis; University of Khartoum, 1980).

———, *Nationalism and peasant politics in the Nuba Mountains region of Sudan, 1924-1966* (Brighton: PhD Thesis, University of Sussex, 1986).

Cunnison, Ian, *Baggara Arabs: power and lineage in a Sudanese nomad tribe* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).

De Wit, Paul V., *Legality and legitimacy: a study on access to land, pasture and water* (Rome: FAO: IGAD Partner Working Group, 2001).

De Waal, Alex, 'Averting genocide in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan', *Social Science Research Council (SSRC)*, (22.12.2006), http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/de_Waal12/printable.html, accessed 23 May 2007.

El-Tayeb, Galal el-Din, *Industry and peripheral capitalism in the Sudan: a geographical analysis* (1989; 1st edn. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1989).

El-Imam, Abdalla El-Tom, and Egemi, Omer, *Addressing land questions in the Nuba Mountains: capitalizing on previous experiences* (Khartoum: UNDP, 2004).

Ende, Nanne op 't., 'Nuba Book Project: Proud to be Nuba', *Nuba Mountains Homepage*', (2007a), home.planet.nl/~ende0098/content/home/Book.htm, accessed 12 June 2007

———, *Proud to be Nuba: faces and voices* (Forthcoming, 2007b).

Gillan, J. A., *Arab-Nuba Policy: Arab Overlordship*, (Durham: Sudan Archives no. Sud723/8/10-13, Durham University Library, 1930).

———, *Some aspects of Nuba administration* (Khartoum: Sudan Government Memoranda No. 1, 1931).

Gore, Paul Wani et al., *Eight grassroots conflicts in Sudan* (Khartoum: UNICEF, 2004).

Government of the Sudan, *First Population Census of Sudan 1955/56: notes on Omodia Map* (Khartoum: Population Census Office, 1959).

Government of the Sudan and SPLM/A, 'The Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement of January 19th 2002', (19.01.2002), http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/NubaCeasefire.pdf, accessed 15 June 2007.

———, 'The Comprehensive Peace Agreement', *United States Institute of Peace*', (16.03.2005) http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/cpa01092005/cpa_toc.html, accessed 12 June 2007.

Haraldsson, Ingemar, *Nomadism and agriculture in the Southern Kordofan Porvince of Sudan*, (Uppsala: Institutionen for ekonomi och statictik, 1982).

Harir, S. and Tvedt, T. (eds), 'Short-cut to decay: the case of the Sudan'. *Nordic Africa Institute* (1994), www.amazon.com/Short-Cut-Decay-Sudan-Sharif-Harir/dp/9171063463, accessed 15 May 2007.

Harragin, Simon, *Nuba Mountains land and natural resources study*, part 1 – land study (USAID in collaboration with the University of Missouri, 2003).

Hawkesworth, D., 'The proper Nuba of Southern Kordofan' in: *Sudan Notes and Records* 15 (1932), 159-200.

Henderson, K. D. D., 'A note on the migration of the Missiriya tribe into South-West Kordofan, Sudan' in: *Notes and Records* 22,1 (1939), 49-77.

Ibrahim, Hamid El-Bashir, *Agricultural development policy, ethnicity and socio-political change in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan*, (Storrs: PhD Thesis, University of Connecticut, 1988).

———, *Development failure and environmental collapse: Re-understanding the background to the present civil war in the Nuba Mountains, 1985-1998*, (IAAS and FES Symposium on perspectives on tribal conflicts in Sudan, University of Khartoum, May 11th -12th 1998).

Keiga Council, *The Keiga 1st Conference*, (Keiga Tummero: April 12th-14th 2006).

Komey, Guma Kunda, 'Dynamics of the marginalization process in Sudan: the Nuba Mountains case' in Hassan A. Abdel Ati (ed.), *The Sudan: challenges of peace and redressing marginalization* (Khartoum: EDGE for consultancy & research, 2004), 54-87.

———, *Regional disparity in national development of the Sudan and its impact on nation-building: with reference to the peripheral region of the Nuba Mountains* (Khartoum: PhD Thesis, University of Khartoum, 2005).

———, *Articulating autochthonous identities in claiming traditional land rights in the Sudan: an ethnographic case study from the Nuba Mountains after the CPA*, (Bremen Workshop: After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement/CPA: Signs of Change? November 13-14, 2006, Bremen University, 2006).

Kramer, Fritz W., *The social organization of time among the Krongo of South Kordofan* (Berlin: Insitut für Ethnologie, Freie Universität Berlin, 1987).

Lloyd, W., *Appendix D: Report on Kordofan Province. Sudan* (Durham: Archives no. Sud783/9/40-86, Durham University Library, 1908).

MacMicheal, Harold A., *The tribes of Northern and Central Kordofan* (London: Frank Cass, 1912/1967)

———, *A history of the Arabs in the Sudan and some account of the people who preceded them and of the tribes inhabiting Dar Fur* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1922).

Manger, Leif Ole, 'Traders and farmers in the Nuba Mountains: Jellaba family firms in the Liri area' in Leif O. Manger (ed.), *Trade and traders in the Sudan* (Bergen: Department of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen, 1984), 213-242.

———, 'Traders, farmers and pastoralists: economic adaptations and environmental problems in the southern Nuba Mountains of the Sudan', in Douglas H. Johnson and David M. Anderson (eds), *The ecology of survival: case studies from Northeast African history* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 155-172.

———, *From the mountains to the plains: the integration of the Lafofa Nuba into Sudanese society* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1994)

———, *Local resource management in the context of civil war and genocide: identity, cultural tradition and territory among the Nuba of Sudan* (Williamsburg: The 14th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethological Sciences (ICAES), July 26th-August 1st, 1998).

———, *Perspectives on land tenure and related issues in the Nuba Mountains: a desk study for the Nuba Mountains Program Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT)* (Khartoum: UNDP, 2003).

———, *Understanding the ethnic situation in the Nuba Mountains in the Sudan. How to handle processes of groups-making, meaning production and metaphorization in a situation of post-conflict reconstruction*? (Florence: IUAES, the 1st International Colloquium of the Commission on Ethnic Relations (COER), July 7th-9th, 2006).

March, G. F., 'Kordofan Province' in John Douglas Tothill (ed.), *Agriculture in the Sudan, being a handbook of agriculture as practiced in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 827-850.

Martinussen, J., *Society, state and market: a guide to competing theories of development*, (2nd ed) (London and New York : Zed Books Ltd, 2003).

Mohamed Salih, Mohamed Abdel Rahim, 'Local markets in Moro land: the shifting strategies of the Jellaba merchants' in Leif O. Manger (ed.), *Trade and traders in the Sudan* (Bergen: Department of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen, 1984a), 189-212.

———, 'National versus regional: some methodological problems in the study of nationalism and nation-building in the Sudan' in Mohamed O. Beshir, Mohamed Abdel Rahim Mohamed Salih, and Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil (eds), *The Sudan ethnicity and national cohesion* (Bayreuth: Bayreuth University, 1984b) 39-53.

———, 'Land alienation and genocide in the Nuba Mountains' in: *Cultural Survival Quarterly*: world report on the rights of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities 22, 4 (1999), 36-38.

Nadel, Siegfried Frederick, *The Nuba: an anthropological study of the hill tribes of Kordofan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947).

Rahhal, Suleiman Musa, *The right to be Nuba. The story of a Sudanese people's struggle for survival* (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 2001).

Roden, David, 'Lowland farms for a mountain people' in: *The Geographical Magazine* 3 (1969), 200-206.

———, 'Down-migration in the Moro Hills of Southern Kordofan' in: *Sudan Notes and Records* 53 (1972), 79-99.

———, ‘Changing Patterns of Land Tenure among the Nuba of Central Sudan’ in: *Journal of Administration Overseas* 10 (1975), 294-309.

Sagar, J. W., ‘Notes on the history, religion and customs of the Nuba’ in: *Sudan Notes and Records* 5 (1922), 137-156.

Salih, Kamal el-Din Osman, *The British administration in the Nuba Mountains region of the Sudan 1900-1956* (London: Ph.D Thesis, University of London, 1982).

———, ‘British policy and the accentuation of inter-ethnic divisions: the case of the Nuba mountains region of Sudan, 1920-1940’, in: *African Affairs* 89, 356 (1990), 417-436.

Spaulding, Jay, ‘A premise for pre-colonial Nuba history’ in: *History in Africa* 14 (1987), 369-374.

SPLM, *Governance workshop: Nuba land strategy* (Lwere-Kauda: SPLM Land Office, 2004).

Stevenson, R. C., *The Nuba people of Kordofan province: an ethnographic survey* (Khartoum: Graduate College Publications, University of Khartoum, 1984).

———, *The Nuba people of Kordofan province: an ethnographic survey Monograph (7)* (Khartoum: University of Khartoum, Graduate College Publications, 1965).

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, ‘A Communiqué from the All Nuba Conference of 2nd – 5th December 2002’ (09.12.2002), http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=First+All+Nuba+conference+&btnG=Search , accessed 14 April 2007.

———, ‘The 2nd All Nuba Conference of March 4th – 8th 2005’ *Sudan Tribune* [online newapaper], (10.05.2005), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article9487, accessed 14 April 2007.

Suliman, Mohamed, ‘The Nuba Mountains of Sudan: resource access, violent conflict, and identity’, in Daniel Buckles (ed.), *Cultivating peace: conflict and collaboration in natural resource management* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999), 205-220.