Dans les decades passées, mouvements musulmans de réforme ont attiré une attention considérable, parce que ces mouvements de réforme ont attaqué les structures sociales at religieux existantes, comme les confréries soufis, mais aussi l´État (laïc). Dès l´évènement iconique de 9/11 ce focus sur les mouvements mususlmans de réforme est devenu encore plus accentué pour des raisons evidentes. Or, ce focus sur la spectacularité politique de ces mouvements de réforme a détourné l´attention des autres aspects importantes de réforme, en particulier la question pourquoi ces mouvements de réforme ont gagné un soutien considérable dans les populations musulmanes subsahariennes. En fait, les mouvements de réforme n´ont jamais conduit une lutte exclusive contre les dites bidÝ (les innovations non-islamiques), les confréries soufis ou l´État (laïc), mais ils ont aussi développé des agendas distinctes de réforme, par rapport au développement d´une education islamique (moderne), pour exemple, mais aussi par rapport au rôle de la femme musulmane dans la sphère publique, l´organisation des temps et espaces, comme aussi les questions de la foi et du rituel. De plus, il n´y avait jamais un mouvement de réforme singulier ou monolithique mais, par contre, une vaste gamme d´expressions réformistes même contradictoires, qui ont evolué considerablement dans le cours d´histoire. Aux même temps, l´emphase sure les mouvements de réforme d´orientation anti-soufi ne doit pas cacher le fait qu´il y avait toujours aussi des groupements de réforme d´orientation soufi, qui ont aussi continué de se developper jusqu´aujourd´hui. Une perspective de longue durée des developpements réformistes nous donnera ainsi l´impression, que thèmes et mouvements de réforme ont changé toujours et étaient dans tous ces temps caractérisés par l´influence les cadres locaux respectives. Comme l´importance des cadres lacaux pour le développement des traditions de réforme est, ainsi considérable, il est nécessaire d´analyser les dynamiques de réformes dans un nombre des cas spécifiques. Cela sera fait, donc, dans le cadre des deux ateliers intér-liés, c´est-à-dire, les ateliers „reformes de tradition“ et „traditions de réforme“, dirigés par Roman Loimeier (Bayreuth) et Anne Bang (Bergen) respectivement:
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In the last decades, Muslim movements of reform have become a major focus of attention as these movements of reform have attacked established social and religious forces, in particular, the Sufi-brotherhoods, but also, at times, the (secular) state. Since the iconic event of 9/11 this focus on Muslim reformist groups in subsharan Africa has become even stronger for obvious reasons. The focus on the politically spectacular has diverted, however, the attention from other important aspects of movements of reform, in particular the question as to why these movements of reform could win significant support among Muslims in subsaharan Africa. In fact, Muslim movements of reform have never been active in an exclusive struggle against the so-called bidaÝ (unislamic innovations), the sufi-brotherhoods or the „secular“ state, but have developed distinct agendas of reform, in particular with respect to (modern) Islamic education, the role of Muslim women in the public sphere, concepts for the organization of time and space as well as issues of faith and ritual. In addition, there has never been a single movement of reform but rather a multitude of even competing groups that have developed over a considerable period of time. At the same time, the emphasis on movements of reform characterized by anti-sufi orientations should not hide the fact that there have always been sufi-oriented groups of reform that have continued to develop until today. A look at the „longue durée“ of the development of movements of reform would, thus, show, that issues and movements of reform have been changing all the time and were considerably influenced by local frame conditions. On account of the importance of local frame conditions for the development of differents traditions of reform, it is, thus, necessary to closely look at specific cases, in order to see how reforms of tradition have developed in time and space. This is done in two interrelated panels on „reforms of tradition“ and „traditions of reform“ as chaired by Roman Loimeier (Bayreuth) and Anne Bang (Bergen):
Muslim societies in sub-Saharan Africa have seen, in the 20th century, the emergence of a broad range of initiatives of 'reform' (defined here as 'change with a programme') that have developed, over time, into traditions of reform, both sufi-oriented as well as anti-sufi. Apart from the dialectics of exchange among these different traditions of reform on specific issues such as 'tradition', reformist movements seem to follow generational patterns of development. In my paper, I will focus on these generational patterns and show how a specific generation' tries to establish legitimatory references to earlier 'traditions' (generations) of reform, both within sufi as well as non-sufi-contexts
In this paper, I am concerned with understanding some of the changing modalities of religious expression among Muslims in West Africa. According to the conventional wisdom, there are basically two kinds of Islam in Africa: ‘African Islam’ (usually associated with Sufi orders) and ‘reformist’ Islam. I consider several prominent West African religious leaders, including a ‘reformist’ Muslim public intellectual from Senegal, a charismatic Muslim preacher and media star from Mali, and a non-Muslim ritual specialist (‘pagan’ or ‘animist’ in the language of his detractors) with a largely Muslim clientele in Mali. As I will argue, it is difficult to understand these religious leaders, their followers and changing modalities of religious expression if one limits oneself to the analytical optics of ‘African’ and ‘reformist’ Islam.
This paper deals with movements of reform which capitalize on radical Islam to develop armed struggles in non-muslim regions of Africa South of the Sahara. A few references are made to Uganda and Liberia. But the study focuses on two case-studies: the so-called 'Mungiki' and 'Talibans' in Nairobi, Kenya, and the Niger Delta People's Salvation Front in Ijawland, Southern Nigeria. The objective is to show that since 9/11, the blacklisting of Islamic movements of reform have attracted many rebel groups which, originally, had nothing to do with Islam. Conversions follow several motives: to strengthen social support; to get a backing from the Muslim world; to be recognised as an operational 'terrorist' movement; to foster the legitimacy of an uncompromising protest.
A global discourse among Muslims seems no longer to be questioned. But very little has been documented about the nature of this discourse, and how it is constructed alongside local Islamic discourses. The presentation, as based on interviews in South Africa, will suggest outlines and the context of such a global discourse. It argues for two theses: Firstly, as expected, it argues that the local and global are simultaneously articulated in Islamic discourses. Secondly, it suggests some elements that constitute a global discourse for Islam. This global discourse is not overtly political, and points to some new reformulations in the history of modern reform traditions.
This paper will present some results of a recent research on qur’ânic exegesis in Northern Nigeria. It will focus on the most controversial phases in the recent developments of Nigerian qur’ânic exegesis, when, starting from 1978, a systematic exegetical contest took place on the most popular Radio in the North between the champion of Nigerian reformist Islam (Shaykh Abû Bakr Mahmûd Gumi) and two talented scholars/exegetes of the Tijâniyya (Shaykh ‘Umar Sanda Idrîs and Shaykh Tâhir ‘Uthmân Bauchi). Emphasis will be laid on the educational background of the three, and on the different archetypes of Muslim intellectual they embodied on the new arena offered by the media, as emerging from their different underlying attitudes to the Qur’ân.
My paper will examine the spread and changing roles of the Qadiriyya Boutchichiyya in Morocco and the Khalwatiyya in Egypt from the 1960s to today. I use the term 'revival' because this is how the Sufis themselves, especially the Boutchichis of Morocco, describe the development of the religious and spiritual movement they belong to. I will examine what this "revival" means for them in terms of doctrine, practice and social integration.
Being Somali almost automatically implies being Muslim. Islam is the religion of nearly all Somali, wherever they live in the Horn of Africa or in the diaspora communities of Arabia, North America and Europe. Religion is felt strongly about. The persistent situation of insecurity and uncertainty over the past fifteen years since the collapse of the Somali Republic under Siyyad Barre has only exacerbated this. Lack of physical, material and social security has contributed to the rise in importance of any institutions, structures or mechanisms able to provide these different kinds of security. In the absence of a properly functioning state apparatus with an administration, a legal system and a monopoly on violence, the very basic issue of physical security has to be handled in a different way. In the absence of even the most basic services in the fields of health and education, alternatives have to be found to deal with these issues as well. ‘Islamic’ institutions, structures and mechanisms play an important role in this respect. They do so in a most profound connection with that other defining feature of the Somali social system: the clan structure. This article intends to look at this process in the context of one particular geographic area, located in the Northwest of the collapsed Somali Republic. In 1991, the Northwestern region, controlled by the Somali National Movement (SNM), a guerilla movement dominated by the Northwestern Isaaq clan, proclaimed secession from Mogadishu. Since then, “Somaliland” as the new albeit internationally not recognised republic has been called, grew to look, smell and taste like a ‘state’ . Somaliland has got a government (with an elected executive president), a bi-cameral parliament, a territory , it has got laws including a constitution and the government raises taxes. Cars even have license plates. The way Somaliland came into being and the way it works today, however, owe a great deal to non-state structures and institutions and is subject to non-state dynamics, which have their roots in pre-colonial times, but were adapted to function in the present day context. The idea is to look at the socio-political role of islam in this respect, more specifically at the wadaads, the Somali “religious men” and the institutions they represent and employ.