ECAS 2013

They require individuals to straddle paradoxical worlds simultaneously and manage oppositional demands and obligations. For example, the living and working conditions in peacekeeping missions involve classic disciplinary regimes associated with the military such as security checks and monitors on travel and movement, and with capitalist-civic practices such as the pursuit of leisure, pleasure and the 'good life' in off-duty time . The contradictions result in both the crystallisation and diffusion of military, gender and labour norms such that peacekeepers are simultaneously produced and disciplined. As such, peacekeepers as individuals from the civilian, police, military or private contractor wings of global governance institutions (such as UN, AU, and EU) do not inhabit the social, cultural and economic spaces of a peacekeeping mission in clearly uniform or demarcated ways as do traditional military personnel in around conventional bases.

Using an empirical analysis to shed more light on the impact of peacekeeping economies on the West African sub-region, this article argues that there has been a development of such economies as a results of years of peacekeeping activities in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Coupled with the proximity to borders and the trade networks, this article explains the emergence and examines the implication that, we argue, extends beyond the borders of these countries. This paper dismisses the assumption that the growth of such economies automatically improves the wellbeing and livelihoods of countries and populations that come into contact with it. We posit that, a comparative approach provides the best option in understanding the dynamics of such dissimilar economies.

As part of a larger comparative project on peacekeeping economices in Liberia, DR Congo and South Sudan, this paper focuses on the social and economic architecture created by peacekeeping and peacekeepers in Goma and Monrovia. The argument made is that this leads to a type of vertical economic enclavism that strengthens pre-existing patrimonial relationships

The South Sudan is interesting to study as an exception to the rule of the deep impact of peacekeeping operations in weak states. Three factors contributed to reducing the level of economic diffusion instituted by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from 2005 to 2011. One, Sudan, and particularly the new regional government of Southern Sudan, was experiencing an oil boom. Oil revenues distributed throughout the government system dwarfed the funds from international aid that were actually spent inside the (then-unified) Sudan. Two, because of an underdeveloped commercial sector and dilapidated physical infrastructure the UN mission relied heavily on import of goods and on labour from neighboring countries to fill local civilian positions. Finally, the UN agencies and a number of International NGOs already had a significant presence in Sudan. UNMIS only played a minor role compared to these organisations and has not been necessary for the facilitation of other UN and NGO activities. The South Sudan case helps us to discern under which conditions peace operations instigate economic diffusion and to identify factors determining the scale of their impact.

With interstate conflict currently rare in Africa, peacekeeping missions are the most common type of international deployment for African militaries. Academics and international organizations have at times questioned the effectiveness of these missions and identified negative effects to the host communities but researchers seldom discuss how African militaries are impacted by the deployments. Just as the peacekeeping missions alter dynamics within the local community, similar patterns of exclusion and new hierarchies are seen within the militaries of those nations contributing troops to the mission.

My research on military mutinies in West Africa since independence has identified that mutinies in the region are becoming increasingly linked to peacekeeping deployments. Peacekeeping missions are often competitive and coveted positions for African soldiers as they typically provide large pay incentives and experience needed for promotion. However the selection process for the missions is often marred by accusation of corruption and favoritism. Furthermore, soldiers deployed on international missions work alongside their counterparts from other countries and compare their conditions, salaries, and benefits. It is common for post-deployment mutineers to accuse their chain of command of stealing their money based on claims that their fellow soldiers receive more for the same mission. This presentation will look at how the economic incentives that come with participation in peacekeeping missions often lead to suspicions and divisions within African militaries, which can have long-term negative effects on the organization. Particular emphasis will be placed on The Gambia and Sierra Leone, using interviews with soldiers conducted in 2011 and 2012.

Over the past fifteen years security sector reforms as part of larger peacebuilding interventions have been implemented in some African countries. When doing so, donors, frequently refer to the concept of "local ownership" to underline the agency of people and institutions in the respective countries concerned. Based on data collected in an ethnographic field research in Guinea-Bissau in early 2013 I will demonstrate how "local ownership" is conceptualized both in theory and in practice. Using Guinea-Bissau as an example, I will illuminate quality and contents of what is being diffused by external actors and subsequently adopted, rejected, transformed and/or returned by various local actors involved in such reform processes. Despite official commitments to "local ownership" - a buzzword in current development discourse - the involvement of local actors in Guinea-Bissau's security sector reform has been only realized in a few projects. For instance, an EU security sector reform mission was discontinued after a coup - and due to a lack of - and despite explicit official references to -"local ownership". Thus, what does the plurality of local owners - i.e. local beneficiaries of the reforms; locals employed by the missions; local members of the security sector - expect of such reforms, what is their vision of "security" in particular and of such reforms in general, and how do they perceive the foreign experts, their (often paternalistic) attitudes, and their assumptions of and ways of dealing with such reforms? How do their understandings and expectations differ from "Western", "universal" ones?

Peacekeeping operations often co-exist with international refugees or internally displaced who also interact with the same host population as the peacekeepers and how this influences the local economy. The displaced population may or may not be affected by the local economy shaped by peacekeeping operations. However, they co-exist within the same space and this research seeks to understand how the displaced populations are affected by the international interventions. One of the peacekeeping missions mandate includes facilitating humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees. The condition of displacement does not consist of one, but a multitude of transformations that can have both a negative and a positive effect on the local economy. A comprehensive understanding of this requires a broad intellectual reflection of how the dynamics and patterns of inclusion and exclusion emerge and how the displaced population's livelihood strategies are affected by the peacekeeping operation and humanitarian interventions.

Next to Sudan, MONUSCO in DR Congo is the largest peacekeeping operation in the world today and they have been faced with a number of challenges after the increased violence in late 2012 in Easter Congo. This has also caused a large influx of displacement and harsh living conditions for thousands of people in the region. What type of positive or negative influence do the peacekeeping operations have on the livelihoods of the displaced population and what kind of intended and/or unintended consequences does this have for the local, internally displaced population?