Africa has historically been considered largely irrelevant in terms of conventional power, prestige, geo-political or economic importance, a perception which has not been conducive to the spread of empirical or theoretical research.. The panel intends to build on challenges to such notions, through the reference to changing agendas and representations of what the study of Africa entails within IR and IPE.
Africa's international relations attract little attention outside the circle of scholars, practitioners and publicists committed to their study. The sub-continent has historically been considered largely irrelevant in terms of conventional power, prestige, geo-political or economic importance, a perception which has not been conducive to the spread of empirical or theoretical research.. The panel intends to build on challenges to such notions, through the reference to changing agendas and representations of what the study of Africa entails within IR and IPE. To take but one example, the EU and Africa have become symptomatic of two extremes: at one end of the spectrum, the EU, is portrayed as a 'civil power' widely acknowledged as the most elaborate model of regional construction due to its highly sophisticated institutional architecture and effective crystallization of international trade, investment and common policies; at the other end of the spectrum is the African continent, where regionalism is perceived as non-existent and globally irrelevant. Yet, regionalisation, as a process, is overwhelmingly present in Africa. Indeed, politics and international relations on the African continent are also increasingly characterized by two seemingly contradictory dynamics as the retrenchment of the African state coexists with the increasing prevalence of non-state spaces. These non-state spaces, are important sites where power, authority, sovereignty, and autonomy are (re)defined and (re)negotiated.
The EU and Africa have become symptomatic of two extremes: at one end of the spectrum, the EU, is portrayed as a 'civil power' widely acknowledged as the most elaborate model of regional construction due to its hightly sophisticated institutional architecture and effective crystallization of international trade, investment and common policies; at the other end of the spectrum is the African continent, where regionalism is perceived as non-existent and globally irrelevant. Yet, regionalisation, as a process, is overwhelmingly present in Africa. It proceeds from the build up of patterns of interaction which not only escape state and institutional control, but draw their strength from the preservation of frontier disparities and/or the 'dividends' of violence and insecurity. As Africa illustrates, regionalism should not be necessarily interpreted as integration. Nor should integration theory be conceived through the exclusive lens of European construction. Trans-state regionalisation further points to the need for a dissociation between regional integration and regionalism; in the process this emphasizes the flaws of euro- and state-centric integration theories.
Politics and international relations on the African continent are increasingly characterized by two seemingly contradictory dynamics: the retrenchment of the African state in a neo-liberal world environment and the increasing prevalence of non-state spaces. In the first instance, one can recognize that across the continent, the centralized state continues to play a major role in the affairs of domestic politics and exists as the interlocutor for much of the continent's engagement with the international community, particularly international financial institutions. For example, even where a breakdown of the political fabric has supposedly occurred, such as in various parts of West Africa, capturing the machinery of the central state remains one of the primary objectives of many armed groups. However, it is wrong to assume that the African state is functioning (or has ever functioned) according to the myth of the Weberian/Westphalian ideal state model. In fact, the actual practices around the African state continue to provide useful insights into theorizing the basic notions of sovereignty, autonomy, and territoriality. This is most clearly evidenced by looking at the second dynamic mentioned above: the emergence of non-state spaces within the territorial delineations of the African state. Large and numerous sections of economic space, social space, and, most notably, geographical space are clearly outside of the state's domain. These non-state spaces, whether they are national parks at the margins of a state's border, informal economic networks, or urban youth cultural spaces, are important sites where power, authority, sovereignty, and autonomy are (re)defined and (re)negotiated. As such, this paper will investigate these dynamics and the future implications they may entail for both African politics and international relations.
Thandika Mkandawire talks about African states as 'choiceless', but as the wars of countries such as DR Congo, Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire gives testimony to control over the African state is still much sought after. Both control of the border of the state and its institutions give meaning, but in another way than assumed by traditional IR theory. They are tools for the 'marketing' of authority, and this exercise fulfils many important functions in the postcolonial African state. In particular, the 'marketing of authority' creates social order and organisation, but this is the logic of a state in which from a structural point of view the state is differentiated, but from a functional perspective it is not. This state is therefore far from what is pretends to be, e.g. a weberian nation-state. In a global IPE-setting this state is 'choiceless', but for its inhabitants and fellow African states the authority it can 'market' is of crucial importance as it is precisely this authority that not only creates the spoil of the state, but also negotiates the extraction and redistribution of resources within regional and international cobwebs of networks and alliances embedded in and around the "authority" of the African state and the state system it belongs to.
The African state or, more correctly, conventional notions of statehood in sub-Saharan Africa are in flux, and so are the relations between donors and aid recipients. While the African state is perceived to be at a critical juncture, a variety of trajectories seem possible which range from the successful reconfiguration of African states to their disintegration. In the latter case, new social spaces are emerging. These include new or re-established forms of social domination and hegemonial discourses on legitimacy and accountability. New social spaces are a challenge to donor policies, as one specific area of governance relations between the North and sub-Saharan Africa. The paper focuses on how donors relate to these new social spaces, hence how new social space is defined as a governance problem. Methodologically this process has to be construed as mutually constitutive. Thus, the focus is on two very basic issues: how does authority in new social spaces relate to international donors and play out in the construction of new governance relations?, and how do donor perceptions and conceptions of new social spaces change and how does this affect their approaches to governance in new social spaces? In both cases, my research aims at developing systematic typologies which could serve as a basis for further conceptualization and theory building.
What guidelines are useful in determining the 'successful' mediation of African conflicts? And what do these guidelines indicate about the effectiveness of U.S. mediation initiatives in recent years? I start by describing some recent African conflicts and efforts by the United States, as a powerful international actor, to mediate between the adversaries. After discussing mediation as one among a number of approaches for managing conflict, I will then examine some of the main guidelines in the literature on mediation for managing conflict in an effective manner. In doing this, I will draw upon the corpus of I.W. Zartman’s writings to determine which guidelines are to be regarded as critical. These guidelines will then be used to determine the extent to which U.S. mediators have been effective in facilitating a peaceful end to the civil wars in Liberia and Sudan. In the Conclusion, I will discuss what diplomatic pressures and incentives third parties can make use of in their efforts to bring African conflicts to a peaceful end.
From a South African perspective, the G-20 is a useful forum through which Pretoria can get its voice heard as well as seek to represent Africa in the ongoing debate around global governance. Utilizing the G-20 as a means to advance South Africa’s reformist foreign policy is central to this. However, a lack of progress in resolving key issues vis-à-vis global trade has stimulated the development of other, alternative, fora through which Pretoria also pursues its diplomacy. If the G-20 is to develop into a credible meeting point between the developed and developing world (or at least important emerging markets) then practical progress on matters important to the developing world need to be achieved and evidently taken seriously by the G-7.
There has been a marked lack of theoretical interest in Africa and its place in global politics. The paper suggests to go beyond the division between 'international relations' and 'comparative politics' by applying the concept 'international policy community' to policy-making on Africa in the OECD states. With this starting point, it is possible to place Africa within the theoretical discussions of international relations