ECAS 2013

After the 'lost decades' Sub-Saharan African economies have exhibited positive growth rates, which has led donors to conclude that, thanks to emerging countries, stagnation is now a thing of the past. The paper shows the complexity of causalities and imbalances: these depend on: i) channels (trade, investment); ii) the emerging country (China having by far the strongest impact); and iii) African countries' market structures. On the one hand, this growth relies on structural asymmetries. It is generated by the distorted commodity-based export structures of African economies and falls if international prices decline, which necessarily occurs due to the inherent volatility of prices. High prices are moreover driven by the growth of emerging countries: the growth of African economies depends on factors that are external to them and will decelerate if demand in emerging countries decelerates. This growth increases the specialisation of African economies in commodities, while emerging countries consolidate their comparative advantage in manufacturing and threaten nascent African industrial sectors. As industrialisation is a key determinant of long-term growth, emerging countries may, in the long-term, erode their short-term positive impact on African economies. Asymmetries also stem from the attractive trade and investment policies African countries offer. On the other hand, emerging countries have positive impacts, via their investments in infrastructure, which fosters industrialisation and the spillover effects of investments in commodity sectors. Asymmetries are dynamic processes and depend on the specificities of African countries - economic structures, geopolitical importance, political economy -, and the strategic policies of emerging economies.

From the start of the Lula Government in 2003, Brazilian diplomacy gave a privileged place to Africa and relations became intense. A strategic vision and a coherent perspective were the new basis of the Brazil-Africa relations, which became the principal focus of the so-called south-south cooperation.

Bilateral and multilateral relations were developed in a remarkable way in the areas of trade, investments, oil, mining, infrastructure, health, science and technology, diplomacy and security. Meanwhile, in Brazil, the rights of the population of African descent are being redeemed and, at the same time, it is possible to observe the growing presence of Pentecostal (evangelical) churches and of Brazilian television in Africa, as well as the expansion of the drugs trade and of new African migration towards Brazil.

For many, the relations with Africa prove the solidarity dimension of the social programme of President Lula, while others consider these only as prestige diplomacy, a waste of time and money. Finally, some just regard these relations as business diplomacy, a "soft imperialism", which is only different from the Chinese presence in Africa by its form and intensity. From 2011 onwards, Dilma Rousseff, Lula's sucessor, follow the same pattern of African policy.

The millennium sees dramatic intensification of China activity in Africa. Chinese economy’s demands for raw materials, primarily oil, continue to grow, prompting Beijing to engage in fierce competition with other global actors on the African continent. In struggle for Africa China uses multiple tools. Loans and credit lines, development aid and diplomatic support help China to win favor with African governments.

China’s success in Africa is largely due to its key principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. China’s doesn’t link business with demands for democracy, good governance and non-violation of human rights. “Chinese menace” is a popular cliché in Western media. But is China’s policy a real ‘neocolonial’ menace to Africa? Aid packages, which include investments not only in raw materials, but also in African infrastructure, benefit African economies. When Western companies are often afraid of high investment risk in Africa, China fills up the vacuum. China-Africa cooperation based on win-win approach is attractive for the Black continent. In 2011-2012 Africa demonstrates an average growth of 5 percent, partly thanks to Chinese investments. Chinese aid, trade and investments give African countries new opportunities. To strengthen its influence in African countries China actively uses a “soft power”. Not everything in Chinese policy suits Africans. They fear the pressure with which China operates in Africa, they view the growing presence of Chinese people and the influx of Chinese goods in their countries as a threat. But they appreciate the advantages, which China’s aid gives them. After the Cold War the West has reduced attention to Africa; China has forced developed countries to refocus attention on the problem of marginalization of the continent.

India's foreign policy in Africa has historically been primarily associated with the projection of "soft power": a number of African nationalists drew inspiration from Gandhi, while post-colonial support focused on liberation movements and non-alignment. By the late 1990, interactions and mutual representations were at their lowest ebb, due to a much more pragmatic definition of India's foreign policy interests and the adoption of trade liberalization policies that shaped new priorities. Since then, Africa has turned to become reappraised as a frontier and a pioneering front. Africa's representation as a new frontier, initially stimulated by concern at securing access to new energy supplies, reflects on patterns of trade and investment that carry their own specificity and imprint. The disconnect between pragmatic and ideological concerns has become a hallmark of the reengagement of India in Africa. Parallels are frequently drawn with the simultaneous build up of China-Africa relationships, but these, besides the obvious emphasis on scale, deserve to be more carefully appraised disentangled on the basis of distinctive trajectories and ambitions.

India's interactions with Africa cannot be reduced to the somewhat elusive quest for a coherent foreign policy. The plurality of players and the complexity of the patterns of interaction resulting from their distinctive goals and modus operandi will be discussed through the review of distinctive Indian intellectual traditions which relate to "competing visions" of the country's power and status within the international system.

Africa, including its diasporas, is in flux in the present decade because of the divergence between BRICS & PIIGS: it is growing as fast as Asia. So African inter-governmental institutions can advocate developmental states & African Mining Vision. And its non-state companies & networks can advance African brands/franchises, supply-chains/regulation plus increasingly scarce & conflictual resources like food, land & water. Analyses of & policies for Africa need to reflect such novel developments as post-2015 directions are being debated.

As one of the emerging powers engaged in Africa, Turkey has been deepening its commercial links and investments towards the continent. Recently, the country has also provided emergency humanitarian assistance especially in Darfur and Somalia. Turkey's new approach towards African countries comes in the context of the new «scramble for Africa » characterized by the growing activism of emerging powers from developing economies (South-South cooperation). Unlike other emerging countries (namely, China, India and Brazil) attracted by natural resources, Turkey's engagement seems to be more driven by the desire to create markets for its products. More specifically, Turkey tends to mobilize religion as a foreign policy tool. In fact, its reputation as a Muslim and democratic state is appealing. In this perspective, some countries (Muslim) such as Somalia, Sudan can benefit from Ankara's increasing role. However, under current conditions (weak states), several risks are looming: Turkey can be tempted to act unilaterally, Turkish companies could try to exploit weak economies, and Ankara can be instrumentalized by Sudanese or Somali political elite. Turkey faces a dilemma in Africa: how to maintain its pro-democratic reputation and at the same time pragmatically preserve its regional interests.

Many of the "emerging powers" that have recently assumed a more important international role have significantly increased their economic activities in Africa. Here, the BRICS countries - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - receive most attention due to their economic and political relevance. Africa is considered the last region of the world where new markets are to be explored and political influence is to be gained. The continent is said to hold a vast economic potential.

Simultaneously, the "emerging powers" have sharpened their profiles as "new development partners" that distinguish themselves from the "traditional", Northern donors by engaging in South-South cooperation. Almost all new development partners have shown a substantial increase in their development cooperation activities in Africa. Many times, these appear to be motivated by economic interests to guarantee access to African markets and natural resources.

This paper investigates the relationship between Brazil, as one of the most dynamic BRICS countries, and Angola, as an important African partner country that is rich in resources. The paper evaluates whether the relationship develops in a horizontal manner, as Brazil claims is the case with South-South cooperation. It also focuses on the connection between Brazil´s development cooperation and its emerging economic interests. Here, the question builds on the tenets of dependency theory. The background question is this: Is it possible to identify differences between a Southern development partner and the "traditional" donors from the North regarding the donor's relations to a Southern partner country?