

SECURING THE CITY: PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES AND NON-STATE
AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCEⁱ

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State-centrism has been an enduring feature of International Relations theory. Despite frequent recognition of the emergence of non-state actors and admonitions to rethink the relationship between the 'global' and the 'local', what John Agnewⁱⁱ once termed the 'territorial trap' seems continually to ensnare the discipline. As Michael Barnett laments, 'state, territory, and authority are forever married in IR theory', and even the way in which IR has generally approached the integration of the domestic and the global reflects a continuing tendency to treat them as ontologically separate, pre-given realms.ⁱⁱⁱ In recent years, research on global governance has begun to overcome these limitations, drawing attention to the expanding role and importance of private, non-state actors wielding authority in a variety of different spheres, including the economy, environmental protection, and development.^{iv} This literature shows how the authority of private actors helps give rise to institutional arrangements that structure and direct the behaviour of actors in particular issue areas, and hence, that governance cannot be exclusively associated with the state and with international institutions.

The realm of security has traditionally been largely resistant to claims about the need to unpack state-centric conceptions of authority; indeed many studies of security privatisation have if anything served to reinforce it. For example, to the extent that private security actors have been included in the literature on non-state authority, they have generally been described in two main ways. First, there is a tendency to associate the rise of private security with a corresponding erosion of state sovereignty. This is of course a well-known theme in studies of globalisation, which is frequently seen as indicating a long-term shift from state-centric forms of governance towards a dispersal of power and authority towards private actors and international organisations.^v Given that most definitions of the state centre on the monopoly of the means of violence, it is not surprising that the rise of private security actors tends to be interpreted as a loss of, or threat to, state power. Second, when private security actors have been considered in the literature on non-state authority and governance, they are frequently regarded as illegitimate actors. Until recently, discussions of security privatisation, particularly in Africa, were primarily focused on the role of 'mercenaries',^{vi} with the image of the 'return of the dogs of war' hovering ominously in

the background.^{vii} From this followed an easy, moral condemnation of private security actors. Thus, in the most extensive treatment of private security actors as a form of private authority they are classified as exercising 'illicit' authority, alongside mafias and militias.^{viii}

Neither of these interpretations is necessarily wrong, however both provide an unhelpfully restricted means of grasping the shifting structures of security and authority emerging from privatisation. As regards the first, while there is little doubt that private security may in certain settings be an indication of state weakness or pose a threat to the state, this cannot be taken to be universally true. Authority is not necessarily a zero-sum game, and it is equally possible that private force can strengthen and support the authority of the state. Similarly, while private security may under certain circumstances be 'illicit', glossing over the differences between 'mercenaries' and corporate private security companies^{ix} provides an unduly narrow view of the range of security privatisation, ignoring the vast majority of activities which are entirely legal and often conducted alongside and in co-operation with public security forces.^x In short, assuming that private security is either an erosion of state authority, or that it stands outside legitimate (state) authority, obscures the breadth of its operations and the conceptual and political challenges it poses to understanding the nature and functioning of authority in the contemporary global order.

In this article we argue that the globalisation of private security provides a striking illustration of the shifting structures of global governance and highlights the importance of prying apart the 'state, territory, authority'- triptych. To do so, we broaden the scope of analysis away from the preoccupation with military privatisation to focus instead on the globalisation of private commercial security, that is, the much more mundane, day-to-day activities of security companies operating mostly (but not exclusively) in non-conflict environments and dedicated to protecting "life and assets". We argue that private security can be seen to wield considerable authority- defined as the right and ability legitimately to speak and act- in contemporary international politics. This authority in turn arises from a multiplicity of sources that are intimately linked to global discourses and transformations. Far from standing in opposition to state power in a zero-sum game, private security actors often draw legitimacy precisely from their connections to the state. The authority of global private security companies cannot be contained within the traditional distinctions of inside/outside, global/local or public/private, but requires the dissolution of the 'state,

territory, authority'-marriage in favour of an analysis of new networks and interactions between state and non-state actors.

While often presented as apolitical, as the mere effect of market forces and moves toward greater efficiency in service delivery, the authority conferred on private actors can alter the political landscape and in the case of private security has clear implications for who is secured and how. We explore these shifts in the context of security provision in Cape Town, South Africa, where highly publicised security concerns, complex dynamics of political transformation, and extensive security privatisation come together in one of the country's most politically and symbolically significant cities, and one the world's emerging tourist destinations. What emerges from the analysis, is an illustration of hybrid private-public governance involving both local and global actors, thus drawing attention to what Evans has termed the changing conditions of 'stateness' (the institutional centrality of the state) in an era of globalisation.^{xi}

The authority of private security

While there is no clear-cut distinction between private security companies (PSCs) and private military companies (PMCs), and many companies take on contracts in both the military and commercial sectors, the focus here is on PSCs whose core activities consist of the day-to-day provision of security, or the protection of "life and assets", as opposed to support for and involvement in military operations. The past four decades have seen a remarkable expansion in this part of the private security industry, whose client-base includes a mixture of individuals, business, governments, and international organisations. World-wide, it is estimated to have a total value of US\$85 billion, with continually high growth rates predicted.^{xii} The services offered by PSCs range from basic manned guarding to alarm, patrol and response services, as well as more sophisticated surveillance and satellite tracking systems. More recently, risk management and consultancy services have expanded significantly, both as a reflection of the more challenging overseas operating environments of business and international organisations and the increased security awareness associated with 'risk society'.^{xiii} Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that the activities of private security firms are pervasive in modern societies. In the UK, for example, private security officers outnumber public police by a ratio of almost two to one, while in the US it is

almost three to one. In Hong Kong, the number is five to one, and in some developing countries it may be as high as ten to one.^{xiv}

As the private security sector has expanded, it has also become increasingly transnational. While the majority of security companies in any one location are likely to be small or medium-sized local businesses, the past decade has witnessed the emergence of powerful global PSCs, which by virtue of their reach, resources and revenues constitute an increasingly significant presence in international politics. A series of brief examples serve to illustrate the growth of the global private security industry. Based in Sweden, Securitas is the world's second largest private security company. Founded in 1934, the company has grown to become a multi-faceted global actor. In the 1990s, it expanded rapidly throughout Europe, including central and eastern Europe, often by acquiring local firms. In 1999, the company moved into the North American market, acquiring Pinkerton and, in 2000, Burns Security, thus making it the largest private security provider on the continent. Securitas now operates in 40 countries, and employs over 240,000 people.

The recent history of Group4Securicor is an even more striking illustration of the expansion and globalisation of the sector. In a process which began with the merger between the Danish company Falck and the UK's Group4 in 2000, the company has grown at a startling pace. In 2002 Group4Falck (as it was then named) acquired the second-largest US-based PSC, Wackenhut, thus expanding from 148,000 to 230,000 employees and increasing its countries of operation from approximately 50 to 85. In the summer of 2004, the company merged with the UK-based firm Securicor, to form Group4Securicor. Securicor had itself undertaken an aggressive strategy of global expansion, and had through its acquisition of the South African company Gray Security in 2000 acquired a strong presence on the African continent. Group4Securicor is today the world's largest private security company, with over 585,000 employees, annual revenues of 3.8 billion, and operations in over 100 countries around the world.^{xv} It is the largest employer on the London Stock Exchange, employs over 106,500 people in Africa, and is according to some estimates the single largest private employer on the continent.

Another category contains PSCs that are part of even larger transnational corporations. Chubb, for example, in July 2003 became a part of United Technologies, a \$31 billion, NYSE-listed global corporation. Chubb itself has annual revenues of \$1.5 billion. Similarly, ADT Security Systems was acquired by Tyco

International in 1998 and is now part of a Fire and Security Services company that operates in 100 countries, employs 267,000 people, serves 7, 8 million customers around the world and responds to nearly 34 million alarm signals every year.^{xvi}

The authority of PSCs is, like the authority of non-state actors in general, in large part linked to broad transformations in global governance. Before discussing how these transformations give rise to non-state authority, a few words on the concept of authority itself are necessary. A notoriously elusive concept, authority is generally perceived to lie somewhere between coercion and persuasion.^{xvii} In this sense, authority is linked to legitimacy and consent, or a public recognition of the right of certain persons or institutions to rule or exercise authority over a particular territory or issue area. At the same time, it is clear that authority cannot be entirely divorced from coercion, and that domination and persuasion exist as potentialities that can be employed should trust or consent be in doubt.^{xviii} For the purposes of our discussion here, an understanding of authority as the ability to establish a presumptive right to speak and act is instructive.^{xix} This view of authority takes account of its socially constructed nature, that is, its dependence on an audience or society whose norms and values recognise certain persons, institutions or statements as authoritative. In this way, authority is an effect, rather than an entity.^{xx} At the same time, authorities cannot be seen as simply regulating the activities and interests of actors, but are intrinsic to the construction and constitution of the social world.^{xxi} While this applies as much to public as to private authority, the fact that the latter is commonly assigned to the realm of the non-political and voluntary has until recently prevented analysis of the role and influence of non-state actors in increasing domains of international relations. In contemporary global governance, non-state authorities not only help regulate and co-ordinate already existing activities in trade^{xxii}, environmental standards^{xxiii} and development^{xxiv}, but also help actively to change and reshape preferences and practices so that they correspond more readily with dominant economic, political and social modes of organisation.^{xxv}

Analyses of the emergence of non-state authority have pointed to the importance of broad shifts in global governance, and to a significant extent, the authority of PSCs is also linked to these transformations. In particular, the authority of PSCs is facilitated by three key developments; first, the dominance of neoliberal economic policies; second, the commodification of security and its concomitant constitution as a realm of expert knowledge; and third, the integration of PSCs into “hybrid” security networks. The first two sources of authority are closely related. As analyses of the

shifting nature of authority in the global system have commonly stressed, the increasing dominance of neoliberal economic ideas and policies facilitate the social power and globalisation of private property and capital. It also facilitates the ability of private actors to claim expertise over a given domain or issue area, and thus to wield authority in relation to it.^{xxvi} The “market authority” of PSCs is inseparable from the ascendancy of neoliberal ideas, and the most basic form of authority exercised by PSCs is that which they derive from property rights, and from the “principal-agent” relationship between private security and the private property of its clients. As Sarre points out, ‘Unlike the public police, whose power is found generally in the various law enforcement statutes, the power of private security personnel derives principally from their being legal “agents” of those who control or own private property’.^{xxvii} In a majority of cases, the authority of private security arises from the right to enforce a combination of the “law of contract” dictating an implied or actual contract between the owners of property and those who come onto it (such as, for example, conditions on the conduct of visitors to a site); the “law of property” declaring the right to control the use of property and access to it (particularly the right of exclusion); and the “industrial law” concerning the relations between employers and employees (a typical example being the rule that employees are subject to search when entering or leaving the site). PSCs thus draw authority as the agents of legitimate principals, whose position is itself based in the legitimating principles and legal status of property rights.

A second dimension of the authority of PSCs derives from broader processes involved in the commodification of security. The neoliberal transformations of the last three decades have seen not only a substantial out-sourcing of public security functions, but also an increasing acceptance of PSCs’ status as market actors who provide a “service” that can be bought and sold on a free market. As part of this process, the provision of security has become less tightly identified with the direct and exclusive authority of state officials, and reconfigured as a market in which the public is composed of consumers rather than clients - a realm of individuals actively engaged in making choices about their security provision within a marketplace where public authorities are only one (albeit an important and in many ways still privileged) provider.^{xxviii} Belief in the models of the commercial enterprise as the most efficient form of service delivery, of the public as consumers, and of a security market comprised of both public and private providers have become important elements in the conceptualisation and delivery of security. Security has now become to a significant extent a technique and a form of expert knowledge that, while specialised,

is by no means the sole purview of public authorities and that may in fact be more effectively exercised by private providers. These trends have facilitated a specific form of depoliticization, a de-linking of security from public authority that is related to the growth of private security, as well as to its legitimation and the authority it wields.

The combination of principal-agent relationships (where PSCs act on behalf of the rights possessed by those who own or control property) and the treatment of security as a service^{xxxix} to be provided in the market is an important foundation of the authority of private security in both its actions on behalf of clients and in the process of expanding its own markets and global operations. As a result of these various processes, contracting private security has become increasingly commonplace. Although geographically varied, hiring private security is now standard practice for many commercial enterprises, international organisations and increasing numbers of private individuals, and it is widely accepted – and often encouraged – by public authorities with which it has entered into increasingly close relationships.

It is precisely this closer relationship to public authority that provides the third source of authority for PSCs. Whereas the rise of private authority is often interpreted as an indication of declining state power, there is increasing evidence to suggest that the strict public/private distinction is losing its relevance both empirically and conceptually. Rather than clearly delineated spheres of private and public authority, the governance of particular realms emerges more often than not out of a combination and co-operation of public and private actors. Again, broader global discourses and practices such as New Public Management strategies and moves toward public-private partnerships are of key importance here, and although states are not necessarily the instigator of such “hybrid” forms of governance, they lend them strength and legitimacy through official recognition and/or incorporation into domestic/international law.^{xxx} States can also frequently be seen to benefit from the more widespread use of private governance mechanisms, and may, as Robert Falkner argues in the case of environmental governance, choose to let private actors establish systems of self-regulation and thus be relieved of the arduous burden of negotiation, implementation and enforcement.^{xxxi}

In the security field, the development of hybrid public-private structures has become increasingly widespread.^{xxxii} Public policing in many countries has undergone a process of reform in accordance with neoliberal reforms and pressures. New Public Management strategies, outsourcing, marketization, and consumer-driven logics

have resulted in a 'pluralisation' and 'fragmentation' of policing, so that the public police are only one among many security actors. As a number of the most incisive analysts of security privatisation have stressed, private security cannot be grasped simply by contrasting it to public authority. Instead, the distinctions between private and public security are being blurred and reconfigured, fusing into networks of institutions and practices. As Loader has put it: 'Security must now be taken to refer to a whole range of technologies and practices provided, not only by public bodies such as the police or local authorities, but also by commercial concerns competing in the marketplace. We have unfolding...an uneven, patchwork of security hardware and services, with provision increasingly determined by people's willingness and ability to pay'.^{xxxiii} In such contexts, far from being in opposition to the state, PSCs often draw legitimacy precisely from their connections to public authority.

This does not mean that traditional distinctions are irrelevant: the concepts of public and private and their different forms of authority remain important. In particular, public security authorities retain legislative authorisation and a breadth of jurisdiction that no other actors possess^{xxxiv}, and private security usually operates within a regulatory framework of some kind. However, the public and private sectors need to be treated not as mutually exclusive kinds of actors and realms of activity, but as broadly heuristic concepts that allow different dimensions of a security network to come into focus. The key is to recognise the complex relationships between private security and public authority, and the way in which the authority of these various networks arises from a combination of different sources, including public authorisation, private expertise, private property rights, and neoliberal ideology. In other words, 'state, territory, authority' cannot be assumed to be coterminous, as private authority stretches across territorial boundaries, but not necessarily in a zero-sum game with the authority of public forces and institutions.

Security and private authority in Cape Town

South Africa has one of the world's most highly privatised and globalised security sectors, and as a percentage of GDP, the country has the largest private security sector in the world.^{xxxv} In the space of a short decade, the post-apartheid private security industry has moved from being regarded by the Government as largely illegitimate, and potentially politically subversive, to becoming increasingly integrated

into public-private partnerships and perceived as crucial to the maintenance of law and order. This transformation has taken place in a profoundly transnational space, where PSCs have derived authority from global markets, claims to expert knowledge, as well as the turn to neo-liberal modes of governance.

The context for South Africa's massive private security expansion is of course the transition to majority rule, which was accompanied by high crime rates and pervasive fear among the white minority. By the end of apartheid in 1994, there were three times as many private security personnel as public police officers,^{xxxvi} and from 1997 to 2000 the number of security officers grew from 115,000 to 166,000.^{xxxvii} As the armed forces were down-sized and career opportunities for previously privileged groups were curtailed in both the police and armed forces, scores of white officers fled the public sector to join the burgeoning private security business. South Africa's security market became one of the fastest growing in the world, experiencing annual growth rates of 30% in the mid-1990s.^{xxxviii} The rapid expansion of the market was paralleled by its increasing globalisation, as transnational PSCs looked to South Africa for profitable acquisitions and opportunities. Three of the largest international companies, Group4Securicor, Chubb and ADT, now have a significant presence in the country. Group4Securicor is one of the leading guarding firms, employing approximately 16,000 guards, whereas Chubb and ADT dominate the lucrative armed response market. By 2004, the private security industry was valued at R14 billion, an increase from R9 billion in 1997, with foreign investment estimated at approximately R2 billion.^{xxxix} A total of 3,553 private security companies are registered with the Private Security Regulatory Authority, employing 265,000 active security officers.^{xl} By comparison, the South African Police Services (SAPS) had 98,000 uniformed police officers performing policing functions as of June 2004.^{xli}

The immediate post-apartheid era saw considerable suspicion towards the expanding PSC sector. As the relative balance between public policing and private security tipped in favour of the private, both in terms of personnel and firepower, the under-resourced police force at times jealously guarded their status and role vis-à-vis a highly capitalised private sector that sported not only new patrol vehicles, but frequently also the very latest in surveillance and communications technologies. Police and politicians alike questioned private security's "real" commitment to the reduction of crime, pointing to the obvious connection between commercial success and the continuation and fear of crime. While the idea of companies "profiting from crime" was antithetical to the worldview of many ANC politicians, the police regarded

it as an affront to their professional obligation to “protect life and property”, regardless of ability to pay.

In addition to this ideological opposition and the police’s defence of their status, scepticism and distrust of private security arose from two additional factors. First, the fact that a largely white-owned sector employed a predominantly low-paid, black labour force to guard white wealth was seen as an obstacle to the creation of the “new” South Africa. Moreover, many of South Africa’s PSCs were owned and managed by former officers of the apartheid state’s oppressive apparatuses and the predominance of former intelligence, defence and police personnel gave rise to fears and allegations that the sector harboured right-wing sympathies, and that private militias were being formed by security companies.^{xiii} Private security was accordingly seen as an obstacle, and even a potential threat, to South Africa’s fledgling democracy.

Second, suspicions were voiced that foreign involvement in the sector might be used to destabilise the new political order. In 1995, for example, the Deputy Minister of Intelligence Services Joe Nhlanhla expressed concern that ‘third force elements see the private security industry as a haven from where to continue their third force activities of destabilisation’.^{xiii} Similar opinions were voiced by the Coordinator for Intelligence, Linda Mti, who maintained that ‘the connection that some of the actors in the private security companies have with foreign intelligence services and the similarity of objectives informed by their past co-operation in the Cold War era... makes them free agents to be exploited for espionage activities’.^{xiv} In no small part because of such reservations, the Act currently regulating private security stipulates that all managers of security companies must be South African citizens.^{xiv}

This Act itself provides a striking entry point to the discussion of the authority of PSCs and its links to global discourses and practices. The Act is a scaled-down version of a proposal by the Committee for Safety and Security to ban foreign ownership in the private security sector on grounds that it constituted a threat to national security.^{xvi} The proposal, launched in October 2001, brought a swift reaction not only from the companies, but also from the governments of their countries of origin. Their key argument was that the proposed regulation represented a restriction on trade in services, and that it would be taken as a clear sign that South Africa was breaching liberal economic principles, and that foreign investment (which the

government was actively soliciting) was neither welcome, nor secure in the country. The appeal to the authority of the market worked remarkably quickly, and the proposed legislation dropped from sight in a matter of days. The dominance of economic principles of free trade successfully trumped claims about national security and calls for the protection of domestic industry, and the ability of global PSCs to present their activities as a service and to link their operations to the authority of market principles (and sanctions) played a crucial role in this context.

Some unease towards the private security sector survives among the ANC government and the SAPS, as evidenced perhaps in the recent launch of the Government Sector Security Council to oversee security of certain national key points and strategic installations. It is also unclear how the three month long strike among security guards in 2006, which saw fierce clashes between trade unions and police, will effect the sector's relationship with public authorities.^{xlvii} Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the South African private security sector at the moment enjoys an unprecedented acceptance and endorsement of its contributions to safety and security. In part, this is due to the simple passage of time without the occurrence of any major criminal or political misconduct by the sector, making it difficult if not impossible to sustain arguments of conspiracy and threats to the state. Equally, the 2001 Private Security Industry Regulation Act is also seen to have resulted in a more tightly regulated sector with higher standards and better procedures, increasing the sense of its links to public authority and thus bolstering its legitimacy. More important perhaps is the extensive incorporation of PSCs in hybrid security networks, as South Africa's security policy has become increasingly influenced by global trends in policing and public management.^{xlviii} The demands for improvement in service delivery after 1994 led the SAPS to investigate various possibilities for outsourcing, privatisation, and contracting of specialist services.^{xlix} These efforts were necessary not only because of the new challenges facing post-apartheid policing, but also due to the loss of expertise and personnel and a moratorium on new recruitment. As such, the SAPS and the government were forced by virtue of dwindling public resources and escalating crime rates to accept and incorporate the private sector. In the words of SAPS, there was a need for 'the police, the public, elected officials, government, business and other agencies to work in partnership to address crime and community safety'.¹ The Department of Community Safety similarly concluded that the 'SA Police Service can no longer be seen as the sole agency responsible for fighting crime... other sectors of society with a force multiplying capacity must be

called on to support the SA Police Service in their efforts'.ⁱⁱ As part of this transformation, some tasks have been specifically assigned as 'private' - all police stations across South Africa are now, for example, guarded by private security companies in recognition that commercial guards are cheaper than police officers- while much day-to-day policing has been re-framed as a partnership with a multiplicity of private actors and local communities. Public and private authority is thus increasingly interwoven in South Africa's contemporary security practices.

The Cape Town Central City Improvement District initiative is one of the most extensive examples of such public-private policing partnerships. The idea of City Improvement Districts (CIDs) derives from international models for urban renewal, and has numerous similarities with so-called Business Improvement Districts exemplified by the Metro Tech Business Improvement District in Brooklyn, New York.ⁱⁱⁱ Like the Business Improvement Districts, the CIDs are non-profit organisations that are established when property owners in an area agree to levy an additional tax on their property, and the money collected is used to promote business and economic development. In common with the Metro Tech in New York, which has its own private security force, the primary concern of the CIDs has been security. At present there are about 15 CIDs in and around Cape Town. The largest, and perhaps most controversial, is the Central City Improvement District (CCID) focusing on downtown Cape Town and its central business district. The CCID is an initiative of the Cape Town Partnership, a not-for-profit company founded in 1999 by the City Council and the local business community.ⁱⁱⁱⁱ The main aim of the Partnership is to reverse urban decay and capital flight from the city centre to surrounding suburbs and business parks. As part of this effort, the CCID was established in November 2000, after the majority of property owners, or ratepayers, in the area agreed to the payment of an additional top-up levy on their council bill. Today, the Cape Town Central City Improvement District collects about R15 million annually from the 1200 ratepayers within the area. Of this amount, approximately 50 percent is allocated to security. The remainder is spent on the CCID's other three areas of responsibility - cleaning the city (25 percent), marketing (17 percent) and social development (8 percent).

The CCID is in effect a large-scale partnership policing effort aimed at making central Cape Town safe and secure; an international city and a first class tourist destination.^{liv} Group4Securicor, trading in Cape Town as Securicor, has been

contracted as the main security provider. At the start of the initiative, the CCID security force consisted of only seven officers, but it has since expanded to a total of six patrol vehicles, ten horse mounted officers and 60 foot patrol officers providing a 24-hour security presence in the city centre. At night, the city is patrolled by 40 officers, supported by six vehicles. As a result, the presence of security personnel in the city has increased significantly, and during daytime, the CCID vehicles and foot patrols are frequently encountered throughout Cape Town's relatively compact city centre.

To a significant extent, the security of Cape Town has been devolved to the second largest security company in the world. The visibility of Securicor's mounted, on-foot or mobile patrols far exceeds the visibility of the police. Both the City Police and the SAPS concentrate their efforts in the poorer areas of town, where crime rates are highest, and the City Police have dedicated only two mobile patrols to the city centre.^{lv} Moreover, the police do not conduct foot patrols. Yet, it would be incorrect to perceive the police as absent from Cape Town's security arrangement. Securicor officers work in close collaboration with the police, especially the City Police, but also the SAPS. The CCID/Securicor branded patrol vehicles include a City Police officer, although there are no police markings on the car. The CCID security patrols are also linked to the City Police control room by radio. Furthermore, Securicor operates the Strategic Surveillance Unit (SSU), the control room that supervises Cape Town's 170 close circuit television cameras. The surveillance cameras were initially financed by the association 'Business Against Crime', and then donated to the city. The SSU is manned by around 50 Securicor officers, reinforced by eight City Police officers, and is in direct contact with the SAPS as well as the City Police, ensuring mobile response to incidents. As part of the move towards community or sector policing, Securicor also participate in weekly sector policing fora to identify potential problems, share information and co-ordinate the provision of security with the SAPS and the City Police. Securicor officers in the CCID also frequently provide support to police operations within the city, for example by providing perimeter security when police are searching a building or area. This is indicative of the breadth of change, seen also in the other CIDs in Cape Town. What is emerging is a network of public and private, global and local security actors, and Securicor managers refer to the CIDs as a "paradigm shift" because of this close co-operation.^{lvi}

The CCID is a striking example of the contemporary dissolution of the 'state, territory, authority' marriage. Within this security arrangement, significant authority over

domestic territory resides with a global PSC. This authority is, in turn, linked in important ways to global discourses and practices. Market principles exercise a particularly powerful influence, and the authority of Securicor derives in large part from the company acting as the agent of the city's property owners, and it is seen as entirely legitimate that rate-payers fund and to a large degree oversee a system with security at its core. CCID is a contractual community between ratepayers, businesses and the City Council, and security is regarded as a service like any other, to be bought from the best qualified provider. The commodification of security enables the CCID to present itself as a consumer (as opposed to a client) of security, actively making choices about security provision within a market place where public authorities are only one possible provider. Within this market place, Securicor as a global brand with significant material resources can claim significant expert knowledge and authority. The CCIDs' choice of Securicor was directly related to the company's extensive organisational and financial resources, technical and managerial capabilities, as well as its global reputation and brand recognition. Importantly, there is a key difference between the CCID and the private guarding of 'public private spaces' ^{lvii} such as shopping centres, in that here a private company is policing a public space.

At the same time, it is clear that the security arrangements in the CCID are far from entirely private; the City Council makes up one third of the Cape Town Partnership, and the public police play an important role in security provision. The CCID derives considerable legitimacy precisely from its incorporation into hybrid security networks, and security governance in Cape Town emerges out of a combination of private and public authority. These public-private networks highlight the inadequacies of regarding private security as straightforward threat to the sovereignty of the state, or as 'illicit' authority. In Cape Town, and South Africa more generally, PSCs have to an important extent helped secure the authority of the state, by allowing for the presence of a much larger security force than the state alone could have afforded, thus providing important concrete and symbolic resources for combating post-transition insecurity, and increasing urban blight and capital flight. In brief, the utilisation of private security resources has made it easier for the government to claim that it is "doing something about crime".

In the case of Cape Town, the exact achievements of the CCID in terms of crime reduction are difficult to assess, given the South African moratorium on the release on local crime statistics, but there is a clear sense that the city is safer now than only

a few years ago. Some sources claim a 60 percent drop in crime in the city, particularly in the most common forms of offence, such as pick-pocketing, mugging and theft from cars. Research in 2002 showed that 52 percent of respondents felt safe in the city centre, compared to 16.7 percent only two years prior.^{lviii} Urban capital flight has also been reversed, and the four year period from 2001 to 2004 has seen new investment of about R8 billion in the CCID.^{lix} To the extent that the South African state relies upon income from foreign investment and tourism, not to mention the symbolic status of Cape Town as a “world-class” city, the activities of private security companies can be seen as crucial to its continued authority and legitimacy.

This is not to say that private security everywhere acts to support the authority of the state, or that this is a permanent or static relationship in South Africa. In part, the country’s hybrid security networks have emerged at the instigation of the state, and are part of a state-led policy to maximise security and efficiency. In part, it is a reflection of broader social, economic and political transformations in global governance, and a reaction to global market pressures and demands from ‘customers’ empowered by the commodification of security. Importantly, these transformations lie outside the control of any one state. Thus, while South African official documents stress again and again that the role of private security actors is ‘one of partnership with the State,’^{lx} this might depend on circumstances outside its direct control. Because the authority of private actors arises not only from the state, it cannot be assumed that the state will always and inevitably be in a position of control – or even of obvious primacy - in such security networks. Sovereign state power, in other words, is not static in these global structures of governance, nor can the primacy of the state be automatically assumed. As Johnston has observed, state power, the manner in which it is consolidated and distributed is contingent on social and political conditions.^{lxi}

The shifting boundaries of public/private authority also have political and social implications. While the increasing authority of PSCs is commonly justified and explained in terms of economic logic and efficiency, it simultaneously has implications in terms of who gets secured and how. In the CCID, those who pay are also able to play a powerful role in determining the security agenda. In Cape Town this has led to a focus on ‘cleaning up the city’. In the words of the Provincial Development Council of the Western Cape: ‘In order to become a “world class city”...we must vanquish “crime and grime”... and remove the “undesirable elements”’.^{lxii} While this has resulted in an impressive 24 hours cleaning service, it is

also reflected in a security effort focused on “order maintenance” and on reducing what are often described as “minor nuisances” like beggars, vagrants, informal parking assistants, and street children. Securicor officers are instructed to ‘move along’ beggars congregating at intersections. For “undesirable elements”, such as street children and vagrants the CCID has meant increased harassment and more frequent arrest. Street children are regarded as a special problem, allegedly perceived by Capetonians and tourists alike as not only a nuisance, but as responsible for the majority of petty crime.^{lxiii} Securicor officers frequently transport street children to so-called safe-houses, in order to get them off the street, in full knowledge that they will be back the next day. A number of by-laws have also been passed to facilitate the clean-up of Cape Town, including prohibition of begging which inhibits or obstructs the public, begging within six meters of an automatic teller machine/cash point, and also the washing and drying of clothes in city streets.^{lxiv}

The CCID recognises that the causes of vagrancy and homelessness are social and cannot be solved by security measures alone, and has appointed a social development officer and five street workers to help street children and homeless adults. In addition, the Partnership sponsors one of the city’s organisations providing shelter for the homeless. Social services, however, account for a relatively small amount of the CCID’s budget (8%), and the exclusionary elements of the city improvement districts are hard to dispute. For sections of the population in Cape Town, the altered politics of protection brought about by the CCID is experienced as an increasing restriction of access to public space, as a combination of public bylaws and private enforcement serve to prevent the poor and the homeless from utilising the city’s public spaces. Importantly for our argument here, the social fragmentation that follows from such exclusionary security practices may ultimately pose political challenges for the state as the question of legitimate access to and activities within public spaces has the potential to raise difficult questions in a networked security environment.

Conclusion

The extraordinary growth and globalisation of the private security sector presents complex analytical and political challenges. In particular, the development of public-private, global-local security networks challenge too-easy an ascription of authority solely to the public security agencies of the sovereign state. Indeed, the development

of global private security firms, and the existence of public-private, global-local security networks can be seen, as analysts of globalisation have pointed out in other realms, as part of increasingly important structures of global governance in which the role of the state – and the nature and locus of authority – is being transformed and rearticulated.

Seen in this context, the authority of private security arises from three sources. First, the expansion of private security has been both a product and an enabler of broader liberal processes of globalisation, and the authority of private security needs to be seen in light of its relationship to the authority of private property. At one level, this involves its relationship to transnational property rights and the expansion of global capital. But it is also a consequence of broader shifts in the provision of security in both developed and developing countries, and of widespread perceptions that public authorities cannot provide adequate security and that private security is a necessary response. Private security firms have been empowered both politically and in market terms by this shift, and by the broader process of commodification that has seen security increasingly treated as a service to be sold on an open market, provided by the most efficient and effective actors and, in consequence, significantly de-linked from its status as a monopoly of public authorities.

Second, these processes of privatisation and commodification have allowed private security firms to acquire the status of being legitimate authorities in these areas, possessing significant expert knowledge and technical, financial, and organisational capacities specific to this field. Both private clients and public actors now turn with increasing frequency to private companies as a means of analysing and addressing security situations, and while security firms' authority to act is usually limited by statute, their ability to act as legitimate and ever more pervasive private providers and public 'partners' is increasing.

Third, the authority of PSCs arises from their increasing incorporation in hybrid security networks. These networks are neither disconnected from state authority, nor reducible to it. They represent important new arrangements in the delivery of security, as well as powerful actors able to wield significant authority in the security field.

While security has often been seen as the sector most resistant to forms of non-state governance, we hope to have shown that a focus on the broad processes of

globalisation and privatisation at work in the security industry demonstrates the emergence of public-private, global-local security networks that have considerable impact on the day-to-day provision of security, and that have implications for broader issues of social stability and state legitimacy. This process cannot be grasped simply by seeing it as the erosion of state authority, or as the opposite: the straightforward strengthening of the state through the integration of private capacities. What is emerging is a much more complex structure, whose political effects challenge the conventional conflation of government, territory and authority that have for so long dominated thinking about both security and international relations.

There is little doubt that private security raises key political and normative issues. However, these debates must take place in light of a clear recognition that the boundaries of the public and private, the global and the local have already undergone significant transformations. While the example of Cape Town's Central City Improvement District is unusual in its extensive integration of public/private, global/local security actors, public-private security partnerships are spreading not only in South Africa, but also across the continent. In many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, private security companies are integrated into complex networks of authority that challenges any clear cut distinction of public/private and global/local authority. Far from being 'illicit', security privatisation as a form of private authority is at the heart of networks of global governance and is crucial to an understanding of contemporary international politics.

Notes

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ⁱⁱ John Agnew, 'The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory', *Review of International Political Economy*, 1(1), 1994, pp.53-80.

ⁱⁱⁱ Michael Barnett, 'Authority, Intervention, and the Outer Limits of International Relations Theory', in Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham (eds.), *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 49-50.

^{iv} See John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, *Global Business Regulation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); A. Claire Cutler, *Private Power and Global Authority* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter (eds.), *Private Authority and International Affairs*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach, *Politics: Authority, Identities and Change*. (Columbia: University of Southern Caroline Press, 1996); Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas Bierstecker (eds.), *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Richard Higgott, Geoffrey Underhill, and Andreas Bieler (eds.), *Non-State Actors and Authority in the Global System* (London: Routledge, 2000); Karsent Ronit and Volker Schneider (eds.), *Private Organizations in Global Politics* (London: Routledge, 2000); Robert Falkner, 'Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links', *Global Environmental Politics* 3(2) 2003, pp. 72-87. L. Henry, Giles Mohan and H. Yanacopulos 'Networks as Transnational Agents of Development', *Third World Quarterly*, 5(5), 2004, pp.839-855.

^v See Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

^{vi} Abdel-Fatau Musah and J.K. Fayemi, *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma* (London: Pluto, 2000); Guy Arnold, *Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Jackie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), *Peace, Profit, or Plunder: The Privatization of Security in War-torn African Societies*, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999).

^{vii} Bernedette Mutheun and Ian Taylor, 'Return of the Dogs of War? The Privatisation of Security in Africa,' in Hall and Bierstecker, *The Emergence of Private Authority*, pp. 183-199.

^{viii} Rodney B. Hall and Thomas Bierstecker, 'Private Authority as Global Governance' in Hall and Bierstecker (eds.), *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.3-22.

^{ix} See Abdel-Fatau Mussah, 'Africa: Private Military Intervention and Arms Proliferation in the Process of State Decay', in J. Milliken (ed.), *State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); Meuthen and Taylor, 'Return of the Dogs of War?'

^x These tendencies have been recognised in some of the most recent literature, which goes a long way towards recognising the shifting boundaries of the public/private entailed by military privatisation. See for example, Deborah Avant, *The Market for Force* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

^{xi} Peter Evans, 'The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization', *World Politics*, 50(1), 1997, pp.62-87.

^{xii} Credit Suisse/First Boston, *Review of the South African Private Security Industry*, (Europe: Credit Suisse First Boston, 7 February 2001).

^{xiii} Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992).

^{xiv} Francesco Mancini, *In Good Company: The Role of Business in Security Sector Reform* (London, Demos, 2006).

^{xv} Basic information on both companies can be found on their respective websites: www.securitas.com and www.group4securicor.com

^{xvi} See www.adt.com and www.chubbsecurity.com.

^{xvii} Richard Friedman, 'On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy', in Joseph Raz (ed.), *Authority* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. 63); Raz (ed) *Authority*; Bruce Lincoln, *Authority: Construction and Corrosion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Barnett, 'Authority, Intervention, and the Outer Limits of International Relations Theory' discusses authority in IR.

^{xviii} Lincoln, *Authority*.

^{xix} Lincoln *Authority*; Barnett 'Authority, Intervention, and the Outer Limits of International Relations Theory'; in private security, Anna Leander 'The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of the Emergence of Private Military Companies', *Millennium*, 33(3), 2005, pp.

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- ^{xx} Steven Lukes, 'Perspectives on Authority' in Raz (ed.), *Authority*, pp. 203-217.
- ^{xxi} Barnett, 'Authority, Intervention, and the Outer Limits of International Relations Theory'.
- ^{xxii} Cutler, *Private Power and Global Authority*.
- ^{xxiii} Jennifer Clapp, 'The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and the Developing World', *Global Governance* 4(3), 1999, pp.295-316.
- ^{xxiv} Thomas Callaghy, 'Networks and Governance in Africa: Innovation in the Debt Regime' in Callaghy, Kassimir and Latham (eds.), *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa*, pp.115-148.
- ^{xxv} Barnett, 'Authority, Intervention, and the Outer Limits of International Relations Theory'.
- ^{xxvi} See for example, Cutler, Haufler, and Porter, *Private Authority and International Affairs*; Virginia Haufler, *A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001).
- ^{xxvii} Rick Sarre, 'The Legal Basis for the Authority of Private Police and an Examination of Their Relationship to the "Public" Police', in *Private Sector and Community Involvement in the Criminal Justice System* (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994), pp. 169.
- ^{xxviii} For extensive and detailed analyses of these processes, see David Garland, *The Culture of Control* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Les Johnston, *The Rebirth of Private Policing* (London: Routledge, 1992); Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, *Private Security and Public Policing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Ian Loader, 'Thinking Normatively About Private Security', *Journal of Law and Society*, 24(3), 1997, pp. 377-94; P. O'Malley and D. Palmer, 'Post-Keynesian Policing', *Economy and Society*, 27, 1996, pp. 135-147; George S. Rigakos, 'Hyperpanoptics as a Commodity: The Case of the Parapolice', *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 24(3), 1999, pp. 381-410; Les Johnston and Clifford Shearing, *Governing Security* (London: Routledge, 2004).
- ^{xxix} Indicative is the treatment of both Securitas and Group4Falck as exemplary models of a service company in Waldemar Schmitt, Gordon Adler and Els van Weering, *Winning At Service* (New York: Wiley, 2003), and the discussion in John Stees, *Outsourcing Security: A Guide for Contracting Services* (Woburn, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1998).
- ^{xxx} For an example of this in environmental governance, see Clapp, 'The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance'.

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- ^{xxxi} Falkner, 'Private Environmental Governance and International Relations'
- ^{xxxii} Johnston, *Rebirth of Private Policing*; Jones and Newburn, *Private Security and Public Policing*; David H. Bayley and Clifford Shearing, *The New Structure of Policing: Description, Conceptualization and Research Agenda* (Washington DC: National Institute of Justice, 2001).
- ^{xxxiii} Ian Loader, 'Private Security and the Demand for Protection in Contemporary Britain', *Policing and Society*, 7, 1997, p. 147.
- ^{xxxiv} Jones and Newburn, *Private Security and Public Policing*.
- ^{xxxv} Credit Suisse/First Boston, *Review of the South African Private Security Industry*.
- ^{xxxvi} Mark Shaw and Clifford Shearing, 'Reshaping Security: An Examination of the Governance of Security in South Africa', *African Security Review*, 7(3), 1998, p. 4.
- ^{xxxvii} Data supplied by private security company.
- ^{xxxviii} Credit Suisse/First Boston, *Review of the South African Private Security Industry*, p.7.
- ^{xxxix} Martin Schonteich, '2001 Crime Trends: A Turning Point?', *SA Crime Quarterly* 1 July, 2002; D. Albert, 'New Security Company Identifies Niche Market', *Security Focus* 22(1), 2004, p.56; Anthony Minaar, 'Crime Prevention, Partnership Policing and the Growth of Private Security: The South African Experience'. Paper presented at *Policing in Central and Eastern Europe – Dilemmas of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, Ljubljana, Slovenia, September 23-5, 2004.
- ^{xl} Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority website www.psira-sa.co.za
- ^{xli} Minaar, 'Crime Prevention, Partnership Policing and the Growth of Private Security', p.13.
- ^{xlii} See Jenny Irish, *Policing for Profit: The Future of South Africa's Private Security Industry* ISS Monograph Series 39 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999); Martin Schonteich, 'Fighting Crime with Private Muscle: The Private Sector and Crime Prevention', *African Security Review*, 8(5) 1999, pp.65-75; Mike Hough, 'Private and Public Security in the RSA: Competition or Cooperation?', *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 24(2) November 2002: pp.78 (18), 5.
- ^{xliii} Hough, 'Private and Public Security in the RSA'.
- ^{xliiv} Hough 'Private and Public Security in the RSA', p.5.
- ^{xliv} Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001.
- ^{xlvi} See Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams 'Privatisation, Globalisation and the Politics of Protection in South Africa', in Jef Huysmans, Andrew Dobson and Raia Prokhovnik (eds) *The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency*, (London: Routledge, 2006).

^{xlvii} The strike was highly conflictual and controversial. 57 security guards were killed, according to the Private Security Industry Provident Fund, because they wanted to return to work. The South African Transport and Allied Worker's Union is suing the Ministry of safety and Security following a march in Cape Town, where the police fired shots and used teargas against demonstrators. See 'At Long Last, Security Strike is Over' Mail & Guardian 22 June 2006; 'Provident Fund: 57 Guards Killed During Strike', Mail & Guardian, 19 June 2006.

^{xlviii} See Bill Dixon and Janine Rauch, Sector Policing: Origins and Prospects. ISS Monograph no. 97. (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004) and Dixon, this volume

^{xlix} Minaar 'Crime Prevention, Partnership Policing and the Growth of Private Security'.

ⁱ SAPS, quoted in Julie Berg 'Private Policing in South Africa: The Cape Town City Improvement District – Pluralisation in Practice', *Society in Transition*, 35(2) 2004, pp.227

ⁱⁱ Department of Community Safety 'Provincial Government Western Cape: Strategic Plan 203/04 to 2005/06', p. 6.

ⁱⁱⁱ See Tony Travers and J. Weimar 'Business Improvement Districts: New York and London' (London: Corporation of London, 1996); Robert C. Davies, Christopher W. Ortiz, Sarah Dadush, Jenny Irish, Arturo Alvarado, and Diane Davis 'The Public Accountability of Private Police: Lessons from New York, Johannesburg, and Mexico City', *Policing and Society*, 13 (2), 2003, pp.197-210.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ The Board of Directors consists of representatives from, amongst others, Business Against Crime, The Cape Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Cape Town Tourism, The South African Property Owners Association, City of Cape Town, and the Provincial Administration of the Western Cape ([www. Capetownpartnership.co.za](http://www.Capetownpartnership.co.za)). See also Berg 'Private Policing in South Africa: The Cape Town City Improvement District'.

^{liv} See www.Capetownpartnership.co.za

^{lv} The Cape Town City Police is a municipal police service established in December 2001. The main aim is visible policing, and they make arrests and issue fines for all types of offences but do not have investigative functions, which is the responsibility of SAPS.

^{lvi} Interviews with Securicor managers.

^{lvi} Clifford Shearing and Phillip Stenning, 'Modern Private Security: Its Growth and Implications' in M. Tonry and M. Norval (eds.), *Crime and Justice – An Annual Review of Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 193-245.

^{lviii} Sylvester E. Sylvester, 'It's Official: Cape Town is Clean and Safe', *Cape Argus*, 6 March, 2002.

^{lix} Derek Bock, 'Cape Town Central City: An Urban Renewal Success Story', (Public powerpoint presentation, Cape Town 2005).

^{lx} Department of Safety and Security 'White Paper on Safety and Security: In Service of Safety 1999-2004' (Pretoria: Department of Safety and Security, 1998), p. 7.

^{lxi} Les Johnston, *Policing the Risk Society* (London: Routledge, 2000), p.162.

^{lxii} Quoted in Berg, 'Private Policing in South Africa', p. 242.

^{lxiii} See E. Sylvester, 'It's Official: Cape Town is Clean and Safe'.

^{lxiv} See www.capetown.gov.za/by-laws. For a highly critical view of the CCID, see Tony Roshan Samara, 'State Security in Transition: The War on Crime in Post Apartheid South Africa', *Social Identities*, 9(2), 2003, pp.277-312.