ECAS 2013

La Jama'at al-Tablîgh (Association pour la prédication)[ ]est un mouvement religieux musulman revivaliste fondé en Inde à la fin des années 1920 par Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhalawi (1885-1944). L'activité missionnaire de ce mouvement vise à faire revivre la foi des musulmans, dans le cadre d'une interprétation littéraliste de celle-ci.

Cette activité missionnaire n'est pas politique, et ne vise que la transmission d'une pratique musulmane fondamentaliste. En cela, les Tablighis se démarquent d'autres mouvements musulmans revivalistes, notamment les salafistes el les frères musulmans, dont la prédication a un contenu politique explicite beaucoup plus marqué.

La présence de ce mouvement en Mauritanie date de plus de vingt ans plus précisément en 1977. Depuis lors ces tablighi s'implantent de façon intensive dans les grands centres urbains du pays et enrôlent des éléments de tout bord et surtout des groupes sociaux autrefois marginaux sur le plan religieux.

Au début des années 2000, ce mouvement connaitra une régression visible et s'impliqua visiblement dans la politique en allant massivement au vote.

Quelle est l'origine de ce repli? Pourquoi coïncide-t-il avec l'émergence des groupes jihadistes ? Comment ce fait-il que les jihadistes recrutent leurs éléments en grade partie dans les rangs des tablighi? Et pourquoi ces derniers optent pour le militantisme politique ?

In February 2010, around 20 imams of slave origins (haratin) held a press conference to denounce the persistence of slavery in the The Islamic Republic of Mauritania. They insisted that free-born "white" Moor ulama are complicit with existing social hierarchies because they have always refused to declare slavery illegitimate according to Islam. Two years later, a group of anti-slavery activists decided to publicly burn copies of the Mukhtasar of Khalil, one of the central texts of Maliki jurisprudence that is actively used and deeply respected in the region. The perpetrators of such a "blasphemy" argued that such texts are not fully Islamic because they are the basis on which slavery and social hierarchies are legitimized and hence perpetuated in Mauritania.

Increasingly, the denunciation of the legality of slavery and inequality or persons in Islam is an important feature of the anti-slavery discourse and practice. This paper aims to reconstruct the evolution of this counter-discourse that is being developed not only by anti-slavery activists in the Islamic public sphere, but also by a number of other Muslims willing to challenge the official Islamic authorities, including non-haratin Muslim intellectuals.

Among pther ideas, I argue that despite what "the industry of terrorism" (following Madawi al-Rashid) leads us to believe, various militant movements within Muslim societies sometimes imagine, practice, and engage with Islam in a non-Islamist fashion.

This presentation will discuss the activities developed by the League of Mauritanian Ulama (LMU) throughout the decade mediating from its foundation, in the aftermath of 9/11, to the present; a period which has proven decisive both at national and global levels. The regime-change process initiated in Mauritania in August 2005, the substantial impacts on Islamic polities after the 9/11, as well as the much more recent Arab uprisings, all signal different, but nonetheless pertinent, aspects related to the commitments of the LMU. I will present some of the personalities affiliated with this structure, their basic corpus of publicised Islamic scholarship, and the LMU's effective use of new media technologies; signalling, at the same time, the emergence of new Islamic actors directly concurring with the state-sponsored LMU. Special attention will also be devoted to the role of the Tawassoul party (with elected representatives in the senate and the parliament, and already responsible for the administration of two of Nouakchott's largest "communes"), which stands out as a structured opposition to the LMU.

All of these actors, albeit their divergent agendas, participate in the political structure of the state, they are all associated with - different - transnational networks, and they all make use of new technologies in order to diffuse their programs. These common aspects shared by different Islamic agents, should anchor a debate which is prominently centred on political Islam and on the vitality of Mauritanian, but also regional, Islamic militancy.

Since the first months of 2012, Ethiopian Muslims have been demonstrating on Fridays by waving the symbol of yellow cards to protest against government interference in religious affairs. At the core of their mobilization is the al-Ahbash ideology that was introduced to promote a new model of Islamic education against religious extremism. Al-Ahbash ("The Ethiopians" in Arabic) was founded in Lebanon in the 1980sby a scholar of Ethiopian origin who advocated Islamic pluralism and opposition salafi movements. It was rejected by Ethiopian Muslims when it was imposed to them as the doctrinal basis for an official Islam. In front of repression and censorship on media, the only actual information on the course of the showdown is given through videos and posts shared through social networks on internet. An Ethiopian Muslim media created in 2010, based in the Ethiopian diaspora in North America, has been very active in this process.

The purpose of this paper is to review on how Ethiopian Muslims have been led to adopt new communication strategies. Not only the heterogeneous corpus of videos posted on internet will be described, but their actual impact will be assessed. Are these pictures directed towards the diaspora and aimed at gaining financial support (to compensate the sense of guilt of not being able to take part in the demonstration)? Have they played an actual role amongst protesters, particularly the youth, in the spread and evolution of the protest movement despite the very strict control of the authorities on internet communication?

Islamic movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, affiliated to soufi brotherhood or to reformist groups, have proved their capacity of auto-governance supported by their own think-tank, media and transnational academic and financial networks. In new Islamic movements such as "Dahira-toul Moustarchidine wal Moustarchidaty" in Senegal or "Izala" in Nigeria, we can notice the emergence of new types of leaders and educated young disciples, especially in urban areas and Diasporas. The media-literacy and the involvements in academic and/or political fields characterize these actors and their movements. Some groups have their own schools and universities linked to international organizations and supported by various investors, notably from Arabic and Golf countries. Conferences, political meetings and seminars are now organized by several groups and involve local political leaders.

We can also observe a new type of autonomous Muslim intellectuals joining the international academic communities. They have a dual position of "outsiders" and "insiders". On the one hand, their Muslim militancy keeps them out of both Western and African societies. On the other hand, their "rationalism" and capacity to express themselves in different fields links them both to Western academic field and to political and/or educational areas of their native society. Despite the importance of these intellectuals in many new Islamic movements, their integration in the local society and their relationship with the government remains problematic.

Based on case studies, this paper investigates the roles of new Muslim elites in Islamic movements, thanks to their ability to construct a new sphere of knowledge and communication.

While there has been much emphasis on new types of media for the dissemination of Islamic ideas, this paper focuses on the traditional Friday khutba (Islamic sermon). Lebanese Shaykh 'Abdul Mun'am al-Zayn was trained in Najaf, Iraq, studied under Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr and Ayatollah al-Khu'i, and serves as a wakil (Shi'i representative) to Ayatollah al-Sistani. Sent by Musa al-Sadr, he first arrived in Dakar in 1969, where he worked to build the Islamic Social Institute, which opened in 1978. As the first Shi'i institution in Senegal - and all of West Africa - and the only mosque where sermons are preached entirely in Arabic, Shaykh al-Zayn quickly gained a following - enhanced by his charisma - of both Sunni and Shi'i Muslims, Arabs as well as Africans. This paper focuses on the shaykh's discursive strategies for addressing his unique diasporic following. At times he stresses the particularities of Shi'i Islamic practice, but more often he highlights a universal Islam. In analyzing khutbas given in 2003 during the beginning of the U.S.-led war in Iraq, this paper pays particular attention to his engagement with global politics and how his messages are translated for a community in West Africa detached from the Middle East. Many second, third, and now fourth generation Lebanese in Senegal (whose families first arrived in the late 19th and early 20th centuries) have never visited Lebanon.

This paper examines Sufi reform and religious radicalism in the context of French colonialism in Burkina Faso. Focusing on the religious reform of a Tijaniyya sheikh, Boubacar Sawadogo, and his encounter with French colonial rule, the paper offers a fresh explanation on the strategies of reform pursued by charismatic Muslim leaders under colonial rule. Sawadogo employed his charisma and peaceful strategies of reform to expand the Muslim population of the colony despite French restrictions on religious proselytization. Between the 1920s and the end of French rule, French colonial administrators declared the Hamawiyya, a branch of the Tijaniyya to which Sawadogo belonged, radical and xenophobic. Its leaders were thus either persecuted or placed under strict surveillance. Yet the evidence regarding Hamawiyya radicalism was very limited, especially with regards to Sawadogo's community. Both French sources and oral records indicate that Sawadogo and the French independently pursued strategies of coexistence that enabled Sawadogo to convert the population to Islam without without threatening colonial order. Thus, Sawadogo's pursuit of a peaceful proselytism, which contrasted with the tradition that emerged from the Fulbe jihads of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries in the subregion, demonstrates clearly that peaceful reform remained part of West African tradition of religious reform.

In this paper, I discuss how Malians are critical of and disappointed with the leaders of their state; their activism is focused on moralizing the daily lives of Malian Muslims. Ultimately, the goal is to moralize the Malian state by creating a class of pious, educated, and well-informed Malian citizens. Islam mondain, as I saw it unfold in Bamako's classrooms and beyond, leads me to argue that Malian arabisants should not be assumed as having the potential to be Muslim extremists based on their shared characteristics with extremist groups (poverty, unemployment, etc.). The concept of citizenship into the modern secular state is not called into question and most young arabisants do support the democratic system and its values. However, this is not to say that Malians are not engaged in social activism, rather that their activism is specific to their needs and hopes as Malians.

The local and international influences vying for power within Bamako's médersas have worked to create a new approach to Islamic knowledge and in turn, participated in the development of a new Islamic religiosity in Mali, one that is this-worldly oriented, activist yet not political per se, focused on rendering daily life morally pure. This standardized version of Islam is referred to as mondain and is propagated by the arabisants - the teachers, students and former students of Bamako's médersas. Yet, this is not particular to Mali and clearly participates in the larger debate within the Muslim world about the relation between piety, modernity, globalization, democracy, etc.

When in 1989 the Islamist party of the NIF became the backbone of the military government of Omar el-Bashir, the new Islamist project was propagated by the government and as introducing a modern, more proper version of Islam to Sudanese public life. It thereby relegated the former influence of Sufi Brotherhoods on the socio-economic, political and cultural aspects of life of many Northern Sudanese to the realm of 'tradition' and 'secterianism'. Recently, there is a revival of particular Sufi Brotherhoods with an increase in attendance of zikrs (dhikr, communal meditative prayer meetings) at their zawiyas (litt. corner), the space where sufi followers and their sheikhs assemble. Some of these brotherhoods, such as the Mukashfiyya and the Burhaniyya, are popular especially among the urban youth of the new upcoming middle class. Interestingly, both followers and Sufi Sheikhs claim that the orders do not have a political project, like sufi orders had in the past. The sheikhs claim they only cater for the spiritual needs of a growing group of Sudanese especially in cities. In this paper I will look closer at the reasons why participants of the zikr opted for this particular Sufi Order, in what way they enact their membership and how the new media is used as part of constructing a zawiya. Finally, I will debate to what extent these sheikhs and their followers can be taken to construct a counter-discourse to the Islamist discourse in contemporary politics in Northern Sudan.

Somalia has been the issue of both local and international debates since colonization, but has recently become the symbol of Islamic fundamentalist activities in the region. This ongoing conflict in Somalia, with the invasion of Ethiopia and the intervention of international forces, has led to general corruption and the abuse of the area by traditional clan elders and armed clan militia to further their political agenda. The 'statelessness' of Somalia is the result of this inconvenience; unfortunately, the region is open to different kinds of dilemmas.

In his recent published book "Crossbones", Farah rejects the view that piracy of Somalian fishermen is the result of their greed to ameliorate their material conditions, and insists that they are trying to protect their own resources as a means of earning a living. He lifts the lid on the situation and asks: If these Somalians earn what they have by piracy, and are believed to be living a lavish life, why, then, is Somalia deplorably underdeveloped? Farah finds the answer to this question by learning the truth that the ransom taken from the other party is shared by external players; Somalis have either little or nothing at the end. We argue that Farah creates a fictional world to advance the view that the religious groups, like al-Shabaab, have used this bad image of Somalia, and tried to grab political power for themselves by using religion-Islam-as a repressive force.

Abstract

Kenya is witnessing a pronounced Muslim activism presence in the country's public sphere, which could be attributed to numerous factors, but significantly to political liberalization of the early 1990s. Due to the democratic freedom, it encouraged the emergence of a section of Muslim clerics advocating for Islam as a relevant political ideology to both the minority Muslims and the general Kenya's population. This group of Muslim clerics espouses Islamist view of the world, and like other Islamists in the world, their key call is the insistence of the establishment of an Islamic state governed by sharia. The article seeks to contribute to the larger debate on Islamism within the Kenyan context. Though some commentators are pessimistic of the presence of Islamism in Kenya, I endeavor to demonstrate its existence in the country. I conceptualize Islamism in Kenya in the form of individual Muslim clerics who reject secularism, democracy and the nation-state. In this respect, I employ Sheikh Aboud Rogo's sermons and statements as a representation of Islamism in Kenya. Through his hateful and inciting orations that included issuing fatwas against the government, praising attacks on churches as acceptable in Islam, and completely disregarding mutual religious co-existence, indicated the existence of an extreme form of Islamism among sections of Muslims in Kenya.

The study of Salafism in Egypt after the revolution raises three essential issues. The first issue is regarding Salafist mapping in Egypt, as most researchers view Salafism as an individual bloc, which is an essentially inaccurate perception. The Salafist currents, in fact, include many sub currents with a variety of points of divergence between them, each having important implications on the future of the Salafist phenomenon. In addition, A full in-depth analysis of the salafist phenomenon would entitle an inclusive understanding of the Salafist stand on various issues of public opinion, especially with regards to political and religious coexistence, democracy and activism. Second issue deals with the change in Salafist tendencies over time, regarding issues of protest, formal and informal political participation as well the participation in the parliamentary legislative process. The third issue addresses the possibly that Salafism offsets into a stream of radical jihadi movements. The general rhetoric used by some of the icons of the Salafi movements doesn't suggest that such a transformation would happen in the near future. Moreover, the Salafist participation in the formal political field suggests that the Salafis have adhered to the rules of the political practice and have made the distinction between their political agenda and their ideological one. However, the possibility of the violent jihadi transformation cannot be yet ruled out, as the Salafist phenomenon is still a recent one that is yet to be fully defined