ECAS 2013

In the quality of chancellor of a country that arrived late to the run of colonization of Africa, Angela Merkel is one of the first European leaders to come directly to Africa, being interested in an improvement of the relations between Germany and some countries of Africa, especially from the South Atlantic, in which Angola is included. She visited Angola during the month of July, and after that, a frigate (called Sachsen) of German Navy came also for the first time in October of 2012 to Angola.

In 2011, it was approved a new strategy to the partnership between Germany and Africa that is based in aspects such as: Democracy and the rule of Law; the political, social and economical transformation of the African societies; the questions of freedom and security; and also the natural and energy resources.

But when we think in South Atlantic and in the role of Germany in it, we need also to remember the importance of Brazil in it. 2013/2014 will be the year of Germany-Brazil, in order to improve and reinforce the traditional relations between the two countries.

Brazil has a great role between the countries of Portuguese language, a central position in the South Atlantic that could be useful to Germany. In a way, Brazil needs the help of Germany to its development - especially in technology - and in the other way, Brazil cans support the relations between Germany and Africa of the South Atlantic. In the end, all win advantage of this triangle.

With the third Millennium, a new aid architecture based on the notion of partnership has been adopted by DAC. Partnership has been developed to regulate the relation between donors and recipients on the base of reciprocity and it is interpreted in Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. The 4th Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 reassessed the performance of donors and recipients countries and it extended the notion of partnership on the international and national levels to include non DAC countries.

The EU endorsed in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and in the European Consensus on Development in 2006 the scope of development cooperation that built on three main principles: Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence, however, these levels of cooperation target European member states.

On the other side, Arab countries and the Gulf Countries in particular became major donors since 2002 with the increase of oil prices. Their shares have been exceeded the international commitment of increasing aid to 0.7% of GNI. The Arab ODA targets the poor countries and less developed countries in the continent and covers different sectors.

Reconsidering the notion of partnership in the 4th forum has enabled Arab countries with other new donors to participate in shaping the scope of aid effectiveness.

The paper will investigate the dynamics of Arab donors' integration in the international aid architecture which is dominated by traditional donors and how the European donors have been regulating their relations with Arab donors (new comers) in Africa with targeting aid effectiveness?

A política de cooperação de Portugal com os países africanos de língua oficial portuguesa, não tem atendido aos saberes e experiências acumulados pelas vivências multiculturais da sua história. Tem-se sustentado num imaginário afro-lusófono dissimulado. Portugal tal como a União Europeia tem vindo a perder protagonismo, mas o atual contexto de crise, apesar dos seus constrangimentos, apresenta a possibilidade de introduzir novas formas de relacionamento e políticas de cooperação, com maior racionalidade na aplicação dos recursos, mais eficácia e melhores resultados. Segundo estes pressupostos analisámos os campos, empresarial, segurança e cultura (2000-2010) e concluimos pela da necessidade de um olhar corrigido por parte dos governantes e das elites. Nesta fase da globalização, Portugal deve aplicar os recursos e conhecimentos adquiridos a Sul, para introduzir novos paradigmas nas suas políticas de cooperação e participar no desenho de novas relações União Europeia-África.

Following the adoption of the Rome Treaty, the EU developed a formal and privileged cooperation framework for its relationship with countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP). Since 2000 cooperation between the EU and the ACP is governed through the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). At the core of this agreement, which expires in 2020, lies the objective of "reducing and eventually eradicating poverty, consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy" (Art. 1). The CPA pursues this objective through three complementary dimensions: political dialogue, economic and trade cooperation, and development cooperation. This unique configuration makes the CPA the most comprehensive North-South partnership in existence today, all the more because it involves both state and non-state actors. A common view among stakeholders of ACP-EU relations is that Africa will hold the keys for the future of the ACP group. Africa's trade remains largely focused on the EU, while both Pacific and Caribbean states have access to other regional markets than the EU. This paper draws on the findings of a joint ECDPM-DIE research projects which analysed relevant studies and included consultations in six African states to gather perceptions on the past, present and future of ACP-EU cooperation from a wide variety of stakeholders. By presenting this analysis with an emphasis on perceptions, views and ideas from African stakeholders beyond Brussels, this paper seeks to contribute to an ongoing debate on the future of Africa-EU relations.

EU, as well as BRIC countries, has a long history of relationships with Africa.

In the 21 century BRIC countries as emerging economies tend to play more important role on the continent. They start to offer alternatives to the EU initiatives and approaches in Africa which changes the political realities in which EU (as an organization and its members in individual capacity) used to operate on the continent. In this paper I use the acronym BRIC because South Africa's policy is not my subject in this context.

EU refuses to see BRIC(S) as a new integrated global player yet recognizes its growing strength. Many of the EU member countries (e.g. Britain) regard BRIC activities in Africa as a threat to their interests. EU was not prepared for this shifting balance of power.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss in which areas and ways EU faces new challenges from BRIC in its policies towards Africa and how it reacts to them. It also aims at describing the changing reality in African countries, changing mindset of African elites in this respect. (167)

While EU still works with Africa on the basis of the "donor-recipient" model, BRIC countries want to offer Africa a new model of the global order in which developing countries presumably will have more opportunities to have their say. In this international context EU receives new impetus to develop its common foreign and security policy approach to African problems, make the dialogue with the continent more constructive.

Abstract.

The Cotonou Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is the latest in a long history of Multilateral Dependency between Africa and the European Union (EU) that constitute a threat to poverty reduction efforts and the development prospects of some of the world's poorest countries. There is little evidence to suggest (even from the implementation of the Lome preferences) that trade liberalization will transform the economies of Africa into a major leader in the global supply chain for manufactured goods and services. This paper analyzes the mechanism through which this Multilateral Dependency is affecting Africa and provides information on international and intra-African responses to the crisis. A qualitative mechanism of data collection and analysis has been adopted. The paper contends that the wider EU political economy is exercising a modulating and a restraining influence on the capacity of trade to act as an "engine of growth" in Africa. Hence, there is an urgent need for the state in Africa to articulate macroeconomic policies that will build its capacity to key into the global value chain.

Keywords: Economic Partnership Agreement, Trade, Regional Integration, General Agreement on Trade and Tariff, Multilateral Dependency.

Efforts to include political dialogue as a component of the EU and Africa's long established relationship started tentatively and were often controversial - the result of differing European and African interpretations of what political dialogue actually meant. This was symptomatic of the asymmetrical nature of the relationship, with African concerns directed at political dialogue being used as a tool through which the EU could impose conditionality at the expense of focusing on development.

Despite these obstacles, political dialogue has evolved since the first EU-Africa Summit in 2000. This progress culminated in the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), an explicitly political partnership framework which promised more equitable dialogue between the two sides in a range of policy areas.

Yet, despite the ambitious agenda of the JAES, political dialogue remains imperfect. The first purpose of this paper is to assess the recent evolution of political dialogue, demonstrating how perceptions between the two sides converged enough to facilitate the formulation of the JAES. It is shown that mutual understanding was more evident at the EU and African Union working levels than between senior officials and heads of government, where perceptions about the nature of the relationship lagged and where traditional donor-client role conceptions often reprised themselves. The second part of the paper assesses the implications of this disjuncture between decision making levels, arguing that the gap must be comprehensively addressed if political dialogue is to flourish.

The global aid architecture, so far mainly framed by Western perceptions, strategies and practices, is undergoing a major reformulation, both in theoretical and practical terms. Some of the changes in development cooperation patterns - which include the increased complexity and fragmentation of cooperation across a wider range of actors or the blurred distinction between several flows and instruments - are both a result and an important input to the redefinition of institutional settings, in the overall relationship between developing countries and in boosting a stronger voice for African countries. On the one hand, rising powers have profound impacts in the global geographies of power and wealth and are increasingly important drivers of development theory and practice, leading to alternative conceptualisations of development cooperation or, as some experts call it, to a "post-aid world". Countries will be increasingly evaluated for their global contribution for development (beyond aid) and for their capacity of formulating comprehensive responses to global challenges (which impact on development). On the other hand, this growing presence has itself boosted a self-reflection on the performance of OECD donors and for the EU in particular in its relationship with Africa. How are these new global dynamics impacting in the reformulation of EU-Africa partnership? Are the EU and Africa really ready to go beyond aid and donor-recipient approaches that have characterized their relations since decolonization?

As the African continent grows and its economic leverage increases globally, the prospects for the future of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership seem to be in better odds than those of the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement bound to end in 2020. However, the rhetoric of mutual interests and political dialogue cannot continue to be systematically translated into practices of "how can (we the EU) help Africa to solve its problems / what should (we Africa) ask from Europe to solve our problems". This persistent attitude that still exists in both parties is exemplified by comparing JAES with its Plans of Action: the will expressed in the JAES to "evolve the relationship towards a political dialogue based on common interests" is submerged into Plans of Action designed, once again, to solve African perceived problems. This is not to say that financial and technical programmes of development cooperation are not justified - they are and they can still play an important role; however, no matter how much based on African needs and objectives or how much "empowered" by the Africans, these programmes cannot be a substitute for political dialogue. The dossiers on economic, security and global issues have to be central pieces in the strategic partnership, regardless of the level of economic development of the parties, meaning that the frontiers among development, trade and foreign policy have to be crossed by both parties.