La lutte armée est l'une des caractéristiques de l'histoire politique et administrative de l'Afrique contemporaine et de la RDC en particulier. Ce phénomène apparait comme un mécanisme d'auto-prise en charge mis en place par des personnes ou groupes d'individus ayant constatés, non sans gêne, que les lois, le secteur de la sécurité, l'administration et les politiques en place sont en leur défaveur. Pour rayonner et se maintenir, les milices s'appuient sur l'idéologie nationaliste et à ce titre elles se nomment « patriotes». A cette idéologie se greffent celles de messianisme et d'invulnérabilité. Tous les chefs miliciens s'autoproclament « libérateurs» de leurs nations de l'oppression. Pour renforcer la morale de la troupe, les miliciens recourent à la drogue et aux fétiches. Et pour des raisons de lobbying et de gouvernance des entités sous leur contrôle, elles se scindent en factions civile et militaire. Certaines armes utilisées sont achetées localement à vil prix ou pillées dans des stocks officiels. D'autres sont importées via les pays voisins et les trafiquants d'armes. Le corps de la milice est composé généralement des jeunes désœuvrés et des enfants déscolarisés. Les femmes sont essentiellement utilisées dans le renseignement et pour le transport des armes et minutions. Cependant, nombreux miliciens esquivent la nourriture préparée par les mains d'une femme aux motifs qu'elle est impure et source de malheur. Le repli des miliciens dans les milieux ruraux est une stratégie pour se soustraire des poursuites mais également pour s'autofinancer à travers l'exploitation et la commercialisation des ressources naturelles.

In an attempt of problematizing different understandings of justice after mass violence, this paper takes as raw material for the critique of criminal justice a close scrutiny of the negotiated political settlement for the transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ushered in by the Pretoria Global and Inclusive Accord of 2003. In doing so, the paper looks to re-appraise the prevailing normative expectation—largely influenced by the notion of lex talionis—in righting past wrongs in the event of mass atrocity. In the final analysis, the paper draws some critical lessons for the unfolding transitional justice debates in view of the peculiar historical and socio-political contexts within which mass violence in contemporary African Great Lakes region has taken place.

The context of protracted conflict and mobility of people in Eastern Congo has stimulated a reconfiguration of rural-urban connections and of the demographic and spatial characteristics of the region. The urban dimension of conflict (even for smaller urban agglomerations in rural areas) has largely been absent from the massive production of literature on violent conflict in the DR Congo. This paper presents the historical and political trajectory of the boomtown Kitchanga to demonstrate how processes of urbanization in more rural areas in North Kivu (Eastern Congo) are strongly intertwined with processes of displacement in the context of violent conflict. Through the different episodes of the protracted conflict in the DRC, Kitchanga has occupied very different positions, ranging from a safe-haven for IDPs, to a rebel headquarter, to a violent battleground. This paper highlights the political aspect of urbanisation and argues that through the politics of urbanization as well as the politics of forced displacement, urban centres in conflict areas often become crucial arenas of contestation and state formation. Based on a detailed historical account of the development of Kitchanga into an urban agglomeration, the paper demonstrates that urbanism emerging from forced mobility in rural areas in North Kivu is both a product as well as a producer of conflict, of violence, and of political or military struggles over power and control. The article builds on original empirical data gathered by the two authors.

Idjwi Island is located on Lake Kivu, near the border between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. The population of thus territory of 200 km2 is estimated at 200 000 inhabitants. Idjwi is both a "borderland" and one of the economical and political "margins" of DRC. But unlike several parts of North and South Kivu, Idjwi people didn't experience armed groups or fights in the last twenty years. Therefore, Idjwi is supposed to be « in peace » because war didn't happen. This vision of a peaceful land has been reconsidered through fieldwork in Bugarula, in the north of Idjwi. It has been clear that the population keep memories of recent wars and undergo some indirect consequences, especially when refugees come to the closest cities Goma and Bukavu ; like other parts of Eastern Congo, Idjwi is deeply concerned by many land conflicts and mining artisanal industry in a context of the collapse of the Congolese state. How do Idjwi people tell the history of rebellions and perceive the economical, ecological and social crisis where they have to live themselves, but "without war" ? For which reasons doesn't armed conflict take place there ? These elements push researchers into questioning the definition of « peace », considering that war on Idjwi seems both close and far, possible and not.