Emerging Forms of Power in Contemporary Africa: Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Findings

Thomas Hüsken & Georg Klute

Summary

The transformation of statehood is a frequently debated topic in studies that deal with globalization. This is particularly true with regard to the African continent; here, the "building" of the nation-state has been confronted, more than anywhere else, with quite a number of challenges. At times and in certain areas, state structures even collapsed, and thus transformed contemporary Africa into the symbol for state failure. In particular, the peripheries of many post-colonial states in Africa assist to the emergence of local stateless forms of power, which seem to suggest the end of the globalised statehood utopia.

The paper refers to the central issues of the panel "Uncertainty and Order in African Polities" by the following questions: Are these new forms of political organization only a reaction to uncertainty caused by the weakness or even the absence of state structures? Are these orders able to substitute the State in the long run? Are global processes confronted with enduring local representations of order and rule, indicating that stateless societies can resist the overwhelming power of the "Leviathan"? Can the longevity of local political models lead to the transformation of the state as the only and unique model of organised power? Or do they foreshadow a specific form of interlacement between non state actors and the state that will lead to heterarchical political settings in Africa and elsewhere?

Introduction

The colonial expansion and the subsequent global implementation of statehood seemed to support the idea of evolutionists and scholars of the theory of systems that the modern bureaucratic state of western origin is the inevitable mode of political organization for human societies. Since the end of the cold war, the crisis and the factual erosion of the state in the former USSR and in Africa initiated a debate on the transformation of statehood. Apart from generalizations such as "weak" or "failing states," transformations of statehood are nowadays labelled with numerous additional attributes, such as "network state" (Züricher / Koehler 2001), a term referring to interconnections between the state and networks of non state actors, or "cunning states" (Randeria 2003) describing weak states that rely on development cooperation and international aid in order to endure.

In the last two decades, Africa has experienced deep changes resulting in new social and political settings almost everywhere on the continent. The end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, multi-party democracy in Tanzania and Benin, the achievement of peace in Mozambique and Angola, civil wars in Somalia, Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Rwanda genocide, or the regionalisation of conflicts, are few though well known examples of a political setting which becomes more and more heterogeneous. These processes not

only chased many of Africa's military or dictatorial regimes away, they also fragmented organised state structures and administration or made them even collapse. At times, these changes are explained as part of the global change due to the end of the cold war and the break-down of the socialist block. At other times, specific African causes are put forward. Africa, however, nowadays serves as a particular symbol of state failure. In Africa the crisis of statehood seems to be deeper than anywhere else in the world. Significantly, the adjectives to qualify resulting structures of the African state have been consistently negative: "Failing", "failed", "weak", "soft", "incomplete", "collapsed", "greedy", or "criminal", are some of them (Bayart 1989, Bayart / Ellis / Hibou 1999, Fatton 1992, Chabal / Daloz 1999). The term heterarchy, as opposed to hierarchy, seems appropriate to describe resulting differentiated distributions of power-foci in many African countries (Chabal / Feinman / Skalnik 2004; Bodarenko / Grinin / Korotayev 2004).

During the same period regional or transnational political actors emerged (Copans 2003) who attempted to, and sometimes even succeeded in, expropriating state sovereignty and administration through processes of informal 'privatisation' (Klute / Trotha 2004). Some of the new actors on the complex African political scene seem to be well known "old fellows": chieftaincies and so-called traditional authorities now reappear on the regional and national political stage (Oomen 2002; Van Rouveroy 1994). Some political actors, however, wear new faces. These new actors include ethnic militia, economic and military entrepreneurs, transnational smugglers and last but not least agents in international organisations of development aid or conflict management.

Nevertheless, the central reference of thought and consideration remains the state. Political organization beside or beyond the state are predominantly perceived as deviant development, but not as independent phenomena of political organization. This is particularly true for the discussion on the reconstruction of statehood in Africa (Tetzlaff / Jacobeit 2005). As a consequence, current debates on non state groups and formations focus on the "informalization" or the "re-traditionalization" of politics in Africa (Chabal / Dalosz 1999; Kassimir 2001), portraying non state actors as competitors and opponents of the state.

Looking at the way political anthropology deals with the transformation of statehood in Africa, one can distinguish three lines of thought. The first perspective is dedicated to local case-studies: Bierschenk (1999) analyses the political arena and its actors in the African city of Parakou in Benin and thus illustrates how the command state (Elwert 2001) operates behind the facade of modern statehood on the basis of clientelism, corruption and the approbation of development aid. The second school focuses on African chieftainship and segmentary modes of tribal organization; it tries to integrate a historical perspective that aims at the analysis of continuities and innovations of these modes of political organization

within new contexts and settings (Spear 2003). This school was able to demonstrate how chieftainship in Africa was institutionalized as "administrative chieftainship" (Beck 1989, Trotha 1997, Alber 2000) within the intermediary rule of the colonial state. The historical depth of the analysis unfolds the continuity and inventiveness of "neo-traditional" chieftaincy. Contemporary chieftaincies seem to operate as well within the context of modern statehood as in the horizon of tradition. Chiefs show competences in both spheres of political organization. Thus, they are able to succeed as political entrepreneurs on local or regional levels, and even become part of the political elite of the state (Lentz 2000). Skalnik (2002) shows that chiefs, particularly in times of transformation, successfully turned peoples' feelings of uncertainty into support for themselves by combining chieftaincy with notions of security and trust. We do not yet know whether the renaissance of chieftaincy in Africa is merely a substitute for weak or incomplete statehood doomed to disappear as soon as the state will recover, or whether it indicates the emerge of non state modes of political organization and rule (Skalnik 2004).

In North Africa, the interrelationship between states and tribes is discussed in ways that reach beyond the perspective of antagonism and conflict (Khoury / Kostiner 1990). Although tribes played a significant role in the creation of Islamic empires, they also dominated at various times vast areas that did not come under effective Islamic imperial authority. Since the mid of the nineteenth century, tribal groups were incorporated, at different speeds and varying degrees, into the modern states that evolved at that time. Tribes, however, did not necessarily cease to exist because states were formed. In fact, it was not uncommon in the process of state formation that tribes were encouraged to reach an agreement with state authority in order to preserve their autonomy. In other cases, new tribes emerged that did not organize themselves on the basis of ethnicity and kinship, but on the basis of other, more dynamic loyalties (Anderson 1990, Hüsken / Roenpage 1998). This perspective is in sharp contrast to "traditional" contributions which promote the paradigm of antagonism and conflict between state and tribe (Scholz 1991). The political reality in North Africa thus seems to be characterized by varying degrees of interlacement between states and tribes, joined by a number of new groups and formations that evolved in recent years. Today, tribal networks or formations with tribal backgrounds and resources dominate the military and security apparatus in Libya (Obeidi 2002). They have successfully appropriated state functions in southern Algeria and even established parastates in the North of Mali. The interlacement of tribe and state either appears as division of labour between both parties, or as a process in which the state is colonized by tribesmen, or as privatization and appropriation of sovereign rights and central tasks of the state. Thus it is obvious that until today the leviathan has not managed to overwhelm non state forms of local power.

Interlacement can also be understood as a dynamic process of transformation and innovation challenging and changing existing conceptions and models of order.

A third perspective in political anthropology focuses on the emergence of local, non state forms of power and their interlacement with the state. This perspective does also include a historical dimension: it explores the cultural construction of peripheries within states (Das / Pool 2004) and emerging forms of power and domination. However, the crisis of the state in Africa seems to alter the spaces of manoeuvre for non state political actors enabling them to succeed with their conceptions of order against, or parallel to, or in interlacement with, the state (Lebeau et al. 2003). One of the best known examples in this respect is the interlacement of non state conceptions of order and models of statehood in Somaliland. Here, the interlacement of non state actors and what was called a failing state has led to a "neo-segmentary order" (Heyer 1997, Trotha 2005) that nevertheless continues to present itself as a state.

Klute and Trotha introduced the conceptions of "para-statehood" and "para-sovereignty" (Klute 1998; Trotha 2000, Trotha / Klute 2001) in order to explain the particular situation of a chieftaincy in Mali. They describe the relationship between the para-state and the central state of Mali as conflictive process in which local actors appropriate rights and functions of the state, thus transforming statehood in Mali into a heterarchical setting. The conceptions of para-statehood and para-sovereignty were recently adapted to alter the perspective on failing states by drawing the attention not to the weakness of the state, but to the strength and vitality of local forms of power (Hauck 2004). Another perspective uses the approach to focus on the take over of central functions of the state by development organizations. This does not only induce processes of the erosion of the state's legitimacy (Neubert 1997), but can also lead to a "para-sovereign rule of development" (Klute / Trotha 1999). Since most of the mentioned studies refer to post conflict situations, it seems quite reasonable to ask whether the emergence of local power is necessarily bound to conflict, civil-war or post war settings. Beside the investigation of the conditions that allow for the emergence of local non state power, questions like its modes of material reproduction and legitimacy are challenging fields of study. It should also not left aside that these processes can also lead to the strengthening of the contested state.

Parastatal rule in the Adagh, Mali-Algeria

Adagh is the name of a mountainous area in the borderland between Mal and Algeria. The inhabitants of the region, roughly 100.000 people, are nomadic pastoralists, mostly Tuareg. Compared to other areas inhabited by Tuareg, the amount of literature on the region is rather scarce, particularly with regard to the field of politics. This situation remained unchanged throughout the time of colonial domination (Klute 1992). It was only in 1971 that

the British anthropologist Swift (Swift 1979) got access to the region and conducted some months of fieldwork. Swift was followed by Klute who studied the daily life and work of camel nomads (Klute 1992). Apart from Ag Sidiyene's ethno-linguistic study (1996), the historical studies by Farias (2003), the autobiography of last colonial administrator of Kidal region, Jean Clauzel (1989) and the work of Dida Badi (2001) on local myths of origin, all subsequent publications dealt either with transnational migration to Algeria and Libya, or the clan based social organization of migrants, or with the rebellion of the Tuareg against the Malian state in the years 1990-1996.

The erection of the (modern) colonial state at the beginning of the 20th century has been the starting point for the rise of a group of chiefs that dominates until today the political sphere of the region. As in other parts of their colonial empire, the French integrated the chiefs as local intermediaries into the colonial administration, an institution known as "administrative chieftaincy" (Beck 1989). In the Adagh, however, the French could only assert their position during the first 25 years of their presence (until 1928) with the help of the same group of chiefs they had installed as intermediaries before. Indeed, the chiefs sent out Tuareg warriors to support the colonial army militarily, and to fight side by side with the French against anti-colonial resistance or nomadic raiders. This peculiar state of affairs is locally perceived as a time of "parallel rule" of the French colonizers on the one hand, and the Tuareg chiefs on the other; it is used until today to legitimize the chiefs' claim for power and authority parallel to the one put forward by the Malian state (Klute 2001).

It is thus not surprising that there was a strong demand to reach regional autonomy by way of establishing a federal state once Mali had achieved its independence in 1960 (Boilley 1999). The rejection of this claim by the Malian state led to a first military upheaval in 1963-1964, that was bloodily put down by the Malian army (Lecocq 2002). From 1963 to 1987 the Adagh was a restricted area under military control, isolated from the political, economic and social development in the rest of postcolonial Mali. In 1968, the socialist regime of Modibo Keita was overthrown by a military *coup d'etat*. Following the colonial tradition, the new military regime contented itself with the outer control of the region in order to prevent any further upheaval. There was hardly any investment in infrastructures, and domestic politics was left to the chiefs. However, this example of intermediary rule should not be misinterpreted as an indicator for the weakness of the Malian state. The military administration of the Adagh remained intact and the presence of troops was significant.

In 1990 the so called Tuareg rebellion occurred. Most rebels were migrants from Algeria and Libya returning to Adagh for the sake of erecting an independent state or to reach at least regional autonomy, thus taking up the very same claim their fathers had failed to accomplish. After several years of fighting it became clear that no side was able to take victory. The civilian population became so war weary that "traditional" leaders offered

themselves as mediators and initiated reconciliatory meetings. The chiefs not only succeeded in the mediation of the conflict, bringing peace to the region that, however fragile, has lasted until today. They also recaptured the power taken from them by the rebels and even enlarged their position into a form of regional para-sovereign rule. Here we cannot go into detail concerning the concepts of para-state and para-sovereignty (see Klute 1999, 1998; Klute / Trotha 1999 and 2004). Only the following should be noted.

By "para-state" and "para-sovereignty" we understand, firstly, the institutional and, secondly, the legal side of this kind of rule. In this type of rule social power foci and relevant nongovernmental groups have taken over parts of the rights of sovereignty of the central authority or of core duties of state administration. The transfer of power and duties is not provided for by the constitution. We see the process of handing over of sovereign rights and state administrative duties as procedure of expropriation occurring by means of processes of "informal decentralisation" and "privatisation". Expropriation is typically carried out by groups which are in direct competition with the state such as power groups of the colonial and postcolonial intermediary. They include groups of the administrative chieftaincy and development aid organisations, in particular non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Just like the administrative chieftaincy in colonial and postcolonial times the political rule in the regional para-sovereign chiefdom in the Adagh is not exercised by a single chief but by a group, whose members are related to one another by consanguinity and tribal membership. The members take on quite different duties in the chiefdom, and the fulfilment of these duties may at times entail serious conflicts between them.

Today's politics in the Adagh are marked by an "intermediary concept of domination". All actions must serve to ensure co-operation with the central government, to protect "one's own" population from the demands of the central government and to ensure the role of the chiefdom as intermediary between the "outside" (central government, international donors etc.) and the "inside". In its intermediary role the para-sovereign chiefdom has to appear indispensable to both the members on the inside and the representatives of the outside, and to provide the region with as much autonomy as possible.

The "para-state" in the Adagh tries to establish a regional monopoly of violence and thus forces the central government to drop their monopolistic claim in this respect. It also expropriates from the central state the right to occupy leading positions and all other offices lying within the field of the para-state. In place of the pre-colonial principle of a "rule over people" the "para-state" puts in place a territorial principle of rule and can do this far more successfully than the colonial and postcolonial state.

The history of the Algerian part of the Adagh differs from what has been mentioned about the Malian side. In Algeria important changes were already introduced at the end of the

French colonial domination. The French recruited significant numbers of Tuareg warriors for the war against the independence movement FLN from the mid-1950s onwards. Roughly at the same time the colonial authorities conducted explorations for petrol and other resources as well as for testing grounds of atomic bombs of the French *Force de Frappe*.

After the independence of Algeria the socialist regime, similar to the one in Mali, considered nomadic pastoralism as anachronism that had to be overcome and replaced by a sedentary way of life considered part of modernity. Thus sedentarization programs were promoted. Unlike Mali, Algeria was able to compensate the people of Adagh economically and financially through the redistribution of revenues erected from the exportation of petrol and gas (Klute 2002).

During the Tuareg Rebellion of the 1990's the Malian-Algerian borderland was used by the rebels to withdraw from the fighting and by the civilian population as refuge and shelter. The rebels also used it to recharge arms and supplies. After the rebellion had ended in 1996, the opportunities the borderland offers were frequently used for transnational trade, smuggling and the trafficking of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. It is interesting to note that these transnational connections and practices nowadays even intensified despite the interference of several states (Algeria, Mali, USA) engaged in recapturing state control over a vast area considered by the governments of the United States of America and Algeria, and, though to a somehow lesser degree, also of Mali, as a stronghold of terrorists in the southern Sahara (Keenan 2004).

Since 2004 the American Army started its "Pan-Sahel-Initiative" (PSI) in Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. The programme was meant to train Special Forces of the respective national armies in order to better control the vast border regions between these countries. In 2005 the PSI, now named Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism-Initiative (TSCTI), was extended to Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria and budgeted with half a billion dollars (Lecocq / Schrijver 2007). The United States have occupied an air-base near the village of Tessalit at the Malian-Algerian border and equipped it with the most sophisticated technologies in the "war" the Bush administration has declared to lead "against terror".

It is thus obvious that we can not speak here of weak or absent states. On the contrary; apparently more state representatives and more armed men than ever before are present in the region, and several powerful states, among them the super-power of our time, the USA, engage militarily, financially and politically in the Malian-Algerian borderland. Despite their presence local political actors succeed anyhow in sustaining or even expanding their para-sovereign position. This became clear once more on the 23rd of May 2006, when several hundred Malian soldiers of Tuareg origin took some garrisons of the Malian Army in the North of the country. It was only after more than nine months of a "cold war" like type of

confrontation and several rounds of negotiation, again led by the para-sovereign chiefs that a peace between the Malian government and the insurgents was agreed upon at the end of March 2007.

The para-state in the Adagh is not only strong enough to defy the Malian army and the Malian state; it is also strong enough to chase away the Algerian Al Qaeda-affiliated "Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat" (GSPC), accomplishing thus an endeavour neither Mali nor the USA succeeded to do. End of September 2006 the Tuareg insurgents reported that skirmishes had occurred between them and the GSPC, resulting in the death of three of the GSPC's leaders, among them the commander in chief. By proving their willingness and their (military) capacities to fight any outside threat, the para-sovereign chiefs in the Adagh underlined their regional claim to leadership and their claim to the regional monopoly of violence. They had already shown to Mali their readiness to confirm their position, be it with military means, and they now show that they are able to protect the regional population even against outside, "global" violence, thus gaining the most important kind of legitimacy, namely the one that emanates from the protection against violence, and that lies at the heart of the formation of any kind of order.

Interlacing modes of political power in the Egypt-Libya borderland

The territory of the Aulad Ali tribes stretches along the Mediterranean Sea from Al-Hamam in Egypt to Benghazi in Libya. Approximately 350.000 Aulad Ali live in Egypt and around 150.000 in Libya. The Aulad Ali are not a marginalized group. They represent the majority (85%) of the population in the Egyptian governorate of Matruh. The international border between Egypt and Libya offers opportunities in trade, smuggling and labour migration. In Libya, the vast oil fields and the massive national and upcoming international investment offer significant economic advantages that can be mobilized by the Aulad Ali in their relation to other tribes and the state. In Egypt, the state tries to appease the Bedouin population by investments in infrastructure, the channelling of international development aid and, more recently, by a loose and tolerant border-regime that allows for various forms of legal and illegal transnational transactions. Thus the economic situation in the borderland is comparatively stable.

The Aulad Ali Bedouins are not unknown to social anthropology and anthropogeography. The last empirical studies though were conducted eight years ago, among them the study of Müller-Mahn (1989), the analysis of a Bedouin economy by Hüsken and Roenpage (1998) and the historical work of Rusch und Stein (1988). Furthermore, there is Obermeyer's study on changing patterns of Bedouin leadership (1973), Cole und Al-Tourki's study (1998) on labour, tourism and economy and, of course, Lila Abu-Lughods popular "Veiled Sentiments"

(1987). The relationship between states and tribes is described quite differently in the books quoted above. Oriented at "Segmentary Theory", Müller-Mahn, and Abu-Lughod tend to identify general antagonisms between state and tribes. Modernization (and state formation) is seen as a process in which the tribe is infiltrated, marginalized and assimilated by the state. Hüsken and Roenpage (1998) by contrast - following the tradition of Marx (1978), Salzmann (1980) or Eickelman (1989) – emphasize processes of innovation, inventiveness and persistence in their analysis of Bedouin political organisation and politicians. From their point of view, nomadic tradition serves as resource for the making of we-group-identities, used to shape and organize change and transition. Tribes either play a quite active role in the context of state formation or have successfully turned their interlacement with the state into informal autonomies. The notion of tribal confederation refers to historical events such as the "Sanussi-Confederation" at the turn of the 19th to the 20thcentury (in which the Aulad Ali were involved). Such confederations, characterized by common religious belief, a certain political program and a charismatic leadership, does no longer exist. Nevertheless the Aulad Ali tribes represent an "imagined community" in the sense of Benedict Anderson (1983) with a particular tribal ideology (common origin, equality, solidarity) that might at times articulate common goals. The tribes offer a system of reference in which a wide range of corporative networks of different scale and depth can be arranged. Tribes provide a setting of institutions and regulative procedures for conflict resolution such as the customary law "urf". These settings and arrangements can substitute or cooperate with the state. They can also transform into central elements and references of non-state forms of rule.

The Egyptian state is often portrayed as a neo-patrimonial political system allowing for a certain form of pluralism under the coercive control of the state. More recent studies (Kienle 2001) point to networks which have successfully colonized the framework of the Egyptian state. These networks use the state for the legal and illegal appropriation of material resources and the accumulation of power. These networks consist of old and new economical elites and the military apparatus. The national party (NDP) serves as a cooptation machinery that allows other political formations to participate and benefit from the regime. The NDP operates within and beside the state. Talking about the state in Egypt thus always means talking about formal and informal agents who use the state as a legitimatory façade to pursue their ends (Weiss 1994). The peripheries and border-regions of Egypt are traditionally governed by military generals loyal to President Hosny Mubarak. Here, not the weakness or ill-functioning of the state is the interesting point, but the interlacement of an already informalized state with local power groups.

The formal structure of local political participation is represented by the "*maglis mahall*" (assembly of the governorate). The assembly is a formal democratic institution that is limited by the authoritarian character of the Egyptian political system. The core of decision

making is in the hands of the governor. Bedouin members of the assembly seek for access to the governor's neo-patrimonial networks, particularly within the NDP, and are eager to establish face to face relationships. At the national level, the Aulad Ali are represented by a minority quota in the national parliament. The purchase of parliament seats is exposed to heavy bargaining, expensive election campaigns and informal strategies. Bedouin members of the parliament who belong to the national party (NDP) usually gain access to the party's formal and informal distributional networks. On the very local level (*maglis al-quaria, maglis al-medina, maglis al-markaz*), Bedouin associations and their representatives have successfully colonized these public institutions. Here Aulad Ali politics are played out according to the local agenda of power and interests.

The analysis of the state in Libya is much more difficult and challenging. In the past years, field studies have been almost impossible. Among the few recent studies at our disposal figures Obeidi's "Political Culture in Libya" (2001). Libya's political system and ideology seems to be shaped by the intersection of nationalism and egalitarianism with Muammar Al-Gaddafi as revolutionary charismatic leader (Anderson 1990). Informality and vagueness are characteristics of the regime and strategic means of politics. Though Gaddafi's nationalism does contain notions of territoriality and nationhood, it has never favoured the concept of the modern bureaucratic state. In his Green Book (released in three volumes during the seventies of the past century) Gaddafi advocates a diffuse ideology of natural socialism and egalitarianism that portraits the nation rather as a big tribe than as a society organized and structured by the state. Until today, Libya does not have a constitution. Gaddafi himself is not the formal president of the country; he is the leader of the revolution and the head of the armed forces. The latter function represents a formal position of power that is in line with the general interlacement of political rule and the military in most North African countries. Another semi-formal institution of Gaddafi's regime is the *rigal al-kheima* ("men of the tent"). The *rigal al-kheima* (comprising a notion of tribal and military tradition) is a consultative forum attached personally to Gaddafi; it consists of fellow revolutionists and members of Gaddafi's tribe, the Qadadfa. The *rigal al-kheima* are engaged in political decision making on various levels. In addition, the members of Gaddafi's tribe have successfully colonized the security apparatus.

Gaddafi himself creates and uses vagueness and informality to assure power and control. Particularly illuminative in this respect is the somehow blurred concept of *shar'iya al thauriya* (the legitimacy of the revolution or revolutionary legitimacy) that gives Gaddafi various options to overrule as well dogmas and principles of the green book as decisions of the people's congress. Another aspect of Gaddafi's personalized rule is his way to perform in public. According to his shifting agendas, strategies and the circumstances of appearance (be it local, national or international) Gaddafi appears as philosopher and poet,

as tribal notable and father of the nation, as military leader or lately as sage diplomat seeking for rehabilitation in the international community.

In his early years, Gaddafi and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) did their best to keep the tribes away from politics and power. The regime decreed the abolition of the tribe as a legal unit and reorganized local administrative structures according to the interest of Gaddafi and the RCC, explicitly replacing "tribal politicians" by followers of the revolution. The reform dismissed those governors, mayors and deputy majors who were tribal sheikhs or notables. In this respect Gaddafi's romancing the tribe was less a political practice than an ideological strategy aimed at legitimizing Libya as a nation. Nowadays the tribes seem to recapture power. Due to the economical crisis of the country induced by the UN sanctions, the regime has implemented appeasement strategies (particularly in the peripheries) that open up new spaces for political action to non state agents. The tribes, as it seems, are stepping out of the "shadow of the state" (Beck 1989).

In the past twenty years, bi- and multilateral development projects and programs have played a significant role on the Egyptian side of the border. The first findings of our fieldwork seem to indicate the existence of informal associations between development experts, Egyptian public servants and Bedouin politicians that emerged within the context of the measures. Apparently, development programmes merge statehood and local power into a specific non state "rule of development or development order" (Klute / Trotha 1999). Though the "development order" in Egypt does not create any concrete rules, it nevertheless bypasses or substitutes the state by introducing a new framework of action, represented by "projects" or "programs". Projects and programs contain distinctive ideologies and practices that contradict the authoritarian state in Egypt and Libya. The simple notion of participation frequently used in development discourses creates spaces of manoeuvre that at times are colonized and used by non state actors and associations. Development experts (particularly those of NGOs) often promote anti-state attitudes that are in accordance with Bedouin perspectives. Also decentralization programs can be an attractive starting point for local associations to enlarge their power. Due to the long lasting international isolation of the country, development cooperation in Libya is almost insignificant. Yet, the role of development here might be played by transnational oil companies and investors. Entrepreneurship and massive investment in domestic tourism has also influenced the political landscape on the Egyptian side.

The sheikhs of the Aulad Ali are public servants as well as representatives of the tribes. They do thus stand for a mode of intermediary rule. This "administrative chieftaincy" was already well established at the time of the Islamic empires, and carried on by the colonial and the postcolonial states. It is important to note, though, that the sheikhs' power was always limited by the decentralised, multi-polar political structure of the tribal society (Peters

1990). The attempts by the Italian and British colonial authorities to enlarge their power never succeeded the way it did in other parts of Africa. Nevertheless, the sheikhs do play a paramount role in the interlacement of state and tribe as well as in the emergence of new political formations. Sheikhs establish associations that are strategic <u>and</u> moral networks. Loyalty and cohesion are ensured by kinship, religion, friendship, or through common social, economical and political goals. Associations comprise tribesmen, representatives of the state, entrepreneurs and businessmen, smugglers and development experts. They operate on local, regional, national and international levels. They try to establish lasting networks that are stabilized by a moral economy based on reciprocity and mutual benefit. In many parts of the respective region they have established non state regimes with specific modes of legitimacy and reproduction. These associations effectively control and organize central political features such as security (protection against violence), conflict resolution, social services and the management of land use rights. They have successfully patronized other groups, made them their clients, and they have overtaken core duties of the state. The clients are not part of the inner circle of the association. Although they benefit from the services of the association they are also governed by it.

The self definition and legitimacy of associations usually contains specific references to the state. They overtake functions of the state arguing that "they are more efficient or more just and lawful" or because "the state is corrupt". A certain tribal rhetoric is used to further legitimize the rule of the associations. Hence, there is also critique of this rhetoric among the clients. Clients describe it as camouflage for unjust power relations "they do not represent the tribe, they only represent themselves and their interests", "they are worse than the state". Nevertheless the stability and persistence of certain associations and their rule is not only based on power or manipulation. In the end obedience and support of the clients has to be ensured by state like services and transfers.

Recently entrepreneurs and state politicians are stepping into the arena. These agents play an important role for the economical reproduction of non state orders. The leaders of associations often seek a particular interlacement with the state. In Egypt they frequently campaign for seats in the parliament of the governorate or the national assembly. A particular strategy is to become NDP party member in order to gain access to the advantages of the cooptation machinery.

Another actor in the borderland of Egypt and Libya is represented by gangs. We perceive gangs as "strategic groups" that aim at the appropriation of resources. Gangs operate as large scale smugglers or (land) speculators. Business and profit are their primary goals, but not necessarily the establishment of long lasting moral communities. However, gangs are usually interconnected with associations and are actively involved in their economical reproduction. Gangs frequently finance election campaigns of sheikhs who seek parliament

seats. Due to their commodities, services and transactions the scope of gangs can vary between small local smugglers and formations operating on the international level. Gangs mostly act in illegal and informal spheres. Thus they may use means of corruption, force and even violence to pursue their ends.

An interesting field of interlacement are legal practices in the border region of Egypt and Libya. These legal practices are shaped by the interlacement of the codified state law and the Bedouin customary law *urf*. We are dealing thus with an interlaced regulative system of conflict resolution that represents a specific form of legal pluralism. The state law in Egypt and Libya is characterized by frequent interventions of the government and powerful strategic formations. The local executive apparatus, however, lacks efficiency. Corruption is a wide spread practice and law enforcement follows power and influence rather than legal norms, a state of affairs which seems to refer to a weak state or, more generally speaking, to a heterarchical setting (Klute / Embaló / Embaló 2006). Both states also use the means of avoidance of law enforcement as a form of appeasement of the tribal population and the local powerful. Thus a large part of conflict resolution in cases of land use rights, theft and even murder is left to the *urf*.

The *urf* is a contextual customary law that is based on mediation rather than on conviction and sentence. Its strength and its weakness at the same time is the fact that it is deeply embedded in Bedouin society. Due to the dynamics of sedentarization and economic transformation, the *urf* is as well in transition. Nowadays powerful sheikhs, entrepreneurs or politicians and their associations serve as guardians of law and justice. In fact, these leaders and their association are corrupting the *urf* to mere camouflage or a surface legitimacy of their interest. Influencing or bribing the *mardi* (traditional conflict mediators) is common, and *urf* councils are often prearranged according to the ends of powerful factions. Another form of interlacement between the state law and *urf* can be found in the realm of land-rights; here, a form of labour division is established that seem to satisfy the state and local groups alike. Although most Bedouins do not hold official land titles (officially land is owned by he state), investors have to contract with the state and the respective Bedouin, who holds a title on the basis of the *urf*. In the last years a new type of Bedouin lawyer has appeared. These university trained lawyers are specialized in state law and the transformed *urf* and offer their services as fixers or negotiators for investors (mostly in tourism). The less privileged, however, hardly get justice. There attempts resemble a power-shaped realm that offers little to those without influence or access to powerful associations. On the other hand associations who seek to build up a lasting rule have to establish routines of conflict resolution that not only serve their ends but also guarantee legal security in order to gain legitimacy.

End and outlook

At present it seems ambitious to make concrete predictions about the future of new orders and their interlacement with existing power groups, mainly with the respective states they deal with. Interlacement in our understanding addresses dynamic and complex processes of bargaining for power, ideas and opportunities between agents and groups that differ in origin, practice and ideology. We have tried to show that it means more than just the local answer to the weakness of the postcolonial state in its peripheries, that it is more than its substitute or a mere response to conflict and post-conflict situations. On the one hand, interlacement contains the persistence and vitality of none state agents and of meaning- and powerful practices that contradicts or even challenges the state. On the other hand, it represents dynamic transformations that dissolve the opposition between formal (state) and informal (tribe) political organization, eventually creating new forms of order, among them the type of order we proposed to call "para-state". Thus interlacement creates a complex and at times blurred amalgam of non state like and statehood practices and ideologies.

- Interlacement may be a mere division of labour between local power groups and the state.

- In other cases interlacement might take the shape of innovation resulting in new forms of power such as the "para-state", or, in a more revitalised form, "chieftaincy-regimes" (Skalnik 2004).

- Interlacement my also evolve into entanglement and power locked structures, even into disintegration and violent conflicts.

Besides material, in particular financial foundations, non state orders need to develop ways to secure their power positions politically.[1] What kinds of political means are used, besides politics in the region or within national parties? Do non state actors try to build up relationships with international development agencies or with regions and communities abroad, in the Occident, independently from the central-state? Do they establish transnational political networks on an ethnic basis within Africa or with groups in the western Diaspora, as our data seem to indicate, in order to put their position on a secure and independent footing?

This last point, namely ways of securing non state orders politically, is of course related to the question of the legitimacy of these orders. We want to suggest that in particular the study of three forms of legitimacy is needed: The first form we name "moral legitimacy". Moral legitimacy employs the convincing power of re-invented or at least modified historical traditions which belong to the oldest and most often used tools of legitimacy resources.

---

[1] In what follows, we refer mainly to Bellagamba / Klute 2007.

Moral legitimacy underlines continuity instead of change and represents reliability in a more and more complex world which is difficult to understand.

The second form of legitimacy we call "basic legitimacy of the protection from violence" (Klute 2001). The offer of protection from violence lies at the heart of any process of power-building and serves at the same time as an effective means of legitimacy. Though this form of basic legitimacy appears to be particularly impressive in times of "generalised violence" (Beck 1996), it is as important in times of peace, after conflicts and beyond post-conflict situations. We would even go further and argue that those who are able to offer protection from violence are at the same time those with the best chances to accumulate power chances and to establish finally a power-position.

The third form of legitimacy could be called "just governance". Our thesis is that any kind of political authority or power position today is seen in the context of generalized statehood. By using this term we do not want to stress the fact that all areas of our globe are divided between or at least claimed by states. What we want to underline is instead that any contemporary rule is seen in the context of modern statehood. Legitimacy consequently augments if the political orders in question, statal or non statal ones, contain some aspects of modern statehood, among them the notion of territoriality, the monopoly of violence, redistributive functions and last but not least elements of justice and equality (Klute 2004).

References

Abu-Lughod, Lila 1986, *Veiled Sentiments. Honour and Poetry in a Bedouin Society*, Berkeley & Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.

Ag Sidiyene, Ehya 1996, *Des arbres et des arbustes spontanés de l'Adrar des Iforas (Mali). Étude ethnolinguistique et ethnobotanique*, Paris: Orstom / Cirad.

Anderson, Benedict 1983, *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,* London: Verso.

Alber, Erdmute 2000, *Im Gewand von Herrschaft. Modalitäten der Macht bei den Baatombu (1895-1995),* Studien zur Kulturkunde Band 116, Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag.

Anderson, Lisa 1990, "Tribe and State: Libyan Anomalies", Khoury, Philip S. / Joseph Kostiner (eds.) 1990, *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley / Los Angeles: 288-302.

Badi, Dida 2001, «Le mythe de fondation des Touareg Ifoughas», *Awal. Cahiers d'études berbères*, N°24., Paris : Ed. De la maison de sciences de l'homme.

Bayart, Jean-François / Stephen Ellis / Béatrice Hibou 1999, *The criminalization of the State in Africa*, Oxford: James Currey.

Bayart, Jean-François 1989, *L'État en Afrique. La politique du ventre*, Paris: Fayard.

Benda-Beckmann, Franz von 1994, „Rechtspluralismus: analytische Begriffsbildung oder politisch-ideologisches Programm?", *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* 118,2: 1-16.

Beck, Kurt 1989, "Stämme im Schatten des Staats: Zur Entstehung administrativer Häuptlingstümer im nördlichen Sudan", *Sociologus*, Jahrgang 39, Heft 1: 19-35.

Beck, Kurt 1996, „Nomads of Northern Kordofan and the State: From Violence to pacification", Klute, Georg (ed.), *Nomads and the State*, special issue of Nomadic Peoples, number 38: 1996: 73-98.

Bellagamba, Alice / Klute, Georg, "Introduction: Emerging Forms of Power in Contemporary Africa", Bellagamba, Alice / Georg Klute (eds.), *Beside the State. Emerging forms of power in contemporary Africa,* Amsterdam: Brill (forthcoming).

Bierschenk, Thomas 1999, „Herrschaft, Verhandlung und Gewalt in einer afrikanischen Mittelstadt (Parakou, Rép. du Bénin)", *Afrika-Spectrum* 34,3: 321-348.

Bondarenko, Dmitri M. / Leonid E. Grinin / Andrey V. Korotayev 2004, „Alternatives to Social Evolution", Grinin, Leonid E. / Robert L. Carneiro / Dmitri Bondarenko / Nikolay N. Kradin / Andrey V. Korotayev (eds.), *The Early State, its Alternatives and Analogues*, Volgograd: 3-27.

Boilley, Pierre 1999, *Les Kel Adagh. Un siècle de dépendances, de la prise de Tombouctou (1893) au Pacte National (1992). Etude des évolutions politiques, sociales et économiques d'une population touarègue (Soudan Français, République du Mali),* Paris: Karthala.

Chabal, Patrick / Jean-Paul Dalosz 1999, *Africa Works: disorder as political instrument*, Oxford/Indiana: James Currey/Indiana University Press.

Chabal, Patrick / Gary Feinman / Peter Skalnik 2004, "Beyond States and Empires: Chiefdoms and Informal Politics", Grinin, Leonid E. / Robert L. Carneiro / Dmitri Bondarenko / Nikolay N. Kradin / Andrey V. Korotayev (eds.), *The Early State, its Alternatives and Analogues*, Volgograd: 46-60.

Clauzel, Jean 1989, *Administrateur de la France d'outre-mer*, Paris : Laffitte.

Cole, Donald P. / Soraya Altorki 1998, *Bedouin, Settlers, and Holiday-Makers. Egypt's Changing Northwest Coast*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.

Copans, Jean, 2003, « Introduction. La fin de la société 'd'Etat': entre mobilités sociales et violences invisibles« , Lebeau, Yann / Boubacar Niane / Anne Piriou / Monique de Saint Martin (eds.), *Etat et acteurs émergents en Afrique. Démocratie, indocilité et transnationalisation*, Paris: Karthala : 7-21.

Das, Verna / Deborah Poole 2004, *Anthropology in the margins of the state*, Santa Fe, School of American Research Press.

Eickelman, Dale 1989, *The Middle East. An anthropological approach*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Elwert, Georg 2001, „The Command State in Africa. State deficiency, clientelism and power-locked economies", Steffen Wippel / Inse Cornelssen (Hg.), *Entwicklungspolitische Perspektiven im Kontext wachsender Komplexität. Festschrift für Prof. Dr. Dieter Weiss*, (Forschungsbericht des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, Band 128), München, Bonn, London: Weltforum: 419-452.

Elwert, Georg 2003, Feldforschung. *Orientierungswissen und kreuzperspektivische Analyse*, Sozialanthropologische Arbeitspapiere Nr. 96. Berlin: Hans Schiler.

Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1973, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Evers, Hans-Dieter / Tilman Schiel 1988, *Strategische Gruppen: Vergleichende Studien zu Staat, Bürokratie und Klassenbildung in der Dritten Welt*, Berlin: Reimer.

Farias, Paulo F. de Moraes 2003, *Arabic Medieval Inscriptions from the Republic of Mali. Epigraphy, Chronicles, and Songhay-V˜ ¦^*ÁPãȼˆ*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Fatton, Robert 1992, *Predatory Rule. State and Civil Society in Africa*, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Gellner, Ernest 1973, "Introduction to Nomadism", Nelson, Cynthia (ed.), *The Desert and the Sown, Nomads in the wider Society*, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California: 1-9.

Hauck, Gerhard 2004, „>Schwache Staaten?< Überlegungen zu einer fragwürdigen entwicklungspolitischen Kategorie", *Peripherie* 96 (2004).

Heyer, Sonja 1997, „Staatsentstehung und Staatszerfall in Somalia: Dezentralisierungsmodelle jenseits des Staates?", *Working Papers on African Societies*, Nr. 23, Berlin: Das Arabische Buch.

Hüsken, Thomas / Olin Roenpage 1998, *Jenseits von Traditionalismus und Stagnation. Analyse einer beduinischen Ökonomie in der Westlichen Wüste Ägyptens*, Münster: LIT.

Hüsken, Thomas, 2003, „Der Stamm der Experten, Chancen und Probleme der interkulturellen Kommunikation und des interkulturellen Managements in Projekten der deutschen staatlichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit", *Sozialanthropologisches Arbeitspapier* Nr. 97, Berlin: Hans Schiler.

Hüsken, Thomas, 2005, *Der Stamm der Experten, Rhetorik und Praxis des interkulturellen Managements in der deutschen staatlichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit*, transcript, Bielefeld.

Kassimir, R., 2001, "Producing local politics: governance, representation, and non state-organisations in Africa", Callaghy, Thomas et al. (eds.), *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa. Global-Local networks of Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 93-112.

Keenan, Jeremy 2004, „Terror in the Sahara: the Implications of US Imperialism for North & West Africa", *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 101: 475-496.

Kennet, Austin 1968, *Bedouin Justice, Law and Customs among the Egyptian Bedouin*, London: Franc Cass & Co Ltd.

Khoury, Philip S. / Joseph Kostiner 1990, "Tribes and the Complexities of State Formation in the Middle East", Khoury, Philip S. / Joseph Kostiner (eds.), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley / Los Angeles: University of California Press: 1-22.

Kienle, Eberhard 2001, *A Grand Delusion. Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt*, London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

Klute, Georg / Trutz v. Trotha 1999, *Parasouveränität. Gedanken über einen Typus intermediärer Herrschaft*, Vortrag, gehalten auf der Tagung ‚Macht und Herrschaft' der Sektion Entwicklungssoziologie und Sozialanthropologie der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in Marburg vom 10. - 12. Juni 1999.

Klute, Georg / Trutz v. Trotha 2004, "Roads to Peace. From Small War to Parastatal Peace in the North of Mali", Foblets, Marie-Claire / Trutz von Trotha (eds.), *Healing the Wounds. Essays on the Reconstruction of Societies after War*, (Oñati International Series in Law and Society), Oxford: 109-143.

Klute, Georg 1992, *Die schwerste Arbeit der Welt. Alltag von Tuareg-Nomaden*, München: Trickster Verlag.

Klute, Georg 1998, "Hundert Jahre Chef. Vom administrativen Häuptlingtum zur regionalen Parasouveränität", *Working Papers on African Societies*, Nr. 26, Berlin: Das Arabische Buch.

Klute, Georg 1999, "Vom Krieg zum Frieden im Norden von Mali", Hahn, Hans Peter / Gerd Spittler (Hg.), *Afrika und die Gobalisierung*, Münster - Hamburg - London: 455-472.

Klute, Georg 2001, Die Rebellionen der Tuareg in Mali und Niger, Manuskript 629 S. (Habilitationsschrift Universität Siegen).

Klute, Georg 2002, „Tuareg und der moderne Staat", Museum Künstlerkolonie Darmstadt (Hg.), *Tuareg. Eine Nomadenkultur im Wandel*, Darmstadt: Häusser.Media: 21-31.

Klute, Georg 2004, „Formen der Streitregelung jenseits des Staates", Eckert, Julia (Hg.), *Anthropologie der Konflikte. Georg Elwerts konflikttheoretische Thesen in der Diskussion,* Bielefeld: transcript: 298-314.

Klute, Georg / Birgit Embaló / Idrissa Embaló 2006, "Local Strategies of Conflict Resolution in Guinea-Bissau. A Project Proposal in Legal Anthropology", *Recht in Afrika* 2006: 253-272.

Lebeau, Yann et al. 2003, *État et acteurs émergents en Afrique. Démocratie, indocilité et transnationalisation*, Paris: Karthala.

Lecocq, Sebastian, 2002, '*That Desert Is Our Country': Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali 1946–1996*, Amsterdam: Proefschrift Maatschappij en Gedragswetenschappen, Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Lecocq, Sebastian / Paul Schrijver 2007, "The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front", *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 25, 1, Jan. 2007: 141-166.

Lentz, Carola 2000, "'Chieftaincy has come to stay'. La chefferie dans les sociétés acéphales du Nord-Ouest Ghana", *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 159, 2000: 593–613.

Marx, Emanuel 1978, "The Ecology and Politics of Nomadic Pastoralists in the Middle East", Weissleder, Wolfgang (ed.), *The Nomadic Alternative, Modes and Models of Interaction in the African-Asian Deserts and Steppes*, The Hague, Paris: Mouton Publishers: 41-74.

Müller-Mahn, Hans-Detlef 1989, *Die Aulad 'Ali zwischen Stamm und Staat. Entwicklung und sozialer Wandel bei den Beduinen im nordwestlichem Ägypten*, Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag.

Neubert, Dieter 1997, *Entwicklungspolitische Hoffnungen und gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit. Eine vergleichende Länderfallstudie von afrikanischen Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen in Kenia und Ruanda*, Frankfurt/New York: Campus.

Obeidi, Amal 2002, „Elitenstruktur in Libyen: Neue Institutionen und aufstrebende Eliten", Perthes, Volker (Hg.), *Elitenwandel in der arabischen Welt und Iran*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit: 65-77.

Obermeyer, G. J. 1973, "Leadership and Transition in Bedouin Society: A Case Study", Nelson, Cynthia (ed.), *The Desert and the Sown, Nomads in the wider Society*, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California: 159-173.

Oomen, Barbara M. 2002, *Chiefs! Law, Power and Culture in Contemporary South Africa*, PhD Dissertation, University of Leiden, Netherlands.

Peters, Emry L. 1990, *The Bedouin of Cyrenaica, Studies in personal and corporate power*, J. Goody/ E. Marx (eds), Cambridge University Press, Camebridge.

Randeria, Shalini 2003, "Between Cunnig States and Unaccountable International Institutions: Social Movements and Rights of Local Communities to Common Property Resources", *Discussion Paper* Nr. SP IV 2003-502, http://skylla.wz-berlin.de/pdf/2003/iv03-502.pdf (29.05.2004)

Rusch, Walter / Lothar Stein 1988, *Siwa und die Aulad 'Ali. Darstellung und Analyse der sozialökonomischen, politischen und ethnischen Entwicklung der Bevölkerung der Westlichen Wüste Ägyptens und des Prozesses ihrer Integration in den Ägyptischen Staat von Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts bis 1976*, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.

Salzman, Philip C. 1980, "Introduction: Processes of Sedentarization as Adaptation and Response", Salzman, Philip C. (ed.), *When Nomads Settle, Processes as Adaptation and Response*, New York: A J. F. Bergin Publishers Book: 1-20.

Scholz, Fred 1991, „Von der Notwendigkeit, gerade heute über Nomaden und Nomadismus nachzudenken", F. Scholz (Hg), *Nomaden , Mobile Tierhaltung, Zur gegenwärtigen Lage von Nomaden und zu den Problemem und Chancen mobiler Tierhaltung,* Das Arabische Buch, Berlin, 7-37.

Skalník, Petr 2002, "The state and ethnopolitical identities: the case of community conflicts in northern Ghana", *Nouveaux Mondes* 10: 141-166.

Skalnik, Petr 2004, "Chiefdom: a universal political formation?", *Focaal. European Journal of Anthropology* 43: 76-98.

Spear, Thomas 2003, "Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa", *Journal of African History*, 44 (2003): 3-27.

Swift, Jeremy 1979, *The Economics of Traditional Nomadic Pastoralism: The Twareg of the Adrar n Iforas (Mali),* PhD, Sussex.

Tetzlaff, Rainer / Cord Jacobeit 2005, *Das nachkoloniale Afrika. Politk, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft,* Opladen: VS.

Trotha, Trutz v. / Georg Klute 2001, "Von der Postkolonie zur Parastaatlichkeit. das Beispiel Schwarzafrika", Reiter, Erich (Hg.), *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2001*, Hamburg usw.: Mittler: 683-707.

Trotha, Trutz v. 1997, "From Administrative to Civil Chieftaincy. Some Problems and Prospects of African Chieftaincy", *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (special issue):* 79-107.

Trotha, Trutz v. 2000, „Die Zukunft liegt in Afrika. Vom Zerfall des Staates, von der Konzentrischen Ordnung und vom Aufstieg der Parastaatlichkeit", *Leviathan, Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaften*, 28. Jg. Heft 2: 253-279.

Trotha, Trutz v. 2005, „Der Aufstieg des Lokalen", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*: 28/29 (2005).

Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, E. Adriaan B. 1994, "Et toujours ce chef coutumier: résistance au pouvoir étatique au Sud-Togo sous tutelle française", Möhlig, Wilhelm J.G / Trutz v. Trotha (Hg.), *La légitimation du pouvoir et du droit*, Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag : 129-156.

Weiss, Dieter 1994, Entwicklung als Wettbewerb von Kulturen. Betrachtungen zum Nahen und Fernen Osten, *Diskussionspapiere* Nr. 22, FU Berlin, FB Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Volkswirtschaft des Vorderen Orients. Berlin: Das Arabische Buch.

Züricher, Christoph / Koehler, Jan 2001, « Institutions & Organizing Violence in Post-Socialist Societies », *Berliner Osteuropa Info*, 17 : 48-52.